I AM YOU

The Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics
Hypothesis of objectively existing world, since the beginning of the last century, is being seriously attacked not only by theoretical physics, but recently also by experimental quantum physics. Locally-realistic thinking doesn’t seem reliable any more. All this makes scientists who are not satisfied by current situation, when we are able to make quantum calculations, but do not understand how it works, to revert to the question of the bases of QM. Undoubtedly, the key issue is the role and the status of observer in the QM.

Everett was the first one to try to get rid of Descartes “infernal” observer. He tried to build the realistic physical model of the observer and to imbed it into the theory. But it did not work. In our work we analyze what the laws of physics will be like for the observer, being part of the same system, which he observes? In contradistinction to Everett, we do not limit ourselves by speculating of the physical nature of observer. We create the model of abstract observer and get unexpected results. Self-referential interaction of the observer with himself creates quantum-relative reality! Thus, we have proved that our “toy” model generates the physics very similar to physics of our real world, and we have reason to think that this is not a coincidence.
I AM YOU

The Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics

By

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Springer
“To my four fathers:
Horst Ungerer
Ray Martin
Jaakko Hintikka
and
Miro”
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preliminary Acknowledgments xiii

Chapter 1. PERSONAL BORDERS 1

§1.1 Individuation, Identification, and Identity: Take One 1
§1.2 Closed Individualism, Empty Individualism, and Open Individualism: The Three Views of Personal Identity 6
§1.3 Philosophical Explanations 22
§1.4 The Apparent Excluders of the Open Individual View Of Personal Identity 24
§1.5 Dissolving Our Boundaries 26
§1.6 Philosophy Without Proof 30
§1.7 Isn’t Open Individualism Already Known to be False? 35
§1.8 Consciousness and the Cosmic Towers: a Parable 36

Chapter 2. BORDER CONTROL 43

§2.1 Apparent Excluder (1): The Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment 43
  §2.1.1 Consciousness Explained: The Dream Analog As a Conceptual Boundary Dissolve of the Metaphysical Significance of the FEC Border 47
    §2.1.1.1 Consciousness Refined: The Dream Analog and I, The Subject-In-Itself 51
  §2.1.2 The Relata of the FEC Relation: Subject and Object, Three Caveats 55
  §2.1.3 World Boundaries and I, Take One; or, The One and the Many, Take Three: Letting the Nullteilig Out of Klein’s Bottle 59
  §2.1.4 The Causal Barrier 60
§2.2 Apparent Excluder (2): Alter Subject Identification 61
  §2.2.1 The Epistemological Barrier 62
  §2.2.2 In Search of Zombies: Is FEC + ASI An Inter-Personal Boundary? 63
  §2.2.3 Dream Analog II: Can a Person Be the Subject of More Than One (Disjoint) Set of Experiences Simultaneously? 67
    §2.2.3.1 Arguing With Myself Over Everything and Nothing: Non-pathological Phrenic Amnesia, Shuffled Memories, and Multiphrenia 72
    §2.2.3.2 Askew Modalities: Weak (Closed World)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PHYSIOLOGICAL BORDERS</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3.1</td>
<td>Moving Beyond Subjective Experience</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3.2</td>
<td>Apparent Excluder (3): The Physiological Border</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3.2.1</td>
<td>Physiological vs. Psychological Individuation and Identification: Does Matter Matter?</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3.2.2</td>
<td>The Physiological Substance Dissolve</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3.3</td>
<td>The Persistence of Closed Individualism</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3.4</td>
<td>Thought Experiments About Persons</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3.5</td>
<td>The Contemporaneous Physiological Dissolve</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>NEUROLOGICAL BORDERS</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4.1</td>
<td>The Bodily Dissolve</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4.2</td>
<td>The Brain Dissolve</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4.3</td>
<td>The Tie-Breaker Condition and The Closed Individual View</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4.4</td>
<td>How Bizarre is Nozick’s Tie?</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4.5</td>
<td>Can Two Different Brains Be the Same Person?</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SPATIAL BORDERS</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§5.1</td>
<td>Can One Person Be Two Different Human Beings?</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§5.2</td>
<td>The Teletransporter</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§5.3</td>
<td>Apparent Excluder (4): The Spatial Border</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§5.4</td>
<td>Fission With Identity: Are You An Open Individual?</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>PSYCHOLOGICAL BORDERS</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.1</td>
<td>Apparent Excluder (5): The Psychological Boundary</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.2</td>
<td>Personas, Personalities, and the Subject, Take Zero: Borges Nor I</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.3</td>
<td>Primary, Secondary, Tertiary and Quartic Identification: The Fourfold (\varepsilon/\delta) Manifold</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.4</td>
<td>The Subject, Take One: Freedom From the Self</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.5</td>
<td>The Subject, Take Two: Self and Other</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.6 The Subject, Take Three: <em>Cogito, Ergo Quis Est?</em></td>
<td>229</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.6.1 Self-Consciousness Explained: The Intuition of Personal Identity (<em>I Am I</em>)</td>
<td>230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.6.2 Self-Consciousness Liberated: Averroës Strikes Again for the First Time</td>
<td>237</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.6.3 The Self and <em>I</em>: Identity for Identity’s Sake</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.7 Dissolving Our Selves: The Analysis and Synthesis of Multiple Personality Disorder</td>
<td>245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.7.1 Personas, Personalities, and Selves: From a Metaphysical and Metapsychological Point of View</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.7.2 FEC, Emotions, and Metaphysical Reversal</td>
<td>255</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.7.3 Altering Ourselves Philosophically</td>
<td>257</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.8 The Memory Dissolve</td>
<td>261</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.9 The Physiological Border Retreat</td>
<td>265</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.10 The Omni Dissolve: Daniel Kolak Through Krishnamurti Becomes Ann-Margret</td>
<td>268</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6.11 Apparent Excluder (6): The Unity of Consciousness Dissolve</td>
<td>276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 7: **CAUSAL BORDERS**

| §7.1 Apparent Excluder (7): The Causal Border | 299 |
| §7.2 One Small Step For Personkind | 302 |
| §7.3 The Causal Dissolve | 305 |

Chapter 8: **METAPHYSICAL BORDERS**

| §8.1 The Metaphysical Substance Border | 317 |
| §8.2 The Soul Dissolve | 319 |
| §8.3 Metaphysical Subjectivism | 322 |
| §8.4 The Transcendent Illusion, the Transcendental Illusion, and the Third Copernican Revolution: A Brief History of Personal Metaphysics | 336 |

Chapter 9: **IDENTITY BORDERS**

| §9.1 The Identity Dissolve, or, Is Cessation of Identity Death? | 349 |
| §9.2 Is Reductionism True? | 353 |
| §9.3 What Parfit’s Combined Spectrum Argument Really Shows | 360 |
| §9.4 Identity, Survival and What Really Matters | 366 |

Chapter 10: **PHENOMENOLOGICAL BORDERS**

| | 375 |
| §10.1 The Lucid Dream Analog, the Intuition of Understanding, and the Paradox of the Dreaming Thinker | 377 |
| §10.2 From a Phenomenological Point of View | 391 |
| §10.3 The Phenomenal Self, the Phenomenal World and the Noumenal Subject: The Unspeakable Mode Of Being or, Silent No More | 396 |
| §10.4 Sinn Beyond Borders | 412 |
| §10.5 Quantum Phenomenology, Quantum Consciousness, and Phantom Identity | 423 |
| §10.6 The Phenomenology of Survival and Identity: Empathy vs. Identity | 435 |
| §10.7 Seeing Through Ourselves: Conceptually Extending the Borders of Experience | 439 |
| §10.8 The Phenomenological Boundary | 445 |
| §10.9 The Ghost in Hume’s Labyrinth and the Continuous Phenomenological Dissolve | 448 |
| §10.10 Drawing Ourselves Phenomenologically: The Man Who Mistook Himself For the World | 452 |
| §10.11 Drawing Ourselves (Temporally) In Phenomenal Time: Being In the Specious Present | 465 |
| §10.12 Drawing Ourselves (Spatially) Within the Phenomenal World: The Localization of Nonlocality | 469 |
| §10.13 The Phenomenological Black Hole At The Center Of the Third Copernican Revolution Revis(it)ed: Drawing Ourselves Into the Center of the World | 475 |
| §10.14 Drawing Ourselves Into the One Multiperspectival Reality, Or Restoring the Suppressed Z-Coordinate to Gödel’s Universe: The Ultra (Open World) Nonlocality Interpretation of Personal Identity | 481 |
| §10.15. Why Was Hume Not a Korsakoff? | 487 |
| §10.16 Incarnation vs. Reincarnation | 489 |
| §10.17 Dismembering Ourselves Through Our Remembering: Personal Identity, Multiple Incarnation and the Formal Phenomenological Analysis of Always, Never and Now | 493 |

Chapter 11: TRANSCENDENTAL BORDERS | 515

§11.1 Climbing Kant’s Ladder: From the Phenomenal Self to the Transcendental Subject | 515
TABLE OF CONTENTS

§11.2 J.L. Mackie, Zeno Vendler, and I: The Wittgensteinian Vessel of Life, All Aboard! 520
§11.3 The New and Improved Transcendental Deduction: Phenomenology’s Transcendental Subject and Brouwer’s Creating Subject As The Open Individualist Noumenal Subject 523
§11.4 The Brains of Daniel Dennett and the Myth of Double Transduction: Transcendental Consciousness Exposed 525
§11.5 What Is It Like To Be the Transcendental Subject? 531
§11.6 Nagel’s Metaphysical Megalomania and the Subject Of the Universe: Playing the Wittgensteinian Game For Higher Stakes 533
§11.7 Full Contact Philosophy: The Noumenal Touch 538
§11.7.1 Dream Analog III 538

Chapter 12: MORAL BORDERS 552
§12.1 Morality and the Separateness of Persons: From Sidgwick to Parfit and Rawls 552
§12.2 Open Individualism, Empty Individualism, and Utilitarianism: Learning to Live With Ourselves 561
§12.3 And Justice For No One: Rawls vs. Utilitarianism 566
§12.4 The Game of Life and the Mathematics of Morality 571
§12.4.1 From the I Am You to the IMF: Open Metaphysical Capitalism 573
§12.5 The Aboriginal Position and the Veil of Knowledge: From Misery to Happiness—Toward a New Moral Calculus 574
§12.6 The Original Position and the Veil of Ignorance 576
§12.7 The Primordial Position and the Veil of Wisdom 578
§12.8 Noumenal Ethics and Freedom 581
§12.9 The Third Copernican Revolution and the Breakdown Of Metaphysical and Metapsychological Philopathy 586
§12.10 Improper Dysfunctionality: Why We Harm Ourselves 598
§12.11 The Conclusion of This Chapter 601

APPENDIX A: LOGICAL BORDERS 606
APPENDIX B: SEMIOTIC BORDERS 610
References 622
Index (names and subjects) 633
The central thesis of *I Am You*—that we are all the same person—is apt to strike many readers as obviously false or even absurd. How could you be me and Hitler and Gandhi and Jesus and Buddha and Greta Garbo and everybody else in the past, present and future? In this book I explain how this is possible. Moreover, I show that this is the best explanation of who we are for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it provides the metaphysical foundations for global ethics.

Variations on this theme have been voiced periodically throughout the ages, from the Upanishads in the Far East, Averroës in the Middle East, down to Josiah Royce in the North East (and West). More recently, a number of prominent 20th century physicists held this view, among them Erwin Schrödinger, to whom it came late, Fred Hoyle, who arrived at it in middle life, and Freeman Dyson, to whom it came very early as it did to me.

In my youth I had two different types of experiences, both of which led to the same inexorable conclusion. Since, in hindsight, I would now classify one of them as “mystical,” I will here speak only of the other—which is so similar to the experience Freeman Dyson describes that I have conveniently decided to let the physicist describe it for “both” of “us”:

Enlightenment came to me suddenly and unexpectedly one afternoon in March when I was walking up to the school notice board to see whether my name was on the list for tomorrow’s football game. I was not on the list. And in a blinding flash of inner light I saw the answer to both my problems, the problem of war and the problem of injustice. The answer was amazingly simple. I called it Cosmic Unity. Cosmic Unity said: There is only one of us. We are all the same person. I am you and I am Winston Churchill and Hitler and Gandhi and everybody. There is no problem of injustice because your sufferings are also mine. There will be no problem of war as soon as you understand that in killing me you are only killing yourself. [Dyson 1979, p. 17]

The subsequent attempt to communicate this insight to others proved as frustrating to Dyson as it did to me. He goes on to write:

For some days I quietly worked out in my own mind the metaphysics of Cosmic Unity. The more I thought about it, the more convinced I became that it was the living truth. It was logically incontrovertible. It provided for the first time a firm foundation for ethics. It offered mankind the radical change of heart and mind that was our only hope of peace at a time of desperate danger. Only one small problem remained. I must find a way to convert the world to my way of thinking.

The work of conversion began slowly. I am not a good preacher. After I had expounded the
new faith two or three times to my friends at school, I found it difficult to hold their attention. They were not anxious to hear more about it. They had a tendency to run away when they saw me coming. They were good-natured boys, and generally tolerant of eccentricity, but they were repelled by my tone of moral earnestness. When I preached at them I sounded too much like the headmaster. So in the end I made only two converts, one wholehearted and one half-hearted. Even the whole-hearted convert did not share in the work of preaching. He liked to keep his beliefs to himself. I, too, began to suspect that I lacked some of the essential qualities of a religious leader. Relativity was more in my line. After a few months I gave up trying to make converts. When some friend would come up to me and say cheerfully, “How’s cosmajoonity doing today?” I would just answer, “Fine, thank you,” and let it go at that. [Dyson 1979, pp. 17-18]

A major difference between Dyson’s experience and my own is that, although Einstein’s relativity (and quantum mechanics) also drew me, “Cosmic Unity” was, in the long run, “more in my line.” (How there can be a “my line” and “his line” when there is only one of us will in due course be explained.)

The purpose of these introductory remarks is to lay my cards on the table, to explain at least vaguely how I came to believe that I am everyone and why a good deal of my life has been devoted to writing the book you now hold in your hands. I say all this because I believe philosophers, like everyone else, get many of their ideas in flashes of insight—but then, because we are philosophers, we tend to sneak the vagabonds in through the back door at night only to present them later at the front door cloaked in the respectable daylight of reason.

In fairness to reason, however, I should also say that although the germination of the idea was by no means the result of careful and rigorous analysis, it was, indeed, first, the study of physics and then philosophy that showed me how to present the idea in a way that “others” might understand it.

For me, the study of physics proved to be a very curious combination of excitement and frustration. On the one hand, I saw in the strange and mysterious relationship, in quantum mechanics, between the observer and the observed the beginnings of an understanding of the fundamental role consciousness plays in the origin and construction of reality—suggestive of Cosmic Unity but hardly expressible in the impoverished and imprecise language that science has available to deal with consciousness, self, and subjectivity in general. Indeed, even a physicist of no less a caliber than Schrödinger, whose understanding of the physical paradoxes was as profound as anyone’s, was moved, by the assiduousness of his lifelong ruminations on the quantum world, to entertain “Cosmic Unity” musings, in
PRELIMINARY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This way:

It is not possible that this unity of knowledge, feeling and choice which you call your own should have sprung into being from nothingness at a given moment not so long ago; rather this knowledge, feeling and choice are essentially eternal and unchangeable and numerically one in all men, nay in all sensitive beings. But not in this sense - that you are a part, a piece, of an eternal, infinite being, an aspect or modification of it, as in Spinoza’s pantheism. For we should have the same baffling question: which part, which aspect are you? What, objectively, differentiates it from the others? No, but inconceivable as it seems to ordinary reason, you - and all other conscious beings as such - are all in all. Hence this life of yours which you are living is not merely a piece of the entire existence, but is in a certain sense the whole; only this whole is not so constituted that it can be surveyed in one single glance. [Schroedinger, 1964, pp. 21-22]

Such thoughts, however—regardless of how prompted they may be by the study of the actual problems, and for all their breadth and eloquence—seemed to me to belong more to the realm of poetry or religion than to the knowledge-seeking enterprise of science. It is true, of course that the tendency of the rational scientific mind has been toward grand theories of unification. Even such cursory remarks are sufficient to remind us that the tendency in our thinking to keep reducing the many to the one is not just “mystical” but is a basic motivation of traditional scientific explanation.

Witness Faraday’s and Maxwell’s reduction of electricity and magnetism into the single concept of a unified electromagnetic field; Einstein’s equation of energy and mass into one universal “substance,” mass-energy; the subsequent prediction in the 1960s of the mathematical unity between the electromagnetic and weak force and its “demonstration” in the 1980s by the discovery of the “Z” particle; and the present search for a unified field theory under the “grand unification theories,” or GUTs, which in the latest guise as a Superforce acting on an eleven-dimensional space would, in the words of physicist Paul Davies,

represent an amalgamation of matter, spacetime, and force into an integrated and harmonious framework that bestows upon the universe a hitherto unsuspected unity.

All science is essentially a search for unity. The scientist, by relating different phenomena in a common theory or description, unifies part of our bewilderingly complex world. What makes the recent discoveries so exciting is that, in theory, all natural phenomena can now be encompassed within a single descriptive scheme. [Davies 1984, p. 6]

The reasons for the existence in our minds of this “tendency” towards unification may be many. Though this is neither the place to develop an interpretation of such a “Parmenidean tendency” nor argue for it, surely one
of the reasons must be the compelling fact that it has tremendous explanatory power, theoretically, and that, practically, it often works. Faraday’s and Maxwell’s unification of electricity and magnetism gave us radio and electronics; Einstein’s gave us nuclear energy; and so on. That is probably why, in one form or another, this, one of the most fundamental tenets of the knowledge-seeking enterprise since the time of Parmenides, has survived all the conceptual turmoil and paradigm shifts from Parmenides to modern quantum mechanics. The physicist David Bohm, for instance, puts it thus:

one finds, through a study of the implications of the quantum theory, that the analysis of a total system into a set of independently existent but interacting particles breaks down in a radically new way. One discovers, instead, both from consideration of the meaning of the mathematical equations and from the results of the actual experiments, that the various particles have to be taken literally as projections of a higher-dimensional reality . . . [Bohm 1983]

The idea is that what we might regard as two distinct, individual particles can, in Bohm’s words, “refer to a single actuality, which is the common ground of both . . .”

Whether or not the “tendency” to explain multiplicity in terms of unity can be shown to be an essential paradigm of scientific thinking is not crucial to my analysis. I wish merely to suggest here, at the onset, that the broad strokes with which we paint our extraordinary “scientific” pictures will do just as well for painting extraordinary, “metaphysical” ones. And if at first I use broad strokes to make a claim about broad strokes it is only because I prefer to save the fine-tipped brushes for sketching in the details of the grand picture that puts you at the center of everything.

That is, I am not suggesting that we should draw conclusions about the truth of “Cosmic Unity” from any of these preliminary remarks. Rather, I am here merely making the observation that while Cosmic Unity goes very much against our ordinary, common-sense perception of ourselves and the world, the urge behind the formulation of it does not, contrary to what one may at first think, require a greater or more radical departure from our ordinary rational methodology than we have already been willing to make in science.

In other words, going from a many-persons view to a one-person view might put a great burden on commonsense conceptual schemes—but no greater a burden than did (at the time) the leap from Newtonian Mechanics to Einsteinian relativity or, say, the switch from a geocentric to a heliocentric view of the solar system. That is, going from the idea that you
are one person living in a world containing billions of persons to the idea that you are everyone may (or may not) require a leap of the imagination, but if it does the leap required is no greater than the shift from an absolute to a relativity physics or the change from a stationary earth to a moving one. Such great leaps are neither absurd nor unimaginable. If we can make them in contemporary science, we can try to make them in contemporary philosophy.

It was in fact my initial experience with theoretical quantum physics and then philosophy that made Cosmic Unity seem more plausible than it would have seemed had I been immersed in a Newtonian worldview or the commonsense worldview of the proverbial man on the street. This double philosophical shift from what Wilfred Sellars calls the “manifest” (commonsense, pre-theoretical) to the “scientific” (post-theoretical) image in physics and philosophy, I was shocked to find, had striking elements in common. Indeed, my personal tugs of war between identity and consciousness on the one hand and physics and cosmology, on the other, had quite literally come to a head, namely, my own:

One day my physics advisor took me aside and said, “Look, Dan, you keep asking these big questions. Why don’t you first try and understand all the little answers?” Try as I would however, the big questions just kept popping into my head in the most inopportune moments: what is an observer? What is an observation? Is physics the study of the world or of our understanding of the world? Finally, my advisor got so frustrated he suggested that perhaps my temperament might make me better suited to philosophy. I asked what philosophy was. I had never even heard of it.

He said something like, “That’s where all they do is ask big questions to which there are no answers.” A few years later, I was in my second year of graduate school, working with a great philosopher of science, Dudley Shapere, who was as well versed in relativity theory and quantum mechanics as any physicists I had ever known. I was working on various foundational problems in the philosophy of space and time when it occurred to me that one could make a model of a singularity that was not like the singularity envisioned by Penrose and Hawking. Penrose’s nothing was basically an orderly singularity with enough chaos in it to generate galaxies, stars, and, eventually, people. This to me seemed not at all nothinglike; it was structured in certain formal ways. In my model of the universe I was trying to work out how a completely unPenrose-like and unHawking-like completely unstructured nothingness would preclude there ever being anything. I would then use my ultrasingularity theorem that nothing whatsoever exists as a Kantian antinomy to the Hawking-Penrose singularity and thereby show that physicists could not use a singularity as an ultimate explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. I showed my model of the universe to Shapere who suggested I see his friend in the physics department, a well-known physicist named Charles Misner who had—contrary to Penrose and Hawking—been developing what he called a chaotic singularity model [see, e.g. Misner 1968], in
which he tried to show how a universe could nevertheless come out of even a completely unstructured nothing. Shapere told him he had a graduate student who perhaps had the making of a doctoral dissertation that Misner might be interested in. When I showed Misner my model and what I was trying to do with it, he pointed out various mistakes and gaps but suggested that I might indeed wish to develop this further as a doctoral dissertation. He said, “The key thing you’ve got to decide here is whether you want to patch this thing up far enough mathematically so that it answers your questions, or if you’re just going to leave it this way to make philosophical problems.” In other words: did I want to be a physicist or a philosopher?

Instead of being excited, I left Misner’s office in a quandary. Had it really come to this? Did scientists simply patch things up to get their ultimate answers? Did philosophers just squint the right way to keep making problems? [Kolak 2001b, p. 411]

When I then pointed out to my professors that I had also come essentially to the same view of personal identity as Erwin Schrödinger and Freeman Dyson, and was now wondering how consciousness as I saw it numerically identical everywhere could be brought into the Big Picture, everyone made a convincing case that I should give up such nonsense except Ray Martin (co-author of our *Wisdom Without Answers*!), who inspired me to develop my view and become a philosopher. Under Ray’s guidance I wrote my doctoral dissertation: *I Am You: A Philosophical Explanation of the Possibility That We Are All the Same Person.*

That was nearly two decades ago. I have since then continued to develop my view. This book is the result. I have drawn on parts of my dissertation throughout. Sections of Chapter 2 and 3 draw on my “The Metaphysics and Metapsychology of Personal Identity: Why Thought Experiments Matter In Deciding Who We Are,” and Chapter 7 draws on “Personal Identity and Causality: Becoming Unglued,” both published in *American Philosophical Quarterly.* Chapter 6 draws on “Finding Our Selves: Individuation, Identification, and Multiple Personality Disorder,” published in *Philosophical Psychology.* I have also drawn from some of the work Ray and I did on *Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues,* published by Macmillan. I have also drawn on my dialogue with Dan Dennett, “Consciousness, Self and Reality,” some of which I have excerpted here (in *Questioning Matters*, McGraw-Hill), as well as from my *Wittgenstein’s Tractatus* and *From the Presocratics to the Present,* both now published by McGraw-Hill.

In presenting my arguments I rely on and present detailed analyses of much recent work on personal identity, especially that of Derek Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker, and Robert Nozick, whom I thank for inspiring me with an eminently suitable model of philosophical explanation without
which this would have been a very different, and far lesser, work; I am very sorry that he did not live to see this publication. Also, the work of David Wiggins, and Thomas Nagel, as well as the less recent but still, from the standpoint of the development of my view, centrally important work of Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, Averröes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Royce, James, Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, Kant, Husserl and Brouwer. My development of the implied moral theory owes much to Rawls, Sidgwick, again Kant and again Parfit. I hope I have presented their views fairly. Since I am using their work to support a view that most of them do not hold I suspect I may not always have been entirely successful. I am in that regard especially grateful to Derek Parfit, who has over the years provided me with over fifty pages of detailed comments and much critical advice on several different drafts. That Parfit has been so helpful in the development of a view directly antithetical to his own is a testament to his extraordinary character. Brian Garrett gave me superb comments. Garrett Thomson (yet a third Oxfordian) provided me with many helpful suggestions on various drafts. Freeman Dyson importantly showed me by example that a rational and scientifically minded person could believe that we are all the same person and provided much needed personal encouragement, especially at the beginning. I will never forget that night when, as an overanxious graduate student at the University of Maryland, driving him to Union Station in Washington, D.C., ignorant of Dyson’s views on the subject, I hesitantly explained what I believed. Dyson turned, his face suddenly a black hole in the light of the train, except for his eyes and his smile, twinkling: “Why, I’ve believed that for a very long time.” His letters, like the unexpected fax that came in one night from the High Energy Physics Group at Princeton, from John Archibald Wheeler, have lost none of their initial impact. Sam Gorovitz, Jerry Levinson, and Alan Pasch gave needed support and excellent criticism; Sam, especially, has been a helpful mentor over the years. Most recently, over the past several years I have had the great fortune of spending a good deal of time with Jaakko Hintikka from whom I have learned more about philosophy at the cutting edge than I have from any other cutting edge philosopher, ever.

This book has profited from many other fruitful discussions and communications, far too numerous to mention. Some that particularly stand out in my mind, in no particular order, as having had a direct bearing are discussions with John Symons, Daniel Dennett, John Prager, Peter Unger, Steve Stich, Jay Lombard, Alvin Plantinga, Paul Davies, Dudley Shapere, Fred Suppe, Eddy Zemach, Bill Boos, David Goloff, Bill Hirstein, Victor

In this work I do not rely on ancient, medieval, and modern arguments. Rather, I arrive at the view through an analysis of the contemporary philosophical debates on the problem of personal identity. In the process of explaining how it is possible that we are all the same person, I offer a new explanation both of consciousness and of self-consciousness, a new theory of Self, of certain psychopathologies, provide some links to initial mathematical models (e.g. Stone-Čech compactification, Hausdorff spaces, Taub-NUT space, the Gödel Universe, singularities) and nonlocality, broaden the philosophical applications of Hintikka’s IF Logic, integrate the phenomenology of space and time from intuitionistic points of view, bridge analytic and phenomenological methods, provide an analysis of conceptual reference frames with an eye as to how to go about revising them from within, and in the widest sense construct a protracted counterexample to the received scope and limits of formal philosophy. Moreover, I show that we are all the same person turns out to be the best competing explanation of who we are for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it provides the metaphysical foundations for global ethics.

The book is intended not only for philosophers in the traditional sense but also those philosophers in physics, mathematics, psychiatry and psychology, linguistics, computer science, economics, communication theory, and other related disciplines, for whom personal identity and consciousness matter, albeit typically in a suppressed way because putting these issues up front may be disruptive to their own disciplines, while a fuller explanation may bring about a sea change. Those not afraid of sea change should therefore find the book interesting; those seeking one should find it eminently helpful. The book is also accessible to graduate students and advanced undergraduates.

The philosophical problem of personal identity is to explain what it is that makes me me and you you. What is it that makes me one unified and continuously existing individual person throughout various changes over time, and you another? This, however, is an amazingly difficult question to answer. For instance, David Wiggins writes:

Most of us are committed to thinking that if any of our concepts are sound then person is. We think that, being people, we understand what a person is. We also have a very exact understanding of the relation of sameness. Together these understandings should suffice to give a sound principle
for same person—a criterion of individuation for persons. How then can personal identity confront us with such a variegated multitude of apparently insoluble cases? [Wiggins 1976, p. 157]

Thus, as it turns out, it is not as if the far-fetched idea that we are all the same person is up against some clear-cut and well understood “ordinary” notion of person. The “ordinary” notion is, as we shall see, itself deeply problematic.

Second, some of the best recent philosophers, such as Derek Parfit and Robert Nozick, have tried to solve the “variegated multitude of apparently insoluble cases” by moving away from “ordinary” notions of personhood and claiming, for instance, that the unity of individual personhood is weaker than we ordinarily suppose—a view we shall discuss at some length. Parfit, for instance, struggling with the various personal identity puzzles, tries to solve them, as Thomas Nagel puts it,

By breaking down the metaphysical boundaries between himself and other persons, and loosening the metaphysical bonds that connect him now with his future self . . . . [View From Nowhere, p. 224]

Parfit writes:

If some unity is less deep, so is the corresponding disunity. The fact that we live different lives is the fact that we are not the same person. If the fact of personal identity is less deep, so is the fact of non-identity. There are not two different facts here, one of which is less deep . . . while the other remains as deep. There is merely one fact, and this fact’s denial. The separateness of persons is the denial that we are all the same person. If the fact of personal identity is less deep, so is this fact’s denial. [italics mine, Reasons and Persons, p. 339]

Thus in the current literature on personal identity there is already a movement away from the “ordinary” view of persons, a move that, on Parfit’s reading at least, weakens the boundaries between us. It doesn’t remove them, it just—at least in Parfit’s own eyes—weakens them, and this has a profound effect on Parfit’s life:

My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air. There is still a difference between my life and the lives of other people. But the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less concerned about the rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of others. [p. 281]

So there is this gap, the “difference between my life and the lives of others.” The present work is as an attempt to narrow, as well as we can and
as far as we can, the remaining gap.

To distinguish it from the traditional, commonsense view of personal identity according to which we are each a separately existing person numerically identical to ourselves over time—i.e., that personal identity is closed under our known individuating and identifying borders, what I call The Closed Individual View of Personal Identity, or simply Closed Individualism for short—I call my view The Open Individual View of Personal Identity, or simply Open Individualism for short. I argue for Open Individualism by showing the grave conceptual difficulties in supposing that traditional Closed Individualism is true, difficulties which point collectively in one of two new directions: either there exist no continuously existing, self-identical persons over time in the sense ordinarily understood—the sort of view developed by philosophers as diverse as Buddha, Hume and most recently Derek Parfit, what I call The Empty Individual View of Personal Identity, or simply Empty Individualism for short—or else you are identical to everyone. As so often in life, either we get too much or not enough: everyone or no one. Contrary to popular belief, Closed Individualism is not even a coherent view; the two coherent views are Empty Individualism and Open Individualism. Of the two, Open Individualism is the better view. Open Individualism is the best explanation of who we are.

Here, now, I offer a full-contact philosophy for what may well be nothing less than the final showdown in our age-old Socratic battle against authority. Thinking that what matters is not what separates us but what we all have in common undermines all authority, even our own. It unmasks personal separatism as an illusion by which we dominate each other because we cannot dominate ourselves. The logic of identity forbids it.

I am grateful to my editors at Klwer (now Springer) for their patience and diligence over many years, especially Floor Oosting, Publishing Editor, Charles Erkelens, Manager of the Humanities, and Ingrid Krabbenbos, Publishing Assistant.

Finally, I am as always grateful to my wife, Wendy, and to our children Julia, Sophia, Dylan, and Andre for the love without which wisdom for me would be neither expressible nor inexpressible but impossible.

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DANIEL KOLAK
Pomona, New York
PERSONAL BORDERS

“Boundaries between fields are not barriers.”
W.V.O Quine, From A Logical Point of View

Borders enclose and separate us. We assign to them tremendous significance. Along them we draw supposedly uncrossable boundaries within which we believe our individual identities begin and end, erecting the metaphysical dividing walls that enclose each one of us into numerically identical, numerically distinct, entities: persons.

Do the borders between us merit the metaphysical significance ordinarily accorded to them? They do not. Our borders do not signify boundaries between persons. We are all the same person.

“How many persons are there in the world?” To ask this question is to acknowledge our borders. To answer “one,” as I do, is not to deny our borders but merely to deny their significance—to deny that our borders are absolute metaphysical boundaries.

§ 1.1 INDIVIDUATION, IDENTIFICATION AND IDENTITY: TAKE ONE

In ordinary contexts, the question, “How many persons are there?” is not considered problematic. If someone asks, “How many persons are there in the room?” we simply, and quite literally, count heads. But it is not that simple. The problem is that to know how many of something there are in the world, say pebbles or rivers, we cannot proceed unless we know how to individuate the entity in question, how to single it out as one particular entity among many such similar but different, contemporaneously existing particular entities.

Right now for instance I can individuate the pebble on my desk experientially, by tracing (tactilely, with my fingers, or visually, with my eyes) along its outer edges. Or, I can individuate the pebble conceptually; say, by specifying the borders within which it exists as a pebble and then checking my immediate experience to verify whether the pebble on my
desk corresponds, approximately enough, to those criteria. I can thus say, “The pebble on my desk, completely white on one side and completely black on the other, is one pebble with two different amalgams of rock fused through its interior and along its surface.”

I could of course say, instead, that there are two pebbles on my desk, one black and one white, whose borders are so close to each other that the forces of their outer atoms “glue” them together so as to create the (false) perception of one pebble. Whether I count “one” or “two” thus depends in part on which borders I view as significant. In the pebble case what I would say is that while color may be significant in other ways, color borders don’t matter with regard to the individuation of pebbles. A pebble may be revealed by color, enhanced by color, found by color, discovered by color, enjoyed by color, appreciated by color, distinguished by color, etc., without its individuation being thereby fixed, or determined, i.e., closed, as such, by color borders. Therefore, the best thing to say is that there is only one pebble on my desk. When it comes to pebbles, no more so than (I would venture already to assert) people, we need deny neither the reality of color borders nor the aesthetic significance of color borders, etc., to release ourselves from any metaphysical bondage to color borders. (Thus, for instance, if in a strange world pebbles feared losing themselves to color changes and were deeply concerned about preserving themselves and their relations by keeping their colors pure and consistent, associating with similarly colored pebbles, and so on, a good philosopher-pebble among them should be able to allay their fears and concerns by showing his fellow pebbles how a shift from a Closed to Open View of Color Borders is possible.) But there would be nothing wrong in principle with someone from a different society, say one in which color is viewed as metaphysically significant (i.e., a view in which color borders matter for individuation), looking at the objects on my desk and, pointing at the very same object(s), counting, instead, “two pebbles.” His counting and my counting in this case do not describe two different sets of facts: they describe the same facts but apply to these facts different evaluative criteria within two different conceptual frameworks. Or, to go in a slightly different direction, if the “world” in which the pebble(s) in question exist(s) is a world made only of color, for instance a painting, then we may have before us an entirely different situation, where color borders (because color in a painting is all there is) are the begin-all and end-all for the individuation of objects. But even then, in the case of the painting, individuation would be fixed not by the facts but our interpretation of the facts, involving us again in the
question of what matters to us, and why.

Similarly, when I ignore the fact that, say, the one half of the white side and the one half of the black side of the pebble, which together have been facing the sun, are much warmer than the other (black and white) side facing away from the sun, I am at that moment ignoring the temperature borders and color borders but not the physical borders (the desk, for instance, is white and one part of it is the same temperature as the warm side of the pebble, yet I do not thereby individuate “the warm white-desk-white-pebble patch,” though in principle I could). Thus, even the individuation of ordinary pebbles depends in part on what matters—it depends on which borders one takes to be *metaphysically significant.*

Standing next to a body of water rushing through the countryside along a tortuous channel, I can individuate it, ostensively, by pointing and saying, “That is a river.” But to stand at the same spot on the bank where I stood yesterday and, pointing at the bubbling water, claim, “This is the same river I pointed to yesterday,” or to go downstream past any number of forking tributaries and claim, “This is the same river I pointed to earlier,” requires not only individuation—typically, picking out what sort of thing some entity is at a particular time—it requires in addition that I identify that particular entity over time and across various changes. In other words, to identify some entity requires both that I

1) individuate that entity at a time—either experientially (by tracing along visible or tangible borders) or conceptually (by specifying the conditions which make it that particular entity at that time and not some other entity), and that I

2) specify the conditions under which those individuating borders constitute the boundaries of that entity (what distinguishes that entity from other such entities) and make it the particular entity that it is and not some other entity across various changes over time.

Consider a pebble lying on the shore of a lake connected to the ocean by a river. Ordinarily, such a pebble is comparatively easy to both individuate and identify. I can individuate it ostensively by pointing to it and saying, “This pebble here.” It is more difficult but still fairly easy to identify the pebble as the same pebble I held in my hand yesterday, since the pebble appears to be the same continuously existing entity over a fairly long period of time due to its borders being (more or less) rigid and distinct. The concept *identity*, then, requires both individuation—the tracing of borders at a time—and identification—the tracing of borders over time: identity
requires both the experiential (and/or conceptual) tracing of borders at a time and the conceptual matching of the tracings of borders over time.

The identity of an entity, up to and including persons, is thus in part experientially drawn and is also in part theoretically drawn. (Whether any such drawing is correct is a different question; presently we are focusing only on how we draw ourselves, not on whether the drawings we make of ourselves are correct.) The point is that personal identity is not purely experientially drawn. “I am conscious of myself in exactly the same way now, at eighty-one, as I was conscious of myself, my ‘I,’ at five or six years of age,” wrote Tolstoy in his diary, and this personal testament of identity seems purely experientially drawn until one asks how it is drawn. First, Tolstoy’s identification cannot be drawn experientially unless both A) what it is like, experientially, to be Tolstoy age five and B) what it is like, experientially, to be Tolstoy age eighty-one, are co-present in the experience of Tolstoy age eighty-one as he is writing that sentence. Since individuation (A) and individuation (B) are not co-present in individuation (B)—since Tolstoy age eighty-one has as far as we know no direct experiential access to Tolstoy age five—Tolstoy’s testament (thought not necessarily false) is dubious. That is, what Tolstoy takes to be a “given” in experience is, in fact, a theoretical inference and in so far as he is not aware that his inference is theoretical, not experiential, his experiential claim is dubious. Identifying any two individuated states of consciousness as being qualitatively the same (though perhaps Tolstoy did not realize this) is always a theoretical inference, regardless of whether one realizes this or even whether the judgment is veridical. Likewise for the judgment regarding one’s own numerical identity over time: Tolstoy assumes that he, the very same subject who is “conscious of myself, my ‘I’” now is one and the same numerically identical subject who was “conscious of myself, my ‘I’” then. The fact is that all such identifications across individuations (though they may consist in part or in whole of experiential components) must always be at least in part theoretically drawn.

In other words, personal identity, as ordinarily understood, is presumed in, not revealed in, experience. In specifying one’s own identity one must move from experience to theory (the conceptual framework). Hence to claim, “no (background) concept of identity, no personal identity,” is not to claim necessarily that personal identity is an illusion, though some will claim that it is. It is merely to remind ourselves that the concept of personal identity is fixed not by any facts but by whatever best available theory is best applied to the facts. Which of course is not to say that we do any of this
consciously (but nor does it preclude the possibility that it is so done by some aspect of ourselves to which consciousness is not privy). A mélange of hidden assumptions and presuppositions may be functioning in the background as a sort of autonomic interpretation scheme, “folk theory,” etc. When I thus speak of the role of theory I mean to include both theories proper, autonomic interpretation mechanisms, folk theories, and so on.

To sum up: we individuate entities by tracing along borders discernible in experience, in theory (whether theory proper or folk theory), or both. We then identify the individuated entities. The concept “identity” consists in individuation (drawn experientially and/or theoretically: “that pebble,” “that lake,”) and identification (drawn theoretically): “here is the pebble I found last year,” “here is the lake I swam in as a child,”), thereby giving rise to that aspect of the conceptual framework within which we interpret (usually, automatically) our experience according to theory.

That I am is a fact; who I am is an interpretation. We might even say: personal identity is where epistemology and ontology meet, within us.

Typically, a lake is more difficult to individuate than a pebble. We might wonder, standing at the shore of a body of water, whether we are standing at a lake or a wide river or a bay. But it is even more difficult to identify the lake. I might wonder, for instance, whether the lake before me is the same lake I swam in seven years ago. Yet it is easier, in most cases, both to individuate and identify the lake than the river or the ocean since most of the lake’s water remains the same over a long period of time and its borders are a landmass, not other lakes. A river, on the other hand, often flows in and out of other rivers, forming many tributaries and creeks along the way. That is why it is considerably more difficult to individuate a river than a lake and even more difficult to identify a river, since a river’s waters are constantly changing as are (more slowly) its banks. It is even more difficult to individuate and identify an ocean, whose waters are constantly flowing in and out of other oceans (the waters of today’s Pacific, for instance, could well be the waters of some past centuries’ Atlantic).

What about persons? Derek Parfit, in *Reasons and Persons*, which contains hundreds of pages of text on personal identity, says only this about what a person is:

> ... to be a person, a being must be self-conscious, aware of its identity and its continued existence over time. [p. 202]

Parfit never explains what self-consciousness (or even consciousness) is. Nor does he explain in what being aware of one’s identity consists. And it
is still less clear in what the awareness of one’s own continued existence over time is supposed to consist (e.g., the Tolstoy passage), or whether even there is any such awareness (or, still further, if whether such awareness is of anything real). Yet if in pointing to me you asked, “Are you a person?” I would say, “Yes.” If you pointed to a rock or a piece of paper and asked, “Are those things persons?” I would say “No.” We would probably all agree. Here we would be using something akin to Parfit’s criterion. There might of course be cases about which we are less certain, such as when the object under discussion is not a fully developed living human being but a fetus, a dolphin or an advanced artificial brain such as Cog. But this does not prevent us from agreeing on the individuation and identification of most entities, up to and including persons, at least in the ordinary cases.

Thus, clearly, one key element to being a person is, as we understand it, to possess what we have come to call, at least in Anglo-Saxon languages, “mind.” Therein lies part of our difficulty. For, as we shall see, we don’t have any clear and unproblematic principium individuationis for minds. (What and where are the borders of mind, what do they enclose, and how? In philosophy the proverbial theater of the mind has been, quite literally, a theater of war.) Nor can we avoid the difficulty by relying, for the principle of individuation, not on our “minds” but on our bodies or our brains. The already deep conceptual problems with doing so, and the even more grave difficulties it raises for the problem of the individuation and identification of minds, have recently become even more pronounced, as we shall see, due to actual experiments with “split-brain” patients, actual cases of non-surgical division such as (apparently happen in) cases of dissociation, fugue states, and multiple personality disorder, and a slew of illuminating thought experiments about personal identity (the “fission” and “fusion” puzzle cases).

§1.2 CLOSED INDIVIDUALISM, EMPTY INDIVIDUALISM, AND OPEN INDIVIDUALISM: THE THREE VIEWS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

Yet, despite our not yet having any clear and well-defined concept of what a person is, according to the received view of common sense the borders between persons are more like the borders between pebbles than like the borders between rivers, lakes, or oceans. That is, ordinarily we tend to believe that a person is a continuously existing individual, identical to itself over time as determined solely by its own intrinsic features, enclosed
by definite borders from other, numerically distinct, individual persons. This, roughly, is the commonsense, folk-psychological (or, perhaps we should say, “folk-philosophical”) view. I call this sort of view, according to which personal identity is closed under known borders of individuation and identification, the Closed Individual View of Personal Identity, or, more simply, Closed Individualism. According to Closed Individualism, then, there exist many numerically distinct persons about whom the following assumptions can be made:

1) The **single continuous individual assumption**: a person is a single continuous individual over time.
2) The **survival and identity assumption**: a person survives only as long as there exists an individual identical to that person.
3) The **intrinsic features assumption**: a person’s identity depends only on the properties of that person.
4) The **individuation and separateness of persons assumption**: there are definite boundaries separating one person from another.

Assumption [1] implies that there are no significant borders within a person (no borders that disrupt, i.e., enclose, identity), neither at a time (across space) nor over time. A person is according to [1] a significantly continuant individual in the sense that, in spite of various borders—between, for instance, the left hemisphere of my brain and the right, or between “me” now and “me” age three, etc.—identity is not, thereby, closed under these individuating and identifying borders. According to [1], then, when it comes to the question of identity, some borders within people do not matter—they are not metaphysically significant—they do not signify personal identity boundaries. This certainly is an ingredient in what is commonly called the traditional Cartesian View. If one says, “I think, therefore I am,” one identifies, without explicit argument, two very closely bordered individuations—the first and second occurrence of *I*—as being numerically one and the same. Which is to say: personal identity is not closed under that known border of individuation and identification. When Tolstoy says, “I am conscious of myself in exactly the same way now . . . as I was . . . at five,” he identifies, as being numerically one and the same, individuations separated by a border of seventy-six years. In both cases there is identification across psychologically and physiologically individuated borders and this fact of identification supposedly provides (on the traditional Cartesian View explicitly and on Tolstoy’s view implicitly) an apparently self-evident ground for personal identity. This aspect of
Closed Individualism thus implies that not all (personal) borders can be (inter-personal) boundaries—otherwise there would be no persons except for brief spatiotemporal instants—and it is this broad condition that assumption [1] is most generally designed to reflect. In short: even Closed Individualism renders its individuals with a certain amount of metaphysical openness.

Assumption [2] implies that personal identity is a matter of life and death: lose your identity and you lose your life. (This of course does not mean that losing your life is the same as losing your identity, since we could still, if we so chose, identify you as that dead person.) That is, according to [2], the person ceases to exist if and when his identity as the same person he is now ceases; without the continuation or preservation of personal identity there is no survival of any significant kind. The caveat “of any significant kind” is inserted for the following important reasons. Literal personal survival obviously requires, necessarily, the continued existence of the person. In that sense, to continue to exist is just to be identical in the future with some presently existing person. This cannot coherently be denied and hence should not be part of any view. However, in his 1971 article Parfit denies it. Parfit now puts his view slightly differently as follows: personal identity is not what matters, i.e., even in cases of non-identity all that matters in typical cases of personal identity can be preserved. And so [2], designed to capture that part of Closed Individualism that in varying degrees and in differing respects is denied by the type of view I will call the Empty Individual View of Personal Identity, or, more simply, Empty Individualism, specifies that the significance ordinarily accorded to personal survival is a direct function of the significance ordinarily accorded to personal identity: survival matters (is viewed as metaphysically significant) because (if and only if) identity matters (is so viewed). Or, to put it slightly differently: according to [2], personal survival is tied to and cannot be separated from personal identity, in such a way that survival without identity is not what matters. In this respect, anticipating the direction taken by Empty Individualists such as Parfit, Nozick, Shoemaker, and others, we could rename [2] the identity is what matters primarily in survival assumption: survival of any significant kind (i.e., any survival that matters) is possible across some (physiological and/or psychological) border if and only if one and the same entity is identified as being personally identical on both sides of that border. That is, according to [2], personal identity is what matters primarily in personal survival because it is identity that makes significant survival of a person possible.
Assumption [3] implies that who I am depends on no one and nothing else other than myself. That is, personal identity is determined by those internal aspects of my existence that, ordinarily, we take to be essential to me as the person I am: my personal identity depends only on me and what I am like and has nothing to do with who else exists or what anyone else is like. A person is not, for instance, like a country. Our knowledge and beliefs about other people, up to and including ourselves, according to [3], do not affect my real identity—my beliefs about myself have no bearing on the question of who I really am. If no one knew or believed (and behaved as if) you existed, you would according to [3] still exist. Where as with countries it is of course quite different. If no one knew or believed (and behaved as if) the United States existed, the United States would not exist, at least not as a real country; the existence of countries is, in that sense, extrinsic (in a relativist sense). Similarly, whether you are the heir to the throne depends on whether your brother, who is missing at sea, is dead or alive. So the question, “Who are you,” by condition [3], asks for essential information about you (whether you happen to know this essential information or not) and the answer is determined independently of the epistemological question—on what grounds you know who you are (so, for instance, on this condition, even complete amnesia does not disrupt identity and those who claim that an essential characteristic of being a person requires the ability to identify yourself as the same person over time, are wrong). Assumption [3], then, is the assumption of absolute identity. It implies a certain type of absolutism (as opposed to relativism) about personal identity.

[4] implies there are sufficient conditions for there being more than one person: it posits the existence of borders under which personal non-identity is closed. That is, according to [4], some of our borders are closed, absolute inter-personal, boundaries.

It should not be surprising that philosophers, who tend to disagree about so much, tend to disagree about the nature of personal identity. But in this case philosophers tend to disagree vehemently about nearly every aspect of their disagreement. Are the borders of a person like the borders of a pebble, ordinarily remaining (more or less) the same without the “bounded parts” getting “mixed up” with other such parts? Or are the borders of a person like the borders of a lake, undergoing only occasional and very gradual changes, both of borders and of bounded parts, separated from other such entities by definite and (more or less) rigid borders? Or is a person like a river, undergoing constant and (relatively) drastic change both of borders and of bound parts as it combines and mixes with parts from other such
entities, but an entity whose boundaries still are defined by “solid” borders that, like the banks of a river, themselves change very gradually over time? Or is a person like an ocean, in some sense an entity whose identity is not bound by its borders with other such entities, openly flowing and mixing within “fluid” borders defined more by social conventions rather than by any rigid boundaries?

It is (relatively) easy to single out a pebble on the beach and to individuate it from other pebbles in order to say whether there is just one pebble there or whether there are many. If persons are like pebbles, it will be likewise (relatively) easy to answer the question, “Is there one person or are there many?” Lakes are more difficult to individuate than pebbles, rivers are more difficult to individuate than lakes, and oceans are more difficult to individuate than rivers. In the case of pebbles, lakes and rivers, the question, “Is there just one or are there many,” though more difficult than the actual counting, is still relatively easy to answer.

What about oceans? Since the borders between one ocean and another are vague and the contents of oceans openly flow back and forth through each other, we might wonder whether individuating one ocean from another along their oceanic borders reflects merely arbitrary boundaries. Suppose we agree that the oceanic boundaries we draw between oceans are, on a deeper level, arbitrary—that, in an important sense, oceans are distinct but open (metaphysically unbound) entities (that is, unbound from each other, by their oceanic borders). We could of course still choose to keep viewing oceanic borders as oceanic boundaries. But someone could claim that in this case, ultimately, oceanic boundaries don’t matter (they are not metaphysically significant), in the sense that they do not signify any deep truth about the individuation of one ocean from another but, rather, reflect merely a convention. That is, the division of the Earth’s body of water into numerically different oceans via oceanic boundaries exists not in the world itself but in our map of the world. One could thus claim that—on a deeper level—the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are one and the same ocean because they are an interconnected body of water. This is in some ways (but, importantly, not in others, as we shall see) analogous to what I claim: I claim that the borders between us are more like borders between oceans than like the borders between pebbles or lakes and though we can for practical and social purposes use them to draw boundaries between us, the boundaries we draw—on a deeper level—do not really matter, in the sense that they do not track any deep metaphysical truths about the nature of persons. The boundaries we draw along the borders between us exist only
in our maps of ourselves, not in ourselves as we are: personal identity is not border-bound. To distinguish it both from Closed and Empty Individualism, according to both of which personal identity is closed under known individuating borders, I call my view the Open Individual View of Personal Identity or, more simply, Open Individualism. According to Open Individualism, then, personal identity is not closed under known borders of individuation and identification.

Suppose one claimed that—on a deeper level—the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are one and the same ocean because they are an interconnected body of water. It does not thereby follow that if the borders between oceans do not matter in the above sense, then the Indian and Pacific oceans are, in fact, the same ocean. It is not clear, in general, how a claim about what matters (in the metaphysical sense) implies a claim about identity. But if personal boundaries are like oceanic boundaries, then we could for practical and social purposes erect such boundaries even though on some “deeper” level, such boundaries would not really matter (they would not be the metaphysically significant individuators and identifiers of who and what we are). In that sense while the borders between us exist, the ultimate boundaries between us are, in the view presented in this book (since Open Individualism is not bound to a substance view of personal identity), somewhat like the lines of latitude or longitude by which we distinguish one part of Earth from another: practically significant individuators (for determining location), metaphysically insignificant identifiers (for determining identity).

The claim that the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are the same ocean would be comparatively easier to support than the claim that Lake Ontario (Canada), and Lake Titikaka (Peru), are the same lake. Claiming that Lake Ontario and Lake Titikaka are the same lake would require something akin to demonstrating that some hidden underground stream connects these two apparently different (contemporaneously existing but spatially distinct) bodies of water. In that case, if we believed that the borders between us are like the borders between lakes, we would have to construct some “transcendental” unity with which to connect us. We do not have to do this, however, since the borders normally taken to be boundaries between persons presupposed on such a view (that the borders between us are in this sense more like the borders between lakes than like the borders between pebbles) are not, as we shall see, necessarily boundaries between persons. But it can be done and we will do it. However, my initial strategy will be not to synthetically construct some transcendental unity between us but,
first, to analytically *deconstruct* the significance of the borders which according to traditional Closed Individualism are the boundaries between persons.

Why do I want to do this? My purpose is not merely to show how the Open Individual View of Personal Identity is logically possible. Suppose, for instance, that the reason why most people view oceanic borders as oceanic boundaries is either because they believe that each ocean has a unique soul (and that oceanic identity consists in each ocean retaining the same soul across various changes over time), or because they believe that each ocean consists in a unique body of water (and that oceanic identity consists in each ocean retaining the same water across various changes over time). Someone could then claim that there exists only one ocean by showing how it is possible that there exists one ocean, which would be merely a demonstration of logical possibility. On the other hand, one could instead try to show how it is possible that the reasons most people have traditionally individuated one ocean from another are, in actuality, bad reasons—say, because there are no good reasons for believing in oceanic souls, or because in fact oceans do not retain the same body of water over time, and so on. Furthermore, suppose that in the mean time due to such difficulties with the traditional Closed Individual View of Oceanic Identity there arose a new, more sophisticated, albeit Empty Individual View according to which because 1) Oceanic Identity is closed under known individuating and identifying borders and 2) the individuating and identifying borders are better known than in the (naïve) Closed Individual View, an ocean is understood as not really remaining identical to itself for very long in the traditional sense. According to the Empty Individual View of Oceanic Identity, then, other oceanic relations (besides oceanic identity) are what matter in demarcating the “survival” of particular oceans over time, but this concept of “oceanic survival” is conventional only and does not track any deep metaphysical truths about oceans. In that case, a believer in the Open Individual View of Oceanic Identity and a believer in the Empty Individual View of Oceanic Identity could agree that the traditional Closed Individual View of Oceanic Identity is false, but could disagree about whether, in reality, there are many different oceans, or no oceans, or only one ocean, because they disagree about whether oceanic identity is open or closed under known individuating borders. And in so far as the Open Individual View were the best available alternative to the (problematic) traditional Closed Individual View of Oceanic Identity, the Open Individualist could further strengthen his position (beyond the
demonstration of mere logical possibility) by showing how it is possible that the Open Individual View of Oceanic Identity is more preferable to the traditional Closed Individual View than is the Empty Individual View because Empty Individualism with regard to oceans throws out oceanic identity, as it were, with the individuating and identifying water, where as Open Individualism preserves it. In that sense, Open Individualism with regard to Oceanic Identity is more conservative than Empty Individualism is, even though both are better than the non-viable traditional Closed Individualism. That is precisely what we shall see in the case of the Open and Empty Individual Views of Personal Identity: the former is more preferable than is the latter to traditional Closed Individualism in that it is the far more (positively) conservative view. Furthermore, there is at least one more very important additional merit that makes Open Individualism preferable both to the traditional Closed Individualism and to Empty Individualism: Open Individualism provides the metaphysical foundations for global ethics. Thus, for instance, in our Oceanic Analog suppose that Jones who believes that the Morning Ocean and Evening Ocean are numerically distinct entities dumps toxic waste in the morning where in the evening he and his children go swimming. The metaphysical shift from the traditional Closed Individual View of Oceanic Identity to the Open Individual View would by decreasing the metaphysical significance of (perceived/conceived) Oceanic Borders increase greatly the moral significance of the new view. Likewise, shifting instead to an Empty Individual View of Oceanic Identity would more than likely in due course destroy ocean life.

Ultimately, then, we shall see that, when conceived properly, our borders (except perhaps for conventional purposes) do not matter (they are metaphysically insignificant, in that they do not entail the identification of various individuations as numerically distinct individuals such that— independently of that map—there exist a plurality of numerically distinct, separately existing continuously self-identical individual persons). One could express this, as we do for instance in some cases where two bodies of water border each other, by giving a name to the larger, interconnected unity. We could, and perhaps do, consider both Lake Ontario and Lake Erie to be parts of a larger unity that we call “the Great Lakes.” Thus, for instance, we could give a name to the larger unity of which we are all a part and call it the “Universal Self,” “World Soul,” “God,” etc. This is the view propounded in Josiah Royce’s

proof which a rigid analysis of the logic of our most commonplace thought would give for the
CHAPTER 1

doctrine that in the world there is but one Self, and that it is his world which we all alike are truly meaning, whether we talk of one another or of Cromwell’s character or of the fixed stars or of the far-off eons of the future.

William James calls this

the classic doctrine of pantheistic idealism . . . . There is thus in reality but this one self, consciously inclusive of all the lesser selves, logos, problem-solver, and all-knower; and Royce ingeniously compares the ignorance that in our persons breaks out in the midst of its complete knowledge and isolates me from you and both of us from it, to the inattention into which our finite minds are liable to fall with respect to such implicitly present details as those corporeal sensations to which I made allusion just now. Those sensations stand to our total private minds in the same relation in which our private minds stand to the absolute mind. Privacy means ignorance . . . and ignorance means inattention. We are finite because our wills, as such, are only fragments of the absolute will; because will means interest, and an incomplete will means an incomplete interest; and because incompleteness of interest means inattention to much that a fuller interest would bring us to perceive.

In this account Royce makes by far the manliest of the post-Hegelian attempts to read some empirically apprehensible content into the notion of our relation to the absolute mind. [Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 183-184]

Or one could attempt a rather different and perhaps even more “manly” sort of Open Individualism, in which we are not each a part of some larger personal unity but in which our individual personal unities are, in toto, one and the same numerically identical personal unity. This is the view of personal identity espoused by Erwin Schrödinger:

It is not possible that this unity of knowledge, feeling and choice which you call your own should have sprung into being from nothingness at a given moment not so long ago; rather this knowledge, feeling and choice are essentially eternal and unchangeable and numerically one in all men, nay in all sensitive beings. But not in this sense—that you are a part, a piece, of an eternal, infinite being, an aspect or modification of it, as in Spinoza’s pantheism. For we should have the same baffling question: which part, which aspect are you? What, objectively, differentiates it from the others? No, but inconceivable as it seems to ordinary reason, you—and all other conscious beings as such—are all in all. Hence this life of yours which you are living is not merely a piece of the entire existence, but is in a certain sense the whole; only this whole is not so constituted that it can be surveyed in one single glance. [What Is Life, pp. 21-22]

These two variations on Open Individualism show the extent to which our view can support both a “theistic (deistic)” model and an “atheistic” one; in the former, I am you because we are each a part of a “super-person” (i.e., “God,” “the Noumenal Self,” “the Transcendental Subject,” etc.). In the
latter, I am identical to you because you and I are one and the same individual person, in the way we each, ordinarily, understand ourselves to be a person; it is this alternative that we shall encounter most often in this book, although as we shall see (in Chapter 11, Transcendental Borders) there is more than ample room for both. One major difference between Open Individualism and traditional Closed Individualism is that, according to Open Individualism, the individual person who each one of us is can (without necessarily knowing it) be at more than one place at the same time. That is, one difference between Closed and Open Individualism is that according to the latter a person can exist simultaneously at many different places and times, doing, thinking and experiencing many different things simultaneously, without that individual being thereby, necessarily, some lesser part of a greater individual. This will bring up, for instance, the issue of whether (and how) a person can be the subject of more than one set of experiences simultaneously, and other such issues related to the topic of the locality vs. nonlocality of personal identity, which we shall explore in some detail later. Thus one challenge for Open Individualism is to explain how I the author here and now having experience $e_1$—composing these words consciously aware that I am the author—and you the reader then and there having experience $e_2$—reading these words consciously aware that you are not their author—can be one and the same person, numerically identical, in spite of facts such as the following:

a) experience $e_1 \neq e_2$,

b) the subject having experience $e_1$ at time $t_1$ is not simultaneously co-conscious or aware of being (or having been) the subject having experience $e_2$ at time $t_2$,

c) the subject having experience $e_2$ at time $t_2$ is not simultaneously co-conscious or aware of being (or having been) the subject having experience $e_1$ at time $t_1$,

and so on. The challenge is to show how such borders between us are not metaphysical boundaries individuating us into different persons: personal identity is not closed under those individuating and identifying borders. I will try to meet such challenges by showing how it is possible that—contrary to what we may now believe—using our best present notions of what a person is, we could all be (numerically) one and the same individual person existing at many different places at the same time, doing, thinking and experiencing many different things at the same time and over time without being simultaneously co-conscious.
The first step, however, if we are to consider Open Individualism as an actual possibility—given that most of us already are bound by traditional Closed Individualism—is to show how our borders are more like the borders by which we individuate oceans than like the borders by which we individuate pebbles. According to Closed Individualism, and according to those philosophers who wish to preserve appearances and their received view of persons, the borders between us are more like the borders between pebbles than like borders of oceans (or rivers or lakes) because (so they believe) the existence of persons as separate and distinct entities numerically identical to themselves over time is (relatively) well defined. Thus, in ordinary circumstances, the borders along which the boundaries of persons is determined is fixed by the way the world is; discovering boundaries between persons will, according to Closed Individualism, for the most part be no more difficult than discovering the boundaries between pebbles. The identities of persons, like the identities of pebbles, according to traditional Closed Individualism, are more deep than the identities of rivers, lakes, or oceans because the borders individuating persons are, for the most part, sharp and well-defined.

We will begin by calling traditional Closed Individualism into question. Fortunately, traditional Closed Individualism can be called into question fairly easily. Indeed, it has already been called into question in the current literature on personal identity. Derek Parfit, Robert Nozick, and Sydney Shoemaker, for instance—each of whom holds that our borders are not like the borders of pebbles but are “fuzzy” and “variable” like the borders of rivers, lakes, or oceans—have discarded traditional Closed Individualism in favor of variations on the Empty Individual View of Personal Identity. These writers have, each in their own way, developed theories of personal identity that contradict the *single continuous individual assumption*. It follows from their views, as we shall see, that a person can cease to exist for a period of time and yet, without any intermediary stages during which that person exists, survive. These writers have gone so far as to deny, in varying degrees, the *survival and identity assumption*. For instance, as already mentioned, Parfit in his early paper\(^\text{10}\) presented an argument that implied a new sense of “surviving as” in which a person could survive various changes over time without there necessarily existing anyone who is identical to that person. Parfit now says that he has abandoned this view\(^\text{11}\) but, like Shoemaker and others,\(^\text{12}\) still claims that personal identity is not primarily what matters: we can, these authors argue, be related to future persons with whom we are not identical in such a way that this relationship
is as good as ordinary survival. The idea is that you, a particular individual at a particular time, can undergo various changes such that even though no one exists after the changes who is the same person as you, the result is as good as survival—even across borders where identity is not (strictly) preserved.

These views are a long way away from traditional Closed Individualism. By making a strong case that survival is, ultimately, not a matter of discovery but to a certain degree of decision (because it is determined, in part, by “what matters”) these writers suggest that what matters to us at least in part determines survival. This is because, using the various puzzles, these theorists note that the logic of personal survival apparently does not correspond to the logic of personal identity. For instance, the identification of Y as X and Z as X can occur both in, or by, Y and Z even in cases where Y and Z are two contemporaneously existing qualitatively similar branchings of one person, X. And so what matters in survival according to these writers is the continuance of a particular set of survival relations (for Parfit, psychological continuity and/or connectedness), rather than the continuance of identity (since everything that matters is on their view preserved even in cases where identity is not preserved). If the Empty Individualists are on this point correct—that who we are is in part determined by what we believe ourselves to be—then the question of what we can be brought to believe, using the sorts of conceptual analysis for which contemporary analytic philosophy is uniquely suited, may become deeply relevant to our actual lives.

Furthermore, as we shall see, these Empty Individualists have denied the intrinsic features assumption; that is, they believe that whether you shall exist at some time in the future does not merely depend on you, but can depend on external factors, such as who else happens to exist.

Rejecting traditional Closed Individualist assumptions may, and should, seem problematic. The more problematic it seems, however, the better for Open Individualism. For ultimately the competition will turn out to be not between Open Individualism and traditional Closed Individualism (which simply cannot solve the various puzzles of personal identity, neither the practical nor theoretical ones) but between the additional (unproblematic, identity-preserving, or better yet identity-conserving, conservative) step to Open Individualism or the additional (problematic, identity-dissolving, radical) step in the very opposite direction to the Empty Individualism of philosophers such as Parfit, Nozick, Shoemaker, and others (which can in varying degrees solve the various puzzles but with far more radical strain to
the received conceptual framework than Open Individualism).

As we shall see, Empty Individualism implies relativism by stipulating, for instance, that whether two individuations (or, person-stages) are identified across borders as one numerically identical person depends in part on who else exists. Furthermore, Empty Individualism implies reductionism by stipulating that the boundaries of persons consist in, or are reduced to, underlying physiological and/or psychological borders. Or, to put their reductionist proviso more positively, without emphasis on the eliminativist thesis: the reductionist aspect of Empty Individualism requires accepting that you can “as-good-as-survive” at some future time without there existing at that time any person who is numerically identical to you (a move achieved by reducing what matters in survival to something other than personal identity, such as psychological and/or physiological continuity).

I use the term “relativist” in this case with emphasis on the claim that personal identity is determined extrinsically (hence is relative) rather than intrinsically, and not with emphasis on the sense that personal identity might be, loosely speaking, “dependent upon personal or social convention.” Open Individualism is not opposed to one aspect of the relativist thesis, namely, what I have noted in my claim that personal identity is presupposed by, not revealed in, our experience. Open Individualism is thus consistent with, loosely, the “conventional” sense of “relative,” even though in other ways it is a more objective and in some ways more absolute view of personal identity than Empty Individualism. That is, Open Individualism allows (without requiring) what Stephen White has appropriately dubbed “metapsychological relativism”:

The metapsychological facts are those facts about personal identity, responsibility, and the unity and character of the self which are presupposed, rather than settled, by empirical psychology. The relativist claim, then, is that there could be two societies, neither of whose members are either misinformed or irrational, but whose social practices settle the significant metapsychological issues in radically different ways. [Stephen White 1989, pp. 322-323]

It is specifically the ontological (rather than social or epistemological) constructivism that I will argue against. Open Individualism will thus emerge as an absolute (non-relational) identity view that does not preclude (nor does it require) a social constructionist thesis. Absolute personal identity, as construed on the Open Individual View, will as we shall see allow us to understand how we can view ourselves as each being a bordered but boundless entity (not bound by the borders individuating us), that is, as
an entity whose identity is not bound by the borders within which each of us lives our lives.

Ironically, recent variations on the new Empty Individual View of Personal Identity are to a certain extent less antithetical to our Open Individual View than is the traditional Closed Individual View. For although Empty Individualism drops the single continuous entity, the survival and identity and the intrinsic features assumptions, it does not completely drop the individuation and separateness of persons assumption; it does however weaken it. By weakening the individuation and separateness of persons assumption, Empty Individualism makes Open Individualism seem less implausible. What then are the remaining boundaries that prevent us from considering Open Individualism as an actual possibility? One major boundary is the prevailing (received view) belief that a person cannot be at more than one place at the same time, an assumption I call the “Spatial Boundary.” Nozick, for instance, while willing to relax, as does Parfit, the (metaphysical) significance of many of our borders, firmly retains the significance of this one. He believes, as apparently does everyone writing on personal identity except, notably, Parfit (as well as Dennett), that it would be absurd for one person to be at more than one place at a time. But this key assumption—that one person cannot be at more than one place at the same time—like the other apparent boundaries standing in the way of Open Individualism, will in the present work be attacked on several different fronts. We will raise serious doubts about whether such accepted borders between us are necessarily boundaries between persons. In so far as I succeed in raising such doubts, I hope to make some philosophers, especially those who may be generally sympathetic to various aspects of the recent Empty Individualist Views, sit up and take note of a possibility—Open Individualism—that in the present literature on personal identity is not even considered as a possibility. And why not? Sometimes, because assumptions essential to such a view—such as that a person can be at more than one place at the same time—are dismissed outright, without analysis, on grounds of absurdity. Other times, as is the case with Parfit, it is considered but dropped. Parfit is at specific points in his analysis willing to entertain the “bizarre” possibility that one person can be at two different places at the same time. In speaking about an exact, atom-for-atom replica, qualitatively identical to him, Parfit writes:

I need not assume that my Replica on Mars is someone else. Here on Earth, I am not aware of what my Replica on Mars is now thinking. . . . I can believe that I do now have another other stream of consciousness, of which, in this stream, I am now unaware. [Parfit 1984, p. 288]
That is, Parfit can regard himself and his Replica, each of whom exists as a person in two different places at the same time, as one and the same person.

Why these contemporary Empty Individualists—not only Parfit and Nozick and Shoemaker but, as we shall see, Nagel as well—seem so often (without being aware of it) poised at the threshold of Open Individualism without considering the possible connection will reveal both the strength and the weakness of their arguments for their own views. At the same time, I will suggest a solution to the impasse into which the contemporary debate has led us—a solution not in terms of ending the debate with closed questions that are best answered by social or cognitive scientists but, rather, by redirecting the debate into a new and more open view.

In the end the reader may or may not choose to accept Open Individualism as the best view. The reader may prefer one of the variations on Empty Individualism. I would not consider this to be a failure of the present work. The acceptance of Open Individualism on the part of the reader is by no means my only goal. I wish merely to add one more viable alternative for us to choose from. For if freedom can be measured by the number of viable options among which one can choose, then having Open Individualism as a viable option—whether ultimately we choose to accept it or not—can make us freer. (This may apt to sound as not a very interesting sense of becoming freer. But the point is that Open Individualism could be true [in more than merely the logically possible sense] and thus that the truth about us could be even more strange than we may now believe possible—and that seeing this might free us of certain conceptual constraints that are remnants of the received traditional Closed Individualism. It may allow us, even, to draw into reality a more expansive view of ourselves. And if we take those additional steps we will have laid the metaphysical foundations for global ethics.)

Furthermore, by showing that Open Individualism is an actual possibility I hope not only to deliver a Swan Song to the traditional Closed Individualism that is now the received view of both folk and professional psychology (as well as philosophy) but also to point out that some of the presuppositions (themselves remnants of traditional Closed Individualism) accepted by the new Empty Individualist approaches are questionable and thus that any conclusions drawn from them—such as the extremely important and far-reaching view that identity is not what matters primarily in survival on grounds that personal identity is closed under known individuating and identifying borders—ought to be suspect. For instance, in not recognizing the possibility that a person can exist at more than one
place at the same time (i.e., the possibility of personal non-locality), as Nozick, Shoemaker and others have done, or in recognizing the possibility, as Parfit does, and then not recognizing the full implications of it as an actual possibility, these writers make the false assumption that—due to the possibility of a human being fissioning in a way that preserves everything that matters in survival—identity is therefore not what actually matters. Indeed, we shall see that Parfit, Nozick and Shoemaker have not succeeded in making the case for identity not being what matters—that, in spite of the possibility of fission, personal identity does matter, in the relevant sense, and can be viewed as being necessary for relevantly significant survival—and that, consequentially, one can accept, instead, the Open Individual View.

Similarly, it is the failure even to consider the possibility of Open Individualism—the view that personal identity is not closed under known individuating and identifying borders—that leads such writers to make their own “bizarre” claims about the true nature of personal identity that, as we shall see, are no less (and frequently far more) bizarre than Open Individualism. For instance Nozick, as we shall see, believes not only that personal identity is to a degree relative—that who you are depends on who else exists—but that your personal identity is partially determined by your personal values, by whatever you consider important to your concept of self:

What is special about people, about selves, is that what constitutes their identity through time is partially determined by their own conception of themselves, a conception which may vary, perhaps appropriately does vary, from person to person. [Philosophical Explanations, p. 69]

Such extreme subjectivist claims show the extent to which some of our present concepts are pushed (and pushed they should be) when considering the various personal identity puzzles (both “actual” and “theoretical”).

Similarly, the conclusion Parfit draws from the weakening of the apparent boundaries between us is not (as I do) that the borders between contemporaneously existing individual human beings are not necessarily boundaries between persons. Rather, Parfit claims,

the main conclusion to be drawn is that personal identity is not what matters. [Reasons and Persons, p. 255, his emphasis]

Unlike Parfit, we can believe that who I am—my personal identity—does not depend on the existence or non-existence of other people (if you agree then you are against Empty Individualist claims of Parfit and Nozick).
Similarly, we can believe that personal identity is what matters primarily in survival. The reason we can believe this is that we can believe my continued survival requires the preservation of my personal identity—that if there is to be survival then it must be personal identity that matters. However, like Parfit, Nozick, and, among others, Shoemaker, we can believe that our borders are more like oceanic borders than like the borders individuating pebbles. The conclusion we can draw from this, however, is not that personal identity is not what matters but, rather, that the unity of a person is such that survival is possible across borders ordinarily taken to be uncrossable boundaries between persons. Therefore, unlike Parfit, Nozick, and Shoemaker and like Nagel, Williams, Swinburne, and others, we can believe that significant survival (survival that matters) requires identity. But, very much unlike Nagel, Williams, Swinburne, Lewis, and others, we can also believe that the borders which they think are boundaries between persons are not necessarily boundaries between persons, so that a person survives, with identity, not only at more than one place at a time, but everywhere where there is a person.

Thus, ultimately, Open Individualism is an alternative to both traditional Closed Individualism and the Empty Individualism that developed in reaction to it. It is a middle ground between, on the one hand, the conceptually unsound Closed Individualism and, on the other, the radical and conceptually problematical Empty Individualism that improves over Closed Individualism but by dissolving the concept of personal identity and replacing it with other (psychological and/or physiological) relations that do not require identity. Open Individualism dissolves not the importance of personal identity but, instead, dissolves the importance of the boundaries between us by showing how it is possible that personal identity is not closed under known individuating and identifying borders, that is, that personal identity extends beyond our borders.

§ 1.3 PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS

The first step we must take, if Open Individualism is going to remain more than just a fleeting hypothesis, is to see how it is possible that something that appears not to be true could be true. So we will begin by showing how it is possible that, although our borders appear to us to be boundaries between persons, it could be true that—in spite of these appearances—only one person exists and this one person is you and is everyone. In this respect I take Nozick’s [1981] account of philosophical
explanation as the starting point for my thesis. Daniel Dennett [1984] also takes Nozick’s suggestion as a new paradigm of philosophical explanation:

Nozick (1981) urges philosophers to consider abandoning formal proof in favor of a particular sort of philosophical explanation, in which we bring ourselves to see how something we want to believe in could be possible. This is excellent advice, in my opinion, and I take my project in this chapter (and indeed in the entire book) to be an exercise in Nozick’s brand of explanation. [Elbow Room, p. 49n]

Take, for instance, the problem of free will. We would like to have free will. But how is it possible that we have free will, if all actions are causally determined? Even if there is randomness in the world, as implied by quantum mechanics, there seems little, if any, room for free will. Similarly, we would like to know the truth. But how is knowledge possible, given the well-known arguments of the skeptic? And so on. Nozick writes,

The form of these questions is: how is one thing possible, given (or supposing) certain other things? Some statements $r_1, \ldots, r_n$ are assumed or accepted or taken for granted, and there is a tension between these statements and another statement $p$; they appear to exclude $p$’s holding true. Let us term the $r_i$ apparent excluders (of $p$). [Philosophical Explanations, pp. 8-9]

How, then, is $p$ possible, given its apparent excluders? How is it possible that we are all the same person, given the apparent excluders of our all being the same person?

Again let us note that, in asking this, I am not concerned merely to show that Open Individualism is possibly true (in the sense that there is some possible world, $w$, containing apparently many persons, in which that view is true); rather, my concern is to show that reasons for thinking that Open Individualism is actually false are bad reasons. It is important to distinguish these concerns since the first is apt to seem irrelevant (after all, we are concerned with what sorts of things we are in this actual world; it is conceptually interesting, but not especially germane to the topic of personal identity, to learn that there is a possible world in which, for instance, persons are immaterial souls or God dreaming).

Moreover, because we ourselves are bound up in the received view, apparent excluders have a dual function: in the interests of self-preservation, both of the view (theoretical) and of the self (psychological) partly structured by that view, apparent excluders make new views seem improbable and to make the received view seem obvious (e.g. by helping make the theory transparent). Since the starting point for any philosophical explanation is from within an already received view, into which the self is
not just ensconced but bound, apparent excluders of new views are thus at the same time what we might think of as the proverbial other side of the coin and thus call, apparent includers, consisting, typically, both of the facts and/or intuitions that combine to keep us (naively, that is, unreflectively or pre-theoretically) in the received view upon which the apparent excluders/includers bestow the authority of incumbency. They work on at least two fronts, one overt (apparent) and the other covert (non-apparent), embellishing the facts that help structure our intuitions or the intuitions that help guide our interpretations of the facts. On the overt front, we feel the full force of the apparent excluder, the “strangeness” or “implausibility” of the proposition expressing it. On the covert front, we feel not so much the force of the apparent excluder as we do the comforting familiarity and apparent obviousness, the acceptability, indeed, the psychological necessity, of the propositions expressing it. Thus we must in either case see whether some particular Border between us is (constituted in) a fact or (constituted in) an intuition, state in no uncertain terms what these actually are (without any view-theoretic or psychologically loaded embellishments), carefully distinguishing the one from the other and then, while being as mindful of the latter as we know we must be diligent of the former, cross the proverbial path, thin as a razor, between them.

§ 1.4 THE APPARENT EXCLUDERS OF THE OPEN INDIVIDUAL VIEW OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

How could Open Individualism possibly be true, when it has so many apparent excluders? Here is an initial rendering of some of the sorts of borders along which individuation is determined and identification assessed, each an apparent excluder of Open Individualism, each a “real” border, stated in “neutral” (with regard to Closed vs. Open Individualist) language:

1) The Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border: The apparent ability to control immediately certain borders directly in experience onto which the subject is conjoined at the exclusion of others.

2) The Alter Subject Identification Border: Some objects from which I am separated by FEC (e.g. you) are themselves being appeared to by objects (e.g. me) individuated and identified in relation to the (alter) subject exclusively conjoined therein.

3) The Physiological Border: Each human being consists of numerically
distinct physical material.
4) The *Spatial Border*: I am apparently located at any one time at only one spatial location.
5) The *Psychological Border*: Human beings differ in personality, character traits, and memories—that is, human beings differ in their *psychologies*.
6) The *Stream of Consciousness Border*: At any one time each particular, simultaneously coexistent, conscious human being has a qualitatively different “stream of consciousness.”

We shall consider these each in turn throughout the next several chapters. (1)-(6) describe, according to Closed Individualism, some definite and uncrossable boundaries between persons (we will consider several others). Thus, when considering these borders as being actual boundaries (between persons), I will write, for instance, not “Spatial Border” but, rather, “Spatial Boundary,” the “Physiological Boundary,” and so on. If there are any such definite and uncrossable boundaries between us, such that some border determines (i.e., binds) personal identity, then the Open Individual View of personal Identity is a false view. Borders (1)-(6) are thus apparent excluders of Open Individualism. Nozick writes:

Given the (apparent) incompatibility between the apparent excluders and *p*, there are two ways to continue to maintain (the possibility of) *p*. First, one of the apparent excluders can be denied, or there can be a denial of their conjunction all together. To save the possibility of *p*, it is not necessary to prove these denials, only to show we need not accept one of the apparent excluders or their conjunction. Second, each of the apparent excluders can continue to be maintained, while their apparent incompatibility with *p* is removed, either by close scrutiny showing the reasoning from them to not-*p* to be defective, or by embedding them in a wider context or theory that specifies how *p* holds in the face of these apparent excluders. [p. 10]

In other words, if we used Nozick’s first way we could claim that Open Individualism is true by denying the reality of one or more of its apparent excluders—by denying, for instance, that anyone but you is conscious or that anyone but you is a physical body, and so on. We could deny that borders (1) – (6) (which, according to Closed Individualism, are interpersonal boundaries) are real. We could thus claim for instance that you are a hallucinating brain in a vat and that nothing exists but the brain and the vat. In that case, you would be the only person in the universe; since there would be no boundaries between you and anyone else because there would be no one else, you would be a being that was bordered but not bound (like the universe itself, in the view of some cosmologists such as, most notably,
Stephen Hawking) and thus Open Individualism would be a true, if trivial, thesis. But Open Individualism does not require that sort of solipsistic skepticism, nor does one need to be that sort of solipsist or skeptic to accept it. We need not claim anything at all like that. We can in fact accept that (1) – (6) describe real borders (within a person) that nevertheless are not boundaries (between persons): they are not what personal identity consists in. Thus I will use the term *border* to refer to individuations that exist (or that we believe exist) within a person (though that person may not be consciously aware of it), and the term *boundary* to refer to some such border that (we believe) indicates or fixes the limiting boundary, or extent of a person (independently of whether it actually does). And so we need not deny the truth or reality of any of the apparent excluders (1) – (6). Instead, we can use Nozick’s second way of maintaining the possibility of *p* in light of its apparent excluders, *r*. We thus need to show how each apparent excluder is merely an apparent, rather than an actual, excluder of Open Individualism—that each of the borders (1) – (6) is not necessarily a boundary between persons. We will do this by performing what I call, “Conceptual Boundary Dissolves.”

§ 1.5 DISSOLVING OUR BOUNDARIES

A *Conceptual Boundary Dissolve*—what I call, simply, a *Boundary Dissolve*—is an example showing how the metaphysical significance ordinarily accorded to some border that supposedly requires us to view that border as an inter-personal boundary, can be dissolved. Showing how it is possible that personal identity is not bound by borders which, according to Closed Individualism, are absolute and uncrossable boundaries between persons, can weaken our intellectual commitment and emotional attachment to Closed Individualism, freeing us from having to view that particular border as a boundary, thereby “dissolving” the metaphysical significance accorded to that particular border under Closed Individualism. Such a philosophical explanation does not erase the border. It merely demonstrates how it is possible that *p*₁ and *p*₂, individuated by some border, *b*₁—such that there is a way of counting, or separating, *p*₁, via *b*₁, from *p*₂—can nonetheless in spite of *b*₁ be identified as the distinct individuations of one and the same numerically identical person.

A *personal boundary*, or, simply, *boundary*, is a border that represents an absolute limit of personal identity (identity stops there); a *personal border*, or, simply, *border*, is one that does not. (In a sense, Boundaries are
“metaphysically opaque,” Borders are “metaphysically transparent.”) So a Boundary Dissolve, in so far as it is the conceptual removal of a conceptual obstacle, is a philosophical explanation (in Nozick’s sense) of how it is possible that some particular border that apparently defines the limit, or boundary, of personal identity is not really an excluder of identity. A Boundary Dissolve works by showing us

1) how some such boundary can without absurdity be demoted from the status of (inter-personal) boundary to the status of (intra-personal) border,
2) that the reasons for viewing that border as a boundary are bad reasons, and/or
3) that unless such metaphysical devaluing is made possible within our conceptual framework for the identification of persons, the ordinary notion of a personal identity is either dissolved or reduced to nothing or to absurdity.

Understanding how it is possible that personal identity is not bound by some border, b, is a way of demonstrating how you, a person, can exist as one numerically identical person in spite of (what can be coherently imagined must be possible). In doing so, we illuminate the real (rather than merely imaginary) constraints as to how we may choose to draw our boundaries based on which borders we actually take to be significant in the determining of personal identity. Such a philosophical analysis (without reliance on proof) does not preclude discovering the truth about ourselves. It can even help us to correct our views about ourselves so that they more closely track the truth when our beliefs about ourselves are inconsistent or in error. Thus, since we need to show how it is possible that personal identity is not bound by borders 1-6 (apparent excluders 1-6), one answer to the question, “What sort of being am I?” will turn out to be this: “I am a bordered being without boundaries.” In other words, to claim that we are all the same, numerically identical person is to claim that the (real) borders individuating us do not (in reality) individuate us into numerically distinct persons.

One way to perform a Boundary Dissolve is by taking some particular border, b, which, according to Closed Individualism, is accorded the status of metaphysical boundary between persons, and showing how b is already considered, in Closed Individualism, as a border within one person. Boundaries are person-dividers. Typically, the reason b is viewed as a boundary is that the believer in Closed Individualism is not aware that b already obtains within him (if he were, and he wished to be coherent, then
either a Closed Individualist would not use $b$ to draw boundaries between us, or else he would not view himself as the same continuously existing person over time). Once it is seen, not just theoretically but experientially, that $b$ already obtains within and among individuations presently identified, in Closed Individualism, as one person, the Closed Individualist can then correct the (previously masked) incoherence of his view about his personal identity by lowering the metaphysical significance ordinarily accorded to $b$ and thereby extending, expanding, or dissolving his boundaries, or he can choose to keep the metaphysical significance ordinarily accorded to $b$, thereby narrowing his boundaries.

In either case, a Boundary Dissolve improves the coherence of our view of ourselves. If border $b_1$ is considered a boundary between persons and it turns out that, upon closer analysis, it is also an excluder of Closed Individualism (because, typically, the Closed Individualist is not aware that $b_1$ already obtains within what is already taken to be personal unity), but we are not willing to lessen the metaphysical significance of $b_1$, then not only is Open Individualism false, Closed Individualism is also false: in that case there are no continuously existing identical persons in the ordinary sense. The truth, if we wish to preserve the value presently accorded $b$ as a metaphysical boundary and also to hold a coherent view of personal identity may in that case be found in some version of Empty Individualism. A Boundary Dissolve, then, may take the form of a dilemma: either dissolve the metaphysical significance of boundary $b$ or dissolve the metaphysical significance of personal identity.

The sort of move we will rely on in using Boundary Dissolves is in some ways analogous to the following. Suppose that believers in the “Closed Individual View of Voting” are such that the Joneses are considered as having the legitimate right to vote but the Smiths are not. Someone asks a Closed Individualist the following. What principle, or set of principles, is it that grants to Jones the right to vote while not granting the same right to Smith? The answer is that some principle, $P_1$, gives Jones that right and excludes Smith. However, it is pointed out to the Closed Individualist, $P_1$ applies both to Jones and to Smith. The Closed Individualist then evokes some other principle, $P_2$, which excludes Smith. However, it is then pointed out that $P_2$ also excludes Jones. If, at the end of the analysis of the Closed Individual View of Voting, it turned out that any principle, $P$, that includes Jones also includes Smith, and any principle, $P$, that excludes Smith also excludes Jones, we could conclude either that Jones and Smith should both be allowed to vote or both be excluded from voting. That is what I will
claim is the truth about personal identity: either, on our best understanding of who we are, we are best viewed as being all the same person or we are best viewed as not being continuously existing persons who are numerically identical to themselves over time at all. Open Individualism will turn out in the end to be not just possible but the best view.

What makes the Boundary Dissolves possible is that the concept of personal identity functions both as a sort of metaphysical glue—an (intra-personal) unifier across borders—and as metaphysical scissors—as an (inter-personal) divider of individuating boundaries. As a unifying concept, it binds the earlier to the later stages of ourselves. As a dividing concept, it separates us from each other. So, for instance, using a particular Border as a Boundary I must show how it is possible that what I already take to be me is, indeed, me, and then I must follow through to see how far this extends my personal identity. What the appropriate Boundary Dissolve will show is that in each case the plausible view is that I extend much further or much narrower than Closed Individualism allows; indeed, a Boundary Dissolve may project me not just into familiar territory already accepted as my own but even into territories that I may, prior to the requisite philosophical analysis, have taken as belonging to someone else. I am then left with a choice: either I can accept that in reality I am far more than what ordinarily I take myself to be, or I can somehow strengthen the status of some border in question such that the Boundary Dissolve does not extend me across it. However, in strengthening the border I may find that, with the border so strengthened, I am then far less than what I ordinarily take myself to be. Thus each successful Boundary Dissolve will show us how, while the Closed Individual View is false, a proper philosophical analysis cannot sustain the status quo as a viable view because any proper analysis will always grant too little or too much: ultimately, we are in each case left either with the view of ourselves as constantly dying in short-lived instants, at each experience of which there is the illusion of identity, or else one in which we cheat death but with a vengeance.

Boundary Dissolves can thus be viewed as a conceptual apparatus for taking imaginary pictures of an imaginary object, the concept of a person, which may or may not correspond to the truth (there may not be any truth to correspond to). By thus improving the coherence of our abstract conceptual art we can see what could be seen if seeing past the appearances to whatever truth is by them hidden, were possible.
§ 1.6 PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT PROOF

Each supposedly uncrossable metaphysical boundary between us is a conceptual barrier to our viewing ourselves as all being one and the same person—is an apparent excluder of Open Individualism. By constructing a case in which personal identity extends across borders that, according to the apparent excluder in question, are definite and uncrossable (metaphysical) boundaries between persons, we will see how it is possible that the border that purportedly separates us into different persons is not a metaphysical boundary between persons. Seeing how in each case this is possible will thus show how Open Individualism can be true in spite of its many apparent excluders. This part of our analysis will not by itself prove that Open Individualism is true. But even if in the end I succeed in proving that Open Individualism is true this would not thereby help us to understand how Open Individualism can be true—any more than having the proof that the universe (whatever it is) exists (a proof we do have) helps us in any way to understand how it is possible that the universe exists rather than, for instance, there being nothing at all. Nozick makes this same point as follows:

A proof of \( p \) will give us the conviction that \( p \) is true, but it need not give us understanding of how \( p \) can be true (given the apparent excluder). [Philosophical Explanations, p. 10]

Thus, I will first explain how Open Individualism is possible in spite of its apparent excluders. I will thereby show that the traditional borders people have used to draw metaphysical boundaries separating people from people are individually and collectively subject to serious criticism. Traditional Closed Individualism and Empty Individualism are flawed views, the former more deeply so than the latter (due, in part, perhaps to the shallowness of the latter).

Why do this? First, there is, I believe, intrinsic merit to such a demonstration. To borrow another remark of Nozick’s about his own book, Philosophical Explanations,

When this book explores hypotheses depicting eccentric possibilities, as it sometimes does, even a reader who is convinced the hypothesis fails, who will not take the possibility seriously, even a reader who does not enjoy (as I do) the playful exploration of possibilities for its own sake, may see benefit in the increased understanding gained. [p. 12]

Second, I hope in the end to produce, by the method of \textit{via negativa}, a cumulative impression in the reader’s mind that will make Open Individualism seem more plausible than it now seems. And I hope to do this
not by making any far-fetched claims about what a person is but by pointing out in a negative way why the borders between us are not necessarily boundaries between persons. In this way I will show that Closed Individualism is vulnerable to a variety of criticisms of a sort that, by relying on those same intuitions, collectively point in the direction of Open Individualism.

Third, I believe that Open Individualism is not merely possible but that it is a genuine option in William James’ sense. If Open Individualism were not a genuine option, then, for the practical side of our ordinary, day-to-day lives which, alas, even philosophers, qua human beings, must lead, Open Individualism would seem, at best, a mere intellectual curiosity, an amusing idea, a clever theme for a science fiction novel. For philosophers qua philosophers, on the other hand, it could of course still have the status of, say, the skeptic’s demonstration of the possibility that you are right now a brain in a vat. Knowing that you might right now be a hallucinating brain in a vat—recognizing this to be a conceptual and logical possibility—is a problem for an epistemologist, not a bricklayer standing in an (albeit possibly nonexistent) unemployment line, wondering about the (albeit possibly imaginary) hungry family waiting at home. Recognizing Open Individualism as a conceptual possibility might have similar (ir)relevancy; for as the brain-in-the-vat possibility might turn a philosopher into an epistemological skeptic, so the possibility of Open Individualism might turn a philosopher into a skeptic about Closed Individualism (assuming the reader already isn’t one), or into a skeptic about the existence of persons.

But if Open Individualism won’t do much for the proverbial man on the street it really won’t do much for the philosopher, either, who, after all, when not being a philosopher is the man (or woman) on the street. In this respect I agree wholeheartedly with William James when he says that “the whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one.” This is particularly germane to the issue of personal identity where, as Parfit, Nozick, and other philosophers have shown, ultimately the conceptual walls out of which we have erected metaphysical boundaries between us are constructed not merely out of facts but also in part out of our own beliefs and values and the interpretations we make of our experience based on them. Thus, how we reason and what we may be brought to believe about ourselves at each step along the way is of importance to the question of personal identity. Kant and Sartre, for instance, both argued—from quite different positions—
toward a related position, namely, that one very important—perhaps even most important—consideration regarding the question of whether or not we have free will is determined, first and foremost, by the question of whether or not we can be brought, using our best available conceptual and/or phenomenological abilities, to believe that we do. (Daniel Dennett, in his most recent book on free will, 17 goes in the same direction.) Likewise, in drawing conclusions about personal identity using the best of our abilities we draw not just a theory or a conceptual framework: we draw ourselves.

Now, a Boundary Dissolve might function at either the conceptual (theoretical, philosophical) or experiential (phenomenal, psychological) level, or both. At the theoretical, philosophical level, it may succeed as a conceptual analysis of what our (real) possibilities are. At the phenomenal, psychological level, it may produce a change experientially by changing the way we perceive ourselves. That is, accepting a Boundary Dissolve might mean accepting, intellectually, that either my personal identity must extend across some border or else I am not a continuously existing person. Or, it may mean viewing myself, deeply and emotionally, in a way that affects my day-to-day life by accepting that my personal identity extends further than I previously may have thought. None of the Boundary Dissolves in the present work require, or presuppose, a change of the latter sort (though they will allow for it). But they can along such lines serve to remind us of how we may have constructed our view of ourselves based on presently accepted (likewise imaginary) Boundary Dissolves with little (if any) sound idea as to how such a move is possible in actuality. That is, most of us already find ourselves embedded in a psychology (one precipitated from Closed Individualism) ungrounded by any deep metaphysical truths. We interpret ourselves automatically according to Closed Individualism; like the man on the street, most of us already live inside our interpretations, for the extent of our lives embedded inside psychological territories sustained, and generated by, scientific ignorance, naive folk theory, or both. And as philosophers we must be careful not to allow ourselves to be unduly influenced by the state of our psychologies.

At the same time, Open Individualism provides conceptual scaffolding for making it possible to alter our psychologies: to actually experience ourselves differently. Before there were countries, for instance, someone had to invent the possibility of identifying ourselves across various borders, such as those defined by family, tribe, or even city-state. Somebody had to show how it is possible that people could exist as a unity with diverse interests toward a common “state,” (an example of a “political Boundary
Interestingly enough, both for liberalism and for Marxism, nations are supposed to be stepping stones, in the historical development of humanity, toward some future unification of the world. In each case there is required some initially experientially inactive, purely intellectual, concept that leads to a patriotic feeling within human beings that is then in turn heightened, by various religious or political symbols and rituals, such that it becomes an active experiential ingredient in, and sustainer of, actual political unity. The philosophy of Open Individualism thus provides a conceptual framework by which the understanding of our metaphysical unity can in turn make it possible for our actually living in a morally unified world—where the unification is not imposed from without but discovered from within—should we choose to do so.

Or, take the example of language. Before there was language it had to be shown, through various signs, that what was going on within these borders, “in here” (me), and what is going on within those borders, “in there” (you), could be identified as the same sort of goings-on, so that people could learn to function with some requisite degree of unity. Actual language makes experientially perspicuous what before language was only conceptually possible, and today the linguistic conceptual framework creates conscious unity among us well above what unity there was before. Similarly, Open Individualism provides us with such a conceptual framework as a prerequisite for experiencing ourselves as a unity. Nobody discovered language, nor probably even consciousness itself; these conceptual and experiential unities had to be “invented” through the brain (or, constructed through the organism) through various stages of possibilities before emerging into the world as actualities.

To limit philosophy to proof is to exorcise from it its profound ability to alter our future. In moving away from striving for “knock-down arguments” towards what may be considered speculative metaphysics in a distinctive synergy of analysis and experience for the purpose of building the foundations for a new, global ethics, we may return to philosophy its original creative function.

Limiting philosophy to proof is also to limit it to the past. The psychological individuations we call “beliefs” consist in thoughts wrapped in attitudes. Ultimately, agreeing or disagreeing with a particular view is rarely, even for those of us who are philosophers, the effect of being presented with a proof. If being presented with a proof were a necessary condition for the having of a propositional attitude, then reasoning could never have gotten off the ground, since the first proof must already have
relied on the having of appropriate attitudes. Rather, our conclusions are, typically, the effect of the attitudes we already have—attitudes that have been conditioned into our conceptualizing by what has been shown to be possible in the past. That is, except in some very rare cases, we check our propositions against our psychological attitudes, not the other way around. In that sense, believing that some proposition, \( p \), is true, is as it were not something we do but, rather, something that happens to us.\(^{19}\) This is because instead of reason simply guiding our psychological attitudes, our psychological attitudes guide our reasoning and perhaps this is why learning the techniques of philosophy (such as learning how to unwrap our psychological attitudes from our propositions) so often leads philosophers to disagree about so much.

One obvious way to proceed with “making the case for” Open Individualism would be to extract ourselves from our attitudes and “see ourselves objectively.” On some other topic this might be achievable. The topic of personal identity, however, is so far-reaching and encompassing in terms of our self-conceptualizations, that this is all but impossible. That is why we will proceed in a way that does not require the removal of attitudes from all our propositions about ourselves. On the contrary, it requires just the opposite: instead of creating a new logical (and/or propositional) structure and then seeing whether our present attitudes can coherently sustain it, we begin with strict adherence to our deepest attitudes as guides in constructing our conceptual scaffolding and then seeing which new propositions can coherently be hung upon it. What makes it possible to do this is that close analysis of our deeply held present attitudes—contrary to what we may now believe—shows them not to be coherent with the logical space described by any version of Closed Individualism (nor, ultimately, of Empty Individualism), but they are not among themselves inconsistent or incoherent: rather, they track a very different view. The different view they track is Open Individualism.

I should also perhaps say that the belief that we are each a different person is so deeply ingrained in us that the acceptance of Open Individualism would more than likely entail something akin to a Kuhnian “paradigm shift,”\(^{20}\) or what R.G. Collingwood called the “breakdown” of “absolute presuppositions.”\(^{21}\) We need not attempt to make such a transformation in the present work, though we can get it started. What we can do along the way is to show in what ways our present paradigms are inadequate for dealing with the problem of personal identity—that on this matter presently we are indeed at an “intellectual crisis.” And, by showing how the concept
of personal identity extends us across our borders I hope to bring us to the very brink of the sort of conceptual change characterized by a paradigm shift or the breakdown of absolute presuppositions. My hope is that by lingering for a while on the threshold without crossing it we can at least sneak a peek at what awaits us on the other side.

§1.7 ISN’T OPEN INDIVIDUALISM ALREADY KNOWN TO BE FALSE?

Open Individualism has so many immediate and obvious apparent excluders that it seems patently absurd to even conjecture that we are all the same person. I’ve recently been to India, you haven’t. Doesn’t that make us essentially different? A woman puts on a bra—am I, a male, thus a transvestite? You’re thirsty, I drink a beer—have I thereby quenched your thirst? I was born in Zagreb in 1955, the only child of Rajka and Miro. Are your parents named Rajka and Miro? Are you from Zagreb? Are you an only child? And so on.

These sorts of objections illustrate the way in which through the narrowly focused glasses of folk psychology Open Individualism appears as a misty blur, an absurd phantasm so obviously contradicted by our senses, our language, our thoughts—in short, by the whole of our experience—that it couldn’t possibly be true. The belief that we are each a different person, on the other hand, focused so sharply by the glasses of common sense that its image has by now etched itself into the very lenses of perception, appears so obviously true and untainted by doubt that in our everyday lives we don’t even question it.

Many philosophers, who until they analyze an issue for themselves and pick it apart rely on their common sense as much as anyone else, would initially tend to dismiss Open Individualism on exactly such grounds; they would claim that Open Individualism is absurd, logically incoherent, already known to be false, etc. Thus I will first address this obvious common-sense objection that Open Individualism couldn’t possibly be true because it is an already-known-to-be-false absurdity, a conceptual and logical impossibility. As Nozick remarks:

The strongest mode of exclusion would be logical incompatibility: the apparent excluders, in conjunction, logically (appear to) imply that \( p \) is false; they imply the negation of \( p \), which we may write as not-\( p \). [Philosophical Explanations, p. 9]

If it were the case that the apparent barriers to Open Individualism,
apparent excluders (1) - (6), implied that Open Individualism was a logical impossibility, then we couldn’t use Nozick’s second way of showing how \( p \) is possible in spite of its apparent excluders \( r \). We would have to use the first way; namely, we would have to show that the apparent excluders (1) - (6) are each false. Since we need not believe that the apparent excluders (1) - (6) are false we need not proceed in this way.

It is therefore imperative that we first demonstrate that Open Individualism is possible. To do this, we must describe a possible world that is qualitatively indistinguishable from the actual world, makes sense at least intuitively, entails no logical contradictions, and in which Open Individualism is true. Of course, this will not by itself make the slightest case for Open Individualism. The demonstration of Open Individualism as a logical possibility merely provides the first, opening chapter of our Open Individualist Manifesto.

§ 1.8 CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE COSMIC TOWERS: A PARABLE

Imagine a huge, monolithic tower of black metal boxes numbered in sequence like the locked mailboxes at your local post office. Through the center of the tower runs a spiral staircase, giving the curator access to all the boxes. Within each box, say the one numbered 1001, there is information about, among other things, the contents of the other boxes in the tower. This information is fairly accurate concerning the contents of the lower-numbered boxes—the 1000th, 999th, 998th, and so on—but fairly inaccurate concerning most of the contents of the higher-numbered boxes—in this case the 1002nd, 1003rd, and so on. And the reliability gets worse and worse the further one goes in either direction, though the accuracy deteriorates much faster in the upward direction.

The tower has a name—it is called “Daniel Kolak.” Part of the information in each box contains what we ordinarily might call “the physical state of the world at a particular moment.” Another part of the information in each box contains what we ordinarily might call my “subjective point of view of existing as an individual at a particular spatiotemporal location in the world.”

The curator’s name is Consciousness. A viewing device allows Consciousness to compile any sequence of boxes into a virtual reality experience such that he can go at will from one sequence of boxes to another and observe that particular section of Daniel Kolak (DK).
Whenever this is done Consciousness momentarily loses the particular point of view of being the Cosmic Curator standing on a spiral staircase and peeking into a black metal box and instead experiences the subjective point of view contained inside the box—for instance, that of DK at his sixteenth birthday party in Bethesda drinking champagne and smoking a cigar for the first time.

One can conceive how such a state of affairs could be possible in terms of the way we sometimes explain how the medium containing particular information can become “transparent” in the following sorts of ways. When we are told for instance that information-carrying waves of air called “sound waves” producing pressure against our inner ear cause the sounds we hear as such we may wonder why we do not ordinarily perceive the sound waves as air pressure. One standard sort of answer is that the air pressure is interpreted automatically, e.g., “compiled by the brain,” as voice or music or whatever, without any conscious control on our part and without any of the intermediary levels showing up in our consciousness. The intermediary levels can in that sense be called “transparent.” Similarly, we are told for instance that looking at the world we do not perceive the electrical impulses of our neurons firing at the back of our retinas as the firing of neurons but, rather, that we perceive the firings of neurons not as the firings of neurons but as colors and shapes because the way the information is encoded into the electrical impulses is “transparent” to consciousness; what we are consciously aware of at the end of such a causal chain is the direct and unencumbered interpreted reconstruction of the electrical impulses as images. Similarly, in the Cosmic Towers, we can understand how when the curator, Consciousness, peers into a particular box, Consciousness does not perceive whatever medium the information in the boxes is encoded in. Rather, Consciousness is “hooked” directly past the medium to the message.

In other words, when Consciousness experiences the contents of a box a particular part of DK “comes to life” and is subjectively experienced as “the present.” Seen “from the inside,” as it were, this subjective experience seems to be an integral part of a continuously flowing sequence—what ordinarily we might call “the mental life of DK.” But this sequence, like the continuity of experience and of time, is in this example an illusion. Since any particular Box contains information—“memories”—only from the lower numbered boxes (what ordinarily I would call “my past”), the order in which Consciousness sequences the boxes does not matter at all. The subjective point of view will always be that of DK continuously
experiencing the world, as I now seem to be experiencing it.

So, what would it be like to be DK in this other possible world? It would be like being DK in this actual world, the world of my occurrent immediate experience. For whether Consciousness goes in ordinal sequence from box 1001 to 1002 to 1003 to 1004, or whether Consciousness goes out of sequence from box 1001 to 23 to 12 to 10467, the subjective experience of a “continuous flow” from past to present to future will be the same. Consciousness can even go back to the same box a hundred times, it will not matter from the subjective first person point of view—it will not matter in the least to DK. No matter how Consciousness samples the contents of DK, so long as Consciousness does not leave information about the true nature of Consciousness encoded in any box, the world in DK’s immediate experience will appear to DK exactly as it does now appear to me, apparently “flowing” from past to future.

Near the Cosmic Tower called DK stands a Cosmic Tower called YOU. Perhaps scaffolding connects YOU and DK so that Consciousness can easily travel from one floor of YOU to another floor of DK with ease.

Suppose Consciousness just viewed Boxes 1001 to 19001 in Cosmic Tower YOU, resulting in the subjective experience of reading this book. Then, Consciousness walks over to Cosmic Tower DK and views boxes 993 to 103,892, resulting in the subjective experience of writing this book. Then Consciousness goes back to YOU and inspects boxes 20188 to 21000, resulting in the subjective experience of your vehement criticism of this book. Then Consciousness goes back to boxes 105,033 to 110,999 in DK, resulting in the subjective experience of my defending this book against your vehement criticisms.

In other words, what I call “my” subjective experience and what you call “your” subjective experience are really the subjective experiences of one and the same Consciousness. And so on: no matter how many Cosmic Towers there are, Consciousness, the Cosmic Curator, is the subjective consciousness of each tower. Consciousness can go from being Hitler to being Anne Frank merely by stepping from one Cosmic Tower into another; in that sense Consciousness is Winston Churchill and Hitler and Gandhi and everybody.

Many Towers, one Consciousness. The story involves no conceptual impossibilities, no logical contradictions—even if the Towers are infinite in number, representing not only all the so-called “individual persons” of this world but all the individual persons on all the worlds in this universe and in all other possible universes as well. One might object, perhaps, that the
“Consciousness and the Cosmic Towers” story is incompatible with functionalism or with accepted canons of simplicity in explanation. Either or both claims might well be true. But unless functionalism or the accepted cannons of simplicity in explanation are logically necessary truths, which I do not believe anyone thinks they are, such objections would miss the point of the example. The “Consciousness and the Cosmic Towers” is merely intended as a demonstration of the logical possibility that Cosmic Unity is true; that is, the point of the story is not to make any claims about what is the case, but rather to make a claim about what could conceivably be the case.

One might also object that the parable entails determinism. But we can imagine any number of variations. For instance, Consciousness could also be the author of the contents in the boxes, and conceivably there could even be a way for Consciousness to “write” the information “from the inside,” while Consciousness seemed to be undergoing whatever experience is described in the box, such that the contents of all other boxes changed accordingly and simultaneously so as to provide “consistency.”

The “Consciousness and the Cosmic Towers” story describes a possible world in which everything you and I seem right now to be experiencing as separately existing individual persons in a complex world of many such separately existing individuals, could in reality turn out to be the subjective experiences of a single person, named, “Consciousness.” Except for exploiting the vagueness and ambiguities of terms like “consciousness,” “person,” “you,” “me,” “experience,” and so on (which we shall clarify and disambiguate in due course), we have not misused language in any serious way. Most importantly, in imagining the world of many Cosmic Towers run by a single curator, Consciousness, we have not employed any logical contradictions. Yet the logical relations in that world—a world qualitatively indistinguishable from this world, from the world in your immediate experience right now as you read this—sustain relations like “you” and “me,” without sustaining the metaphysical boundaries that entail the existence of other persons.

This far-fetched example is of course not meant be anything more than that. We are as yet nowhere near the end of our story but only just barely at the beginning.
NOTES

1 By “metaphysical significance” I mean, simply, that the referent, or designated object, of the evaluation (in this case, a pebble), covers more than the immediate object present in my experience. I am thus obliged to extend my judgment beyond what is available to me in the present moment and in that regard I am involved in metaphysics, regardless of how unproblematic or obvious the judgment may seem, because of the nature of our language, to be.

2 Thus in one important sense (in the computer-theoretic sense) we can say that a theory compiles experience.

3 Cog is the name of the robot at MIT that Daniel Dennett and I discuss in our “Consciousness, Self and Reality,” where we consider what it means to ask whether Cog or other sorts of beings are conscious. See §11.4.

4 In my native Serbo-Croatian, for instance, there is no word that carries, even remotely, the meaning of the English word “mind.” I thus found it extremely unsettling when, as a child, having recently emigrated to the U.S. from the former Yugoslavia, I listened to Mrs. O’Connor, my third class teacher, trying to explain to me the meaning of a word for which I did not have the concept. She hoped in the process to make the word clearer to the rest of the class and at first this seemed to work, but then the class became progressively more confused. I walked away from the experience with the unpleasant thought that perhaps all words, in all languages, refer, ultimately, to nothing real.

5 Brian Garrett pointed this out to me.

6 In his initial personal correspondence to me Parfit claimed not to be denying this, but he has since acknowledged in his most recent correspondence to me that he does seem to deny it by what he says.


8 It would be interesting to know what James meant by calling Royce’s pantheistic idealism manly, and whether he would regard Schrödinger’s as more manly or less.

9 This of course still leaves room for the possibility that we are distinct instantiations of the same universal.

10 As originally stated in his article, “Personal Identity.”

11 As revised from the original position in later printings (it was Peter Unger who pointed out to me the differing wordings in various printings) of his Reasons and Persons.
12 See Shoemaker and Swinburne’s *Personal Identity*, Nozick’s *Philosophical Explanations*, and Parfit’s *Reasons and Persons*, relevant sections reprinted in my *Self and Identity*.

13 For a good discussion of social constructionism, see Harré’s *Personal Being*, relevant section reprinted in my *Self and Identity*.

14 In my view, (1)-(6) can be regarded as true statements about human beings, not about persons. We could thus follow Locke’s distinction between the identity of a man (i.e., of a human being)—which involves the identity of a particular animal—and the identity of a person—which does not. See chapter five of the present work, where I discuss this distinction in more detail, and Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 340. For a similar contemporary view that relies on this sort of distinction see Shoemaker and Swinburne’s *Personal Identity*, especially pp. 77-79.

15 Literally, “The Negative Way,” the method used by the medievals, particularly Nicholas Cusa, Maimonides, and St. Thomas Aquinas, who tried to discover the nature of God not by clarifying positively what God *is* but by pointing out in a negative way what God *is not*. The most illuminating use of it is in Cusa’s blend of Neoplatonic philosophy and thirteenth-century mysticism (which itself grew out of an opposition to Scholastic Aristotelianism) tempered by Cusa’s analogies from mathematics. Just as Kant would later claim that the categories of reason, with their opposites and contradictions, can only give us a limited and inadequate representation of reality—itself beyond our direct access and understanding—the problem as Cusa saw it is that reason (*ratio*) is by its nature discursive (Latin: *discurrere*, “to run about”). This means that because our thinking is discursive any conclusions drawn upon it are attained through a series of inferences, not by direct insight. Although the intellect (*intellectus*) transcends this limitation insofar as it is capable of intuitive cognitions (apprehended all at once), such as insights, ordinary language cannot adequately express these intuitions because it relies necessarily on categories, oppositions, and contradictions that exist only at the finite, relative level of immediate appearances. Thus the unity of opposites in ultimate reality—Cusa’s “everything is everything”—can never be directly attained by us; however, when the mind sees that it cannot attain this realization, it is then already enlightened, at which point it can transcend its limitations. In other words, during the brief instant that the mind can see (not just believe in) its own limits, it transcends its own limits, it transcends itself toward the infinite. That is the “learned ignorance” that, according to Cusa and, I would imagine, the original Socrates, is the main goal of philosophy. For a fuller exposition of these ideas, see my *From the Presocratics to the Present: A Personal Odyssey*. 
For an example of a contemporary skeptic who does not believe in persons or even in his own existence, see Peter Unger, “Why There Are No People,” and his incredible “I Do Not Exist.” Unger has since somewhat modified his position into a “minimalist physical” view.


For a fuller exposition between my distinction between psychological and cognitive attitudes, see my In Search of God: the Language and Logic of Belief.

This, I think, is the upshot of certain aspects of Wittgenstein’s views on the nature of the relation between language and thought; see my Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.

Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics. In this regard I think Collingwood’s less famous notion is a good deal superior to Kuhn’s.
BORDER CONTROL

You are what you control and care for.
Daniel C. Dennett, “The Origins of Selves”

The proverbial man on the street, more than likely, believes that the seemingly obvious, common-sense distinction implied by concept pairs like “me and you,” “inner world and outer world,” “subject and object,” “self and other,” and so on, based on his apparent ability to control immediately certain borders directly in his experience at the exclusion of others necessarily precludes the possibility that he is everyone. Is this belief correct?

§2.1 APPARENT EXCLUDER (1): THE FACT OF EXCLUSIVE CONJOINMENT

“You tell me I am everyone; how then do you explain the fact that some people try to harm me? I don’t want to harm myself; when I’m near a cliff, for instance, I carefully control my movements so as not to fall; when near a stove I try to avoid burning myself, and so on. So, if all the ‘other’ people are really me—including the muggers who just followed me into a dark alley—then to the degree that I can control my own movements I should be able to control theirs. But I can’t. The muggers, against my will, beat me up and take my money; behind my back my accountant cheats me; my enemies try to usurp my power at every turn. What good is Open Individualism when for all practical purposes I live in a world where my ability to distinguish myself from others is basic to my survival?”

This sort of response shows how the conceptual boundary between self and other, indeed between me and everything else in my entire perceivable universe—personal being bound within, yet separate from, all the rest of cosmic being—derives from my apparent ability to control immediately certain borders directly in my experience onto which I am conjoined at the exclusion of others. Thus when I exclaim, as I bring my arms to my chest,
This is me” and then point to you or the chair and say “That is not me,” what I mean, without assuming any presuppositions that go beyond the character of my own experience or accepting in advance traditional Closed Individualism, is this: “I am apparently able to control immediately this border directly in my experience onto which I am conjoined at the exclusion of that one.” I am drawing an ostensive boundary between us based on an incontrovertible fact about my experience, which I call “the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment,” or FEC:

FEC: The apparent ability to control immediately certain borders directly in experience onto which the subject is conjoined at the exclusion of others.

In other words, render your experience “non-immediate,” “indirect” “compounded by layers of interpretation”—e.g. “thick,” in C.I. Lewis’s sense—as you like, distancing thereby the subject (hermeneutically) from its objects, you cannot escape being drawn (phenomenologically) into your (interpreted, indirect, compiled) experience, literally, locked into the thick of it, by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment. For no matter to what degree the borders in experience are “subjective” in the sense that they depend for their particulars upon the subject (even if entirely, for their existence as such, in say Berkeley’s, Fichte’s, Schopenhauer’s, or especially Schelling’s sense), this very dependence upon the subject is, itself, at the same time, necessarily, and to a certain but always pragmatically significant degree, dynamically independent from the subject, so much so that the subject is conjoined onto the former at the exclusion of the latter. “Thick but locked,” experience at the most basic level involves, necessarily, “independence friendly”—to borrow an apt phrase from Jaakko Hintikka—border dynamics.

It certainly is a fact about my experience that I am thus exclusively conjoined onto “my” limbs, “my” point of view (I am “here,” not “there,” where “you” are), “my” memories (I can remember my sixteenth birthday, not yours); and so on. I am thus exclusively conjoined because—regardless of what else may be going on, as it were, “behind (or beyond) the scenes”—I am apparently unable to immediately control directly in my experience borders interpreted (automatically, i.e., compiled) as e.g. your limbs, the clouds I see up in the sky, the flight of birds, your memories, etc., in the way that in my experience I am apparently able to control immediately borders interpreted (automatically, i.e., compiled) as e.g. my limbs, my thoughts, my memories, etc.. This dependence/independence relation between subject and object may be causal, covariational, epiphenomenal,
phenomenological, metaphysical, magical, illusory, mystical, etc., but as stated it is a fact. More than that: the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment is an *experiential divide* along which the *conceptual boundary* between one person and another seems solidly fixed. The distinction between borders that can apparently be controlled immediately in experience directly and borders that cannot is one of the fundamental building blocks of the received view of ourselves as separately existing individual persons with well-defined (e.g. Fregean\(^4\)) boundaries. FEC thus seems to provide an incontrovertible empirical foundation for the belief in beings beside ourselves, up to and including the belief in other persons. FEC is, in that sense, a fundamental border that for us represents the tangible wall determining our (inter-personal) boundaries: the metaphysical separateness (non-identity) of persons, based upon an empirically verifiable, experientially based fact.

FEC divides us. The man in the street’s lament, then, is that any metaphysic that does not take this fact into account or, worse yet, like Open Individualism, seems at first glance openly to deny it, is if not obviously false then on pragmatic grounds useless at best. We might therefore as philosophers make the mistake of allowing such received considerations to influence us, either directly in the formation of our theories or more overtly, by blinding us to possibilities that we might otherwise have overlooked. For instance, Richard Swinburne, like many other philosophers, assumes that something like FEC plays a central role in our concept of ourselves as separately existing individual persons:

To say that this body, sitting at the desk in my room is my body is to say . . . that I can move parts of this body (arms, legs, etc.), just like that, without having to do any other intentional action . . . .

My body is the vehicle of my agency in the world and my knowledge of the world. [*Personal Identity*, p. 22]

Similarly, P.F. Strawson writes,

each person’s body occupies a special position in relation to that person’s perceptual experience. We may summarize such facts by saying that for each person there is one body which occupies a certain causal position in relation to that person’s perceptual experience, a causal position which in various ways is unique in relation to each of the various kinds of perceptual experience he has . . . . [Such facts] explain - if I may be permitted to put it so - why I feel peculiarly attached to what in fact I call my own body; they even might be said to explain why, granted that I am going to speak of one body as mine, I should speak of this body as mine. [*Individuals*, pp. 92-93]

If FEC explains the metaphysical significance accorded to the experiential
border between for instance your body and my body, as Strawson seems to think, then we might understand why we draw boundaries along such borders. This might say something about our psychologies (whether folk or otherwise) but does not show the distinction to be sound—any more than understanding why Aristotle thought the earth stood still makes his argument a good one. If, on the other hand, to say “this is my body” and “that is your body” means you and I are different persons, as Swinburne seems to think, then the existence of other persons follows necessarily from FEC. In that case FEC, if it obtains, means that other persons exist. And since we know that FEC obtains, we know, on this view, that other persons exist.

This view is false. FEC is \textit{not a sufficient condition} for the existence of other persons. FEC is of \textit{insufficient metaphysical significance} for personal identity to be closed under individuation and identification by FEC. FEC is merely an \textit{apparent excluder} of Open Individualism. A \textit{reductio} will help demonstrate this. Let us assume that the FEC Border does signify a Boundary between different persons, that personal identity is thereby closed under individuation and identification by FEC. Then any time you are in the presence of borders separated from you by FEC you have grounds for making a metaphysical division between “self” and “other.”

Now, one of the difficulties facing Open Individualism is that our experience is already interpreted in terms of traditional Closed Individualism. In trying to imagine appropriately significant situations in which Closed Individualism is not true, therefore, it would seem we are up against having to imagine something utterly foreign to our experience. This, however, is fortunately not the case. We have lots of experiences—dissociation, fugue states, multiple personality disorder, commissurotomy (“split-brain” patients), and dreams\(^5\)—where drawing inter-personal Boundaries along the lines drawn by traditional Closed Individualist Borders such as FEC will not work and opening the borders between us along the lines of Open Individualism not only works better but may even be the best competing explanation. We will first consider the simplest, least exotic, and arguably the most common of these—dreams—as a way of illustrating and explaining our method. We will then go on to consider other examples, both from actual medical cases and imaginary thought experiments.
§2.1.1 CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED: THE DREAM ANALOG AS A CONCEPTUAL BOUNDARY DISSOLVE OF THE METAPHYSICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FEC BORDER

A gang of muggers is chasing you down a dark alley. It is raining. Picking up the pace you turn a corner, trying to get away. A dead end street—you stop and turn. You’re cornered.

“Please, stop,” you plead. “Let me go!”

But they don’t. The one with a deep red scar across his face opens a switchblade. You throw him your wallet.

“Forget about it,” he smiles, “your money and your life.”

“Who are you?”

“The name’s Scarface. Here.” He takes off his scarf and gives it to you.

“Put this on.”

You notice the pattern—the ace of hearts—and think: scarf ace. You laugh nervously.

“Go on,” he says. “Make a blindfold.”

“Why?”

“It’ll hurt less.”

You drop the scarf. The others grab you. You try with all your might to break free.

“Let go!”

Their grip is too tight, too strong.

Scarface slashes your face.

You scream: “Why are you doing this?”

“Nothing personal,” he laughs. “Just following orders.”

“Whose?”

He thrusts the knife into your chest and twists. “Yours!”

Screaming, you wake up.

In dreams, just as in waking life, you find yourself apparently able to control immediately certain borders directly in experience onto which you are conjoined at the exclusion of others. You seem to be at a specific spatiotemporal location relative to some “other” people, some of whom, as in the above gruesome but not atypical nightmare, might be in the process of mugging you. Now, what explains this?

No one, it seems, wants to get mugged. The experience is in and of itself unpleasant, regardless of whether it occurs in a dream or waking state. Thus, in the dream, you, “the muggee,” were trying to get away from the muggers. But now let us ask: why were you, identified in the dream as the
character running away from the muggers in the dream—the “muggee”—apparently able to run from the muggers, but apparently unable to make the muggers stop chasing you? Suppose you say it is because the muggers were chasing you, you were afraid, and you wanted to get away. But then let us also ask:

(1) Did you want to be afraid?
(2) Did you want to be chased?
(3) Did you want to be caught and stabbed in the chest?

It seems, leaving Freud aside (or in the wings), that the answer to 1-3 is No. But then, again, we must still ask: Why did the character running away from the muggers—the muggee—do what apparently you wanted (e.g. try to get away from the muggers) and the muggers in the dream do what apparently you didn’t want (e.g. grab you, stab you)?

The standard line, so commonplace one is hardly likely even to question its presuppositions, is that one and only one of the characters in the dream—the muggee—is you, whereas the muggers are not you. The commonsense explanation is in terms of an Identity Boundary. But of course even a moment’s reflection reveals that because the mugging occurs in your dream, such an answer answers nothing. Everyone and everything in your dream is you. Personal identity is not closed under individuation and identification by those borders. The objects in the dream (e.g. the alley, the rain, the scarf, the switchblade, the mugger’s bodies, etc.) are you. Scarface, the muggers in the alley, and so on, are you. But if they are, also, you, why do they act as if they have a “mind of their own”—and not do what you want?

When put this way, it would be very odd, to say the least, to suppose that the answer to this question is that it was because you are in control of your own movements directly whereas you are not in control of the movements of other people directly. “Them’s not other people,” as the old Vaudevillian used to say to the novice, pointing at the audience: “them’s you!” The problem here is not with your perhaps understandable inability to control other people but, rather, with your perhaps not so well understood inability to control yourself, that is, to control borders within your own mind—borders from which you are separated by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment. (What we have here, in other words, in terms of our discussion above, is a border that exemplifies what is at the same time a causal barrier but not a metaphysical boundary).

In the nightmare described above, as is typical of dreams, you find yourself situated at a specific spatiotemporal location among (localized in
relation to) phenomena (the objects of your [dream] experience) some of which apparently cannot be controlled immediately directly in experience (e.g. the street, the buildings, the pursuant muggers, etc.) and some of which apparently can be thus controlled (the arms and legs of the character running down the street trying to get away from the muggers). That is, in the dream you (just as now) have the apparent ability to control immediately certain borders directly in your experience onto which you are conjoined at the exclusion of others (much to your distress in the dream); for instance, you do not appear able to control immediately the “dream muggers” directly in your experience just as right now you do not appear able to control immediately any people that may happen to be hanging around (hopefully friends not muggers or torturers) directly in your experience. In both situations—in both the dream and waking states of consciousness—the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment holds. Does FEC then, also close? Is personal identity closed under that known individuating and/or identifying border?

We answer: No. Were FEC by itself to establish the boundary suggested by concept pairs like “me and you,” “self and other,” and so on—were personal identity closed under individuation and/or identification by that border—then it would do so in the case of the dream. But in a dream the muggers separated from you by FEC are not other persons. They are you. In a dream, as for instance Carl Jung observes,

The whole creation is essentially subjective, and the dream is the theater where the dreamer is at once scene, actor, prompter, stage manager, author, audience, and critic. [General Aspects of Dream Psychology, p. 58]

What our Dream Analog thus shows in no uncertain terms is that FEC clearly does not by itself automatically exclude the possibility that what is from an experiential point of view locked out of your control, i.e., separated from you by FEC, is you. It does not do this because we have a clear and simple counter example: FEC occurs in both dreaming and waking experience—the experiential border dynamics are in each case the same—and yet you believe (now that you are awake) that the characters in your dreams are not other persons and that the characters in your waking life are other persons. In both the dream and waking case you are apparently conjoined onto one locus of movement at the exclusion of others. By itself FEC is therefore not of sufficient (metaphysical) significance for determining the boundaries of personal identity; FEC does not, in and of itself, necessarily establish a boundary between persons; personal identity is
not closed under individuation and identification by such known borders. Or, to put it more specifically in terms of our reductio: if you choose to so regard FEC, then the characters in your dreams are other persons, which more than likely is by your own account not just false but, even, absurd.

Does this imply that if Open Individualism is true in “real” life, then “real” life is, as for instance the good Schopenhauer would insist, a dream? No! It merely shows how, if Open Individualism is true in “real” life, then “real” life is to a certain extent and in a certain specific sense like a dream: life is a set of experiences, separated from each other (individuated) by border controls defined and actualized as such by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, which can be reasonably identified as the experiences of one person. This is, at least, one way in which Open Individualism could be true in light of its first apparent excluder, the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment.

There are of course other borders, each of which we shall consider in turn, with varying degrees of complexity. To limit the amount of surprise, I will now yet once again give away the plot: in each case, we will ask: Border \( \beta \) holds but does it close? And in each case we will be able to confidently answer: no. The point, then and now, is that by showing how it is possible that bordered individuation, \( \beta_1 \) and bordered individuation \( \beta_2 \) can be (and in fact not just are, but need to be, even in traditional Closed Individualism) identified as the bordered individuations of one person, we can go on to explain how it is possible that in each case, as we have just shown to be the case with FEC, is not a boundary between persons—that \( \beta \), as we have just seen in the case of FEC, is not necessarily an inter-personal boundary, i.e., that personal identity is not under individuation and identification by such known borders closed.

This relatively uncomplicated case of FEC is a relatively simple version of a Conceptual Boundary Dissolve. Without removing, negating or in any way denying the existence of the FEC Border, our Dream Analog shows how it is possible that this all too well known border does not bind personal identity, paving the way away from the traditional, the “independence challenged” (to borrow Hintikka’s bon mot) experiential border dynamics that holds us, not just in its grips but has us as it were locked up in traditional Closed Individualism, on the “independence friendly” path toward Open Individualism. Or, to put it slightly differently, the metaphysical significance of FEC is by our philosophical explanation lessened, such that we can sensibly claim that, in another refinement of recently trendy philosophical terminology, in and by itself the FEC Border between us does not matter to personal identity. In that sense, we have
begun to dissolve the metaphysical significance ordinarily accorded to that border.

§2.1.1.1 CONSCIOUSNESS REFINED: THE DREAM ANALOG AND I, THE SUBJECT-IN-ITSELF

Everything in a dream exists solely in your mind if anything does. But in a dream that’s not how it seems. Why not? Well, for one thing, if it did, there would be no dreams as such. Mistaking (misidentifying) your own internal mental states for events external to your mind is a necessary condition for the having of dreams (and, indeed, as for instance Kant saw it in terms of his transcendental illusion, for the having of experience of any sort whatsoever). But that does not explain what makes that phenomenon itself possible as such. What makes the dream work is that you—the “container,” the “owner,” of the dream and of everything in it—find yourself situated within and among the objects in your dream—literally, drawn into the “thick” of it—locked (phenomenologically as well as hermeneutically) into your (dream) experience, the subject of and to your own mental states, onto some of which you are conjoined (your dream “body image” e.g. running from the pursing muggers) at the exclusion of others (e.g. the “body images” of pursuant dream muggers).

In other words, in a dream—just as now—the “manifold of goings-on,” to use Erwin Schrödinger’s quaint phrase (where mannigfaltigkeit [manifold] is, roughly, the Kantian “totality of experience as it is presented in sense”), is identified not as internal phenomena of the mind (e.g. ideas, representations, thoughts, figments of the imagination, etc.) but, rather, as phenomena external to the mind (i.e., a world of objects). This act (perhaps in Fichte’s sense) of (mis)identification—the dissociation (“alienation” in Hegel’s and even Marx’s sense) of the mind from itself, into object and subject—itself made possible by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, makes possible that (arguably) fundamental and dare we say essential aspect (minimal necessary condition) for the having of (any sort of) experience as we know it, namely, the individuation and identification (localization) of phenomena (e.g. the objects of experience) in (perspectival, i.e., “subjective”) space and time from the first person point of view in relation to the (reciprocally localized, in relation to said objects) subject, denoted and expressed simultaneously to speaker and hearer, i.e., communicated (even, and especially, when they are one), using the first person indexical, I.

Now: what is thereby communicated? What is the subject? In philosophy
here the answers run the proverbial full gamut from literally everything to, quite literally, nothing. The problem, from a conceptual as well as a logico-linguistic point of view is that ordinary (even, and especially, philosophical) discourse is handicapped—to borrow another apt locution from Hintikka—in that the first person indexical, “I,” which invariably denotes “whole subject” also denotes, simultaneously, something akin to “the whole subject within the whole subject.” Thus, when for instance I say, “I am in Dubrovnik,” by I I mean “the whole of me” where “whole” functions not as a border but a boundary (e.g. between the subject and “the external world,” “the physical world” “the noumenal world,” etc., depending on your ontology and/or metaphysics). But when for instance I say “I am thinking about Dubrovnik,” or more revealingly, “I remember Dubrovnik,” by I still I mean “the whole of me” except now “whole” functions not as boundary but border (e.g. within “my mind,” “my psychology,” “my brain,” etc., depending on your metaphysics and/or ontology) between the subject qua “observer,” i.e., the subject of experience, and the subject qua “the observed,” i.e., the objects in experience (the objectifications/identifications of the subject, what ordinarily we simply and naively [pre-theoretically] most often call “experience,” or sometimes less naively “the totality of experience as it is presented in sense,” or even more naively, “the world in my experience,” etc.).

What is required, then, in our Dream Analog no less than in our waking states as well, to avoid the traditional logical handicaps is not a part-whole relation that does not preserve the necessary inside-outside tension (separation”) but a whole-whole relation that does preserve it. More formally, therefore, what the first-person indexical I can be said commonly to denote and express (simultaneously to hearer and speaker, i.e., communicate, even and especially when they are one) can (from a logico-linguistic model-theoretic standpoint) be given an intended interpretation in terms of the collapse (in the quantum mechanical sense) or compactification” (in the topological sense, e.g. Stone-Čech) of the (absolute, in Schelling’s or even Hegel’s sense, or transcendental, in Husserl’s or even better yet Brouwer’s sense) subject into the immediate (in Schopenhauer’s sense) residual (from the act of objectification, compactification, etc.) literally, subject-in-itself in relation to which phenomena, e.g. perceived objects (objectifications of the subject, i.e., the mediated, objectified, identifications of the subject qua objects of experience, i.e., “object intuitions”) are individuated and identified in (perspectival, i.e., “subjective”) space and time” from the first person point
of view, i.e., observed. Commonly denoted and expressed simultaneously to
speaker and hearer, i.e., communicated 13 (even, and especially, when they
are one), using the first person indexical, 14 I, the subject-in-itself (discussed
and defined in much more detail in Chapter 6) is our refinement of what in
many philosophical circles 15 is traditionally regarded as a fundamental and
dare we say essential, perhaps even primitive (in the positive sense),
desideratum of personhood, namely, what generally goes under the rubric
of “consciousness.” Readers familiar with the perlocutionary motivation 16
of the Tractatus should be neither surprised nor confused (nor least of all
disappointed) by our locutionary dispensation: “The I,” as Wittgenstein so
aptly puts it, “shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality
coordinated with it” (Tractatus 5.64). (Felix Klein’s term nullteilig 17 might
also here be put to good use.)

Now, are we here evoking some sort of “purely formal,” subjectivist
criterion of personal identity? Are we espousing some new form of
formalism informed by phenomenological reduction? Are we finally
making good on Russell’s threat to replace the Philosophy of Mind with the
Philosophy of Mathematics? Are we inserting, possibly dogmatically, the
“primacy of the subject,” “the primacy of experience,” “radical
empiricism,” “phenomenological reduction,” etc., or maybe just (over)
simply waxing Tractarian? Hardly. While I am not necessarily opposed to
any such past, present or future logico-philosophical innovations, or some
as yet undeveloped synergistic transdisciplinary incorporation thereof, the
point here is not to close off our Open View by restricting ourselves to any
such metaphysical/ontological, epistemological or metaphilosophical
framework. Our purpose is in fact just the opposite, namely, to show how
Open Individualism is possible given what can (and on many views is)
considered to be an arguably essential, perhaps even primitive (in the
positive sense), minimal condition for the having of the sort of experience
that we humans who are persons enjoy and that for instance rocks and
amoebas arguably do not. I am therefore taking great pains to present this
aspect of our experiential borders in the best and (as I see it) truest possible
locutionary light, rather than say (as unfortunately is so often done in
philosophy today) in the dimmest possible light of the straw men, so that
they can be easily dismissed with the back of the pragmatic perlocutionary
(at best pseudo-intellectual) hand. In other words, I ask: given the
seriousness (and even “strangeness,” in Strawson’s sense 18 ) with which
some particular border, β, can (given our best possible refinement) be taken,
how is it possible that you and I, separated by β, are one and the same person?\textsuperscript{19}

Our distinction in the Dream Analog between the mind \textit{qua} “objects perceived in perspectival space and time,” “the world in my experience,” etc., vs. the mind \textit{qua} “subject,” “perceiver,” “observer”—explains the degree to, and sense in which, one can (if need be) say that the objects located “in” experience are “formed out of” the mind, that is, that they are \textit{phenomena, to the degree that such locutionary dispensation is made necessary by one’s metaphysical/ontological orientation.}\textsuperscript{20} The quite overt purpose of making such distinctions is to explain how it is possible for us to say at this point that in a dream, \textit{just as now}, “FEC separates ‘me’ from all the rest of ‘myself,’” and at the same time unlike in certain circles that shall remain nameless\textsuperscript{21} to \textit{know what we mean}, namely, that the subject in relation to which objects are individuated and identified (located) in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, is \textit{dissociated}, or separated by FEC (and thus e.g. “hermeneutically distanced,” “phenomenologically sealed,” etc.) from its objects of perception (i.e., from the “objects in experience,” “the world in my experience,” etc.).

Moreover, what we mean by explaining in this way how it is possible that in a dream the person can be both “the subject” (the observer) and “object” (the observed)—should now be clear. Since everything in your dream exists solely in your mind, in the dream the subject in relation to which objects (in the dream) are individuated and identified (located) in perspectival space and time from the first-person point of view, i.e., observed, \textit{is you}. Clearly, however, this is \textit{(must be)} the “is” of identity, not of identification. Certainly when I see, say, a chair in a dream I \textit{am} (must be) that chair (that chair is me, it is my own mind, part of myself, not some other being) even though I am not identified \textit{as} that chair (nor \textit{could} I be, since experience as we know it requires the subject to be appeared to by objects, as Kant and many others since have realized). When you thus find yourself in a dream observing events from a particular first-person vantage point, you “the observer” are, equally clearly, \textit{inside} your own mind, as it were, “inside yourself.” \textit{Object-like form and subject-like form in the dream, which have not (and necessarily cannot have) a common form, i.e., not a common identification, have (and necessarily must have) a common identity.} And yet, the fact of the matter is that what you \textit{qua} “the observer” in the dream identify not as subject but as \textit{objects individuated and identified (located) from the first person point of view in perspectival space and time, i.e.,}
observed, and from which in the dream (just as now) you are separated (dissociated) by none other than the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, is but the result of your mis-identification of your own mental states as other than what they are. The mind identifying its own states as non-mind and not itself are a self-deception necessary for the having of experience as we know it. That is how in a dream (just as now) we can explain how it is possible that you find yourself on the one side of a phenomenal divide between borders that apparently you can immediately control directly in your experience and those that apparently you cannot, such that you are conjoined onto the one, “self,” side of the equation—I am this, (the is of identity) e.g. my body image—at the exclusion of the “other”—I am not that, (the is of identification) e.g., the objects in the dream world. In spite of the obviously necessary non-identifications, this is not, and cannot conceivable be, an identity boundary. Saying this clearly may require us to go to great lengths but clearly it can be thus shown in this case at least how it possible and even necessary that personal identity is not in this way closed under individuation and identification by such borders.

We can thus say: in a dream (just as now) I am locked simultaneously in and out of my own experience in virtue of the apparent ability to control immediately certain borders directly at the exclusion of others, such that I am conjoined onto the one, “self” side of the phenomenal divide at the exclusion of the “other,” (i.e., “objects in experience,” “the world in experience,” etc.). And that is how we can explain how it is possible that if the dream happens to be a nightmare I, qua the subject identified as the “central” character in the dream (in virtue of the conjoinment relation) from whose first person point of view the (dream) experience unfolds, apparently also exclusively, may for instance find “myself” in the unhappy 23 act of being mugged. Likewise now (just as in a dream) we can explain how it is possible (in light of the immediate apparent excluders) that I find myself on one side of a phenomenal divide between what apparently can and what apparently cannot be controlled immediately directly in experience, conjoined onto the former, “self,” side of a phenomenal divide at the exclusion of the latter, “other.” The FEC Border holds. But it does not close.

§2.1.2 THE RELATA OF THE FACT OF EXCLUSIVE CONJOINMENT
RELATION: SUBJECT AND OBJECT, THREE CAVEATS

Before proceeding further a few preliminary comments are in order. First, there is an obvious sense in which FEC separates me (hermeneutically, as
well as ontologically) from my liver, my blood, the replacement of my cells, the splicing of my DNA, etc. This relatively undemanding but perhaps deceptively simple observation already confirms that FEC is not, by itself, sufficient for drawing an inter-personal Boundary, i.e., that personal identity is not closed under individuation and identification by such known borders. Such an explanation will not of course however carry much weight with our proverbial man on the street who, more than likely, may regard these sorts of examples as variably (and ironically) either too complex to pay any attention to or else too trivial to take any notice of. Borders beyond reach of experience are not only difficult to demarcate clearly using ordinary or even technically sophisticated language but, at least in this case, not the most relevant issue to our lives, the man in the street will want to say; rather, it is the borders in experience that matter. For the fact of the matter is that what separates me from, for instance, you in my experience (independently of any theory, at least apparently) is not a border between the “me” that I experience (e.g. my thoughts, feelings, desires) and the “me” that I do not experience (e.g. my liver) but, rather, between the “me” and the “not-me” in my experience.

Second, our having started off here with an example from dreams may put off some readers and so to these readers I want to say: don’t worry. What is significant about the dream analog is not what it tells us about dreams—though what it does tell us may turn out to be unexpectedly significant—but, rather, what it reveals about the nature and significance of the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment regarding questions of personal identity without our yet having, at this initial stage of our gradually unfolding analysis, to untie certain metaphysical knots that by the time we have reached the later chapters will more or less have unraveled, i.e., explained, themselves.

Third, some readers may be wondering, perhaps not without some metaphilosophical trepidation, what exactly the relata are of the Conjoinment relation from an ontological or metaphysical point of view. What is conjoined onto what exclusively? When I say that I am conjoined onto these (my) limbs but not those (yours), what if anything does the I, used to denote and express the one side of the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment relation, refer to in so far as (I will claim) the described situation clearly parallels the dream case? In other words: since everything in a dream—despite appearances to the contrary—is “me,” (the is of identity, not identification) why then, and even more importantly how, the separation (or dissociation, hermeneutic distance, etc.), apparently metaphysical, between subject and object, between “the observer” and “the
observed,” brought about in virtue of the mutually independent border dynamics expressed by FEC?

Here, on the one hand, I want once again to say to any concerned readers, don’t worry: at this initial juncture what the relata are from a metaphysical or ontological point of view doesn’t so much matter, not because the relata are insignificant—they aren’t—or because we cannot state clearly and distinctly what they are—we can and in due course we will—nor even because metaphysics and ontology don’t matter—we will consider all manner of metaphysical and ontological borders in due course—but because presently our goal is to show how our requisite method of philosophical explanation works regardless of what the metaphysical or ontological relata are. This, you will recall, is part of our initial promise regarding the metaphysical invariance of our thesis. And because whether I am essentially my brain, my body, my psychology, or whatever, will each be considered in turn, we need not as yet commit ourselves to any particular metaphysic, ontology of personal being, and so on. We are for now but seeking an understanding merely of the possible and necessary metaphysical significance (or lack thereof) of the experience of identified control simpliciter. Or, to put this point slightly differently: the strategy behind beginning this part of our initial analysis with this particular aspect of the experiential border dynamics expressed by FEC is that, regardless of the reader’s metaphysical orientation or ontological commitment (or lack thereof), the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment is, clearly, not an interpretation of experience but a fact about experience. I am drawing our attention to this fact and asking, what is the significance of this fact?

On the other hand, when I say that I am conjoined onto these (my) limbs at the exclusion of those (yours), the indexical “I” is obviously not intended here to refer, for instance, to my liver. My liver has as far as I know no mental states of any kind, certainly nothing as momentously vital as the subject; my liver can appear (be represented, or identified as such) to the subject as a mediated intuition, i.e., an object of perception, but cannot itself be thus appeared to by objects in so far as within those borders there is no subject in relation to which objects can be individuated in perspectival space from the first person point of view, i.e., observed. Which is but to say: my liver is not conscious. I may be wrong, of course, but presently that’s not the point; rather, the point is that we should be able to accommodate those readers who need and want to be able to say in no uncertain terms that the liver is in itself, at best, a thing that lives, as it were, in the dark; the liver has no perceptions or intuitions of any sort, neither
mediated nor immediate; the liver can be an identified object, i.e., a mediated intuition, of perceptual experience, but not the subject in relation to which perceived objects are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, what ordinarily we simply and naively call being conscious. Which is also but to say that the liver has no perceptual experience whatsoever. The liver can, at best, be observed, or represented to the subject qua appearance or observation but it cannot itself be appeared to by objects, it cannot be a conscious observer. The liver may come to be in some sense experienced as an intuition but it does not itself have any intuitions of any kind. Again, in the most vulgar terms: I may be conscious of my liver but my liver may not be conscious. And so on ad nauseum.

But, likewise, and here it always gets just a bit tricky, given what we’ve said above, with for instance my brain: if it turned out that in theory the mind “reduces,” or “reducible,” (in any one or more of the many current, often mutually exclusive, senses of reducibility) to the brain or to the liver or to something else entirely, what I need and want to be able to say and show to any reader, regardless of his or her or its metaphysical orientation (or lack thereof), is that the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment is still, nevertheless, a fact. It is a fact about my experience. And it is also a fact, I want to be able to say and want for you to be able to understand and acknowledge (correct me if I’m wrong), about your experience. And the best way to put what this fact is about is to say, for reasons explained above (and for additional reasons explained in more detail throughout the work), that it is about the nature of the relationship between subject and object, i.e., between me and everything else in my experience up to and including, especially, the mind and body represented (or presented) in experience (vs. for instance in theory) onto which I find myself at this present moment exclusively conjoined.

For instance, at the present (occurrent) moment in the act of composing these words I find myself conjoined onto these (seen) fingers exclusively, onto these thoughts, etc., but not for instance conjoined (an certainly not exclusively) onto the children seen playing outside in the garden (even if, somehow, beyond the borders of this, my occurrent experience, I am!), nor onto the clouds seen drifting across the sky, nor onto the blood flowing unseen through the veins in the seen fingers typing away on the keyboard, nor onto the neural firings in the brain that I believe may be and probably are causally relevant to all of the above experiences, any more than I find myself conjoined exclusively onto whatever is going on in the liver that I
believe helps sustain the physical operations directly involved in the life of this particular human being. Where as the perceived breath, for instance, is right on the FEC Border, sometimes and usually not, but always within reach. And so on.

§2.1.3 WORLD BOUNDARIES AND I, TAKE ONE; OR, THE ONE AND THE MANY, TAKE THREE: LETTING THE NULLTEILIG OUT OF KLEIN’S BOTTLE

The Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment is, indeed, a fact. It is a fact about my experience. And it is a fact about your experience. What this fact is about is the nature of the relationship between the subject—by which we mean, given our caveats above, the subject-in-itself, i.e., I, “consciousness,” about which we shall have much more to say (e.g. §§6.3, 6.6, 6.7—and the objects (both “mediated” and “immediate”) individuated and identified in (occurrent perceptual and apperceptual) experience (i.e., subject objectifications), namely, between “consciousness” and the “contents” of consciousness, that is, between me and everything else in my experience up to and including, especially, the mind and body (e.g. “mind-body image”) represented in experience (vs. for instance in theory) onto which I find myself at this present moment, as I sit here composing these very words that you cannot possibly at this moment have any idea you will ever read and yet you are reading, exclusively conjoined. And because the relata of these admittedly strange relations themselves translate ultimately into what in any view must be regarded as the most fundamental “non-relation” relation, namely, identity (the relata being the subject qua subject-in-itself and subject qua subject objectifications, involving mutually friendly dependence/independence relations) we should not be ashamed to say that our yoga-like perlocutionary contortions of familiar relations reach well beneath the familiar surface grammar into deeper unfamiliar logical structures, such as for instance represented by IF logic. (See Appendix A: Logical Borders.)

In this way our locutions allow us to say what needs said without our having to step adverbially on (or stub) any proverbial (metaphysical or ontological) toes, and to acknowledge (if only to ourselves) that FEC expresses an internal relation (of the subject), between subject(-in-itself) and (objectified, [mis]identified)subject, representative of the border control dynamics encountered in any experience, be they dream or waking states, where on one side of the border is “the subject qua subject,” the subject-in-itself—I, “consciousness”—and, on the other, “the subject
identified as object”—the “contents of consciousness,” “the world in my experience,” and so on. FEC is ultimately thus, to repeat, a relation between subject qua subject—i.e., the subject-in-itself—and the subject identified as object—i.e., the objects in experience—stated in as metaphysically neutral terms as is at this present juncture philosophically possible.32

This having been said, the standard problem with our trying to understand, conceptualize and explain this virtually non-standardizable aspect of our own mental lives is that the subject (subject-in-itself) in relation to which (mediated and immediate33) objects, e.g. perceptions, are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, is itself individuated and identified in relation to the thereby individuated and identified objects, by which I mean not what logic necessarily renders false, namely, that the subject-in-itself is an object of experience (an observation that no doubt threw Hume into the darkest corners of his labyrinth of doubt, which we shall ourselves in due course not flinch from exploring) but, rather, what logic renders necessary, namely that the subject-in-itself—I, consciousness—is conscripted by language (be it e.g. Tractarian or e.g. English) to be spoken of in terms of an “internal” aspect (or “internal relation,” as conceived for instance perhaps in Bradley’s sense) of the subject (such that, in that limited sense, to quote both J. Fodor and J. Krishnamurti simultaneously, “the observer is the observed”) even while, to once again quote and, perhaps help clarify the good Wittgenstein a bit further still, there is an appropriate sense in which we can say what cannot be said, namely, that both “I am my world” (Tractatus, 5.63) and, as Wittgenstein does almost in the same breath, that “The thinking, perceiving subject does not exist” (5.631), in so far as “The subject does not belong to the world but is the boundary of the world,” (5.632).34 (Once again Kline’s nullteilig comes to mind, or, perhaps I should say, flies in and at the same time out of Kline’s bottle; likewise the concept of nonlocality, mentioned below and discussed subsequently in appropriate detail, which Wittgenstein might well have appreciated had he known about it.)

§2.1.4 THE CAUSAL BARRIER

It may also be worthwhile to point out at this admittedly early stage of the game that while not a metaphysical boundary between persons (i.e., α and β separated by FEC are not, necessarily, numerically distinct persons), FEC is, interestingly and revealingly enough, a causal barrier, by which I mean the following. FEC explains how it is possible (and in fact necessary, in
Kant’s sense, for the having of any sort of experience whatsoever, be it dreaming or waking) that you can be appeared to by what ultimately is you (the is of identity, not identification) without the immediately apparent intended actions apparently being causally linked directly in experience with the simultaneously perceived objects in experience. For apparently I cannot control directly in my experience the movements of the dream muggers the way apparently I can control immediately directly in my experience the movements of the one character in the dream onto which I am conjoined, namely, the one running away from the dream muggers.

Which is to say: I cannot cross that border, i.e., that border is from a phenomenological point of view a causal barrier albeit not a personal boundary, even in a dream where what is on the other side of this border is (an aspect of) me and not (an aspect of) some other person or some other sort of being other than myself. (I cannot cross a border where, and perhaps especially when, I am already there on the “other” side.)

In other words: what is from a legitimate causal point of view identified as a barrier (as well as from either a hermeneutic or phenomenological point of view, or both) can from a legitimate metaphysical point of view be identified as not a boundary but a border, as we shall see yet again, and in much more detail, in our analysis of the Casual Border (Chapter 7). As doubtless the good Freud, no less so than his avatar Schopenhauer, for rather different but hardly non-germane reasons both realized, “I am unable by an immediate act of will to control x directly in my experience” and “x is not me” are not coextensive expressions, not even when x and I occur in (or to) one and the same mind.

§ 2.2 APPARENT EXCLUDER (2): ALTER SUBJECT IDENTIFICATION

The Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment is of course not the only border between us; it is but one of the many apparent excluders of Open Individualism. There are others, each of which can be added to FEC in an attempt to exclude the possibility of Open Individualism.

One such apparent excluder is that some of the borders from which I am separated by FEC are themselves minded in the way that I am, for instance: you, my neighbor, my wife, etc. That is, you are each in my experience identified as having an internal, subjective mental life, as being not “dark” inside, not automata, “zombies,” etc., as each being yourselves “subjectively illuminated from within,” as I am to myself, in the way that
for instance rocks, clouds, amoebas, etc., are not. Thus, while a border such as I encounter experiencing a tree or cloud is identified as object in virtue of the relevant border dynamics, a border such as I encounter experiencing for instance you or my neighbor is identified as subject, also in virtue of the relevant border dynamics (seemingly purposeful behavior, etc.). Which is to say that—taking once more great pains to not assume any presuppositions that go beyond the character of my experience—some experiential borders from which I am separated (“locked out”) by FEC are not only objects, individuated and identified (localized) as such in perspectival space and time from the (my) first person point of view, i.e., observed, they are furthermore also identified as being themselves appeared to by objects (e.g. me) individuated and identified in alter-perspectival space and time from an alter first-person point of view, i.e., observed, by the therein exclusively conjoined subject (e.g. you) reciprocally individuated and identified (localized) in relation to said phenomena (i.e., objects, e.g. me). Let us call this “Alter Subject Identification,” or ASI:

ASI: Some experiential borders in relation to which I am localized and from which I am separated (locked out) by FEC (e.g. you) are identified as being themselves appeared to by objects (e.g. me) in (alter-perspectival) space and time from an alter (second, third, fourth, etc., mutually exclusive, mutually independent/dependent) first-person point of view, i.e., observed, in relation to the alter subject (e.g. you) localized and exclusively conjoined therein.

§2.2.1 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL BARRIER

Solipsists (or, the solipsist) may think, albeit prematurely, to object: hold on, that surely is an assumption, an inference, an interpretation; how do you know this to be the case? There is no “direct” subject-to-subject communication, but only, at best, through the happy medium (unhappy consciousness, to evoke again Royce’s para-Hegelian locution) of unshared objects. But to the premature solipsist we can safely say, look again: as stated, ASI is neither an interpretation of my experience nor an assumption about, say, your (having) experience but, rather, a fact about my own experience, just as FEC is. For unlike for instance my experience of the chair upon which you sit (say you have just entered the room that I am in), you are as a matter of fact in my experience identified not as object but as subject. In saying this I am reporting a fact about my experience having to do neither with an interpretation of experience nor an assumption about
anyone else having experience but, rather, about an identification of borders in my experience regardless, even, whether in reality I am but a brain in a vat, God dreaming, etc. Identifications are not interpretations. The identification may be misleading, as facts all too often are, but the fact of the matter is that the identifications go as they go and not some other way: identifications and individuations are in their own way facts about, not interpretations of, experience. To think otherwise is to be confused about experience, or language, or more than likely both.

Second, although we shall go to some pains to demonstrate that the ASI Border is not a metaphysical boundary (between persons, i.e., \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) separated by ASI are not, thereby necessarily, numerically distinct persons), the ASI Border is, interestingly and revealingly—as solipsists or, should I say, the solipsist would be more than glad to point out—at the very least a type of epistemological barrier (albeit not personal boundary). (This parallels the causal barrier point about FEC.) What I think the solipsist would rightly want us to acknowledge here is the fact that I believe but do not (arguably) know that—to put it now in less factual and more interpretative terms—some particular Alter Subject Identification (e.g. you) is veridical, that is, as David Lewis might well have wanted us to put it, that you are yourself being appeared to by objects individuated and identified (localized) in (alter)perspectival space and time from a (second, third, fourth, etc., mutually exclusive, mutually independent/dependent) first person point of view, i.e., observed, in relation to the (alter) subject in turn thereby localized and exclusively conjoined therein.

§2.2.2 IN SEARCH OF ZOMBIES: IS FEC + ASI AN INTERPERSONAL BOUNDARY?

Now, those (most) of us who believe that the people around us are not zombies but conscious, i.e., that Alter Subject Identification is veridical, do tend to believe also that we are each a numerically distinct subject—that for instance conscious state \(\mathcal{I}\) \{I-the-subject-looking-at-you\} and conscious state \(\mathcal{B}\) \{you-the-subject-looking-at-me\} each belong, as such, to different persons. Most of us are not solipsists and so we do believe this, and thus we believe we know that other persons exist. But why do we believe this? We believe it because we believe that

\[
[m] \quad \text{I observe some FEC-individuated objects (e.g. you) identified as being themselves appeared to by objects (e.g. me) individuated and identified (localized) in (alter-}
\]
perspectival) space and time from an alter first-person point of view, i.e., observed, in relation to the *alter* subject (e.g. you) in turn thereby localized and exclusively conjoined therein is a sufficient condition for

\[ n \] other persons exist.

Imagining possibilities where \([m]\) is not a sufficient condition for \([n]\)—that is, where the conditional

\[ o \rightarrow n \]

does not hold, is like imagining a case where we drop a vase from the roof but it does not break; it merely shows that \([o]\) is not necessarily true. But \([o]\) could still be empirically true. And unless we have sufficient evidence to the contrary we are justified in believing that \([o]\), and so we can justifiably claim that we know that other persons exist.

Proposition \([m]\) contains two claims. The first, factual, claim is that I do experience borders from which I am separated (locked out) by FEC (e.g. clouds, tables, cars, my dog, you, and so on). This is the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, a true claim that identifies a real border. The second claim is that some of these borders, onto which in my experience I am not exclusively conjoined (e.g. you), are identified as each being themselves conscious, i.e., that they are in themselves appeared to by objects individuated and identified (localized) in (alter)perspectival space and time, i.e., observed, in relation to (by) the (alter) subject in turn thereby reciprocally localized in relation to said objects and exclusively conjoined therein. This is the ASI Border. It too, is a factual claim that, we believe, is veridical. Now, if

\[ m \] FEC + ASI

is sufficient for

\[ n \] other persons exist,

then it is either by FEC, or by ASI, or both, that we know that other persons exist. But how could \([m]\) be sufficient for \([n]\)? There are two possible ways. Either \([m]\) *means* that other persons exist, in which case \([n]\) follows necessarily from \([m]\), or \([m]\) *provides evidence* for \([n]\), in which case \([n]\) might be empirically true. The idea, then, is that if some experiential borders from which you are separated by FEC are not just dark inside, mere
automata, or zombies but, rather, themselves have experience (phenomena) individuated and identified (localized) in (alter)perspectival space and time, i.e., observed, in relation to (by) the (alter) subject in turn thereby localized and exclusively conjoined therein, this then is evidence that you are in the presence of other persons.

In other words, the supposed added difference that turns the FEC Border into a metaphysical Boundary between persons—into an actual excluder of Open Individualism—is this:

“Suppose I agree with you that right now my experience bifurcates as you say into what apparently I can control immediately directly and what I cannot, such that I am conjoined onto the former at the exclusion of the latter. Fine. But among the latter some borders—for instance, you—are I believe themselves minded in the way that I am, namely, they are conscious, or, as you say, that they are in my experience identified not as object but as subject. Supposing this identification to be veridical, and I do, doesn’t this exclude the possibility that you and I are the same person—doesn’t it exclude the possibility that you are everyone?” (Note: In case you think the individuation and identification of persons should simply be traced along our physiological borders, don’t worry—we will consider physiological borders in the next chapter. Presently we are seeing whether experiential border control simpliciter is, necessarily, a boundary between persons.)

This sort of objection certainly seems plausible. Before objecting to it, however, recall again that we will be responding to this apparent excluder via Nozick’s second way, not the first. Using the first way would entail, for instance, making the epistemological objection that we have no way of knowing whether any particular instance of ASI is veridical. Any particular instance of ASI may or may not be veridical. Suppose, however, that it is always non-veridical. Then you are the one and only conscious being—the one and only subject—in the universe (the rest being zombies, automata, or figments of your imagination, etc.). In that case, Open Individualism—the thrust of its fundamental proposition being that we are all the same person or, conversely, that one and only person exists—wins by default. If you are the only subject in the universe surrounded by objects none of which are “illuminated” from within, all of which are “dark inside,” without experience, mere figments of your imagination, automata, zombies, etc., then indeed there are no other persons but you. In that case, traditional Closed Individualism—the thrust of its fundamental proposition being that
we are each a numerically distinct person or, conversely, that many persons exist—is (trivially) false.

However, regardless of whether we are Closed or Open Individualists, we can, and do, believe that the people around us are not mere puppets, automata, zombies, etc. We believe the people around us are, in a word, conscious. This, the experiential fact of Alter Subject Identification, is perhaps justified, perhaps not, but probably it is and in any case most of us do believe it, accept it, live by it. This is the case regardless of whether you are dreaming or awake, whether you are a “real” and “ordinary” human being living in a “real” and “ordinary” world, or whether you are a hallucinating brain in a vat, or even whether you are God dreaming. But since we can and do in fact believe that the FEC Border separates us not just from mindless objects but from likewise alter subjects exclusively conjoined therein, we must rely on Nozick’s second way of showing how $p$ is possible in spite of its apparent excluder(s) $r$. That is, we must show not that the borders from which you are separated by FEC are but mere objects (i.e., that there is no subject within those borders there, as it were, “looking out,” as Bogart says to Bacall, “Here’s looking at you, kid.”). Rather, we must show how, even if some experiential borders from which you are separated by FEC are themselves conscious as you are, it is possible, nevertheless, to identify them—inclusive of the subject though they be, no less so than separated from you by FEC—as one and the same numerically identical person, you.

In §2.1 we objected to the idea that FEC, by itself, is an actual excluder of the possibility that we are all the same person. This is because FEC holds across both dreaming and waking experience, and yet you can (and no doubt do) believe that the characters with whom you interact in dreams are not other persons while you can (and no doubt do) believe that the characters with whom you interact in waking life are other persons. We imagined the believer in other persons responding to this counter-example by bringing the ASI Border into play. So, does (1) FEC plus (2) ASI entail that other persons exist?

Dreaming or awake, both the FEC Border and the ASI Border hold. The question presently before us is whether, together, they close. Is personal identity closed under (individuation and identification by) these known borders between us?
§2.2.3 DREAM ANALOG II: CAN A PERSON BE THE SUBJECT OF MORE THAN ONE (DISJOINT) SET OF EXPERIENCES SIMULTANEOUSLY?

Returning now to our mugging nightmare, let us once again ask: why were you apparently able to control immediately the movements of the muggee directly and not the movements of the muggers? We are all familiar enough with the direction that, if pushed, the standard, received sorts of answers here invariably go, namely, toward the notion that “their” actions are the product of some phenomenologically and/or psychologically undisclosed but perhaps in principle theoretically disclosable “dream mechanism” or some such sort of automated processes produced by “your” “un’conscious mind, etc. In other words, “they”—the “other” dream characters—are phenomenological puppets whose strings are being pulled by a psychological mechanism (i.e., the puppets of a puppet). We need not yet deny this sort of direction or that such a stance or some variation thereof may fail ultimately as an explanation of the experience or the underlying process of the experience in question (though we will, and it will); we need only consider for now the possibility of going in the other direction and ask, first, whether it is possible for us to imagine how it is possible that the “other” characters in the dream (the muggers) are each, also, themselves conscious in the way that you (the muggee) are (i.e., that what in fact explains the behavior of the characters in dreams is that they in fact are as they appear to be, namely, that they are conscious), and then we ask: if the characters in your dreams are conscious, are they therefore other persons?

Let me first of all emphasize that, without a doubt, ordinarily, we would—most of us, at least—be more than likely inclined to believe that the answer to such a question is an emphatic, “No!” We are inclined to believe (while we are awake, of course, in retrospect) that dream characters are not conscious, i.e., that ASI, which holds both in dream and waking states, is true in the latter but not the former. And this not because there is “no one there” in the dream—you are there, the whole dream exists within your mind, and you are having that experience—but because the someone who is there in the mugging nightmare is the one who is being mugged, not the one who (or, actually, perhaps I should say “the ‘no-one’” who) is doing the mugging. Ordinarily what most of us would want to say is that for instance in our mugging nightmare the character “Scarface” is but a mere appearance, with no “inside,” there is no one there behind that face looking out at the scene before him. Scarface in the dream is not conscious, he is but a mere appearance with no “inside,” no subject behind that face (inside
the object) “looking out.” In other words, what ordinarily we would want to say in this case is that no one in the dream is mugging you not because you are not having the experience of being mugged but because behind the muggers’ masks there is no actor, no observer, no consciousness, no subject. The mind of the actor is, as it were, in front of that (perceived) object, not behind or within it for the simple reason that there is no subject behind the mask, the mask is “empty.” The someone who is there is the someone located, as it were, “in front of” that (perceived) face, not the one “behind it” because—the Alter Subject Identification notwithstanding—there simply is no one “behind” the mugger’s face. In that sense, the representations, “muggers,” are, at best, phenomenological automata, apparitions, phenomena, dream puppets, zombies; their “heads” have nothing whatsoever in them. That you (falsely) identify them as such is of course a fact, but ASI is in the dream but a false identification. That is the sense in which the muggers are “mere” representations and, as such, at best, phenomenological automata: there is no one in the dream who enjoys the mugging; there is however someone in the dream who feels the horror and humiliation of being mugged, someone for whom the muggers appear not from the first person but third person point of view. The feelings of superiority, enjoyment, glee, satisfaction, etc., are but the “empty” appearances of emotion, where as the feelings of anger, fear, humiliation, etc., are the “full” appearances of emotion, felt from the “inside” by you, the subject in relation to which objects in the dream are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, namely, the I who is (identified as) the muggee. Which again is but to repeat that within the representations, “muggers,” there is no one, no consciousness, no subject affording to those borders their own perspectives on the mugging: those characters are “unconscious” objects, they are “subjectless” (psychological, phenomenological, intentional) objects, mere appearances, (psychological, phenomenological, intentional) “zombies.” Whereas on the other hand the “central” character in the dream, the one being mugged—the one who upon waking you will remember having been—is experiencing the mugging in the alley from the first person point of view. “You,” the one in the dream being mugged, are not a zombie; “they,” the ones doing the mugging, are zombies. That is what, ordinarily, we would be inclined in such a situation to believe.

Except now we are as part of our philosophical explanation trying to see if it is possible for us to go the other way and imagine that in our Mugging Nightmare the Muggers too have a subjective inner life just like the
character from whose perspective you experience (apparently exclusively) the dream. That is, in the Mugging Nightmare you (the character from whose perspective you apparently exclusively experience the dream) experience the fear and humiliation of being mugged, while one of the “dream” muggers experiences the excitement and anxiety of attacking a stranger, another experiences his growing remorse, another laments about the economic difficulties that (so he thinks) made him mug this stranger in the alley (never realizing that the stranger, as in so many a great J.L. Borges story, is the one dreaming him), and so on.

Now, this may seem like a hard idea to swallow, too difficult or taxing upon our intuitions to plausibly imagine (unless of course one is a Borgesian, not to mention an Averroist, etc.). By way of motivation, however, let us begin by reminding ourselves that our presently imagined scenario, in which other characters in your dream (besides the one you are playing from the first person point of view) are conscious, would in its own way help to explain (but not explain away) a strange and perhaps equally inexplicable (though perhaps not to the same degree) puzzlement about dream experience. For the fact is not only that in dreams I am apparently unable to control immediately certain borders directly in experience onto which I (qua the subject in relation to which phenomena in the dream are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time [localized] from the first person point of view, i.e., observed) am conjoined at the exclusion of borders that, in the dream, are nevertheless—in spite of the fact that apparently I cannot immediately control them directly—none other than me (my own mind, e.g. the dream muggers); the fact is that what is there before me in the dream quite apparently can be thus controlled directly in my experience, independently of me, the subject in relation to which said objects are individuated and identified (localized) in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., “observed.” To say this is but to repeat that in our dreams, as in our waking states, ASI holds just as surely as does FEC; we are now but adding to this observation that quite possibly the reason for this may have something to do with this being a natural, perhaps even the best competing, explanation of the observed events (regardless of our subsequent dismissal of this possibility, as it were after the fact, upon waking).

Lest anyone misunderstand the thrust of our present point, let me repeat once more what we are trying to do by putting it this way: the muggers in the dream certainly behave as if they are conscious. For instance, they seem to see you. Not only do they (seem to) make (dream) eye contact, their
(apparent) movements, speech, actions, etc., all seem by outward appearance to be not only purposeful but, typically, quite well—indeed, astonishingly well—synchronized to track your own, coordinated, as it were, with what you regard as exclusively (though now perhaps falsely) your own. Ask Scarface a question, he responds; this is typical of dreams. You want the muggers to let you go, but they don’t. You scream, you plead, and yet—quite apparently against your will—Scarface, in the end, nevertheless, stabs you. Say you were surprised and frightened by the approaching knife. Did you control that movement, did you render its geometrical and dynamic properties, calculate the tensors and differential equations that phenomenological rendering requires, did you create the fear, the emotion? How? Using what tools? And, even if so, how then, were you surprised? Something, or someone, seems to be guiding the apparently purposeful behavior of the dream characters and it certainly doesn’t seem to be you, the poor terrified muggee up against the wall. To thus suppose, as we do quite automatically and innocently suppose, both in our dreams and our waking states, that what explains this is the (notice: quite logical) presence of consciousness—that these objects (e.g. Scarface) are independently dependent upon the subject in relation to which objects are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time (localized) from the first person point of view, i.e., observed—is itself quite natural and, in fact, eminently quite reasonable. Why? Because, in part, what the appearance of control that the subject, typically, affords us, involves not just the apparent ability to control certain borders directly in experience by, say, an immediate act of will but, moreover, by an (immediate, spontaneous, etc.) act of free will. Clearly, there is something apparently unmediated and, in a word, free about, in a word, consciousness, something apparently spontaneous, unconditioned, willfully independent, even as it is conjoined onto (dependent upon) the borders in experience. This is why typically the notion of consciousness as such fares so well as a plausible candidate for a fundamental, perhaps even essential (minimal necessary) condition for the having of the sorts of experiences that we who are persons have and that “lower” forms of life, e.g. amoebas, arguably, do not.

Whereas, on the other hand, let us also for another moment pause to reflect still further on what could explain the situation in the mugging nightmare according to our received common sense view on such matters. For here what we might be inclined to say is that one part of your mind—the subject identified as and exclusively conjoined onto the central character from whose first person point of view the dream seems to be thus,
apparently also exclusively, experienced—is estranged, or alienated, perhaps as conceived in Hegel’s or Royce’s sense, from another part of your mind—the perceived objects representing, from the third person point of view, a gang of muggers, etc., all mere appearances. And what we have dubbed the “Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment” is the border that separates these two “parts” or “aspects” of the mind from each other. Now, of course, ordinary language prompts us, as for instance Wittgenstein went to great pains to show, to call the mugge “you” (self) and the muggers “them” (other). But, once again, in so far as you are the dreamer and this is your dream, both the “you-(self)experience” and the “they-(other)experience” are your experience and, therefore, properly regarded as an aspect of one person who is, and by our best understanding of ourselves and the world cannot be anyone other than, you. Which, yet again, is but to say: you do not identify the experience in the dream of the muggers struggling with you as you struggling with yourself but as you struggling with someone else. That is, although the dream struggle with the muggers and everything in the dream exists only in your mind and therefore all parties of the struggle exist only in your mind, both the subject in relation to which perceived objects (“ideas,” “representations”) are individuated and identified (localized) in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., “observed,” and all the objects in your experience are but aspects of one and the same person, you. Thus what the dream character (“muggee”) from whose perspective you are experiencing the dream, apparently exclusively, has in common with the dream character (“mugger”) is that you are both aspects of (“inside”) the same mind, you both belong to and in fact you are both (aspects of) the mind of one and the same person. And this in spite of the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment: the subject is exclusively conjoined onto the muggee, not onto any of the muggers, though the muggee and muggers all exist as aspects of one and the same person, separated from each other by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border within the mind of one and the same numerically identical person, you. (The person is the dream and everything in it, up to and including, especially, the subject.) You are in the dream being appeared to from “within” what therefore in the dream becomes “you,” not from within what therefore in the dream becomes “them,” though what in the dream becomes “you” and what in the dream becomes “them” all are you in the sense of being (aspects) of one and the same numerically identical person, you. In the dream you are only fooled (by the fact of Alter Subject Identification) into believing that they, the muggers, also are conscious in the way that you, the muggee, are.
dream, “you” could in principle say to “them,” “I see, therefore you are blind,” “I think, therefore you do not,” “I feel, therefore you do not,” “I am the subject and therefore you are not,” etc., i.e., “I am conscious and therefore you are not.” And this because, to put it one way—and here now we get to one of the (deeply) hidden presupposition of Closed Individualism—a person cannot be the subject of more than one set of (perspectively askew) experiences simultaneously. “You” are therefore the only conscious character in the dream. This is necessarily so because a person cannot possibly be appeared to from two or more (in this case, purely phenomenological) locations simultaneously, having two independent sets of non-identical experiences, because a person cannot possibly be the subject of more than one disjoint set of experiences simultaneously; and this (here now that hidden presupposition again, worded slightly differently) a person cannot be situated at more than one (again, in this case purely phenomenological) “location” at a time.

But now I repeat: Or so, ordinarily, we believe. We are in fact now attempting, as we shall do in varying degrees and in a number of ways throughout this work, to challenge this, one of the most pivotal and apparently indubitable of all absolute presuppositions of classical modern thought regarding the nature of persons, namely, that personal identity is closed under individuation and identification (locality) in (perspectival) space and time.

§2.2.3.1 Arguing With Myself Over Everything and Nothing: Non-pathological Phrenic Amnesia, Shuffled Memories, and Multiphrenia

We are presently trying as it were to loosen the hold of one pivotal aspect of traditional Closed Individualism by motivating ourselves with the realization, which a little reflection upon the Dream Analog reveals, that our received explanation as to what explains the observed behavior of dream characters is, to put it mildly, not very good. For the more deeply we reflect, in fact, the poorer the standard received (Closed Individualism inspired) explanation fares; many of our dream experiences are under the received (mechanistic) explanation nothing short of stunning. So perhaps allowing ourselves to go a bit further with a bit of a stunning example of our own, which is all that Dream Analog II (an upgraded version of our first Dream Analog, whereby dream characters are alter subjects, i.e., conscious) requires, should—when our received prejudice regarding the necessity of the locality of personal identity is put into proper perspective—seem if not
less stunning at the very least not unduly straining to the received conceptual framework (more on that below), relatively speaking.

Let us now therefore throw any remaining caution to the wind and simply proceed, as follows, by supposing what one might naively (pre-theoretically) suppose cannot be supposed, namely, that the subject in the dream is (identified as) everyone, not just as the fact of individuation (FEC) conceals but as the fact of identification (ASI) reveals, i.e., that in the dream there is individuation and identification (localization) of phenomena (the objects of experience) in (multi-perspectival, i.e., “objective,” “empirical,” “public,” etc.) space and time from multiple (conjoined/disjoined) first person points of view in relation to the (reciprocally multiply localized, i.e., “nonlocal” in relation to said objects) subject—I, “consciousness”—multiply exclusively conjoined therein.

Now, leaving for now aside the question of how you could know whether the “dream” muggers are or are not in this way likewise each, as it were, conscious, i.e., multiply independently dependent upon the subject—that the Alter Subject Identification is as true in the dream as you believe it is in your waking states—if you knew this to be the case, would you then believe that the characters in your dream are other persons? If you believe that

\[ [m] \quad \text{FEC} + \text{ASI} \]

together make for an actual excluder of the view (when ASI is veridical) that we are all the same person, then you believe [m] entails the existence of other persons, i.e., that personal identity is closed under individuation and identification by such known borders, and that therefore any and all (ex hypothesi) alter subjects in your dreams are other persons. In that case, you believe that, if all characters in your dream are not just phenomenological automata but likewise each conscious, that is, each the subject in relation to which objects in the dream are individuated and identified (localized) in more than one perspectival space and time, i.e., observed—since the FEC Border holds across all experience (whether “dreamed” or “real”)—the characters in your dream are, therefore, other persons. But, if your intuitions are like mine, then what your intuitions say is that even if the dream muggers are in this way each independently conscious, they are not, solely in virtue of being each thus independently conscious, other persons. That is, even in the case where all the characters in your dream are conscious, they are not, solely in virtue of being thus conscious (alter subjects) other persons. They arguably are not other persons because, even though independently individuated from “you” (from the “central
character” from whose point of view you are experiencing the dream, apparently exclusively), on a deeper, more fundamental level is it not more reasonable in this case to identify them as you—to suppose, in other words, that it is you who is doing the mugging as well as being mugged? Ultimately, no matter how horrible the suffering you experience in the dream due to the nastiness of the muggers, it would seem in this case most reasonable to suppose that, whether the muggers are independently minded (alter subjects) or not, they are not thereby other persons. After all, who else would they be? The dream is not beamed into your head from some Dream Station on Mars.

To me, it seems perfectly reasonable to think in this way—to suppose that, all else being equal, if in a dream you find yourself arguing and fighting with another character who as it turns out is no mere “zombie” but, also, “inwardly illuminated,” i.e., the subject in relation to which, etc., then you are in such a situation arguing with yourself. If it turned out that your dream characters are in fact alter subjects, they would still be you. Thus if in a dream you find yourself arguing with another character who as it turns out also has experience individuated and identified (localized) in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, this then is a case of you yourself arguing with none other than yourself. It is perhaps an unusual way of arguing with yourself because you are not simply alternating back and forth pretending to be on two sides of what in reality is just a one-sided conversation while remaining cognizant of the fact that you are talking with yourself because in fact you see and hear yourself talking with yourself; rather, you are, simultaneously, on both sides of a two-sided conversation in which from either side of it you are not at all aware of what you are thinking on the other; you do not see and hear yourself talking to yourself, what you see and hear on either side of the conversation is yourself thinking and talking to someone else whose uttered words you hear and performed actions you did not initiate but whose thoughts you do not hear while remaining unaware that this someone else is you. You are, in that case, the subject of more than one (disjoint, perspectivally askew, mutually dependent/independent) set of experiences simultaneously.

Lest any reader think it is impossible to even imagine how such a state of affairs could ever even be possible, let us note, first, that actual cases involving variations on what in psychiatric parlance is known as “phrenic amnesia,” replete with shuffled conscious memories, are known to occur not just in dreams but in waking states as well, in varying degrees, from normal
to pathological psychologies; the most extreme arise in cases of multiple personality disorder, schizophrenia, and other similar sorts of pathologies. Regardless of one’s interpretation of such cases of “dissociation” (to which we shall return in some detail in Chapter 6), it would be odd, first, to say the least, for someone to claim that we cannot imagine how what is generally regarded to actually be the case in pathological waking states could possibly be the case in non-pathological dream states. For that is what our Dream Analog requires, namely, that we take what is possible in waking pathological states to be also likewise possible in non-pathological dream states.

§2.2.3.2 ASKEW MODALITIES: WEAK (CLOSED WORLD) NONLOCALITY, STRONG (MANY WORLDS) NONLOCALITY, AND ULTRA-STRONG (OPEN WORLD) NONLOCALITY

Moreover, what should be even more and less surprising, there are not one but at least three semantically equivalent, mathematically askew modalities in which such a state (or states) require the person to be (whether in a dream or waking state) the therein exclusively conjoined subject of (and to) multiple (perspectivally askew modulo projective geometry) sets of experiences simultaneously, wherein objects are individuated and identified (localized) in (multi)perspectival space and time from multiple independently/dependent disjoint first person points of view, namely, (1) in one (multi)perspectival spacetime manifold, (2) in multiple (uni)perspectival spacetime manifolds, or (3) in multiple (multi)perspectival spacetime manifolds. Let us call these weak, strong, and ultrastrong nonlocality, respectively.

Weak (Closed World) Nonlocality: The individuation and identification (localization) of phenomena (the objects of experience) in one (multi-perspectival, i.e., “objective,” “empirical,” “public,” etc.) space time manifold (world) from multiple first person points of view in relation to the (reciprocally multiply localized, i.e., “non-local” in relation to said objects) subject—I, consciousness—multiply exclusively conjoined to objects within one closed spacetime manifold.

Strong (Many Worlds) Nonlocality: The individuation and identification (localization) of phenomena (the objects of experience) in many (monoperspectival, i.e., “subjective,” “ideal,” “imaginary,” “dream,” etc.) space time manifolds (worlds) from the first person point of view in relation to the (reciprocally multiply localized, i.e., “non-local” in relation to said
Ultra-strong (Open World) Nonlocality: The individuation and identification (localization) of phenomena (the objects of experience) in many (multi-perspectival, i.e., “objective,” “empirical,” “public,” etc.) space and time manifolds (worlds) from multiple first person points of view in relation to the (reciprocally multiply localized, i.e., “non-local” in relation to said objects) subject—I, consciousness—multiply exclusively conjoined therein to objects within multiple disjoint (e.g. Hausdorff separated) open spacetime manifolds.

In (1), what we have is one world (i.e., one closed multiperspectival spacetime manifold) and one nonlocal (i.e., mutually dependent/independent) subject multiply exclusively conjoined therein. In other words: you are an open individual living in a closed world. In (2), what we have is many (small, subjective, idealist, monad, etc.) worlds (many disjoint, i.e., strongly separated, e.g. Hausdorff, closed monoperspectival spacetime manifolds) and one non-local (i.e., mutually dependent/independent) subject multiply exclusively conjoined therein. In other words: you are an open individual living in many closed worlds. In (3), what we have is many disjoint multiperspectival (objective, empirical, real, etc.) worlds, one nonlocal (i.e., mutually dependent/independent) subject multiply exclusively conjoined therein. In other words: you are an open individual living in many worlds all of which are themselves open.

In the first case you are, literally, subjected to multiple simultaneously independent points of view on the one world in your experience (the multi-perspectival manifold of space and time within which objects are indexed as such in relation to the weakly nonlocal individuating/identifying subject), such that the necessity of the perceived (phenomenological) necessity of “monophrenia” would be falsified to the degree that “multiphrenic” states evidenced; in that case what we might think of as “Insular” or Weak Open Individualism, where personal identity is not closed under such known individuating and identifying borders, would be vindicated and, in so far as such a state of affairs is actually evidenced, verified. In the second case you are, literally, subjected to multiple independent points of view on the many worlds in your experience (the multiple mono-perspectival manifolds of disjoint space and times within which objects are indexed as such in relation to the strongly nonlocal individuating/identifying subject); in that
case what we might think of as “Global” or Strong Open Individualism, where personal identity is not closed under such known individuating and identifying borders, would be vindicated and, in so far as such state of affairs is actually evidenced, verified. In the third case you are, literally, subjected to multiple independent points of view on the many worlds in your experience, the multiple multi-perspectival manifolds of disjoint space and times within which objects are indexed as such in relation to the ultra nonlocal individuating/identifying subject; in that case what we might think of as “Cosmic” or Ultra Open Individualism, where personal identity is not closed under any and all possible individuating and identifying borders, would be vindicated and, in so far as such a state of affairs is actually evidenced, verified.

Whichever the case may be, we are now in a strong position to ask, with regard to our Dream Analog II: how, after all—again, whichever the case may be—could the fact that the bordered experiences are qualitatively not the same experience (e.g. they are in either case perspectivally askew) be sufficient to make the subject in relation to which these borders are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time (localized) from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, and the subject in relation to which those borders are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time (localized) from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, numerically distinct persons? For one thing, if it were sufficient, on what grounds would it be sufficient? Clearly, there seems to be no fact of the matter here with regard to the question of whether such borders necessarily makes. To decide one way or the other would seem in such a case, all else being equal, simply arbitrary, a matter of convention. It would make personal identity merely a matter of convention.

We can thus, all else being equal, well enough imagine how it is possible indeed, not only in the dream but in waking states, that the person is in a multiphrenic state, one nonlocal subject of multiple disjoint sets of mutually exclusive (FEC-separated) experiences (whether in closed or open world or worlds) simultaneously.

Moreover, all else is not equal. To claim that the imagined scenario is by itself a sufficient condition for the existence of other persons is simply to mistake qualitative identity for numerical identity. Personal identity after all is a question about numerical, not qualitative, identity. (Which is not to say that qualitative differences don’t matter. It is to say that qualitative differences such as the non-pathological case imagined in Dream Analog II, not to mention a slew of multiphrenic disorders such as are manifest in
certain pathological states such as schizophrenia, would afford us are in and of themselves not of sufficient metaphysical significance to necessitate our thereby drawing along them metaphysical or metapsychological boundaries between one person and another. Being happy, for instance, matters but the qualitative difference between happiness and sadness does not, by itself, necessarily destroy personal identity.) Moreover, if one did decide to draw a boundary between persons in this way, such that the subject $I_1$ of experience $e_1$—$I_1(e_1)$—cannot be one and the same numerically identical person as the subject $I_2$ of experience $e_2$—$I_2(e_2)$—on the grounds that $e_1 \neq e_2$ is a sufficient condition for $I_1(1) \neq I_2(2)$, then—all else now being equal—the subject (now) at time $t_n$—$I_n$—is a numerically different person from the subject (yesterday) at time $t_{n-1}$—$I_{n-1}$. Or, to put it now only slightly differently, to decide that subject $x(\alpha)$ in relation to which object $a$ is individuated and identified in perspectival space and time $m_a$ (localized) from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, cannot be numerically identical to subject $x(\beta)$ in relation to which object $\beta$ is individuated and identified in perspectival space and time $m_\beta$ either because $\alpha \neq \beta$ or $m_a \neq m_\beta$ is sufficient for $x(\alpha) \neq x(\beta)$, “$I$-the-subject-at-time$_n$ in relation to which experiential objects are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time, i.e., observed.” On the other hand, to claim that it is the simultaneity that makes the crucial difference is to presuppose either the necessity of the impossibility of one person being the subject of two different sets of experiences simultaneously or that what I will call the Spatial Border is, necessarily, a Boundary between persons. Both of these presuppositions we shall challenge throughout the book in a variety of ways (see, especially, Ch. 4, “Spatial Borders”).

To thus believe as in the present example that, even if the Alter Subject Identification is veridical in dreams, nevertheless there is but one person there, the subject of multiple (perspectively askew) disjoint sets of experiences simultaneously, this, we can also believe, would be the most reasonable (e.g. best competing) explanation. We could try to understand this, if it were true, as akin to what apparently happens in multiple personality disorder and schizophrenia (already mentioned above, which we will discuss in much more detail in chapter 6). We could, if it turned out that dream characters are alter subjects, think of them as your alter subjects, such that the dream Muggers are distinct performances which you—individuated along various psychological borders (memory-access, co-
consciousness, etc.) so as to create bordered “streams” within yourself, each with a different “first-person point of view”—play “from the inside” using some elaborate mental “special effects” by which your consciousness “splits” into different streams allowing you as it were to “play” several different roles simultaneously. It would be like different roles played by the same actor—you—somewhat in the way that we could imagine an actor, with the help of some clever, state-of-the-art cinematic editing and good make-up, making a movie in which he plays every role. It would be a case of one person having simultaneously qualitatively different thoughts and experiences, a numerically identical being having numerous qualitatively different, mutually independent, points of view.

Our Dream Analog II example can thus also be easily reformulated in terms of what has sometimes been dubbed “dividing one’s mind.” Derek Parfit, for instance, imagines that he is one of a small minority of people whose right and left-brain hemispheres are identical and also that he has been equipped with some device that can block communication between the two identical hemispheres and then reunite them. Connected to his eyebrows, this device gives Parfit control of the process during a physics exam, so that by raising an eyebrow, he can divide, and then later reunite, his mind. Thus, during a physics exam in which he sees two different ways of approaching a problem, Parfit divides his mind so that one “stream of consciousness,” run on his left hemisphere, takes one approach; another “stream of consciousness,” run on his right hemisphere, takes the other. Dream Analog II can be viewed as a non-mechanical version of such a device, where there is in addition more than one delta mind formation. (“Dividing the mind” in this way is also anything but inconceivable, as we shall see from actual cases of commissurotomy, so if you think any such examples involving delta formations of consciousness are simply too far fetched, don’t worry—we will perform Unity of Consciousness Boundary Dissolves in much more detail, using both imaginary and actual cases, in Chapter 6. What is actual must be possible.)

We would not of course have to interpret Dream Analog II as we have here interpreted it. We could still claim that any time you are in the presence of borders separated from you by FEC and ASI, you are then in the presence of other persons. Suppose you believe this. Then you believe that \([m]\) is a sufficient condition for the existence of other persons, and thus that \([m]\) is not merely an apparent excluder but is an actual excluder of Open Individualism. If this is what you believe, then of course you have to grant that dream characters, if it turns out that they are conscious in the way
described, might be other persons. But this, you a faithful traditional Closed Individualist argue, is not a problem. First, you do not in fact believe that dream characters are conscious. You have absolutely no reason for such a belief. You think that traditional Closed Individualist beliefs (such as, “other persons exist,”) are true only of waking experience. Whether Closed Individualism is true also of dream experience might, at best, be a vaguely interesting question which in no way impinges on your belief that Closed Individualism is true of waking experience. Second, if for whatever reason we claimed that by your reasoning Closed Individualism is true in dreams as well, then so much the better for Closed Individualism! In other words, you are such an adamant believer in the Closed Individual View of Personal Identity that the more “worlds” it applies to (e.g. even to dream worlds), the better. That is, you would be taking Dream Analog II not as a reductio of the idea that \([m]\) is sufficient for the existence of other persons. Rather, you would be taking Dream Analog II as having shown that Closed Individualism might even hold in extraordinary cases that we had not yet considered.

This would be an interesting response. It would not be my response. My intuitions say otherwise. Perhaps this is due merely to a “bias” toward Open Individualism. But I doubt it. I find that, like the reader most likely, even if turned out that in dreams not only FEC but also ASI applied veridically to the “other” characters, then the characters in dreams are not thereby other persons.

Although I will offer several additional arguments to sway potential objectors, for the time being let us notice that anyone who would in this case opt for the “many persons” interpretation of Dream Analog II would thereby violate the single continuous entity assumption. The way in which we ordinarily understand the phrase “we are each a different person” is that the person whom we each are is some sort of continuous, unified entity. If it turns out that someone is now willing to consider her life as possibly consisting of her being composed of “many” separately existing entities each of which is a numerically distinct person, all of who exist “within” her head, some of who come and go, but all of who are (on Closed Individualism) numerically distinct persons from the ones who come and go in my head, then both the continuity and the unity of personhood are destroyed, which would in effect amount to leaving traditional Closed Individualism for an unorthodox and somewhat rather bizarre view, such as, for instance, one of the Empty Individualist Views (about which we will have much more to say later on).
Dream Analog II, by showing how it is possible that personal identity can extend across border controls individuated and identified by FEC and ASI, lessens the metaphysical significance accorded to these borders that, in traditional Closed Individualism, are viewed as boundaries between persons. Dream Analog II provides us with another example of a “Boundary Dissolve.” By forcing us to seek other borders (apparent excluders) upon which to erect metaphysical divisions (boundaries) between us it paves the way away from traditional Closed Individualism either toward some version of Empty Individualism or toward Open Individualism.

§2.2.3.3 TIME AND CONSCIOUSNESS: SOME OBJECTIONS TO DREAM ANALOG II

One might still object to the idea that we can successfully imagine that the characters in a dream (besides the “central” one who connects with the waking self) are conscious (that ASI holds in dreams veridically) by claiming that the notion is incoherent. What, after all, would such a strange state of affairs be like?

Suppose that, some time after waking from the Mugging Nightmare, you remembered having experienced “from the inside” all four first-person points of view, as follows. Upon waking you first remember having experienced “from the inside” only the experiences of the muggee. Then, under hypnosis, you suddenly recall the inner experiences of the first mugger as well—you recall having also “been” the first mugger—then you recall the inner experiences of the second mugger, then of the third mugger, and so on, so that in the end you recall the dream from four different perspectives. Is this coherent?

It is. Suppose that, in the dream, the mind dissociates into four FEC-bordered sets of individuations with simultaneously independent border controls. Suppose, in other words, that the mind in the process of individuating itself into separate and distinct borders (as it must do, regardless, to make the dream, or any experience, possible, e.g. in Kant’s sense) is able also in the dream to create simultaneously multiple first person points of view within itself, such that each bordered individuation—i.e., each dream character—is conscious, i.e., independently minded, inclusive of the therein exclusively conjoined subject in relation to which objects are individuated and identified in multi-perspectival space and time, i.e., observed (involving in this case, as described, the weak version of nonlocality). Upon waking, presumably, you would think that you had
dreamt the same dream four times, each time from a different first person point of view. This presumption derives from the hidden presupposition of locality: “A person cannot be the subject of more than one set of disjoint experiences simultaneously.” Thus if you recall having had two qualitatively different sets of experiences—each from a different, mutually independent first-person point of view, etc.—it would then follow necessarily that these two experiences occurred at different times.

But this assumption, “A person cannot be the subject of more than one disjoint set of experiences simultaneously,” though possibly true, is not necessarily true. Suppose that, after you recall the dream from the perspectives of the mugger and the muggees, we determine by use of REM (Rapid Eye Movement) and other techniques that you had dreamt only once during the entire night. In that case, by the criterion “which ‘stream of consciousness’ ‘goes with’ the awake self is the person,” you would have been the muggee and all three muggers at the same time. That is, you would have experienced four different perspectives, four different “subjective points of view” simultaneously. In other words, you would have been four different independently minded characters within your dream simultaneously. (And let me add, for anyone who thinks such states are conceptually incoherent, first, that there is actual empirical evidence that what we have here been imagining actually occurs in dreams.)

It is interesting to note that Swinburne, who as we have noted apparently believes that the FEC Border is a boundary between persons, believes that the sort of “fusion” imagined above—namely, that upon waking you remember “from the inside” having been both the muggee and the mugger—is incoherent and logically impossible:

The experience of fusion cannot be described coherently; which suggests that the subsequent person cannot in any real sense to any degree be both persons, for if he could, he ought to be able to some extent to have experienced both their experiences. But that would not be logically possible, for he could not in any way simultaneously be aware of P1’s experiences while coming to know P1*’s, and be aware of P1*’s experiences while coming to know P1’s. [Personal Identity, p. 45]

If what we have imagined in Dream Analog II is not logically contradictory or conceptually impossible—and it is not—then Swinburne and others who are predisposed to think in this way are, on this issue, simply mistaken.

Furthermore, what we have imagined in Dream Analog II would even allow for us to continue to believe, with Shoemaker, that what makes an
experience “mine” is that I remember it “from the inside:”

But since in fact the only actions or experiences anyone ever remembers from the inside are his own . . . it is a short step from the knowledge that one remembers a past action or experience from the inside to the knowledge that it was oneself that did the action or had the experience. [Personal Identity, p. 105]

“Person P remembers experience E from the inside,” Shoemaker is claiming, entails “P did E.” In that case, if P at time tₙ remembers contemporaneous but separate experiences E₁, E₂, E₃, and E₄, each of which occurred at tₙ₋₁, then P experienced four different points of view at the same time. And unless “P cannot be the subject of more than one set of disjoint experiences simultaneously” is necessarily true—and once again it is not—then in Dream Analog II we have not imagined anything conceptually impossible.

Thus, if your intuitions in this case agree with mine, as they probably do, then we have successfully imagined a case in which (1) the FEC Border, plus (2) the ASI Border, both hold (are veridical), but in which personal identity is not thereby closed, such that “you are in the presence of other persons,” is not necessarily true. This is an important conclusion. Not because you might right now be dreaming—I am not trying to make a point about skepticism. Remember that at the end of the last section the question we asked is whether (putting it now only slightly differently, for emphasis)

[m] I am in the presence of FEC-individuated objects some of which are identified as being themselves conscious (the subject in relation to which, etc.) in the way that I am,

entails

[n] I am in the presence of other persons.

Does [m] entail [n]? That is, is [m] an actual excluder of Open Individualism? The answer, since we can come up with a counterexample in which [m] is true but [n] is false, is that [m] does not entail [n]. FEC and ASI are merely apparent excluders of Open Individualism. Thus, knowing that you and I are separated by the FEC Border—even if we also know that you over there are minded exactly in the way that I over here am minded—we still do not know that other persons exist—and we do not know it even if we know that other bordered individuations, separated from us by the FEC Border, are minded. In the next section we shall consider briefly the implication this result has for the traditional Problem of Other Minds.
Another objection that could be made is that in Dream Analog II there would still be a way to distinguish “you” from the other dream characters, as follows. Whichever independently minded character in the dream connects via memory to your waking life, then that is the person who is you, and the other independently minded dream characters are not you. So if when you wake up you remember experiencing the dream from the first-person point of view of the muggee, such that the present (waking) psychological states are identified with the previous psychological states (in the dream), then that is the person who you are (and were) and the other independently minded dream characters are other persons.

This might be what someone’s intuitions say. But this is unsatisfactory. For one thing, you do not always remember all your dreams and so in some cases such connections will not hold between any of the dream characters and your waking states. Second, suppose that which experiences went with the awake self could be decided later on, just before waking. That is, suppose you are having a dream in which four major characters—the three muggers and the muggee—are each “subjectively illuminated” from the inside, i.e., each independently minded, as we have been imagining, without being simultaneously co-conscious of the experiences of any of the “others.” Now, upon waking, only one set of experiences will connect to the waking self so that the waking self will have access to the “inner life” experience of only one dream character—in the present case, that of the muggee—even though it could have had access to any one of the others, in this case any one of the muggers since we are imagining that they too are each “subjectively illuminated” from the inside, each one conscious. Would this mean that only one of your dream characters—the muggee, who it turns out “connects” with the waking self—is you?

Normally, of course—I repeat—you probably do assume that, since when you wake up from a nightmare you remember “having been” only one of the characters in the dream—in the present case, the muggee—that therefore the other characters—in the present case, the muggers—were not “inwardly illuminated,” each one minded, in the way that the central dream character, the muggee, was. But the point, once more, is that this does not necessarily have to be the case. It could be that, before waking, the mind/brain decides which particular dream character’s inward experience to connect to its waking states at the exclusion of the others. (Again, we will have much more to say about such examples in the sections on Unity of Consciousness.) Would this make only one of the dream characters you, in exclusion of the others? It seems extremely odd to suppose that it would.
Since we would not want to say that who you were is determined after the fact of the experience, this would be an ad hoc way of determining which single “dream” character is you.

We can thus believe that in spite of these sorts of possible objections, our first two borders—(1) the FEC Border and (2) the ASI Border—are merely apparent excluders of Open Individualism—they are not necessarily boundaries between persons. So even if (1) and (2) were true in your dreams, it would not necessarily follow that the characters in your dream are other persons (no more so than in such states evidenced in e.g. schizophrenia cases, to be considered in Chapter 6). Whether the characters in your dream are marionettes—automata, or “zombies”—that are “inwardly dark,” or whether they are “inwardly illuminated,” we could coherently believe that there was no one there in the dream but you, no one to blame but yourself. It might have been the fight with your boss that “set off” the nightmare, but you wrote the script and directed all the action (or at least your “subconscious,” or system uncs, did these things, in the case of the marionettes model). Ultimately, no matter how horrible the suffering in your nightmare, and no matter whether the dream characters are conscious or not, if the actions in the dream are performed by a person, that person is you. Since we can imagine this to be true in dreams, we can imagine it being true in “real” life. And if we can imagine it being true in real life, we can imagine that Open Individualism is true in real life.

What the Dream Analog shows, then, is that philosophers who believe that the border controls of the sort we have considered necessitate drawing metaphysical boundaries between persons, are wrong. Such border controls, even when individuated from each other via the FEC Border, even when buttressed by the ASI Border, do not metaphysical boundaries make—they are not necessarily boundaries between persons. Personal identity is not closed under individuation and identification by such borders. We might choose to make boundaries out of such (independently controlled) borders for some other reasons besides the existence of the borders themselves. But such border controls by themselves are not solid, impenetrable walls that fix absolutely the number of persons in the universe. Such borders are, at best, part of a complex conceptual framework (what I call a conceptual reference frame—see Chapter 10) within which we may choose, if we want, to draw metaphysical boundaries for the separating of people from people. Or not.
§ 2.3 IS THE DREAM ANALOG SELF-DEFEATING?

Jerrold Levinson has posed the question of whether the way I have proceeded in Dream Analog II is, ultimately, self-defeating on grounds that my procedure is viciously circular because I began by assuming the validity of our traditional (received) view of persons that, if my reasoning is sound, in the end is invalid. He asks:

Isn’t it only by assuming that I am an integrated, identifiable single person, whose mind (or minds) has a clear boundary (e.g., that personal identity is determinate) that I can interpret the Dream Analog as you want (that is, that I am the single subject behind the various inwardly lit characters in my dream), and so [m] (I perceive borders that are independently inclusive of the subject but which I cannot control) does not entail [n] (I am in the presence of other persons)? It seems I only get my faith shaken in “m→n” from your Dream Analog by presupposing one aspect of Closed Individualism—“I’m a distinct person, everything in my dreams is ultimately me, whether minded or not, etc.” If I don’t retain this element of Closed Individualism, then I’m not sure what to conclude from your example—in particular, whether Open Individualism could hold across the borders described in your Dream Analog.

In other words, what seems illegitimate to Levinson is that I have proceeded here by accepting from the start one fundamental element of the ordinary concept of a person—that a person is an entity with well-defined borders such that personal identity is always determinate—to conclude that [m] does not entail (or assure) [n], but then we went on to use that weakened connection to cast doubt on the ordinary conception of a person that, in Open Individualism, is justified partly on grounds like [m]. So, it seems that only by granting traditional Closed Individualism from the beginning can we arrive at conclusions that then lead us to doubt traditional Closed Individualism. This to Levinson seems fishy because my strategy in Dream Analog II relies on deep intuitions derived from a conceptual framework that is itself contradicted by the very moves I am making. That is, perhaps we are here involved in a self-defeating paradox in which, as Levinson puts it:

You are making a case against the ordinary view of persons by relying on deep intuitions about the nature of persons derived from our ordinary view of persons—intuitions which, if you succeed in making your case, should not be relied upon because they are false.

Levinson thus poses an extremely interesting difficulty that, in the abstract, reveals something profound about the paradoxical nature of self-reflexive reasoning—our reasoning about ourselves. In his criticism of Dream Analog II Levinson thus raises the problem of how we, who are (at
least part of) the effect of our own conceptual framework (or, *conceptual reference frame*, see Ch. 10) should proceed in our self-conceptualizing. For in so doing we must to some degree as Levinson notes rely on intuitions that are themselves (at least partially) determined by (or, at least, ingredients of) the view being questioned using those same intuitions.

We will return to resolve this deep issue in Chapter 10. For now I will only make the following two suggestions. First, when any particular view is at a state of crisis due to various insoluble paradoxes (as certainly is the case with personal identity), all else being equal, the most conservatively rational thing to do, it seems to me, is to give up the least fundamental (surface) intuitions and preserve the most fundamental (deep) ones, along with the concepts from which they derive. This is precisely the strategy we shall employ throughout this book. That is, it is only parts of Closed Individualism that we need to give up. Our deepest intuitions and the concepts from which they derive we can retain—a move that goes part way with what Parfit and other Empty View Theorists have urged. That is, unlike Empty Individualism, Open Individualism preserves those aspects of the *intrinsic features assumption* and the *survival and identity assumption* (shared by many, perhaps most philosophers) expressed by the idea that *what matters primarily in our continued survival over time is personal identity*. The fact that Open Individualism preserves this aspect of our conceptual framework (conceptual reference frame) will be one of the factors in our claim that Open Individualism is no more bizarre than is Empty Individualism, the other viable alternative. Our solution as we shall see also has many more positive ramifications for resolving the problem of global ethics, to which we shall turn in the latter part of this book.

Second, it is not in principle impossible that, by a careful analysis of our immediate experience and the received theory (traditional Closed Individualism) that structures it, we might—from within that very framework—see the truth about ourselves. What makes it possible to do this is that our experience, as we shall see, is in various ways inconsistent with Closed Individualism such that when the various “cognitive dissonances” are taken together they point collectively in one of two directions: either in the direction of Empty Individualism or in the direction of the Open View.
§ 2.4 THE PROBLEM OF OTHER PERSONS: AN IMPLICATION FOR THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS

You probably believe, as do I, that people around you in waking life are not just zombies or marionettes but that, like you, they have a mind, they are conscious. You probably think the characters in your dreams are not in this way conscious, that they are but empty images, phenomenological zombies, psychological marionettes. Although, I must admit, unlike you I (along with one other researcher that I know, the recently deceased German psychologist Paul Tholey, and for similar reasons) do believe that they are (for reasons having more to do with the empirical data of my more recent dream research rather than with my far more longstanding philosophical theory of Open Individualism), Open Individualism does not require you to believe that dream characters are conscious in the way that you are, etc., as captured by ASI. Rather, I am claiming that

1. the FEC Border plus
2. the ASI Border

are merely apparent excluders of the Open Individual View of Personal Identity and thus that even if the people in “real” life separated from you by the ASI Border (minded in the way that you are) and separated from you by the FEC Border, they are not, in virtue of those borders, not even given that both borders hold and are veridical, necessarily other persons. Those known borders do not close personal identity under individuation and identification.

Brian Garrett, however, raises another objection. Suppose, he asks, that a defender of traditional Closed Individualism offers the following rejoinder: if subject \( I_a \), conjoined by FEC to “A”, cannot control “B” to which is conjoined subject \( I_b \), and “A” and “B” are both persons, then “A” and “B” are distinct persons; but in the Dream Analog “A” (the dream muggee) and “B” (the dream mugger) are not persons at all because a dream character should be thought of adverbially; thus, the Dream Analog is therefore not a counter-example to Closed Individualism.

Besides that this does not address the problems raised by actual cases of multiphrenic consciousness in the psychological pathology literature, the deeper problem with such a rejoinder is that it begs the question, namely: What do the boundaries of personhood consist in? The point of the Dream Analog is that, by itself, such border controls are not sufficient for personal boundaries, that personal identity is not closed under those known individuating and identifying borders. That is, “A” and “B,” individuated
by the FEC Border + ASI Border, can be identified as one person, “P”, even though there is no psychological identification between “A” and “B.”

Perhaps a defender of Closed Individualism would think that the physiological borders are obvious and unproblematic candidates for interpersonal boundaries. Perhaps they are (except, again, we will consider and in fact dissolve various types of Physiological Border in turn). But whether or not physiological borders are sufficient boundaries between persons does not address the present issue, which is (merely the first blow) against the idea that it is via such border controls that the boundaries between persons are drawn. This raises the following question: On what grounds does a defender of the Closed Individual View of Personal Identity establish the existence of other persons to begin with?

Traditionally, the Problem of Other Minds centers around the issue of whether when we observe you exhibiting, say, pain symptoms, there is really “someone there inside you” experiencing that pain or whether you are just a robot or a puppet. Sometimes this question is put as

(P)       Do other minds exist?

Sometimes it is put as

(Q)       Are other bodies minded?

(P) and (Q) look similar but, given what we have thus far concluded, they are radically different questions. It could be true that other bodies are minded (i.e., inclusive of the subject), but false that other minds exist. In other words,

(A)       other bodies are minded,

and

(B)       other minds do not exist,

are not contradictories. They are subcontraries—they cannot both be false but they could both be true.

Initially, this may sound absurd. How could (A) and (B) both be true? But we are beginning to see, and shall see again in much more detail, how it could be possible that other bodies are minded without being other minds. The mind in human X is not necessarily a different mind, in the sense of belonging to some other person, from the mind in person Y. That is, we are raising the possibility that my knowing that you are minded in the way that I am minded rather than a zombie or a robot, and knowing that you and I
are separated by the FEC Border, does not thereby necessarily grant me the knowledge that you are a different person from me. The existence of such borders is neither a requisite for there being inter-personal boundaries, nor is the existence of such borders sufficient for there being more than one person. This presents us with a new philosophical problem analogous in some ways to the Problem of Other Minds, what I call “The Problem of Other Persons.”

The Problem of Other Persons is an epistemological problem. It is the problem of how we can know that more than one person exists. Yet in traditional inquiries into the Problem of Other Minds, we are given a forced choice between only two alternatives: problematic solipsism (a world containing “me” and a bunch of zombies) and traditional Closed Individualism. There is an alternative to these two choices, an alternative to both problematic solipsism and Closed Individualism—namely, the view we are at present trying to make room for—the Open Individual View, which we can think of as Enlightened (rather than problematic), or “Independence-Friendly” Solipsism.

As a sort of Enlightened, or “Independence-Friendly” Solipsism, Open Individualism is part of a view in which you and I and every paradigm example of a person are (numerically) one and the same person. Independence-Friendly (IF) Solipsism is not problematic solipsism. Even if you and I and every other paradigm example of a person exist, IF Solipsism could still be true. So even if traditional, problematic solipsism could be shown to be false, IF Solipsism could still be true. This is because (A) and (B) are not contradictories: other humans could be conscious without there being any other minds. Thus solving the Problem of Other Minds cannot solve the Problem of Other Persons.

Nor is the Problem of Other Persons the problem of how we can know that other persons exist. It is the problem of how we can know that other persons exist. Suppose we know you and I are not robots or zombies but are each minded without our being necessarily co-conscious. Then we might all agree that we know that you and I are each a person. But knowing that you and I are each a person does not, by itself, guarantee that you and I are each a numerically different person.

In other words, the Problem of Other Persons arises not because we do not know whether X, Y, and Z are persons. Rather, the Problem of Other Persons arises because knowing that X, Y, and Z are each a person does not necessarily imply that X is a different person from Y, nor that Y is a different person from Z, and so on. To do that we would have to have some
coherent way of identifying ourselves as one and the same person across some individuations while at the same time ascribing to (or deriving from) these very same borders the appropriate metaphysical divisions so as to make out of them boundaries between persons—and we would have to do this in a way that accounts for the various puzzles, both conceptual and actual. And, as we shall see, we have no coherent way of doing so. So while personal identity is as the good Locke argued presupposed by, and not derived from, experience, personal non-identity is neither presupposed by nor derived from experience, nor could it be—*even in principle*.

Thus, ultimately, the lament of the man on the street that he cannot stop the muggers from beating him up and taking his money, as a common-sense objection to Open Individualism, is at the very best, even in its most shallowest form, *deeply* inconclusive. This is because the man on the street cannot stop the muggers in his dreams, either—yet in his dreams something very much like Open Individualism is true. In a dream, all individuations, minded or not—while distinct from one another on a superficial level—can on a deeper level be identified across the individuations as the masks of one, and only one, person. Regardless of whether behind these masks there is an independently minded actor or whether the masks are empty, if the dreamer exists and is minded and if the individuations in the dreams are minded, they are all the simultaneous, minded but not co-conscious (independence-friendly) individuations of the same numerically identical person. The dreamer, the person who has a dream, is numerically identical with each and every aspect of that dream, of everything and everyone in it—even as its own, most suffering, victim.

§ 2.5 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL NON-IDENTITY

The reason, presumably, why philosophers have focused on the question of what makes a person at two different times one and the same person, is that they hope in the process to discover what a person is—to discover the nature of the person. Parfit, for instance, writes:

The philosophical debate is about the nature both of persons and of personal identity over time. It will help to distinguish these questions:

1. What is the nature of a person?
2. What is it that makes a person at two different times one and the same person?
3. What is necessarily involved in the continued existence of each person over time? [*Reasons and Persons*, p. 202]
Parfit claims that “the answer to (2) provides the answer to (3). . . . In answering (2) and (3) we shall also partly answer (1)” (p. 202). He then spends a great deal of time (more than 200 pages) in trying to answer questions (2) and (3). His answer to (1), however, is extremely brief:

And the simplest answer to (1) is that, to be a person, a being must be self-conscious, aware of its identity and its continued existence over time. [p. 209]

I am self-conscious. I am, therefore, according to those who would accept Parfit’s definition, and also in my view, a person. In so far as you, too, are self-conscious, etc., you too are, on this sort of view, a person. But knowing that you are a person and I am a person does not tell us that you and I are different persons unless we also know the answer to the following question:

(4) What makes X a different person from Y?

In fact, the entire framework in terms of which questions (1), (2) and (3) are asked presupposes the existence of non-identical persons. It implies that we know the answer to (4). Thus in showing that we don’t know the answer to (4), we are questioning the entire conceptual framework in terms of which (1), (2), and (3) are framed.

Philosophers have focused almost exclusively on the question of personal identity rather than on personal non-identity, as if the question of personal non-identity needs not even to be asked. Presumably, the reason is that the difference between two people such as you and me is obvious, while the sameness between any two person-stages of the same person, such as Daniel Kolak now and Daniel Kolak of twenty-five years ago, is not obvious. That is, the idea is that we might not have the metaphysical glue with which to construct the appropriate collage, but we have the metaphysical scissors. But thus far we are beginning to see that the answer to the question,

(4) What makes X a different person from Y?

is—to use an expression that people in the American South are fond of—“we don’t rightly know.” The FEC Border and the ASI Border—what we might assume provide the foundations for an obvious answer—does not provide the needed metaphysical scissors.

This opens up an interesting position. The literature on personal identity—even the Empty Individual Views of Parfit, Nozick, Shoemaker, and others—which focuses exclusively on the question of what it is that
makes one person the same continuously existing person over time, takes
for granted the fundamental assumption that other persons do exist. Other
persons may exist. Most of us certainly do believe, and behave as if, other
persons exist. But it seems that in large part we base our beliefs and our
actions on the sorts of would-be separation axioms provided by FEC and
ASI—just as we do while we are dreaming—which, as we have begun to
see, are not necessarily boundaries between persons. And so we do not
rightly know that other persons exist.

Parfit would have us care less about personal identity than we ordinarily
do care about it. This has led many of his critics to argue that caring less
about our personal identities than we ordinarily do would lead to bad moral
outcomes, such as weakening our obligations to keep promises. Parfit has
responded by claiming that even if caring less about our personal identities
would lead to worse outcomes, it would not make it rational to do so—
“Consequentialism is not the whole truth about rationality.”

The assumption on the part of Parfit’s critics is that caring less about our
personal identities entails that we view ourselves as a multiple series of
related but non-identical person-stages. Parfit does not question this
assumption. But it can be questioned. For we can also care less about
personal non-identity: just as much as we don’t know that DK now the
same person as DK age ten, we don’t know that DK now is a different
person from DK age six.

Parfit may be right about it being irrational to care about personal identity.
But it may turn out that it is just as irrational to care about personal non-
identity—about the distinction between one person and another. This means
that though the supposed “Boundaries” between me and you may be less
significant than we ordinarily suppose, the “Boundaries” between “me” age
42 and “me” age 10 are also much less significant than Parfit, as well as his
critics, would suppose.

In other words, we need not be afraid of losing ourselves. Parfit’s claim
that it is irrational to care about one’s personal identity is based on an
analysis that takes for granted the ordinary view that there exists more than
one person and that there is some easy way of distinguishing between them.
There may exist more than one person. But we are beginning to see that the
view that there is an obvious and simple way to distinguish one person from
another—by FEC or by ASI or both—is false.

Recent analyses of personal identity like Parfit’s may to a certain extent
succeed in dissolving the metaphysical glue. But, in particular, Parfit’s
conclusion about the irrationality of caring about personal identity is based
on the assumption that the metaphysical scissors are ready and sharp. This conclusion, as we shall see in progressively more detail, is false. We can just as easily blunt the metaphysical scissors. Thus, as we shall see, there is no good reason to prefer Empty Individualism to Open Individualism, while there is sufficient reason for preferring Open Individualism to Empty Individualism.

Philosophers are fond of pointing out that we might not know who we are. But these same philosophers forget that we might not know who we are not, either. I may, as Parfit would claim, lack sufficient reason to know that I am the same person as “my” seven-year old self. On the other hand, I may also lack the sufficient reason to know that I am a different person from “my” seven-year old self or from you; ultimately, I have no sufficient reason to believe that I am a different person from any of the other independently minded borders in my experience, up to and including you.

Of course, no one except the most hardened skeptic will deny what the experience of living suggests, namely, that the universe contains many mutually independent subject-dependent states. But, skeptical or not, philosophers working on the problem of personal identity have yet to begin addressing the question of whether there is any reason to believe—aside from the fact that unexamined common sense declares it to be so—that therefore there exists, necessarily, more than one person. And if it is not even clear how, given the “variegated multitude of apparently insoluble cases,” one would go about trying to provide such reasons—and as we shall see, there is not—should we not be cautious about committing ourselves to the received Closed Individual View that has no basis in fact and for which as we shall see there is no coherent and persuasive argument?

Indeed, most of the arguments we shall examine in the course of this work call for a radical redistricting of the Cosmos such that either we draw ourselves together as one and the same person—the independence-friendly, IF Solipsism envisioned by the Open Individual View of Personal Identity—or else we draw ourselves altogether out of the picture as envisioned in Empty Individualism. Or, to put it slightly differently: if traditional Closed Individualism cannot be shown to be true and Open Individualism cannot be shown to be false, why then are we—qua philosophers—so committed to the one rather than the other? (Especially if, as I claim, Closed Individualism is not even possible where as Open Individualism not only is possible but has some positive evidence and sufficient reason for being not just the truth but the best view about us?)

These questions are not merely rhetorical. We shall ask them again, once
we determine the degree to which persuasive arguments—both via negativa and positive—can be made for the Open View.
1. Whether from a metaphysical or ontological point of view this relation ultimately is causal or covariational, phenomenal or epiphenomenal, etc., should not at the present moment get in the way of our explanation; we will consider such borders in (e.g., The Physiological Border, the Causal Border) in subsequent chapters.

2. The Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment thus gives rise to an equally important and equally necessary condition for the having of experience as we know it, namely, the intuition that the objects immediately before me directly in my experience—regardless of to what degree I may know, or believe, that they are mind-dependent (e.g., they are perspectival)—are subject-independent, i.e., that they are not only ontologically but phenomenologically independent of the subject. By “subject-independent” in this case I mean to express something both neutral and broad, so as to give the reader sufficient philosophical latitude to see, or at least get to, as it were, the necessary philosophical longitude. (We thus can avoid, for now, tangential discussions of cause and effect, agency, etc.) The border dynamics involved, for instance, regardless of what view one takes (if any) of the computational drivers involved in the (literally) “behind-the-scenes” mental processing of experiential phenomena, thus require at least the appearance of subject-independence, as do colors, shapes, textures, etc. In other words, render your experience “mental,” “phenomenal,” “unreal,” “mind-dependent”—e.g. “ideal”—as you like, there is no escape from the (in some views “false,” “illusory,” “transcendentally illusory,” etc., in some views “true,” “real,” “pragmatically given,” etc., but in either case necessary for the having of experience) intuition that what is before you is there, and is as it is, independently of the subject or—to put in just in the most simply vulgar terms—is real. This is nowhere more apparent then in what is, arguably, the most “unreal” sort of experience there is, namely, dreams. (For instance even the good Descartes says he almost can’t tell the difference, and even the good Schopenhauer says the two states are, at the very least, different readings of the same book, modulo different page-turnings.)

3. Where that indexes my limbs, or, more precisely, the visual representation of my limbs, i.e., part of my “body image,” or, to be even more precise, my “body-mind image.” See Chapter 6.

4. Not to mention Freudian.

5. Norman Malcolm in *Dreaming* argues that dreams are not experiences; Daniel Dennett, in his response to Malcolm, “Are Dreams Experiences,” concludes: “It is an open, and theoretical question whether dreams fall inside or outside the boundary of experience,” p. 147. Their debate is not centrally relevant to the issue I
am raising here; my argument, being an analog, does not hinge on it being true that dreams are experiences, since even if we never dreamt I could still make the necessary analogy by imagining it to be the case that we had dreams of a certain type. However, I do believe that dreams are experiences, and I argue in Chapter Ten, “Phenomenological Borders,” that there is an important and illuminating sense in which all experience is, from a purely phenomenological point of view, phenomenologically equivalent to dream experience (see the sections on the Phenomenal Self). See also H.D. Lewis, Dreaming and Experience.

6 “Make them cry and they will cry for you, make them laugh and they will laugh at you,” the rest of the adage goes, “but make yourself cry and make yourself laugh and they will laugh and cry with you, right up there on the stage, they will be you.” Attributed to Gaspard Teyssier (1596-1686), the great French actor, songwriter and avatar of vaudeville (thus named after the Vire valley in northwestern France where the form originated) and from which the term “vaudeville” descends.

7 This in my view is the spirit in which Wittgenstein meant that the world cannot be viewed from the outside: for that to take place you would have to be in a world outside the world in which case the “world” that you would be thus “viewing” would be not a world but an idea, or thought. In other words, the subject would in that case view the world as internal to the subject. See my forthcoming, “Metaphysics as Topology.” Compare with Tractatus, 6.45: “To view the world sub specie aeterni is the view of it as a—bounded—whole. The feeling of the world as a bounded whole is the mystical feeling.” Daniel Kolak, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, p. 49.

8 I say communicated rather than, say, merely “denoted,” “indicated,” “signified,” “stood for,” “represented,” “symbolized,” “designated,” “meant,” “referred to,” etc., not to circumvent the whole fascinating issue of whether and then if so how “I” refers (e.g. Anscombe) but because such terms miss the fact that the utterance expresses, conveys, puts across, articulates, etc., something simultaneously both to the hearer and the speaker, and even also what that is.

9 A possible philosophical upgrade of Peirce’s term “indexical” would be to call “I,” “here,” “now,” etc., communicatives.

10 In the topological sense, with discrete topologies with separation axioms, e.g. Hausdorff, wherein the entire “field of consciousness,” i.e., the subject in toto, involves discrete manifolds (“objects”) separated and conjoined by differential equations among which and exclusively onto which the “subject-in-itself” is conjoined (via identification as, which we shall define in Chapter 6). Put simply: the question is to explain how it is possible for consciousness (the “I” in the dream)
to, as it were, “flow,” “move,” etc., “through” consciousness (the “world” in the dream), through itself by “separating” itself from itself to the degree made necessary for the having of experience as expressed by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment.

11 Although to say much more would take us beyond the intended scope of the present work (and into the scope of my forthcoming Logical Foundations of Spacetime, Geometry, and Quantum Mechanics: A Topological Model for the Mind), in the most general mathematical parlance this notion is typically expressible as follows. If \( f \), a continuous function from compact space \( X \) to Hausdorff space \( Y \), is one-to-one, then it is a homeomorphism of \( X \) and \( f(X) \). The identity map \( f: (Y, T) \rightarrow (Y, L) \) is continuous, one-to-one, and onto. Because \( L = T \), the topology \( L \) is unique. Now, if \( X \) is compact, the space \( Y \) is obtained by adding (adjoining) the point \( \infty \) that is both open and closed. If \( X \) is a locally compact Hausdorff space that is not compact, and \( Y = X \cup \{\infty\} \), such that \( X \) is dense in \( Y \), then \( Y \) is the one-point compactification of \( X \). This is especially relevant to what follows, e.g. Wittgenstein’s 5.64. (Generally, a compact space \( Y \) is a compactification of \( X \) if \( X \) is homeomorphic to a dense subspace of \( Y \), and a one-point compactification of \( L \) is itself a generalization of the method of adding a point to a plane to make a sphere.) Clearly and immediately relevant here of course is Brouwer’s fixed point theorem (that every map \( f: B^n \rightarrow B^n \) has a fixed point) in conjunction with the Borsuk-Ulan Theorem: if \( f \) is a map from \( S^2 \) to \( \mathbb{R}^2 \), then antipodal points \( w \) and \(-w\) exist in \( S^2 \) such that \( f(w) = f(-w) \), and we define \( g: S^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^2 \) as a map by \( g(w) = f(w) - f(-w) \), \( w \in S^2 \), it can easily be shown that \( g \) vanishes at some point of \( S^2 \).

12 What I am calling the residual subject-in-itself is the essential aspect of subjectivity that cannot be objectified and therefore remains even and especially after the act of individuation and identification (up to and including identification as, defined in Chapter 6) subjective, i.e., the subject qua subject, the as it were “subjective residue” of individuation, identification and objectification.

13 There is much pioneering work on the logic of communication that is quite relevant to the issues I am raising here about rethinking indexicals in terms of communicatives. See, especially, Johan van Benthem’s “One is a Lonely Number: on the logic of communication,” J. van Benthem, H. Andréka & I. Németi, 1998: “Modal Logics and Bounded Fragments of Predicate Logics,” A. Baltag 2001: “Logics for Insecure Communication,” and J. van Benthem’s other mergings of epistemic and dynamic logic.

14 For another alternative reading of indexicals, see Ingar Brinck’s 1997: The Indexical I.
Not just Cartesian and Hermeneutic but even Viennese and, I hasted to add, the squared one at Harvard.

I am well aware of the (semi)paradoxical nature of the locution, “perlocutionary motivation,” but in my view that is part of the force of the *Tractatus*. See my *Wittgenstein’s Tractatus*. In any case, what I said above about *I* being better termed a “communicative” rather than “indexical” is such that I would add to Austin’s list of illocutionary acts (verdicatives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, expositives) the term *communicatives*, such as *I*, *here*, *now*, *you*, etc., which could thus be regarded as speech acts that are unique in virtue of having simultaneously three degrees of freedom (and could thus be viewed as “spacelike” rather than “timelike” speech acts that have not three but only one degree of freedom in the “negative,” i.e., “timelike,” direction, causing thereby the well known problems of reference and denotation due to the quizzical nature of time and consciousness, discussed below).

Literally, “having no real part,” a term Klein used in order to reserve “imaginary” e.g. for curves specified by equations with complex numbers as coefficients. Thus for instance the real circle $x_1^2 + x_2^2 + 1 = 0$, which has a real center at $(0,0)$, contains no real points, which Klein termed *nullteilig*. Others have used in such cases the locution “virtual” and, still others, “ideal,” both of which are I dare say unabashedly appropriate. Thus if it helps one can offer an intended model-theoretic interpretation of the *I*, our subject-in-itself, in terms of *nullteilig*, as the virtual or ideal subject-in-itself. This can help, too, with the concept, explored in the next section, of the possibility of the necessity of non-locality of (the virtual, ideal) *I*.

As Strawson says in his *Individuals*, e.g. “But, so long as we keep that for the present indispensable sense of strangeness, it can and must seem to need explanation that one’s states of consciousness, one’s thoughts and sensations, are ascribed to the very same thing . . .”

I openly deplore the gross tendency of so many of my contemporaries to dismiss positions antithetical to their own with quips such as “obvious error,” “clear mistake,” “simple fallacy,” etc. It makes us all to be a bunch of idiots and nincompoops grasping at straws. We may all be crazy, yes, but not all of us are stupid.

Again, let me say that because I am a metaphysical subjectivist, I do think it does need to be said; but if you are not, and you do not, it does not: this would however have no impact whatsoever on our philosophical explanation of how Open Individualism is possible in light of its apparent excluders. The reason it wouldn’t
is because say, for instance, that you are a naïve realist unconcerned by the metaphysical conundrums surrounding “the subject.” Then the concerns here being addressed do not concern you and need not be addressed by you. You are, say, gravely concerned instead about physical borders. Fine; the physical borders between us will be addressed in Chapter 3. You would in that case in the present chapter be as unmoved, if perhaps to some degree philosophically amused, by our reflections on the subject as for instance a metaphysical idealist would be by our reflections on the physiological borders in Chapter 3, neurological borders in Chapter 4, and so on. “Why go to such lengths,” you might each say with regard to the other’s concerned borders; the answer to that question is for us cashed in terms of the promised metaphysical invariance of our thesis. The point, for which I would lay pretense to being most certainly a deep one, is that Open Individualism does not require any particular metaphysics or ontology, not because it is metaphysics-free or ontology-free but because, on the contrary, it is as metaphysics and ontology friendly as it is independence friendly, such that it can and does work in any system.

And I don’t mean this necessarily in a pejorative sense; the purpose is not to close off the subject in a philosophical discussion by unnecessarily restricting our terms analytically because, say, it is not possible to say more than the subject can understand but, rather, on the contrary, instead of conserving, liberating the subject by keeping ourselves, literally, in on the conversation.

There will be a detailed discussion of the body image and what I call the mind image and their conjoinment, the body-mind image in Sect. 6.4.

The “unhappy consciousness,” Royce’s clever albeit little known translation of the Hegelian “alienated consciousness,” always seemed to me as apt as it was, and still is, under-appreciated.

Where the first and second person indexicals “me,” “you,” are themselves indexed in relation to the former at the exclusion of the latter.

In the sense, say, that a water chestnut explains its leaves.

Which is not to say that we could not say for instance in a category-theoretic modulo Heidegger sense that “the subject”=Being, the Subject-in-itself=Dasein, the Objectification of the Subject =the World, and so on; rather the point is that the fact, if it is a fact, that there is more than one—in fact, possibly infinite—hyperbolic philosophies is for the Open Individual View not the sort of thorny problem it is for the traditional Closed Individual View but, at worst, a rosy one.

Perhaps, in some sense, even—at the threat of being misunderstood—in
Bergson’s sense.

28 One of the less explored sorts of deficiencies in reducibility accounts is that often they “prove” too much: if $\kappa$ terms in $\mathcal{K}$-sentences can be reduced to $\gamma$ terms in $\mathcal{Y}$-sentences, but then also $\gamma$ terms can be reduced to $\omega$-terms in $\mathcal{Q}$-sentences, where $\mathcal{K}$-sentences and $\mathcal{Q}$-sentences are mutually exclusive, contradictory, and/or live in incommensurate theories $\mathcal{T}$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}$, the reductions reduce themselves from a metaphysical-theoretical point of view to nonsense. See Appendix B.

29 Plato being take one, James being take two.

30 To put it only slightly differently—though I wouldn’t want us to get ahead of ourselves here—as Wittgenstein would want to say, I cannot step into the world: the $I$ is the subject-in-itself in relation to its (necessarily perspectival) objects in space and time and not, itself, the subject in space and time; I cannot, in this very same sense, (because of what is expressed, truly, by Wittgenstein’s “I am my world”), step into myself. Or, to put it slightly differently: I am certainly not on the outside looking out, though that’s the way it seems, nor am I on the inside looking out, though that’s also how it seems, but nor am I on the inside looking in as I would perhaps want to say but, alas, cannot.

31 e.g. in Schopenhauer’s sense: the (phenomenal, representational) body (i.e., the “body image”) he calls an immediate object, whereas the tables and chairs are mediated objects in so far as the latter are known in virtue of, or through, or in relation to, the former, and vice versa. He puts it thus:

“The knowing subject is an individual precisely by reason of this special relation to the one body which, considered apart from this, is for him only a representation like all other representations. But the relation by virtue of which the knowing subject is an individual, subsists for that very reason only between him and one particular representation among all his representations. He is therefore conscious of this particular representation not merely as such, but at the same time in a quite different way, namely as a will. But if he abstracts from that special relation, from that twofold and completely heterogeneous knowledge of one and the same thing, then that one thing, the body, is a representation like all others. Therefore, in order to understand where he is in this matter, the knowing individual must either assume that the distinctive feature of that one representation is to be found merely in the fact that his knowledge stands in this double reference only to that one representation; that only into this one object of perception is an insight in two ways at the same time open to him; and that this is to be explained not by a difference of this object from all others, but only by a difference between the relation of his knowledge to this one object and its relation to all others. Or he must assume that
this one object is essentially different from all others; that it alone among all objects is at the same time will and representation, the rest, on the other hand, being mere representation, i.e., mere phantoms. Thus, he must assume that his body is the only real individual in the world, i.e., the only phenomenon of will, and the only immediate object of the subject.” (World As Will And Representation, Volume I, pp. 103-104)

32 I am reminded of those moments when the guest having just named a private part turns to the host and says, “Are we allowed to say that on TV?”

33 For Schopenhauer, again, the perceived body is an immediate object in contrast to the surrounding mediated objects from which, to put it in our terms, the immediate subject-in-itself is separated by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment.

34 In other words, the “subject” which in Wittgenstein’s sense is the world (“I am my world,”) is not, strictly speaking, as Wittgenstein says, in the world, nor does it “belong” to the world, even though the (residual, from the act of objectification/[mis]identification) subject-in-itself, the immediate subject—the I—is, as it were, “almost but not quite there,” right on the border. Much confusion in philosophy and related disciplines stems from this sort of conflation, or failure to properly distinguish, the “mediated” subject qua subject-objectifications—the “contents” of consciousness—from the “immediate” subject-in-itself—the I, “consciousness”—due as we shall see in large part through a natural but unwarranted conflation and failure to distinguish between identification and identity.

35 In unusual, e.g. lucid, dream states there may be unusual states of covariation but—unless I am grossly mistaken about such matters—covariation, even when it becomes par for the course, is not causality.

36 Though I don’t mean by what I have laid out in this chapter to deny the sort of objectification that some recent Marx-inspired feminists have charged; on the contrary, I hope it may help explain it.

37 For a discrete analysis of the locution identification as see §6.3.

38 Given, of course, the presumption that such an entity as a numerically identical person does exist, as is presupposed by Closed Individualism. This does not in and of itself preclude the possibility that the answer is no in the case that there just in fact are no such entities, as e.g. in Empty Individualism or a view such as is expressed in Peter Unger’s “Why There Are No People.”

39 See §6.3 ff for an explanation of the fourfold identification manifold.
e.g. Hausdorff separated.

Notice that this way we no longer need the scare quotes; the observation is in fact, quite arguably, empirical.

On the one hand, we might even think of this as roughly analogous with crossing one’s eyes to create two visual fields—the difference being that whereas when I cross my eyes I have, arguably, but one location in perspectival space and time—one first-person point of view on my own occurring mental states—and two qualitatively similar but askew, or disjoint, visual fields, in the dream the two visual fields are spread so far apart all the way into the orthogonal direction that it provides two locations, each with an independence-friendly (and, I claim, Hausdorff) separate visual field. On the other hand, there is an important sense in which we can also and perhaps should construct a view in which each eye provides a distinct location for I, so that we could then say without contradiction that the subject-in-itself, even in our ordinary vision, is in reality nonlocal. In that sense I-nonlocality may be a necessary condition for perspectival, i.e., 3-D, vision.

Whether by the proper differential equations and reference frame transformation or some other such method, is not presently central to the issue. This and other possibilities will be further fleshed out in my forthcoming The Logical Foundations of Spacetime, Geometry, and Quantum Mechanics: A Topological Model for the Mind.

e.g. Hausdorff separated.

There are ample mathematical analogs to model how such a state of affairs is possible; an infinitely dense hologram, for instance, would be one which when divided would not dim: on the contrary, if one takes the power set of such a manifold the resulting “divisions” would not only dim but, arguably, “brighten,” as I demonstrate in my The Logical Foundations of Spacetime, Geometry and Quantum Mechanics: A Topological Model for the Mind.

For instance, Jorge Luis Borges, in his short story, “Circular Ruins,” describes a man who dreams a person into existence only to realize, in the end, that he too is a dream: “With relief, with humiliation, with terror, he understood that he too was a mere appearance, dreamed by another.” (Labyrinths, p. 50)

I do not, for instance, find my thesis psychologically comforting. On the contrary. A moment’s reflection reveals how comforting, in fact, the contrary received view is in terms of our common psychological predilection to tell ourselves, whenever we see people in various stages of suffering, conflict, or personal degradation, “there but for the grace of God . . .” or, “I’m glad that’s not
me.” Or, to push it one step further: the psychological “exhilaration” at the thought that I am for instance Plato or Mozart does not compensate for a glimpse at inmates in a prison or mental institution or even, say, watching the evening news.

48 A series of experiments performed by myself as well as researchers such as the late German gestalt theorist Paul Tholey do suggest that other dream characters are minded exactly in the way I suppose here in the Dream Analog. In various Lucid Dream states (dreams in which the subject is aware that he or she is dreaming) interviews with other characters involve phenomena of the following sorts. A (dream) character seated at a table across from the (dream) observer is asked to draw the scene in perspective; the observer does the same. When the drawings are compared, the other characters’ drawing shows a correct perspective on the room. (My friend, another outstanding German dream researcher, Brigitte Holzinger suggested this experiment to me.) Or, characters are asked to do multiplication problems that require thinking—an experiment suggested to me (and also performed by) by Tholey’s groundbreaking work. Also highly significant is the work of Stephen LaBerge at Stanford, who showed recently for instance that the REM trace objects in the dream: dream subjects as per their instructions once they become lucid move their hands in a circle and follow the movement with their dream eyes, then they do the same for a square; the computer picks up their movements. I have been attempting to have the REM trace follow the movements of dream characters other than the central character whose memories go with the waking self; there are a number of extremely intriguing complications but the results look promising. For these and other important related results for psychology, which take us beyond the scope of the present work, see my forthcoming New Interpretation of Dreams.

49 What is an empirical fact is a conceptual possibility. See the sections in Chapter Four discussing the split-brain experiments, as well as my “Ethics Exam” and other Unity of Consciousness Boundary Dissolves in Chapter Six.

50 Once more meaning, thereby, that from a strictly mathematical point of view the “manifold of goings on,” to use Schrödinger’s apt phrase, within the dream experience would have to be described ultimately in terms either of one multiperspectival space and time or one nonlocal subject in multiple disjoint (e.g. Hausdorf separated) spacetimes. This of course complicates nicely the supposedly simple response of naïve realists who would wish to distinguish, simply and naively, between experience that is “objectively real” and experience that isn’t by exactly some such multiperspectival condition; if the minded version of the Dream Analog is coherent—or, even worse for the naïve realists, if it is empirically feasible and justifiable, as I claim it is—then the difference between being the
subject of experience “in” an “objective” space vs. being the subject of experience “in” a “subjective” space disappears and the naïve realist position collapses at best into some sort of pre-Kantian naïve (no wonder Kant called it dreaming!) idealism.

51 Freud’s term for the unconscious.

52 The quote is from his written comments to me.

53 When I first put forth this theory in my doctoral dissertation it had not yet occurred to me that “other” dream characters are, in fact, minded; I considered it then merely a conceptual possibility, albeit an extremely important and revealing one. I now believe, based on further reflections and arguments some of which stem from my work with lucid dreams, that in fact in dreams we all have MPD.

54 Brian Garrett’s response, unpublished.

55 I have also already argued in In Search of Myself that there are good reasons for thinking that dream characters actually are minded—that in dreams we each experience the sort of dissociation akin to multiple personality disorder. One of the dream characters, whose name happens to be Descartes, even proves his existence to another with a reductio in which he passes a Dream Turing Test.

56 If by “consciousness” we mean the subject-in-itself in relation to which objects are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed (“individuation” and “identification” themselves being intuitions of objects in space and time, respectively), by “self-consciousness” I then mean, over and above that (or perhaps I should say below, since in my view self-consciousness is the more primitive, i.e., primordial and original notion than consciousness), the intuition of the subject-in-itself, what I call the intuition of personal identity. Denoted and expressed simultaneously, i.e., communicated, by I am I, the intuition of the subject-in-itself, what ordinarily we simply and naively (pre-theoretically) call “self-consciousness,” involves the cross-product of the (space-like) intuition of the subject, what we might think of, with a slight variation on the theme by Husserl, as “internal space consciousness,” and the (time-like) intuition of the subject—what we might think of, again with Husserl, as “internal time consciousness.” Over and above the intuition of personal identity, I am I—“self-consciousness”—is the intuition of the subject-in-the-not-itself, what I call, “moral consciousness,” denoted and expressed simultaneously by I am you. The metaphysical solution to the socio-politico-economical problem of global ethics is thus not so much cognitive (though it does not ignore cognition) as it is emotive; what is required is not just thinking across our borders but, in addition, and quite a bit more importantly, feeling, beyond sympathy, beyond empathy even, more sublime (in Kant’s sense): when I see you in yourself, in what is you, no matter
what it is I can say to myself that’s you, you have what you have willed, you are what you are, and I can thereby as it were wash myself of the entire experience; but when I see you in the not-yourself, trapped, imprisoned, identified and attached to what is not you, suffering, I cannot be angry, which is itself a form of violence. I am then in that moment suddenly empty in myself, in sorrow, not so much because I feel sorry for you or for myself but because I see in that instant of release from my own attachments and false despair that something has gone deeply wrong somewhere, let us please just put a stop to it, this nonsense is unnecessary, let us—I will—fix it.

57 See, for instance, Susan Wolf’s “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility” in my Questioning Matters, pp. 401-410.

PHYSIOLOGICAL BORDERS

This also shews wherein Identity of the same Man consists; viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued Life, by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized Body.

John Locke, Concerning Human Understanding

Regardless of whether the characters in your dreams are like puppets, zombies, etc., or whether they are themselves conscious, ordinarily in your dreams—just as in your waking life—it is along the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border (buttressed by the ASI Border) that boundaries between self and other get drawn. Forgetting one particular “point of view”—that of being at home lying in bed—is the negative component of the illusion; the FEC Border is the positive one. What is interesting about this is that within our dreams when we are experiencing the dream we automatically believe that we are in the presence of other persons and “behave” accordingly. Later, when we are awake, looking back upon the dream from the perspective of waking life, we do not tend to assume that, in the dream, we were in the presence of other persons. And we would tend to think this way regardless of whether the characters in our dreams are minded.

What we tend to believe about the world of experience while we are awake is of course clear; we have this metaphysical, moral, and legal conceptual boundary, “person,” wherein we assume that in virtue of our being individuated by FEC and identified by ASI, we are each numerically different persons. We have thus far avoided a full-blown analysis of what it is to be a “person,” what the necessary and sufficient conditions are. We have not fully analyzed the concept itself. What we have done instead is to show that our received common intuition that the FEC Border plus the ASI Border are by themselves definite and uncrossable boundaries between persons, i.e., that personal identity is thereby closed under individuation and identification by those borders is false or, at best, deeply questionable.

Similarly, what we ordinarily believe while we are dreaming is also clear.
We ordinarily believe the same thing while we are dreaming that we believe about “real” life when we are awake: we believe, while we are dreaming, that when for instance we are having an argument with someone who looks, sounds and acts like a person, we are in the presence of another person. Indeed, when we are in the process of having any experiences whatsoever, whether those experiences are (unbeknownst to us) dream experiences or waking experiences, during the experiencing we always assume we are in a world in which there exist other persons and we act accordingly. The difference is that when we look back at our dreams we believe we were wrong for having believed (during the dream) that we were in the presence of other persons. Perhaps there is some perspective from which, if we could look back at our lives, we would feel about them the way we feel about our dreams (and the way we would feel even if it turned out our dreams were experienced simultaneously from many different perspectives) when they are over—not necessarily that our lives were not real, but that our lives were not really the lives of separate persons. Many mystics, for instance, have claimed that such a perspective exists and can be experienced. This might be akin, in the Dream Analog, to having a “lucid dream,” a dream in which you know that you are dreaming.

Yet within the world of our waking lives, as we do tend to assume one aspect of Closed Individualism—that other persons exist, i.e., that personal identity is closed under known borders of individuation and identification—and we neither believe nor behave as if Open Individualism were true, we make the same assumptions we make while we are dreaming. But if these assumptions, by themselves, are not enough to exclude the possibility that we are not in the presence of other persons in the one case then, all else being equal, they cannot do so in the other. So if we are to come up with an actual excluder of Open Individualism, we must do so by relying on some additional facts and/or assumption(s) in addition to the FEC and ASI Borders.

Before going on, let me just reiterate the importance of what may otherwise be regarded as a rather simple, perhaps even provincial, demonstration. Suppose $S$ believes that $p$, that $p$ is believed to be common knowledge, and that $q$ is the reason $S$ believes that $p$. Discovering that $q \rightarrow p$ is false should be a devastating discovery, independently of whether $p$ is in fact true or not—all the more so if it turned out that everyone believed that $p$ and also believed that $q$ was the reason why. And if knowing that $\neg(q \rightarrow p)$ did not alter anyone’s belief that $p$, well, what then? But that is precisely the position we are in with regard to our belief in other persons.
We believe that other persons exist, that the existence of other persons is common knowledge in virtue of the FEC and ASI Borders. But the FEC and ASI Borders do not form a sufficient condition for the existence of other persons, knowing this makes no difference, and knowing that it makes no difference itself makes no difference! In other words, not only do we not know that other persons exist, finding out that we don’t know it makes no difference—which should give us more than just a little pause.

§ 3.1 MOVING BEYOND SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE

I know that many readers have been patiently waiting for us to move beyond what they regard (given their metaphysical/ontological orientation) “merely” subjective borders. We have been moving, I know, painstakingly slowly—perhaps too slowly for many readers—but this was necessary, as we needed to make clear our methods, ranging from our take on the nature of philosophical explanation, the nature and role of philosophical discourse in relation to language, up to and including the philosophical grammar and syntax, to what we have termed “Boundary Dissolves.” We are now in a position to move on safely, without getting caught in the old traps.

Suppose, for instance, we add to (1) the FEC Border and (2) the ASI Border, the additional border that what happens in your dreams is “internal to your subjective experience,” hoping in this way to differentiate between the Dream Analog case of (1) and (2) and the waking life case. In other words, whenever you perceive yourself as bounded from other bordered individuations by the FEC and ASI Borders and these borders are not limited to your subjective experience, you are in the presence of another person.

This may look like a step in the right direction, but by itself it is now easily seen to be circular. For, even putting aside the problem of how one would in that case respond to the old Cartesian skeptic who claims that you might right now be dreaming or a hallucinating brain-in-a-vat, how is the metaphysical boundary between “your subjective experience” and “my subjective experience” to be established in the first place? To rely on the FEC Border and defining “that which is me” in terms of “that which moves and thinks in response to my internal subjective life,” would beg the question. To say it without begging the question we would have to define “me” as “that which moves and thinks in response to an internal subjective life.” But by going from “my” to “an” we lose the very distinction we are looking for. For if you are not the immediate and direct causal agent of my
movement, and it turns out to be true that I have “an internal subjective life,” then by the definition of “me” (“that which moves and thinks in response to an internal subjective life”), I am you. (This would be a linguistic variation on the weak nonlocality concept.)

The obvious way to go, it would seem, if one wanted to avoid the petitio and to avoid already concluding that Open Individualism is true, is to claim that drawing metaphysical boundaries between us along FEC and ASI is illegitimate unless the border controls being drawn upon consist not merely in individuations among psychological borders identified via FEC but, in addition, in individuations among different physiological borders. That is, when the borders in your experience of which you are not the immediate and direct causal agent, i.e., which you apparently are unable to control immediately, are themselves conscious, i.e., inclusive of the subject (identified to your experience as such), reside in, are realized in, denote, etc., numerically different physiologies, you are in the presence of other persons. Let us call this addition of the third apparent excluder, “The Physiological Border.” Perhaps, then, it is the Physiological Border between you and me that divides us into numerically different persons, so that simply tracing them over our physical borders we can discover the metaphysical boundaries between us.

§3.2 APPARENT EXCLUDER (3): THE PHYSIOLOGICAL BORDER

In trying to construct out of the (real) Physiological Border between us a (metaphysical) boundary between persons, a believer in traditional Closed Individualism could say, for instance, that in so far as you and I are two different conglomerates of (minded, or conscious, i.e., inclusive of the subject) physical substances separated by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, we are different persons. Thus (1) FEC, plus (2) ASI, plus (3) the Physiological Border, collectively present an actual excluder of Open Individualism.

This certainly seems plausible. For one thing, taken together, (1), (2), and (3) do disarm the Dream Analog counter-example. According to the view that some type of Physiological Border (plus FEC and ASI) signifies a metaphysical boundary between persons, dream characters would not be considered other persons (even if they are conscious) because to be other persons they would have to consist in numerically distinct physical substances, which they are not. This accords with Closed Individualism. In
that case, if there existed within your body more than one (minded) locus of
border control, individuated from other such loci by FEC, as apparently
happens in Multiple Personality Disorder, the other “personalities”
(individuated from each other, for instance, by amnesia borders), would
have to be counted as all being one single person. The idea, then, is that the
borders described by FEC and ASI, together, do sustain the uncrossable
metaphysical boundaries dividing us into numerically different persons
provided that the experiential border controls occur in, or “run,”
numerically different physiologies.

There are several different ways of conceptualizing the Physiological
Border. In this section we begin with the simplest type of Physiological
Border and ask whether the boundaries of personal identity are thus
determined (closed) by tracing along the borders of the identities of the
material in which our physical bodies consist. (Subsequently, we will
consider delineating personal identity along, for instance, neurological
[brain] borders, and other physiological criteria.) Presently, let us refer to
this specific type of Physiological Border, when viewed as a metaphysical
(inter-personal) boundary, as the Physiological Substance Boundary. To
hold that the Physiological Substance Boundary is a boundary between
persons is, in effect, to hold a (physical) substance view of personal
identity.

Ultimately, on this view what makes me me and you you is that we are
each embedded in (or functioning within) physiological borders themselves
individuated by numerically different collections of physical material,
separated from each other by FEC. This physical material is itself a
substance, like atoms or electrons or mass-energy, and what makes for
uncrossable metaphysical boundaries on this view—what is essential to
delineating the boundaries of one’s personal identity—are not, for instance,
the psychological borders between us but, rather, the physical material that
supports, carries or contains our psychological structures. In other words,
the psychological properties I have belong to the physiology that I am made
of and it is this particular material of my body (not the psychological
properties themselves), distinct from the particular material of your body,
which makes for inter-personal boundaries between us.

My physical atoms, the physical parts of which I am made, though
qualitatively similar to your atoms or physical parts, are nonetheless
numerically distinct from your physical parts. You too (modulo physical
theory models) are made up of subatomic particles like electrons and
quarks. Any one of your electrons might be qualitatively indistinguishable
from one of my electrons and in that respect might be said to be qualitatively identical to any one of my electrons in the way that, say, the copy of the book which you are presently reading might be qualitatively identical to the one which your colleague is presently lining his birdcage with. The same may be true of any particular psychological element, such as the sensation of pain or the experience of watching a sunset; the sensations experienced by you could be qualitatively identical to the sensations experienced by me in the way that two different television sets could beam (numerically distinct but qualitatively identical) electrons in similar patterns and project the qualitatively identical picture onto two different picture tubes. Any particular electron of yours, however, is not numerically identical with any one of mine—they are not one and the same electron—we (we ordinarily believe and are conscripted to justifiably believe modulo certain “standard” interpretations of physical theory) because their present spatial locations differ in the way that, say, the copy of the book which you are holding right now in your hand is not numerically identical with the copy that may presently be somewhere else perhaps absorbing parrot excrement, due to the fact that these contemporaneously existing objects are separated by space.

This commonly accepted, elementary distinction between qualitative and numerical identity is deceptively simple; it carries the entire burden of the (supposedly fundamental) distinction between our spatial borders on the one hand and our temporal borders on the other. Temporal borders (we tend to believe) only sometimes create boundaries between persons (i.e., between person-stages). This Closed Individual View belief is captured by the single continuous entity assumption, according to which I, the person (or person-stage) who is rewriting this chapter right now am the same person who some years ago wrote the very first draft. Some of the recent Empty Individualist departures from traditional Closed Individualism, such as Parfit’s, Nozick’s, and Shoemaker’s, deny the single continuous entity assumption.

Spatial borders between contemporaneously existing minded (conscious) bodies, on the other hand (we ordinarily believe) always are borders between persons. This traditional Closed View belief is captured by the individuation and separateness of persons assumption. None of the recent departures from Closed Individualism have gone so far as to deny this assumption explicitly.

Ordinarily, there is assumed to be an important difference between spatial and temporal borders of physical objects. The desk-stage in front of me is
separated by time both from the desk-stage that was in this room six months ago and from the desk-stage that was in your room six months ago. Suppose you and I bought our desks from the same manufacturer and the desks are in fact qualitatively indistinguishable from each other. The temporal individuation of my desk (desk-stage) now and the temporal individuation of my desk (desk-stage) when I first bought it are, we believe, parts of a series of temporal individuations, or temporal borderings, comprising the object-stages of one and the same object due to qualitative similarity (if the material was shaped into a boat it would no longer be my desk); that is, these temporal individuations, or borders, of physical object-stages lie within one single temporally extended entity, the object that is my desk. On the other hand, temporal borders individuating my desk now and individuating your desk when you first bought it are, we believe, temporal boundaries signifying the identities of different physical objects due to the spatial borders between them: my desk and your desk, even if they are qualitatively indistinguishable, have at all particular times during their existence been separated by space.

It is by reducing persons to the material elements out of which a particular physical body is made and defining the boundaries between persons in terms of numerical identity, which is in turn defined in terms of spatial separation, that the Physiological Boundary is an apparent excluder of Open Individualism. You and I, according to this view, cannot be the same person because, no matter how “similar” we (or, some essential part of us) might be “on the inside,” the properties we each have belong to the material in which our respective physical bodies consist. The material parts in which my physiology consists is distinguished from the material parts in which your physiology consists because, though my physiology might be qualitatively identical to your physiology, the two bundles of physical material are not numerically identical since your physiology is “over there” while mine is “over here.” That is the way we ordinarily understand numerical differences between the qualitatively indistinguishable material of our bodies: these things—our physical bodies—are physical and in so far as they are physical they have clearly demarcated spatial positions along which our metaphysical boundaries can be traced.

To trace along this Physiological (Substance) Border a boundary between persons, then, implies that it is a definite and uncrossable Boundary between persons. You and I are different persons because we are (minded human beings) composed of numerically different physical material. Can metaphysical boundaries be thus drawn, simply by tracing them over our
CHAPTER 3

physiological borders?

§3.2.1 PHYSIOLOGICAL VS. PSYCHOLOGICAL INDIVIDUATION AND IDENTIFICATION: DOES MATTER MATTER?

What makes a physiological view of personal identity attractive is that such a move would allow us to draw metaphysical boundaries simply by tracing them over our physiological borders. It would be a way of erecting metaphysical boundaries without having to do any metaphysics. But such tricks are just that—tricks. Metaphysics is sneaked in behind the comforting respectability of physics by covertly blurring over the underlying ambiguities without requisite philosophical analysis. It is only by sticking dogmatically to the unexamined received view of common sense while ignoring the conceptual gaps and inconsistencies, themselves obscured by the feeling of familiarity and obviousness, that the “metaphysical boundaries from physiological borders” trick attains its (false) persuasiveness. The moment we begin an analysis of the physiological borders themselves along which the supposed metaphysical boundaries are drawn, the metaphysics begins and the seemingly unproblematic boundaries of personal identity that, supposedly, both hold us together and keep us apart quickly fail to do one, or the other, or both.

As already noted, the universe gives rise to borders discernible in experience or in theory (or both), individuations along (and across) which we then identify a variety of separately existing, numerically distinct, complex entities. That there is physical individuation is evidenced by our demarcation of physical structures such as stars, planets, rocks, plants, animals, and so on. To claim (or, to recognize) that such physical borders within the universe signify the boundaries of separate individual entities with numerically distinct identities is already to move from the realm of physics to the realm of metaphysics. This is because neither the physical individuation of bordered unities at a time, nor the physical identification of those bordered unities over time are, by themselves, sufficient delineators of the boundaries of physical identity. The universe has many discernible parts and some structures (may) persist with identity while undergoing change of physical elements, others (may) not, and so some kind of additional analysis is required before any particular set of (exclusively conjoined) bordered physical individuations—henceforth, “physical bundles”—can be identified as the bordered individuations of one, numerically identical, physical object.

In other words, the concept, “identity,” even with regard to our
understanding of physical objects, stands for the idea (or, the recognition) that there exist within the perceptible universe multiplicities of separate and distinct objects—which we might call, emphasizing the “id” (it), “the existence of multiple identities.” That is, identity can be understood as a sort of “metaphysical individuation and identification:” the giving rise to, and the sustaining of, the signification throughout the conceptual landscape of some borders over and above others so as to dissolve the latter into insignificance while prioritizing the former into boundaries that then in turn comprise (and sustain) the identities of particular (complex) structures numerically identical to themselves over time. To call this higher-level individuation and identification “metaphysical” is not to follow Shirley Maclaine but only to remind ourselves that the signification in question occurs over and above the fundamental physical elements themselves.

Take, for instance, the pebble on my desk. I pick it up, toss it about, rub it against the top of my desk. The fact is that this little physical bundle pretty well sustains its borders not only against other physical objects but against all the rest of the Cosmos. It does not get absorbed into my hands, sink into the desk, etc. The pebble does not, for instance, behave the way a bundle of water does when rubbed against another, larger, bundle of water—the pebble does not simply “give up” its borders to the larger unit. Where as if I take a handful of water and rub it against the surface of the sea, the borders of the handful of water dissolve into the borders of the sea.

In other words, the pebble, a bundle of rock, unlike a bundle of water, manages to sustain its borders pretty well, even among other rocks, both at a time and over time. This is physical individuation and identification: one discernible part of the universe moves through another part without losing its borders. We might even say, speaking anthropomorphically and with philosophical tongue in cheek that the material in which this pebble consists manages to remember quite well the information required to sustain the pattern of this pebble both at a time and over time. But the pebble, although quite “stubborn,” is not very “smart”; all it can do is keep its own pattern “alive” for a time before the universal forces of disintegration turn it into dust; the pebble is not, in this respect, as smart as a plant (though it is in some ways more “stubborn”). Plants not only manage to sustain their borders at a time (physical individuation) and over time (physical identification), they can (even though dissolving much faster than the pebble) replicate their patterns by making more plants. (Indeed, the plant can even take minerals—“dissolved pebbles”—into its borders and turn them into plants.) Animals are smarter still; not only do animals keep their
borders alive and replicate their patterns, they know how to protect their borders—for instance, by running away from other parts of the universe that may be trying to absorb them into their borders.

There is also, at least within that part of the universe we call ourselves, the existence of psychological individuation (at a time) and psychological identification (over time). Within our mental lives we discern various exclusively conjoined psychological individuations—henceforth, “psychological bundles”—individuated by psychological borders at a time and then there is also the process by which these individuated psychological bundles are identified as exclusively conjoined into separately existing, numerically distinct, complex psychological bundles over time. That there is psychological individuation is evidenced by our demarcation of psychological structures such as character traits, distinct personalities, conflicting ideas, different thoughts, different experiences, various differing emotions such as anger or love, sensations such as hunger, and so on. To claim (or, to recognize) that such psychological structures within ourselves have separate, numerically distinct, identities from other such structures (either within us or amongst us) over time is also to move from the realm of psychology to the realm of metapsychology. This is because neither psychological individuation (the existence within us of various psychological borders at a time) nor psychological identification (the process by which some conglomerates of these bordered psychological individuations are identified over time) are, by themselves, sufficient to determine the boundaries of psychological identity. This is because our psychologies have many discernible parts and some psychological structures (may) persist with identity while undergoing change of psychological elements, others (may) not, and so some kind of additional analysis is required before any particular set of (exclusively conjoined) psychological bundles can be identified as the bordered individuations of one, numerically identical, psychological entity, up to and including “person.”

Take, for instance, an ordinary experience—my experience of the pebble. Having picked the pebble up, tossed it about, rubbed it against the top of my desk, I put it down and close my eyes. The fact is that just as the physical borders of the pebble are sustained against the rest of the physical universe in which they exist, so too the psychological bundle, that we might call, “my experience of the pebble,” pretty well sustains its borders against all the rest of the mind in which it exists. My experience of playing with the pebble does not get absorbed (at least not just yet) into my experience of
having played with other objects, etc.: the psychological bundle that is my experience of playing with the pebble does not simply give up its borders to the larger unit within which it exists—it is sustained as a memory. Where as if I take a breath of air into my lungs and breathe it out, the psychological borders between the experience of that breath and of other breaths I have taken are almost instantly dissolved.

The experience of taking the pebble into my hand, then, unlike the experience of taking a breath into my lungs, manages to sustain its borders pretty well, even among other experiences, both at a time and over time. This is psychological individuation and identification: one discernible part of the mind “moves through” another part without losing its borders. We might even say, speaking once again anthropomorphically and with philosophical tongue in cheek, that the “mental structure” in which my experience of this pebble consists manages to remember quite well the information required to sustain the psychological bundle that is the pattern of the experience of this pebble, both at a time and over time. But the psychological bundle that is the memory of the pebble is not very “smart”; all it can do is keep its pattern “alive” for a time before the forces of mental disintegration dissolve it into oblivion; my memory of the pebble is not, in this respect, as smart as my memory of, say, *modus tollens*. My memory of *modus tollens* not only manages to sustain its borders at a time and over time, it can “replicate” its pattern by being used to make logical statements in its own pattern. (It is of course philosophically very tenuous to make these sorts of anthropomorphic analogies, even when we are talking of cognitive structures, but it is both fun and may, in certain limited ways, be helpful, even revealing.)

Personal identity, then, can be understood as a sort of “metaphysical and metapsychological individuation and identification:” the giving rise to, and the sustaining of, the signification within ourselves of some (physiological and psychological) borders over and above others so as to dissolve the significance of the latter while heightening the significance of the former into boundaries that then comprise (and sustain) the existence of a plurality of particular (complex) numerically distinct self-identical entities—persons. Again, to call this higher-level individuation and identification “metaphysical and metapsychological,” in the way that we are doing, is only to remind ourselves that the signification in question is one that occurs over and above the fundamental physiological and psychological borders themselves.

Now, in this chapter we are considering, first, whether we need the
metaphysical or metapsychological levels at all—whether we cannot perhaps draw personal identity boundaries along physiological substance borders by relying on the numerical identity of the physical material out of which we are composed (or, in which we consist). If personal identity is drawn along the Physiological Substance Boundary, then this Physiological Border, (in the traditional Closed View), must be “metaphysically translucent” enough to allow personal identity to extend across various exclusively conjoined physiological borders but “metaphysically opaque” enough to prevent personal identity from extending across various other exclusively conjoined physiological borders. This means that the Physiological Substance Boundary must allow earlier (temporally individuated) stages of a person to extend, with identity—i.e., for there to be significant physiological identification—to the later stages of a person across temporal individuations while at the same time individuating without identity (that is, numerically dividing) one person from another.

There are of course many obvious problems with the Physiological Substance Boundary, not the least of which is that as a boundary it is far too opaque. But, first, we should note the way in which the qualitative identity vs. numerical identity distinction simply glosses over (rather than unproblematically defines) the boundaries of our identities: it simply presupposes, rather than demonstrates, that identity holds across certain temporally individuated physical borders but not across spatially individuated ones. For the man on the street, the idea that identity does hold across some temporally individuated physical borders but not others seems too obvious to question. Yet even in the case of my desk, this commonly accepted distinction hides the commonly ignored problem: we simply assume, without question, that what counts as a physical boundary between objects is defined unproblematically in part by the limitations of our own senses—that the boundaries of objects in the world are determined by how they appear and how we ourselves are able to demarcate among appearances (by tracing along perceptibles).

Thus one problem is that, upon closer inspection, the identity of all physical objects, according to traditional Closed Individualism, does in fact extend across spatial borders. My desk, for instance, is made up of discrete physical atoms that are separated from each other by empty space. Similarly, one of my suits is at this very moment both downstairs and upstairs (the jacket is on the coat rack, the pants are in the closet). Or, consider the identity of a library. A library can exist on two different sides of a street; it is considered as one and the same physical library, with
identity, across spatially distinct contemporaneously existing bordered places. This is also true of human beings: supposedly, I exist at different places at the same time and it is just that the different places in which I exist appear continuous (because ordinarily we do not look very closely at the gaps which are not easily discernible in experience). From the perspective of one of my electrons, however, I am anything but a continuously solid object; I am, in fact, mostly empty space. So how small do the gaps between the spatially distinct but contemporaneously existing places in which I exist have to be to count as boundaries between persons rather than borders within one person?

In other words, the first problem with the (naive) Physiological Substance Boundary is that even a cursory analysis reveals that the type of border signified by spatially distinct simultaneously existing physiological individuations, by itself, is not always a delineating boundary between (numerically distinct) physiological entities, let alone between persons.

A believer in the Physiological Substance Boundary must thus weaken (dissolve) the metaphysical opaqueness of this boundary; that is, he must weaken the (naive) assertion that the Physiological (Substance) Border is by itself always a metaphysical boundary between persons. Otherwise, a person could be no bigger than an electron or, if electrons have parts, perhaps Leibnitz’s monads! And in doing this one has already left the sober realm of physics for the dark domain of speculative metaphysics. And so one cannot draw metaphysical boundaries simply by tracing along physiological borders. (Even if we chose to stick to an analysis of human beings in terms of macroscopic physiologies, such as “physical organisms,” there are other problems, such as how to define the identity of physical objects that are in a constant state of flux, as we shall discuss shortly.)

There is also the additional problem that those who enjoy some version of a naive physiological view of personal identity tend to sweep much under the physicist’s rug. For instance, without here going into too much detail, just consider the problems posed for ordinary physical identity of objects by Bell’s inequality and other aspects of quantum mechanics. In the words of the physicist Heinz Pagels:

If we go one step further to the level of elementary particles like electrons, then there is no question of difference. Quantum particles have no internal structure that distinguishes them - two electrons are absolutely identical, and so are two photons. The truth is that the entire material universe, with all its variety, is entirely made up out of quantum particles which are completely [absolutely] identical. . . . [The Cosmic Code, pp. 281-288]
A believer in the Physiological Substance Boundary could of course set up specific and well-defined conditions under which the Physiological (Substance) Border is a metaphysical boundary. Certain distances would have to be specified; for instance, whether the physical units are inside or outside “the physiology,” and so on. (We will consider the human organism as a delineator of personal identity shortly.) Or, physical identification could be drawn along physiological borders via psychological identification. But note how psychological identification along physiological borders often erects purely arbitrary boundaries. For instance, we are constantly swallowing our own saliva without any thought or apprehension yet if we spit into a glass and drink it we are repulsed. Yet in both cases the stuff we are drinking is part of ourselves. The response seems irrational, yet it is a purely involuntary psychological identification, based on our drawing our boundaries along the surfaces of our skins. The psychologist R.D. Laing writes:

One is aware that there is a difference between saliva inside one’s mouth, and that same saliva, one inch in space outside one’s mouth, . . . We feel ourselves to be inside a bag of skin: what is outside this bag is not-us. Me-inside. Not-Us outside. [Self and Others, p.92]

Or, to borrow an example from “personologist” Gordon Allport, imagine pricking your finger with a needle and then putting a bandage on it that soaks up the blood; although you probably have no qualms in putting the pricked finger in your mouth and sucking on it, you are probably repulsed by the thought of sucking the blood from the bandage—yet in both cases the blood is yours. Such psychological identifications may extend even into our social and legal practices but there is little reason for thinking that we should signify the boundaries of personal identity along such borders.

The point here is that psychological identification along physically individuated borders, by itself, does not unproblematically erect the boundaries of personal identity. When it comes to the question of identity, it is obvious that nothing is obvious. (Legal issues may even be involved; for instance, on the question blood doping. An athlete “pumps up” to produce highly oxygenated blood, draws out the blood, and then weeks or months later injects the highly oxygenated blood before competition, giving himself a boost. The athlete is not, it seems, injecting “foreign substances” . . . or is he? What, for instance, would prevent one from taking dopamine from one’s own brain and then later, when one needs to change one’s mood, injecting it? What is the difference if one does blood doping with one’s own blood, or with someone else’s? And so on.) To draw the boundaries
PHYSIOLOGICAL BORDERS

between self and other in this way (via psychological identification) seems deeply questionable (we shall of course consider the various types of Psychological Border again in much more detail in later chapters).

A believer in the Physiological Substance Boundary would thus have to draw a metaphysical boundary that establishes a non question-begging distinction between

(1) my existing as a particular continuously existing human being whose personal identity extends across (is not closed by) the spatial borders within and among the material in which the macroscopic physiology we call “my body” consists,

and

(2) my existing as a particular person who is identical across the temporal borders within and among the material in which this particular macroscopic physiology, my body, consists, who nevertheless has a separate and distinct personal identity from other such conglomerates of physiologically bordered entities.

In other words, without some additional conceptual analysis, the distinction between (1) and (2) is not established because the condition of “being at only one place at a time,” strictly speaking, does not apply even to the substances in which ordinary macroscopic physiologies, such as human beings, consist, as we have been discussing. For instance, the left hand side of my body and the right hand side off my body consist in different physical material located in different regions of space “at the same time,” and yet still ordinarily we would say that I have only one body.

So then on what grounds does personal identity extend across (I point to myself) these spatial borders, and then across these temporal borders (pointing again to myself), in a way that precludes its extending across (I point to you) those spatial borders? To say, simply, that in the first case the borders are all “within me,” while in the second case the borders are “between me and you,” is to beg the personal identity question. In both cases we already (even in Closed Individualism) have personal identity extending across spatial and temporal borders. So unless we are prepared to draw in the distances at some arbitrary point, the mere fact of physical and/or temporal separation between physiologies, by itself is insufficient for the drawing of the requisite metaphysical boundaries. (Nor, as we have already seen, can one claim that we can avoid picking some arbitrary point simply by establishing the distinction between the material in which “your” physiology consists and the material in which “my” physiology consists on
the basis of FEC. We will consider this again in more detail with regard to boundaries defined in terms of numerically distinct human brains, numerically distinct human organisms, and so on, in the next chapter.)

Nor can one simply say, “that physiology which I control (the material in which ‘my body’ consists) is me, and that physiology which I don’t control (the material in which ‘your body consists’) is not me,” because as a matter of fact most of the material in which my body consists I cannot control (for instance, my liver, my flow of blood, my digestion, the division of my cells, and so on). In other words, unless one can establish the difference between our qualitative and numerical identity in the first place by some other principle of identity, one cannot use the distinction by itself to establish our non-identities simply on the bases that we are two spatially separated complex conglomerates of bordered physiologies.

§3.2.2 THE PHYSIOLOGICAL SUBSTANCE DISSOLVE

An even deeper problem with the Physiological Substance Boundary is that we can easily imagine a case in which being composed of different physical material is not a definite and uncrossable boundary between persons. This sort of move is another example of a Boundary Dissolve. Since in this case what is being dissolved is the Physiological Substance Boundary, we can call it “The Physiological Substance Dissolve.”

By “Physiological Substance Dissolve,” then, I mean that we can successfully imagine a case in which personal identity can extend across (be not closed by) a border that appears to be a definite and uncrossable boundary between persons. The idea that the Physiological (Substance) Border between us—in the present case, our each being composed of different material parts—is a boundary between persons, dissolves or collapses under the very intuitions from which it arose. By dissolving a boundary in this way we show how personal identity can hold across a border that appears to be a boundary between persons; that is, we show how Open Individualism can be possible in spite of its apparent excluder—in this case in spite of our being composed of different physical material.

We do not yet know what a person is. We are supposing, however, that differences in material composition—the Physiological (Substance) Border—make for boundaries between persons. Thus by imagining a case in which A consists in different physical material than B, yet a case in which A and B are the same person, we will find that, using our ordinary intuitions about personal identity, differences in material composition per se are not necessarily boundaries between persons. But, we might wonder, so
what? What is so great about our ordinary intuitions? Ordinarily, nothing. We need not be intuitionists about personal identity. Rather, we can believe, as do Parfit, Nozick, and others, that whether some border signifies a personal boundary (i.e., determines the extent of one’s personal identity) depends at least in part by how significant that border actually is in the overall conceptual framework within which it is drawn. This actual significance (or lack thereof) may not be readily apparent. And although the (metaphysical) significance of a particular border is at least in part determined by what matters to the questioner, this mattering is not itself arbitrary (as will be discussed) but, rather, is based on what I and others take to be the true nature of personal identity. (We shall also consider the question of what matters, and why, in greater detail.) But perhaps it will at this point help if we briefly sketch where values enter into the question and why (and in what way) paying close attention to what actually matters to us is relevant to the question of who we are.

Parfit argues that in a certain sense the question of “Will some future person be me?” is in some cases empty. There are at least two sorts of senses in which a question may be said to be empty: 1) the question has no answer, or 2) the question has an answer but is empty because in asking it we are not asking for different possibilities ($P \lor \neg P$), each of which might be true, and one of which might be true; rather, a question is empty in the second sense because answers to it give us different descriptions ($P \land \neg P$) of the same outcome. But if we choose (and have good reason for so doing) either $P$ or $\neg P$, then one of the descriptions is better than the other. As we shall see, Parfit will, in some instances, such as in the case of fission examples (considered in later chapters), choose to answer the question, “Which one of the two resulting persons is me?” with the answer, “Neither,” where as I can choose “Both,” not because I disagree with Parfit about whether what matters actually matters but, rather, because I disagree with him about what actually does matter in our continued survival over time.

Thus, for instance, as Parfit and others have claimed, even when we consider imaginary cases, we are inclined to believe that questions about identity must be determinate—that persons are entities with well-defined borders. This belief, according to Parfit, is false; we are, as he puts it, inclined to believe (falsely) that there must always be definite boundaries between us. This belief forms one part of traditional Closed Individualism. Departing from it, as Parfit and other Empty Individualists have done, would allow us to say that since our (traditional Closed Individualist)
intuitions are suspect, we simply cannot always answer the question, “How many persons are there?” because the more fundamental question—how we draw boundaries between persons (or, what those boundaries consist in)—on which the “How many?” question is based, is itself unfixed by the way the world is and, ultimately, indeterminate. In the Dream Analog, for instance, we could answer, without absurdity, “Many,” or “One,” or “There is no answer,” and nothing of substance would thereby be achieved.

On Parfit’s version of Empty Individualism, then, the question “Is it me?” may be indeterminate, or have no answer; it may be an empty question. This is because even when we know all the facts we may not know the answer to the personal identity question; in Parfit’s view different answers in such cases are not different hypotheses about the truth but merely different descriptions of one and the same course of events, so nothing of importance turns on the answer we give. I can agree with Parfit that the question of personal identity is empty in the sense that the boundaries of persons is unfixed by the way the world is. I can disagree, however, that nothing of importance turns on the view we take. In fact, something of great importance turns on the view: our lives. This is because I can believe, following Nozick, that the boundaries of persons are fixed, in part, by how we view the personal identity question. There are some important qualifications about the constraints under which this “metaphysical viewing” must occur to have this creative power, which will be developed later. The point for now is that Open Individualism, which departs from traditional Closed Individualism in other ways along with Empty Individualist Views such as Parfit’s, unlike these other views preserves the (traditional Closed Individualist) intuition that questions about personal identity must, ultimately, be determinate. But here is the crucial and fundamental difference. In my view, our personal identities are determinate facts about us not because our borders are indeterminate (as I, following Parfit, agree they are) nor because our boundaries are fixed by the way the world is (as I, following Parfit and Nozick, agree they are not) but, rather, because we can believe that personal identity is determined (absolute) by our view of ourselves and that the best way to view ourselves (keeping in mind that there will be constraints on how such metaphysical viewing must occur) is that the (real but more or less indeterminate) borders dividing us do not matter with regard to the personal identity question. We can thus form the view, following Parfit, that our borders do not actually have the metaphysical significance ordinarily accorded to them; personal identity is not closed under individuation and identification by such borders. But the
conclusion I (unlike Parfit) draw from this state of affairs is that such
metaphysical designification allows identity to extend across these borders
(should we so choose to view ourselves). Parfit’s view, which also departs
from Closed Individualism in ways that mine does, in addition departs
(unlike my view) from the fundamental intuition that identity is, ultimately,
determinate—though, in my view, again, it is determined not by the way
the world is (as according to traditional Closed Individualism it is) but,
rather, by the way we choose to view ourselves. (Again, keep in mind that
there are some real constraints on our choosing; however, we already have
some understanding of, for instance, the fact that whether there is an actual
“Political [rather than transcendental] unity” on Earth is determined in part
by how we choose to view ourselves. If tomorrow everyone simultaneously
chose to dissolve all current national boundaries and viewed themselves as
Global Citizens of one open country, “Earth,” the old National Boundaries
would thereby be dissolved [though National Borders could well remain].)

So in the end the disagreement between Parfit’s Empty Individualism and
our Open Individualism will turn out to be this: according to Parfit, our
borders are always indeterminate and personal identity is indeterminate
(relative) and (but) whether personal identity extends across some particular
border is not what matters primarily in survival. According to Open
Individualism, our borders are indeterminate and (but) personal identity is
determinate (absolute) because identity is actually what matters primarily in
survival. (Furthermore, as we will see, it is what actually matters in
survival, and not what we think should matter in survival, that really
matters.) In this respect (i.e., regarding the belief both that identity is what
really matters and that what matters matters), Open Individualism, as we
shall see, is competitive with the leading Empty Individualist Views. And,
regardless of the stand on personal identity one ultimately takes, this by
itself should give one pause. (To follow up on the earlier analogy: suppose
people thought that current National Boundaries should matter in the
continued survival of Nations but upon closer analysis it turned out that
what they really cared about were their Cultural, not National, Borders, and
that they were simply very confused about this because they never really
thought very deeply about it. In that case it could turn out that Dissolving
their National Boundaries could better preserve what they really cared
about—in spite of the fact that what they care about is their National
Boundaries.)

Returning now to the Physiological Boundary, we can see that we do not
have to stretch our imaginations very far to see why the Physiological
(Substance) Border is not necessarily a boundary between persons: ordinary life is the Physiological Substance Dissolve. “My” minded physiology at age three and “my” minded physiology at age forty-two, since they are made of different material, are, as individuated by the Physiological Substance Boundary, not the physiologies of the same person. Such physiological rifts exist between all human bodies. You get a completely new skin every couple of weeks; a new stomach lining every three days; and so on. Not only has your physiology replaced billions of cells since you began reading this book, it replaces nearly all its cells within every seven years. (It is very clear, to a man of eight-seven, that the physiology sitting in the wheel-chair is not the same physiology that once played professional Football.) Change of physiological substance, by itself, is a real border but it is not metaphysically significant—it does not really matter in ordinary cases of survival—in the sense that we believe we extend as persons with identity across such borders. That is, we can easily imagine that it is possible to extend with identity across such changes; we can (and do) believe that we survive (continue to exist) across the Physiological (Substance) Border—and what can be imagined must be possible. (We shall take up continuity views shortly.) And since we can imagine a case in which being composed of different physical material is not a definite and uncrossable boundary between persons—a case we think is true in ordinary life—we see that, by itself, the Physiological Substance Boundary between human beings is merely an apparent excluder of Open Individualism. Personal Identity is not closed under individuation and identification by that border.

It might of course nonetheless be true that Daniel Kolak (DK) age three and DK age forty-two are different persons. If DK age three and DK age forty-two are indeed different persons, then the Physiological (Substance) Border might be an actual boundary between persons. But, in that case, Closed Individualism is false, because the single continuous entity assumption, according to which we are each a continuously existing person over time, is violated. (One might thus end up a Parfitian or a Buddhist about persons). That is why, with the Physiological Substance Dissolve, we have an explanation of how it is possible that Open Individualism could be true in light of its apparent excluder, the Physiological Substance Boundary. The important difference is that we can easily show how Open Individualism could be true in spite of this apparent excluder but we can not do so for Closed Individualism (since we do not, in fact, retain the same numerically identical physiological substance over time). Thus, at least on
this particular issue (and if those happened to be our only two choices, which of course they are not), Open Individualism is to be preferred over Closed Individualism. And it is to be preferred over Closed Individualism, ultimately, on grounds of what actually matters in our continued survival. In our continued survival, matter is not what matters.

§3.3 THE PERSISTENCE OF CLOSED INDIVIDUALISM

Before going on to more complicated Boundary Dissolves, let us note what happens to us, psychologically, when we are presented with inconsistencies within our own views of ourselves. The fact is that our psychologies seem structured such that we simply ignore any inconsistencies. For instance, it is a fact that, ordinarily, people are not aware of the extent to which the body is constantly undergoing drastic changes—for instance, that within every seven years nearly all cells are replaced. Ordinarily, people think that matter matters in ways which, in reality, it does not. Until recent advances in science and medical technology, this was not generally known (not even by Heraclitus). Typically, when people discover this truth about themselves, they are surprised and, what is even more surprising, not only do they tend to soon ignore this fact, they neither cease believing in their own permanence nor do they cease believing in the permanence of their bodies. This is true even of materialists who do not believe in any such metaphysical substance. These people do not rush to the nearest personal identity theorist to purchase a new theory of self! Nor do they devise some elaborate continuity analysis. Typically, they accept, for instance, both that replacing most of a car’s parts is to destroy the original car and to produce a replica, that to do this with a body is to destroy the original and to produce a replica, and that if that is what is going on then they too are a replica but—and this worries them briefly but rarely for very long—they continue to view themselves exactly as before, as the same original person over time. In other words, they hold an incoherent view of themselves. (We need not claim that they could not, in principle, come up with a plausible physical continuity view if they tried, say as Peter Unger does, to do so; but, rather, what I am saying is that neither do they try to do so nor does it bother them very much that they cannot easily do it.)

One possible reason for this interesting phenomenon of the persistence of a self-concept against conflicting evidence may be that people have some
other theory, such as a theory of souls. However, even people who do not believe in souls tend to respond the same way. (Another possibility is that deep down people are enlightened beings who know some deep truth about themselves, but probably there is no need to consider this possibility very seriously.) A more likely possibility is that in spite of their now knowing that these (physiological) borders, which up to now they have been ignorant of, exist obscured by appearances, they do not really see these borders experientially and so they can without any cognitive dissonance continue to view themselves as before. Medical researchers, for instance, who actually observe, say, the daily formation of the human pancreas—an event that happens within you every 24 hours—or the formation every three days of another stomach lining, the replacement through division of millions of cells each minute, and so on, do actually tend to view the physiology in which the body consists as a much less permanent structure than do ordinary people.

Similarly, one will encounter this sort of phenomenon (the persistence of traditional Closed Individualist beliefs against conflicting data or arguments) even in the case of various psychological borders. For instance, when philosophy students discover, say by studying Hume’s insightful ruminations on personal identity, that there appears to be no permanent self in experience, typically (unfortunately?) they neither become “selfless” nor do they take the more interesting alternative of giving up their ordinary view of personal identity. This is true even of students who are non-materialists and who believe that their existence as persons is primarily a mental phenomenon. Again, one likely reason is that in spite of their now knowing that such (mental) borders that they have not been attending to nevertheless exist, obscured, within them, they do not really see these borders experientially and so they can continue without any serious cognitive dissonance to view themselves as before. Where as, for instance, some experienced meditators trained in various Buddhist techniques designed specifically to enhance the actual seeing of the borders within their so-called “selves” experientially, actually do tend to experience a change in their former views and achieve a certain type of “selflessness,” at least as is evidenced by their outward behavior.

We shall return to this interesting problem of why our ordinary psychologies seem capable of absorbing any new philosophy. For now it will be enough merely to note this and to suggest that it may play an important role in the constraints, mentioned above, concerning our views of personal identity. The fact is that we cannot simply pick a view of personal
identity in the same way we pick out our clothes.

§ 3.4 THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS ABOUT PERSONS

In this work we often perform thought experiments, so let me at this point make some general comments about their function in philosophy. Thought experiments that entail logical impossibilities are of course unwelcome in any analysis. But some thought experiments involve physical impossibilities and yet lead to great results. For instance, as far as we know, it is physically impossible (i.e., it violates the known laws of nature) for a sub-light speed material object to accelerate to the speed of light. Yet in Einstein’s famous thought experiment about “riding a beam of light,” he does exactly that - with tremendous results. Parfit writes,

The different views about personal identity make different claims about actual people, and ordinary lives. But the difference between these views is clearer when we consider certain imaginary cases. Most of the arguments . . . appeal, in part, to such cases. It may be impossible for some of these cases to occur, whatever progress may be made in science and technology. . . . Does it matter if some imagined case would never be possible? This depends entirely on our question, or what we are trying to show. Even in science it can be worth considering deeply impossible cases. One example is Einstein’s thought-experiment of asking what he would see if he could travel beside some beam of light at the speed of light. [Reasons and Persons, p. 219]

None of the thought experiments we shall consider (except perhaps the one concerning time travel, but perhaps not even that one) involve any logical impossibilities. But neither do they involve any physical impossibilities—that is, though they might at present be impossible to carry out technologically, they do not break any of the known laws of nature. In this respect they require us to make less of a conceptual leap than does the fruitful thought experiment of Einstein’s.

To see how thought experiments can be important conceptual devices for understanding the true nature of personal identity, let us construct a rather bizarre thought experiment about thought experiments, as follows. Imagine a world, Inaudia, in which a deaf society exists in the odd technological position of having the possibility of recording music on tape without the ability to make copies of the music (i.e., the sound structures) from one tape to another. (Although they do not have ears, Inaudians have neurons that can respond to audio signals.) In addition, Inaudians cannot hear the music until after it had been recorded, and they do this by plugging their brains directly to recording devices (Inaudian musicians are never sure of what
their compositions really sound like until they have recorded them). In other words, due to some strange peculiarities of Inaudia (say, due to some property of the ferric oxide particles out of which their tape is made), only live music is recordable but only recorded music is audible; thus, if one plays a recorded tape and tries to record the sound structure from it to another tape, there is always interference that wipes out the sound structure from both tapes. (Supposedly, Beethoven near the end of his life had to compose without ever hearing what he had written; in our imaginary deaf world, all composers are in a similar position except they can eventually hear their work once it is recorded.)

Now, as it happens, the majority of the aestheticians in Inaudia believe that a song is identical to the physical particles on which it is embedded. “Where is Song S?” is answered, “Song S is on tape T.” There is always one and only one version of any S; attempts to duplicate any S have produced some rough similarities but (since in this world no song is really heard until it is recorded) exact similarities are merely fantastic possibilities. So one fundamental condition of the Inaudian Traditional View of Songs is that a particular song exists at only one place at a time and that a song’s identity, like the identity of an ordinary physical object such as a pebble, is bound to the physical object in which the information is embedded; the song is essentially fixed to, and its existence as that song is delineated by, a particular tape.

Along comes an Inaudian philosopher who proposes the following thought experiment. Imagine, he says, a “dubbing machine.” No one has ever imagined such a machine before but he explains that, if you had one, using the dubbing machine you could make out of some particular song many exact copies on other tapes. Does it not follow from his imaginary example, asks the philosopher, that we are mistaken in thinking that the identity of a song is determined by the physical tape in which it is embedded? No, cry some of his colleagues: it does not follow, because we do not actually have any such dubbing machines and, anyway, our view of the identity of songs arose out of ordinary contexts and we simply do not have any idea about what we would say about it if such a strange and unknown situation were to arise. (One of the objectors even publishes a book: Audio Identity Without Thought Experiments.) Wouldn’t these imaginary objectors be missing the actual point—that, even if it turned out in their world that dubbing would forever remain a technological impossibility, their Traditional View of Songs is false? And wouldn’t their Traditional View of Songs be false regardless of whether their “dubbing
machines” were actual or imaginary? And wouldn’t it be doubly inappropriate to say that we have just learned nothing about the true value of thought experiments because we’ve merely imagined a world that doesn’t really exist, perhaps even a world that, given the actual physical properties of our universe, couldn’t exist?

A thought experiment about persons is more than merely a legitimate way of approaching the problem. Provided we set it up carefully, the thought experiment is essential to a proper analysis of it. Another example should make this a little clearer (it will be made even more clear during the course of the work) and put at ease those philosophers who suffer from severe puzzle-case phobias. Typically, these philosophers consider the analytic use of imaginary examples as mere (perhaps even bad) “science fictions” that reveal little, if anything, about the world and ourselves. But consider the physicist’s use of thought experiments involving frictionless surfaces. Although a true frictionless surface does not exist anywhere in nature, nor could such a surface exist, even in principle, physicists perform idealized thought experiments in which they manipulate imaginary hockey-pucks on an imaginary, frictionless surface. The reason physicists do this is that the frictionless surface idealization allows the experimenter the luxury of leaving out all forces but the particular one he wishes to single out and scrutinize. Thus Galileo, constantly plagued by the problem of friction, got around the problem by moving his experiment off the actual, physical inclined plane and into his mind. This allowed Galileo to focus on one force at a time. His results were not irrelevant to “real” physics but, on the contrary, helped contribute to our understanding of the real world.

Similarly, in thought experiments about persons, a well-imagined set-up will allow us to leave out all factors but the one under examination. In physics, the goal is to find out which forces are conserved and which are not; with colliding hockey-pucks, the conserved force turns out to be momentum. In the philosophy of personal identity, the goal is by analogy similar: to find out which psycho-physical unity or motor function unity (i.e., memory, psychological continuity, physical continuity, etc.), if any, preserve personal identity, and which do not. (Obviously, the issue is more complicated in the philosophy of personal identity, where one of the problems is that we are not even clear about what, exactly, we are looking for or, for that matter, how we can tell when we found it. That is why, as we shall see, the problem of personal identity is so fundamental and far-reaching: it plunges us, the observers, into the picture and thereby forces us to re-evaluate the way we think about ourselves and the world and also to
re-evaluate how philosophy is and should be done.) Thus, in our analysis, the crucial function of thought experiments is to limit the issue to one single border at a time—say the Physiological Continuity Border—and then to subject this border to a test in which it is forced to function independently of all other possible borders, say the Psychological Continuity Border. This “singling out of a phenomenon” methodology cannot always be achieved easily, if at all, in real life. In this way we might be able to determine whether the Physiological Continuity Border, for instance, is necessary or sufficient for personal non-identity and if physiological continuity or psychological continuity or something else is what matters primarily in survival.

In this respect, we might liken our method to a camera obscura. Light enters a black box through a very small opening that—without any lenses or complicated optics—limits the amount of light let in and thereby focuses the light into a sharp and clear image. If you make the hole too big and let in too much light you get not an image but a whitewashed, fuzzy blur. Only if you make the hole tiny enough do you get a sharp, full view from which one can sketch, by carefully tracing a line along the image, a picture as accurate as a photograph. Similarly, it is important that we restrict our analysis of personal identity to one point (i.e., one criterion, or one border) at a time. Thought experiments can help us do this. In this way we may attain a glimpse—perhaps even a conceptual snapshot—of the ever elusive “I.”

Now, of course—someone might object—I can imagine being a telephone. Does that show that what I take to be boundaries between myself and the telephone are merely borders, not boundaries, and that it is possible that I am the telephone? No. Ceasing to be this particular human being and becoming a telephone would not, we believe, preserve what matters to my continued existence as the person that I am. Telephones cannot think (not yet, anyway), cannot feel, cannot reason, cannot move about; a telephone could not finish this book, and so on. Whereas if my living brain was put in your living body and continued to function mentally as it now functions, then, I strongly believe and I believe that I believe this with good reason, I would have a new body and using the new body, I—the very person now writing these words—could finish this book; my personal identity, it seems, could be preserved across that border.

Thought experiments, then, are not simply mental ravings; we can distinguish good from bad thought experiments just we can distinguish good from bad science, science from science fiction, and even
philosophically powerful fiction (i.e., Kafka’s, Tolstoy’s) from, for instance, a Harlequin romance novel. To simply say that *The Trial* never really happened—nor, given the way that law courts and people function in the world today, that it could never really happen—is to miss entirely the point that *The Trial* can indeed paint a more accurate and gripping picture of the alienation, despair, and self-deception inherent in the bureaucratization of twentieth-century life than most non-fictional sociological studies ever could.

Since in my view we are each a bordered but boundless entity, what we are trying to picture is clearly not an ordinary physical object but, in some sense, an abstract one. This affords us yet another metaphor that makes ample room for thought experiments in philosophy, one beautifully expressed by Jonathan Glover:

... much modern philosophy, is in a style that resembles abstract art. It argues in part by means of thought experiments: asking the reader to imagine various cases designed to sharpen the conflict between different theoretical views. Often the inner structure of a problem is best exposed by imaginary cases which are in some ways quite unrealistic. The lack of realism is unimportant for the purposes of the thought experiments. But, just as we would not try to use a Henry Moore or a Picasso for learning anatomy, so the thought experiments should be seen as theoretical tools, not as themselves studies in a realistic portrayal of people. [I: the Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity, p. 16]

But I would here throw in a word of caution: we philosophers must be especially careful not to limit our understanding of “realism” to what has been painted, and what is paintable, on canvases deemed acceptable to hang in the old universe—that outdated, classical gallery that got turned upside down and inside out by the advent of relativity theory and quantum mechanics. Indeed, although there may be little room for my picture of I in a classical Newtonian universe of absolute space and time where matter and motion explains everything and atoms obey their well-described “real paths” and “determinate boundaries,”—little that feels “realistic”—the universe of relativized spacetime, the uncertainty principle, vacuum fluctuations, superposition of states, black holes, wormholes, virtual particles, superstring theory, collapse of waves of probability into waves of actuality by consciousness, and so on, makes for Open Individualism a perfect gallery. In this new strange universe there is more than enough room for the realistic picture I am trying to paint.
§ 3.5 THE CONTEMPORANEOUS PHYSIOLOGICAL DISSOLVE

One way a Closed Individualist can try to respond to the Boundary Dissolve of §3.2.2 is to stipulate that the Physiological Substance Border is a boundary between persons only in cases where the borders consist in contemporaneously existing physiologies. That is, you and I are different persons because our bodies consist in contemporaneously existing different physiologies but Daniel Kolak age forty-two (DK_{42}) and DK age 3 (DK_{3}) are not different persons because even though DK_{42} and DK_{3} are composed of different material they do not exist contemporaneously. There are several problems with this, however.

First of all, we are again signifying the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border as metaphysical boundary between persons. For, lest the personal identity question be begged, individuating you from me via the borders of the contemporaneously existing physical material in which our minded physiologies consist, must be defined in terms of the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border. But the FEC Border individuates not only me from you; it individuates also DK_{42} from any past person-stage of DK, say of seven years ago, DK_{35}. For instance, I, DK_{42}, now recall and regret having some years ago as DK_{28} acted a particular way in a situation in which now, in retrospect, I wish I had acted differently. I, the wiser-than-DK_{28} DK_{42}, can now no more willfully control DK_{28}’s behavior than I can yours.

Second, we can imagine people going back in time and existing contemporaneously with their former person-stages. For instance, suppose I, DK_{42}, travel back in time to 1958 and remain in the United States while across the Atlantic is DK age three, DK_{3}. Barring for the moment whatever conceptual difficulties such thought experiments might entail, wouldn’t this be a case of one person being at two different places at the same time—a case of two contemporaneously existing sets of exclusively conjoined physiological bundles (separated from each other by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment), who are nonetheless the same person? Such examples may entail conceptual difficulties. But, first, the idea of something traveling backwards in time is no longer foreign to physics:

Richard Feynman developed the idea that in the world of particle physics the “antiparticle” counterpart to any particle - the positron partner to an electron, say - can be represented as its particle partner moving backward in time. This is not just a mathematical trick; Feynman’s new insight into quantum mechanics greatly simplifies the equations used by physicists to describe the behavior of particles, and can be interpreted as literally meaning that a positron is an electron.
traveling backward in time. Feynman says that he got the idea from a throwaway remark of his former teacher, John Wheeler, when Feynman was still a graduate student in Princeton. Wheeler commented that all electrons, everywhere in the Universe, could be regarded as the same electron which traveled forward and backward in time . . . . [Spaceswarps, 147-148]

Furthermore, we can imagine ways to avoid the more obvious conceptual puzzles. For instance, suppose I, DK42, go back in time and meet DK3, as he sits on the roof of the apartment building in Zagreb torturing pigeons. While we have a trivial conversation he of course assumes he is talking to a stranger, not to his future self. I, DK42, might even vaguely recall having been lectured by some man on the rooftop about why one should not bring unnecessary suffering into the world, but I, (DK42), no longer remember the details of what he said. Now, how many persons are there on the rooftop?

It seems extremely odd to suppose that, simply in virtue of our being two exclusively conjoined physiological bundles, we are two different persons. True, DK42 is taller and weighs a good bit more than DK3. But that is true regardless of whether DK42 is in 1997 or in 1958. DK42 and DK3 can’t be different persons simply because one is taller than the other—if they are then there simply are never any continuously existing persons in the world for any extended length of time. (This might be the truth. If it is the truth, then Open Individualism is false. But, if it is the truth, then traditional Closed Individualism is also false. And, if it is the truth, then—all else being equal [and as we shall see]—there is no reason for planning for my future or worrying about my past.) Similarly with the fact that DK42 can will his arm to scratch his head but cannot will DK3’s arm to scratch DK3’s head: DK42 cannot do this whether he is in 1997 or in 1958. In other words, what is the (metaphysically significant) difference whether DK42 and DK3 are individuated by 39 years of time or by 39 centimeters of space? (Recall, too, that using the principles of Einstein’s relativity, we can translate space-like intervals into time-like intervals, and vice-versa.)

There is of course also the conceptual difficulty of what if DK42 decided to execute DK3 for his crimes against pigeonhood. In that case DK3 would never grow up to be DK42, and so DK42 would never travel back in time to kill DK3, in which case DK3 would survive to grow up to be DK42 who travels back in time and kills DK3 in which case . . . and so on. Isn’t this logically contradictory? In science fiction stories what happens in such situations is, typically, that the universe “branches” somewhat in the way supposed by the physicists Hugh Everett [1973] and Bryce DeWitt in the “many-universes” interpretation of quantum theory, according to which our universe is constantly splitting into myriad branches, so that,
CHAPTER 3

Not only our bodies, but our brains and, presumably, our consciousness is being repeatedly multiplied, each copy becoming a thinking, feeling human being inhabiting another universe much like the one we see around us. [Other Worlds, p. 137]

Ironically, DeWitt calls this “schizophrenia with a vengeance.” Given the possibility of Open Individualism, we may ask an even more amusing question: Is perhaps our belief that we are each a different person but the mental raving of a schizophrenic universe? (Or, to avoid DeWitt’s misuse of the term “schizophrenic”: Is the universe suffering from a multiple-personality disorder?)

Admittedly, what DeWitt and others have described in the many-worlds scenario might be difficult to imagine. But it is not impossible to imagine. And, in any case, regardless of the bizarre implications, such a scenario contains no logical contradictions. As Dudley Shapere eloquently puts it,

One interpretation (Everett-Wheeler “relative state” interpretation) of quantum theory, which has the virtue of consistency if not of initial plausibility, has it that the universe splits into two independent universes on the occasion of every measurement, the two universes corresponding to the alternative possible outcomes of the measurement. . . . The past history of science has time and again produced new ideas that far outstripped prior imagination; speculation about other universes, though still on the borders, has entered the domain of science. We must be prepared for the possibility that there are indeed more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our present picture of the universe. Even other universes. [Reason and the Search for Knowledge, p. 176]

Such possibilities would allow us to get out of the “causal circle” in the time travel example by positing that if DK42 altered the past he would thereby create another branch of the universe; time travel could, in light of such possibilities, be viewed as travel between possible, or “parallel” (or, more precisely, “perpendicular”) worlds. The point here of course is not that we ought necessarily to take these as serious possibilities but, rather, that we ought to take them seriously as possibilities, that is, that we can imagine a case in which two physiological individuations, DK42 and DK3, existing at the same time, separated by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, are not two different persons. That is, we can imagine a case in which it would not necessarily follow that when we count two physiological individuations—two exclusively conjoined physiological bundles—in which two minded bodies consist, each one made up of different but contemporaneously existing matter, individuated by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, we thereby count two persons.
PHYSIOLOGICAL BORDERS

Suppose someone objects that, in the time travel example, DK42 and DK3 are different persons. Presumably, this objector does not think that under ordinary circumstances DK3 and DK42 are different persons. At what point, then, did they become different persons? When DK42 steps into the time machine in 1997, isn’t he still the person he is? Nothing about him changes. And when he steps out of the time machine in 1958 isn’t he still the same person he was when he stepped into the Time Machine? We can imagine him going through these motions in a “mock-up” world, where he travels not back in time but to another, similar planet. He could presumably leave on such a journey without knowing whether he is traveling back in time or to another planet. How could where he goes determine who he is?

Or, suppose some other objector claims that DK42 and DK3 cease being the same person when they meet and exchange words. So DK42 stands inside the doorway to the roof; how can his stepping out onto the roof and talking to a little boy playing with pigeons make DK42 cease being who he is? And suppose, further, that after they have a long and serious conversation, of which DK42 has no recollection, before going back to the future DK42 takes an “amnesia” pill to make him forget he had ever traveled back in time and also gives one such pill to DK3, and they both take it. Then DK3 grows up, becomes DK42, travels back in time, has the exact same conversation, passes out the pills, goes back to the future . . . would who they are depend on whether they took an amnesia pill?

Thus, even if someone objects to the idea that DK42 and DK3, if they existed at the same time, are the same person, one cannot object on the grounds that to suppose they are the same person is counter-intuitive. Supposing that they aren’t the same person has just as bizarre, if not more bizarre, consequences for our intuitions about personal identity.

In case the reader finds the time-travel example too speculative, we can make a somewhat similar Physiological Dissolve to the idea that a person cannot be at two different places at the same time with an example of Daniel Dennett’s. He describes a fanciful experiment in which his body leaves his brain behind:

Each input and output pathway, as it was severed, would be restored by a pair of microminiaturized radio transceivers, one attached precisely to the brain, the other to the nerve stumps in the empty cranium. No information would be lost, all the connectivity would be preserved. [Brainstorms, pp. 310-311]

After the operation, Dennett’s brain is in a vat, but his body is up and around and, since all the sensations from the body are sent via radio to the
brain, and vice-versa, it appears to Dennett that he is “there” in his body, as usual. He experiences things as before, and when he goes down the corridor to the room where his brain is, he stares at it and tries, to no avail, to imagine that he is really there in the vat, not here where he appears to be, namely in the body from whose point of view he experiences the world. So where, then, is the person Dan Dennett?

Suppose, I argued to myself, I were now to fly to California, rob a bank, and be apprehended. In which state would I be tried: in California, where the robbery took place, or in Texas, where the brains of the outfit were located? Would I be a California felon with an out-of-state brain, or a Texas felon remotely controlling an accomplice of sorts in California? . . . In any event, suppose I were convicted. Was it likely that California would be satisfied to throw [Dennett’s body] into the brig, knowing that [Dennett’s brain] was living the good life and luxuriously taking the waters in Texas? Would Texas incarcerate [Dennett’s brain], leaving [Dennett’s body] free to take the next boat to Rio? This alternative appealed to me. . . . I, for one, would not mind at all and would consider myself a free man under those circumstances. If the state has an interest in forcibly relocating persons in institutions, it would fail to relocate me in any institution by locating [Dennett’s brain] there. [p. 314]

We do not at this point need to solve such puzzles about persons, but merely to point out in what way the FEC Border can make it seem that a person is at one and only one place—where the border is individuated and identified in experience—even if the entity (whatever it is, in this case supposedly the brain) that immediately controls the border directly in experience does not go where the border goes; that is, in this case, the agent of the movement does not go where (most of) the body goes.

Furthermore, suppose Dennett’s brain is hooked up to two different bodies simultaneously. What would Dennett see? Could he see from two different points of view at the same time? Perhaps not, perhaps the information would be too jumbled, but perhaps we can even imagine him learning, after a very long time, to see from both perspectives clearly, so that, for instance, he could play a game of tennis with himself.

There is nothing logically contradictory with supposing that he could. Recall, however, Swinburne’s claim that a person could not have two different sets of contemporaneous experiences; according to his view, what we have just imagined is incoherent. But how could that be? We can certainly imagine Dennett playing tennis with himself; it might require intense concentration and lots of practice, but would be like playing “Video Tennis” by yourself, with one hand on each “Joystick,” except that there are two perspectives rather than one. We can even imagine the two halves of
Dennett’s brain splitting, as has actually been done in the split-brain commissurotomies, so that each half is a separate stream of consciousness. (We will discuss such “Neurological Borders” in greater detail in the next chapter.)

Do such considerations suggest that if Open Individualism is true then the one person who is everyone is either a time traveler who goes everywhere and everywhen or is, like Dennett’s Brain, some super-brain that has split up into many different perspectives and simultaneously runs all bodies? No. It merely suggests what the one person who is everyone would be like if Open Individualism were true. The person would be like a time traveler who (like Wheeler’s Electron or perhaps even like Consciousness in the Cosmic Towers parable) weaves in and out of time, or like, in our variation of Dennett’s thought experiment, the single causal agent who controls many different bodies. We thus add these physical analogs to the Dream Analog of the previous chapter in which we concluded that one way for you to be everyone would be that you are like a dreamer dreaming a dream in which, without knowing it, you are every character in the dream. All these are ways how it could be possible that—contrary to the various apparent excluders we have thus far considered—you are everyone.
Parts of this chapter draw on my “The Metaphysics and Metapsychology of Personal Identity: Why Thought Experiments Matter in Deciding Who We Are,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 30 (1993) 39-50. Other versions of this chapter were read at East Tennessee State University, where I am grateful to the comments especially from Hugh LaFollette, and at Kenyon College, where I am grateful to the comments especially from Cyrus Banning and Juan De Pascuale, and also at California State University, Long Beach, where I am grateful to the comments especially from G. A. Spangler and Paul Tang.

For the relevant results from my work on lucid dreams, see my New Interpretation of Dreams. See, also, the references to Stephen LaBerge in the Bibliography and Brigitte Holzinger’s excellent book (which unfortunately has yet to be translated into English) Der Luzide Traum. Betrachtungen Uber das Klartraumen als psychotherapeutische Technik und Pravention (1996). Psychotherapie Lebensqualitat und Prophylaxe (Lucid Dreaming. Lucid Dreaming as a Technique in Psychotherapy. Psychotherapy. Quality of Live and Prophylaxis) Hrsg.(Ed): Hutterer- Krisch, R; Pfersmann, V; Farag, I.S.Wien / New York: Springer.

Some of course would claim, with perhaps sufficient reason, that we have not yet really moved into it; how then can we move beyond it? But we will go much more deeply into the issue of Subjective Borders in due course, if not yet axiomatically then at the very least step by step.

The distinction between qualitative and numerical identity could itself turn out to be inappropriate if, as the physicist John Archiblad Wheeler has claimed, all electrons in the universe can be regarded as one and the same electron weaving forward and backward in time. See Gribbin’s Spacewarps, pp. 147-148. In his personal correspondence to me Wheeler has suggested that he is still partial to such ideas.

Interestingly enough, logical structures are in that sense like “mental plants,” in that they can “take” experiences (of propositions) into their borders and “fashion them” into their “logical image,” thereby generating new logical statements. Theories are in that sense “smarter” than logic; philosophies are smarter still. Not only do philosophies sustain their borders and replicate the patterns by which they are individuated at a time and identified over time, philosophies “know” how to protect their borders—for instance, by “generating” reasons, arguments, and defenses against other, competing philosophies and thereby surviving against other parts of the universe—such as other philosophies that, living in some other philosophers, may be trying to destroy them! Thus we might for a moment venture with Shirley out on a limb and wonder whether as atom is to rock, rock is to plant, plant is to animal, and animal is to human being, so sensation is to experience, experience is to logic, logic is to theory, and theory is to philosophy.

Garrett Thomson provided me with this example.
Nor is it always a boundary when it holds externally between some unusual sorts of physical objects, such as works of art; although the original Mona Lisa and an exact copy of it are ordinarily not considered identical objects, the print, “Descartes,” by John Sirica, hanging on my wall, can be considered numerically identical to other such contemporaneously existing, spatially distinct, qualitatively identical physical objects hanging on other walls. Should anyone consider such counting to be logically impossible, consider the bizarre possibility that whenever within the universe there occurs exact qualitative similarity between any two objects, the universe extinguishes all the “copies” and, at the same time, creates spacetime wormholes in their places such that the one and only one object spontaneously occurs at many different spatiotemporal positions.

Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, p. 44.

John O’Connor provided me with this example.

See Parfit’s Reasons and Persons. In other words, according to Parfit, it is often the case that we can know all about the physiological and psychological ways in which earlier and later person stages are related such that there are no further facts regarding the question whether any such person stages are one and the same numerically identical person; in such cases there simply is no truth of the matter regarding personal identity - the question is “empty.”

“Why There Are No People.” For an abridgment of his recent view, see my Self & Identity, pp. 192-212.

Samuel Gorovitz (“Leaving the Past Alone”), among others, has claimed that traveling backward in time entails backwards causation and leads to absurdity. However, I agree with Mackie (Cement of the Universe, pp. 160-92) that “we can dispose of this reply by describing in some detail conceivable experimental results which, if they were obtained, would be coherently interpreted as evidence for backward causation,” p. 162. Thus, updating Mackie, we could claim that there are ways - as for instance with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics - to interpret backwards time travel in a way that altogether avoids “closed” or “looped” causal chains. Another deeply interesting line, taken by Kadri Vihvelin in “Time Travel: The Rules of the Road,” which I published in my Experience of Philosophy, 5th ed., Oxford University Press, involves Big Al going back in time to kill his infant self, Little Al. After considering all the possibilities and impossibilities, Vihvelin argues, persuasively on her account of counterfactuals in my view, that Big Al can do this but won’t unless he did in which case his own memories on the basis of which he thinks he is doing what he is doing are hallucinations (or, I would argue, confabulations). In other words, if I got in my
time machine and successfully went back in time to kill Hitler, who then never went on to do any of the things for which I (believed I) killed him, what I was acting upon was my own confabulated memories; this is much simpler, both from a physical and logical point of view, to accommodate (although it does bring in further complications on a Stalnaker-Lewis semantics, or Kripke’s rigid designators, involving trans-world identity counterfactual conditionals, which she does not consider). As she puts it, “The particular counterfactuals these laws sustain make it false, I have argued, that time travelers can kill their baby selves. On the other hand, the laws of physics do allow memories and beliefs to arise *ex nihilo*, or at least without being true.”
NEUROLOGICAL BORDERS

“Yorick,” I said aloud to my brain, “you are my brain. The rest of my body, seated in this chair, I
dub ‘Hamlet.’” So here we all are: Yorick’s my brain, Hamlet’s my body, and I am Dennett. Now,
where am I?

Daniel C. Dennett, “Where Am I?”

Let us begin by seeing in what way some other versions of the
Physiological Boundary are merely apparent excluders of the Open
Individual View of Personal Identity.

§ 4.1 THE BODILY DISSOLVE

Perhaps it is not being composed of different physiologies per se that
divides us into different persons, but rather that there is no overlapping
continuity of physiologies between us. That is, since there has been a
gradual, overlapping change of physical material from DK$_3$ to DK$_{42}$, and
the other requirements of identity have been satisfied, DK$_3$ and DK$_{42}$ are the
same person. Only if there has been no such physiological continuity
between X and Y, and X and Y are made of different physical material,
only then are X and Y different persons.

In this view, you and I are different persons because the physiologies in
which our bodies consist are not continuous with each other in the way that
each of our bodies is physiologically continuous with our respective past
person-stages. We can call this metaphysical highlighting along the Bodily
Continuity Border, “The Bodily Continuity Boundary.” The Bodily
Continuity Boundary, then, is an apparent excluder of Open Individualism:
it posits a definite and uncrossable boundary between persons. So how
could Open Individualism possibly be true in spite of this apparent
excluder?

What we are now asking is how it could be possible that X and Y are the
same person even though their bodies are not physically continuous with
each other. This is not difficult to imagine. Suppose you and I switch brains. We would not thereby have switched memories, character traits, temperaments, and so on; we would instead have switched bodies. This is what our pre-analytic intuitions say. You would find yourself, presumably on this view, in my body, while I would find myself in your body. We can imagine this to be the case—no logical contradictions are involved. But how is it that we can thus imagine switching bodies if we are our bodies? Bodily continuity is not preserved across the body switch. Thus, since we can imagine continuing to exist as the persons we are across a break in the ordinary physiological continuity of our bodies, the Bodily Continuity Border is not necessarily a boundary between persons. The reason is that in this case everything that matters to one’s personal identity goes not where the body goes but where the brain goes.

A believer in the Closed Individual View who also believes that the boundaries between persons must be drawn along some type of Physiological Substance Border would no doubt respond by weakening the Physiological Continuity Boundary in specific ways, as for instance by claiming that it is not our having different physiologies per se but our having different neurologies—different brains—that make us different persons. This would accord with our intuitions; ordinarily we tend to believe that what matters to my being me is not that I have these particular limbs, this particular heart, these muscles, and so on, but that I have this particular neurology - this brain. An unfortunate person, who not only has lost all her limbs but has also had heart, liver, and kidney transplants, has not in virtue of those physiological changes ceased being the person who she is.

Perhaps, then, what individuates one person from another is that we each have a different brain. On this view, we draw boundaries between brain cells and the rest of the cells in our bodies and then suppose that personal identity extends across, but only within, the unities specified by those particular neurological borders. We can call this neurological version of the Physiological Boundary, “the Neurological Boundary.” Having different brains, on this view, is a definite and uncrossable boundary between persons.

§ 4.2 THE BRAIN DISSOLVE

The Neurological Boundary also disarms the Dream Analog. The other people in your dreams, even if they are minded, are not other brains. Thus,
the believer in Closed Individualism could for instance claim that the characters in your dreams—whether minded or not—are not other persons because they are not other brains. Whereas you and I are different persons because we are individuated by numerically different brains.

Also, under ordinary circumstances in the “real” world, neurons are not replaced by the body in the way that other cells are (through division and/or replacement—though there is constant exchange of materials), so delineating personal boundaries by tracing along the Brain Border makes Daniel Kolak, age 3, and Daniel Kolak, age 42, the same person. Of course, the Brain Boundary—arguably—then also makes DK$_3$ and DK$_{42}$ the same person in the time-travel example—which is enough to show (arguably) how it could be possible that two contemporaneously existing and spatially distinct minded physiologies could nonetheless be the same person: the direct and immediate causal agent of each particular locus of motion could in each case be the same brain. (In that case, to show that Open Individualism is possible we would have to show in what sense we are all the same brain and that this is metaphysically significant; it would be like claiming, as it is possible to claim, that the brain is a universal machine—a computer—whose identity is significantly defined by the type of hardware and that what matters to brain identity is the hardware running the software, not the software being run, and that we are all the same person in the sense that, say, all PC’s are the same computer.)

However, in case you are not moved by the time travel example, we can show how the Brain Border is not necessarily an absolute Boundary between persons without resorting to a thought experiment that relies on an example from science fiction. We can, as we did in the case of the Physiological Substance Boundary Dissolve, base the Brain Boundary Dissolve in an actual example from science, in this case from recent advances in neurophysiology. In the brain bisection cases performed first in 1939, neurosurgeon William P. Van Wagenen severed a woman’s corpus callosum as a way of alleviating the severity of her epileptic seizures. In examining thirty of Van Wagenen’s split-brain patients, neuro-psychologist Andrew Akelaitis in the 1940s found behavioral anomalies suggestive of split control systems. Between 1962 and 1964, R.W. Sperry investigated similar anomalies. The purpose of the “forebrain commissuromies,” as Sperry calls them, was to sever the “bilateral reinforcement” between the two hemispheres of the brain and thereby prevent the severe epileptic seizure of the patients involved. The operations achieved their purpose; they have been successfully carried out in all cases. But the operations had
bizarre and unforeseen results. Under carefully controlled laboratory conditions, each commissurotomized patient seems to display two separate centers of consciousness. One center of consciousness, apparently focused in the left hemisphere, is completely unaware of what the other center of consciousness, apparently focused in the right hemisphere, is experiencing, thinking, or doing. In Sperry’s words:

Everything we have seen so far indicates that the surgery has left these people with two separate minds, that is, two separate spheres of consciousness. What is experienced in the right hemisphere seems to be entirely outside the realm of awareness of the left hemisphere. This mental division has been demonstrated in regard to perception, cognition, volition, learning, and memory. . . . [“Brain Bisection and Mechanisms of Consciousness,” p. 299]

After the operation, one of the hemispheres seems to be carried along much as a passive, silent passenger who leaves the driving of behavior mainly to the left hemisphere. Accordingly, the nature and quality of the inner mental world of the silent right hemisphere remains relatively inaccessible to investigation, requiring special testing measures with non-verbal forms of expression. [Sperry in Eccles's *Evolution of the Brain: Creation of the Self*, p. 325]

This separated hemisphere, however, according to Sperry, is a conscious system in its own right, perceiving, thinking, remembering, reasoning, willing, and emoting, all at a characteristically human level, and that both the left and right hemisphere may be conscious simultaneously in different, even in mutually conflicting, mental experiences that run along in parallel. [p. 325]

Some writers, notably David Lewis and Roland Puccetti, have argued not only that under special conditions there are two persons inside one brain, but also that, as Puccetti claims, because of the above sorts of considerations all of us are even under normal conditions two persons or, as Lewis claims (although he is not talking specifically about the split-brain case), that if you “fission” into two, then you were two persons all along.

Puccetti argues that we should call each cerebral hemisphere a “person.” His reasoning is that since the commissurotomy patients have, according to his interpretation, two distinct minds, they therefore must each be two distinct persons. Nor does he think it reasonable, since the operation entails the severing of only a few neurons, that the operation created two persons where before there were one. Under ordinary circumstances, according to this view, the two persons inside your head are co-conscious, experiencing the same sensations, memories, and so on. It is only under the separation of
the two hemispheres that these two separate persons diverge enough for their true nature as two separate persons to become apparent.

Lewis, too, claims that there is a way of counting by which there are two people who shared the same body before fission, and that though this might lead to some conceptual ambiguities, these difficulties are not impossible:

It may be disconcerting that we can have a single name for one person . . . who is really two nonidentical persons because he will later fission. Isn’t the name ambiguous? Yes; but so long as its two bearers are indiscernible in the respects we want to talk about, the ambiguity is harmless. If C1 and C2 are identical-at-all-times-up-to-now and share the name “Ned” it is ideal to disambiguate such remarks as “Ned is tall,” “Ned is waiting to be duplicated,” “Ned is frightened” . . . and the like. These will be true on both disambiguations of “Ned,” or false on both. Before the fission, only predictions need disambiguating. After the fission, on the other hand, the ambiguity of “Ned” will be much more bother. It can be expected that the ambiguous name “Ned” will then fall into disuse, except when we wish to speak of the shared life of C1 and C2 before the fission.

But what if we don’t know whether Ned will fission? In that case, we don’t know whether the one person Ned . . . is one person, or many . . .. Then we don’t know whether “Ned” is ambiguous or not. But if the ambiguity is not a practical nuisance, we don’t need to know. [“Survival and Identity,” pp. 28-29]

Thomas Nagel draws even more radical conclusions about the nature of personal identity; at the end of his paper, “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness,” he writes:

it is possible that the ordinary, simple idea of a single person will come to seem quaint some day, when the complexities of the human control system become clearer and we become less certain that there is anything very important that we are one of. [p. 174]

However, as we saw in the minded version of the Dream Analog and shall see in greater detail in the chapter on the Unity of Consciousness, “two separate streams of consciousness” (i.e., borders individuated and identified by FEC and ASI, i.e., “streams of consciousness”) does not necessarily entail “there are two persons” (i.e., personal identity is not closed under individuation and identification by that border, it does not necessarily signify an inter-personal boundary). Neither in split-brain cases nor in the more exotic fission cases that Lewis and others consider is personal identity closed under those borders. Thus Puccetti makes the mistake we pointed out in the section on other minds—namely, he assumes that, in this case, “two minds,” in the sense of two streams of mental activity or consciousness individuated by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border, necessitates the highlighting of that border into a metaphysical boundary such that the two
streams are “two persons.” He makes a claim, in other words, without the requisite argument. While Lewis, as he is writing about an imaginary case in which one minded body “fissions” into two, assumes that two minded physiologies individuated by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border and by bodily differences entails that two persons exist, in the sense that the physiological individuations must then be identified as the individuations of two numerically different persons, which we have also see is not necessarily the case and will later see in much greater detail. Lewis thus also fails to offer an argument for why the FEC Border plus the ASI Border should suffice in the example to necessitate the highlighting of these borders so as to establish metaphysical boundaries.

Thus we can claim, with D.M. MacKay, that in the split-brain case the person is conscious and there is only one person that is conscious, but he has a split control system . . . .

It is also interesting to note, given the intent of the present work, that Sperry himself, in his rejection of Puccetti’s “two persons view,” is apparently led, in the end, to adopting pantheism as a solution to the split-brain problem. But this is not crucial to our analysis; we need do nothing more than merely rely on the actual experimental evidence that a brain can be split, such that two separate streams of consciousness are produced, as a launching point for a thought experiment that can show how, in spite of the Brain Border, two contemporaneously existing minded bodies, individuated from each other by the Brain Border, could be one and the same person. Gazzaniga writes:

Just as conjoined twins are two different people sharing a common body, the callosumsectioned human has two separate conscious spheres sharing a common brain stem, head and body. . . . A slice of the surgeon’s knife through the midline commissures produces two separate, but equal, cognitive systems each with its own abilities to learn, emote, think, and act. [The Bisected Brain, pp. 1-2]

There is some reason to believe that each hemisphere of the brain can to a large extent be considered a duplicate of the other. In Sperry’s words, it is important to remember . . . that the half-brain is, in a sense, pretty much a whole brain in that it contains a complete set of cerebral integrating centers and all their interrelations. [“Cerebral Organization and Behavior,” p. 1753]

Indeed, Puccetti claims that each hemisphere is a brain—and thus that even under ordinary circumstances each of “us” has two brains. Just as it would
be improper to speak of the eye as a single organ with two half-eyes protruding into different parts of the face, he argues, it is improper to speak of the brain as a single organ with two half-brains protruding into different regions of the skull. The commissurotomy merely shows what is always going on unnoticed: it causes the two hemispheres to “get out of sync” (as one can, for instance, become aware that one has two different organs of vision by crossing one’s eyes). His argument is based on the claim that each hemisphere has qualitatively similar but numerically distinct experiences and, in addition, exhibits different intentional acts. Whether the differences were created by the severing of the corpus callosum or were there all along is not clear but, he claims, to suppose that they were there all along is to be preferred for reasons of simplicity. What is clear is that each hemisphere can, for our purposes, be viewed as a complete brain. (Indeed, people have survived with only one hemisphere. And if each hemisphere is a different brain, then it is already possible that I can exist as a person with more than one brain, and so the Brain Border is not necessarily a boundary between persons.)

We need one more supposition, namely that the brain “stores” a particular memory several times over. This too is something that the recent evidence suggests is true. Though it is not clear how this multiple storage is distributed in the brain, we can suppose that it is evenly distributed in both hemispheres. For instance, Steven Rose suggests:

If the same memory is coded in many parts of the cortex; that is, if the state of threshold or synaptic efficacy of a large number of cells, not necessarily, indeed perhaps definitely not, all connected with one another, is altered during the learning process, then the memory may well be stored in many different parts of the system. Particular sets of circuits and firing patterns may form the relevant code, but the memory will not be localized to a single network. Rather, it will be duplicated in both brain hemispheres and many times over. Thus cortical ablation of a circumscribed region will not ablate particular memories because duplicate copies are stored elsewhere. None the less, stimulation of any of these particular regions will trigger firing on at least one of the redundant coding networks. . . . I do not think that there are any phenomena of memory which cannot be explained by this redundant network/modifiable synapse theory. [Rose in Godfrey Vesey’s Personal Identity, A Philosophical Analysis, p. 84]

Thus it is not too far-fetched, given the above sorts of considerations, to imagine the following situation. Doctors tell you that unless you immediately undergo a complicated brain operation you will die of a brain tumor located in the left hemisphere of your brain. The operation entails the removal of the left hemisphere, leaving you with only one half of your
original brain. You, a man who has always prided himself on being (at least perceived as) an outstanding intellectual, are understandably irked at the prospect of losing half your brain. But, all the doctors assure you, the latest neurophysiological research clearly demonstrates that the two halves of a brain are each replete organs which nature has, as in the case of the lung, “doubled over” as a precaution. (We are supposing this to have been discovered in the future; what is already a scientific fact is that people can survive with only half their brain intact.)

Imagine also that your doctors have developed a technique whereby any particular information that (by some unforeseen circumstances) is in one but not the other hemisphere will automatically be copied into the other. Thus, since your complete psychology—your memories, character traits, and so on—is stored in both halves with plenty of room to spare in each hemisphere, the removal of one hemisphere will not hinder your mental or physical life in any way. In fact, as far as you or any of your family or friends are concerned, no one will be able to tell any difference between the half-brained you and the full-brained you. This has been demonstrated in dozens of previous such operations. You even go to interview some of these previous patients and you find happy, normal individuals each of whom wholeheartedly endorses the procedure.

Given that you will otherwise die within a day or two, you agree to go ahead with the operation. A team of doctors wheel you into the operating room, give you a general anesthetic, and tell you to start at one hundred and count backwards. Feeling already drowsy, you close your eyes and begin counting: “100, 99, 98, 97, 96, . . . 95—” when suddenly someone interrupts and asks whether you are awake.

Opening your eyes you discover that instead of lying in the operating room you are now lying on a bed in Recovery Room B. The nurse explains that the operation is over and reassures you that it was a complete success. You try to lift your hand to your face but find that you are completely paralyzed. The nurse says not to worry, that the paralysis is only temporary, and that you should try to sleep. With great relief, and feeling still drowsy, you drift off into a blissful and dreamless sleep.

Now, is this sleeping person you? It would seem, on the present view, that since a different brain is not involved, it is you. One could, of course, claim that since your original brain had two hemispheres and your present brain has only half a hemisphere, your (post-operation) brain is a different brain from the original (pre-operation) brain and so the post-operation you is a different person from the pre-operation you. But this would entail that you
died on the operating table, which not only seems counter-intuitive but also goes against the grain of actual empirical evidence. People have in fact survived with only one functioning hemisphere of their brains. Thus, all else being equal, it would seem inappropriate to simply declare that in such cases the original person has died. And ask yourself whether, in the example just imagined, you would accept such a verdict if you found yourself experiencing the world through the surviving half-brain.

(Suppose we liken the two hemispheres to two “projectors” running the same film. To say that the film survives the breakdown of one of the projectors, so long as the other keeps running, is analogous to claiming that what matters is not the double projectors running but, rather, the single having of experience by whoever is watching the [doubly projected] film. If we imagine the two projectors to be focused so that the images are exactly synchronous, we can see how someone watching the film would not even notice the switching between one projector and the other; this is like Dennett’s imaginative example already considered. It is the experience remaining the same without interruption such that unity and continuity are preserved that makes it possible to view the example as one of survival.)

So if the post-operation person is you, and if the Brain Border is highlighted as a boundary between persons, it would follow that what matters for the preservation of personal identity is that enough of the physical brain survives to permit normal psychological functioning. But this has grave consequences for Closed Individualism. To see why, let us go back to the brain-surgery thought experiment and suppose that upon waking from your blissful post-operation sleep you find the head surgeon and several other doctors standing around staring at you solemnly. Has something gone wrong, you wonder? This time you lift your hand to your face without difficulty—the paralysis is gone—but rubbing your cheeks feels odd and when you look at your hand you realize why: it is not your hand. You scream; not only is the voice not your own, it is the voice of a woman. The doctors quickly restrain you and start explaining that, after the diseased hemisphere of the brain was removed from the cranium it was not discarded. Sometimes, if the hemisphere is well preserved, it is placed inside the empty cranium of a brain-dead donor body and then neurosurgeons use the latest experimental techniques to try to hook up the brain hemisphere to the spinal chord of the still living body. No such “brain transplant” has ever been successful—until now. You are that diseased left hemisphere successfully implanted into another body. Unfortunately, of course, this means—since you are the hemisphere with the brain tumor—
that within a day or two you will die. But this shouldn’t worry you, the
doctors explain, since the healthy half of your brain is already up and about
in your original body that in the morning will be discharged from the
hospital to go back to the awaiting family, friends, and professional life.

Finally you tell the doctors what they can do with their brain operation
technique. Whoever is inside the cranium of your original body, it isn’t you.
You’re over here, not over there. You’re lying on your back, someone else
is up and about. Obviously, the wrong hemisphere has been removed. You
demand to be put back into your skull and connected to your body and other
half-brain immediately; at least then you will have the opportunity to go
and say goodbye to your family, friends, and colleagues before you die.

The doctors explain that this will be unnecessary; you are but the diseased
and about-to-die half of an original brain, the other half of which will go on
living for many years. Though they are sympathetic to your pleas, they
regretfully inform you that under no conditions could they hook you back
up to the other half of your brain and thereby kill a perfectly healthy
human—your original body with the healthy half of your brain—for the
sake of the emotional consolation of a diseased, about-to-die half of that
original brain that—had the transplant into the brain-dead woman’s body
failed—would have been discarded anyway.

“But what about me,” you want to know. “What about this person?” That,
of course, is the question that interests the wobbly and undersized
philosophers standing on their tip-toes in the back of the recovery room as
they try to peek over the shoulders of their illustrious medical colleagues
who, with squared shoulders and both feet firmly and confidently planted
on the ground, stand quite tall. And the question interests us because, by
individuating persons along the Brain Border, prima facie, it would seem
that the anxious and frightened patient in the recovery room—Y—and the
relieved and happy patient watching television in the day room—call him
Z—are the same person. They are the same person because, by the
condition that X and Y are the same person if Y has enough of X’s brain, Y
and Z apparently in this case are the same person because they both have
enough of X’s brain. The reason they each have enough of the original
brain is that, if only Y or Z had survived, the original person, X, would
have survived. Again, this is not mere fanciful thinking; people have as a
matter of scientific record survived with only half of their brains intact.
Since both Y and Z are continuous halves of the same physical brain, and
would be considered to be the same person on those grounds, they are the
same person.8 (Using our film analogy, it would be like taking the
projectors into different theaters and there projecting one and the same film.)

After all, is there really such an essential difference between disconnecting the two hemispheres but leaving them inside the same skull, vs. disconnecting them and putting them inside different skulls? In the one case, if the two hemispheres are the same person, one person is in two different places at the same time—the two places being separated by millimeters. In the other case, the two hemispheres are separated not by millimeters but by meters. Is mere spatial separation, by itself, the crucial factor? If not, what? Is it the addition of the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border that makes the grand metaphysical difference? But why should it matter that, now, each hemisphere is “running” a different body? If, in a dream, each hemisphere of your brain runs one dream character, we would not thereby necessarily have to conclude that two persons exist inside your head. Is the crucial difference, then, that the causal locus of motion is a “physical” body rather than a “dream” body? Why should that be the essential difference that creates two persons where there would otherwise be one? Why should what one runs—either a phenomenological body (the “body-mind image”), as in the Dream Analog case of each hemisphere running a different character, or a physical body, as in the Split Brain case where each hemisphere runs a different set of limbs—make the essential metaphysical difference of who one is?

If Y in the recovery room and Z in the dayroom are the same person, however, then clearly what we will later call the “Spatial Boundary”—the condition that a person cannot be at more than one place at the same time—would not, by itself, be an absolute and uncrossable boundary between persons. That is, a person could be at two different places at the same time in more than just the sense already discussed (namely, that even under ordinary conditions I must exist at more than one place at the same time, that is, at all the places occupied by the various parts of my body). In the present case, the Spatial Border being considered does not, by itself, necessarily signify a boundary between persons but, rather, allows that there can be personal identity (without unity of co-conscious experience), across it - that one and the same person can exist on both sides of the border. The way we can answer the present “puzzle” would thus be to say that Y and Z are the same person who exists at two different places at the same time. (We will consider Spatial Borders again in much more detail in the next chapter.)

The present Boundary Dissolve, as just mentioned, does not imply that
you do, or that you could, extend across these borders experientially or phenomenologically—that the borders are (or could be) “experientially transparent” (though perhaps they could). The fact is that I, the writer, cannot at this moment directly see into the head of you, the reader—but this is true even if the present reader is Kolak in the year 2011 and, even, Kolak seven seconds from now! We have already seen (in the case of the FEC and ASI Borders) ways in which such borders are not necessarily boundaries between persons. What the current examples show us is that, even when we buttress the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment and Intuition of Independent Consciousness Borders with the Physiological Substance Border and the Brain Border, it is possible for one and the same person, in spite of these (real) individuations, to exist on both sides of the border. Someone might be surprised by this, just as Da Vinci might have been surprised to learn that it is possible for one and the same work of visual art to exist, at the same time, at two different places, or as someone before the time of Guttenberg and the printing press might have been surprised to learn that it is possible for one and the same holy book to exist at more than one place at a time. (On the other hand, Da Vinci would probably be able to accept, once we explained the concept of lithography to him, that the same work of art could be at two different places at the same time. And then, if we had a technique for replicating the Mona Lisa—down to an atom-for-atom qualitative identity—he might allow that a painting, too, could exist at more than one place at a time. One way we could do this would be by showing him how what he thinks matters to the identity of the Mona Lisa is not what really matters.)

Similarly, although the man on the street would probably be surprised to find it possible that one and the same person could exist on both sides of a border unbridged by co-consciousness of experience or by some co-conscious phenomenological linkage, a philosopher should not be very surprised. Hume, for instance, claimed that even in ordinary cases there is no such unity extending across the borders of our moment-to-moment psychological individuations. Hume claimed, in effect, that we continue to exist as the same person only in theory. A theory is not an experience. Hence, for an empiricist like Hume, if the only way I can exist as the same person over time is by there being continuous unity of co-conscious experience across temporal borders, then on Hume’s view (since our [apparent] experience of such unity is an illusion) personal identity is an illusion.

Even if Hume’s experiential insight is correct, however, it does not follow
that we fail to continue to exist, with identity, as the persons we are. This is because, as we shall see, 1) continuous unity of co-conscious experience is not a necessary condition of personal identity, and 2) some other aspects of personal existence (other than continuous unity of co-conscious experience) may be sufficient for personal identity. That is, something else might provide the emergent and overarching vehicle for personal identity even in cases where there is individuation without the sort of phenomenological content-linkage (conscious unity of experience) ordinarily supposed (by a non-Humean) to be required in cases of personal survival. Hume’s assumption that personal identity is only a theory and therefore personal identity is not real (that we do not really exist as continuous persons) assumes both that Reductionism is true and that phenomenological extendedness with unity of co-conscious experience is necessary for there to be (real) personal identity. But if our examples thus far have shown anything, it is that such phenomenological extendedness with unity of co-conscious experience across the individuated unities (across our borders) is not necessarily necessary for the obtaining of personal identity across our borders.

§4.3 THE TIE-BREAKER CONDITION AND THE CLOSED INDIVIDUAL VIEW

Let us return now to the split-brain patient. My interpretation thus far might of course be incorrect, but it is not clear that it is. One way it might be incorrect is if neither Y nor Z are the original person as the pre-operation patient, X. This would preserve the Spatial Boundary, the Closed Individualist condition that a person cannot exist at two different places at the same time. But, as we shall see, it has some rather bizarre consequences of its own which cause serious problems for Closed Individualism.

One way to deny that either Y or Z are X would be to add further qualifications to the Brain Border so as to signify it as a Spatial Boundary. For instance, we could claim, with Nozick [1981], Parfit [1983], Shoemaker [1984], Williams [1973], Chisolm [1976], Wiggins [1976], and many other philosophers writing on the subject, that ties destroy personal identity. (Lewis and Noonan are two notable exceptions.)

That is, someone who accords to the Brain Border the (metaphysical and metapsychological) significance required for it to be an uncrossable boundary between persons could now claim that some person X at t₁ can be the same person as some person Y at some later time t₂ only if there does
not exist at $t_2$ some other person Z who resembles X, in the crucially relevant ways, as closely as does Y. The crucially relevant way, in the present case, is the having of enough of the original brain to preserve normal psychological functioning. Thus by adding the tie condition, neither Y nor Z are X. This preserves the signification of the Spatial Border as a Spatial Boundary. It gives us an apparent boundary between persons that appears to succeed from the perspective of Closed Individualism and apparently excludes the possibility of Open Individualism. Appearances, however, as we are about to see, can in this case be deeply deceiving.

You are Y, the diseased left hemisphere transplanted into the empty cranium of a formerly brain-dead woman in recovery room B. The doctors have been examining you all day and are satisfied that your mind has lost nothing during the operation: among other things, you can easily recall every one of the hundreds of memories that before the operation you had picked at random and written down. Testing these and other memories seems silly to you because you have no doubts whatsoever about being the same person you were before the operation.

Wondering what your original body and other half of your brain might be doing and experiencing, you decide (against the doctors’ orders) to sneak out of your room and to go and visit him. Has it even occurred to the poor impostor, you wonder, that something might have gone wrong? Probably not. Probably he thinks he is you.

On the way down the hall you pass a television and see that a repeat of an old “Outer Limits” show, which you remember having watched as a child, is on. You realize that “the impostor,” if he is watching the same show, will also remember having seen it before. And, after all, he did see it, didn’t he? Why not? Didn’t you both see it before? But how could that be, when there was only one of you then? Was it only one of you? Or both? Or neither?

You find him sitting in the dayroom. He turns and smiles politely; noticing that you too have a shaved head, he asks whether you also have had the split brain operation. You nod. He takes your uneasiness to be apprehension about the operation, and (just as you yourself, you realize, would probably do) he begins relating to you his experiences of having interviewed lots of other people who have had this same operation without any side effects. You of course remember every detail of what he says because it was you who had interviewed those people, not him. As he continues talking you realize he’s started to flirt because he’s doing exactly what you do when you start to flirt with an attractive woman.

Suddenly, you cut him off by telling him who you are. He turns peaked
and rattles off a series of questions only he would know the answer to and you answer as only he could. Finally, you complain that the operation was obviously an utter failure, since in a day or two the brain tumor in your head will kill you.

“Wait a minute,” he says. “That’s nonsense. The operation was a wonderful success. I mean, look at me! I’m alive! You’re the right half of my brain. The tumor is in your head, not mine. I’m the person who went into the operating room—”

“No, that was me. They gave me the anesthesia and told me to start counting—”

“Absurd,” he interrupts, “I remember! I started counting backwards from 100—”

“That was me, and by the time I said ‘95,’ I found myself in the recovery room—”

Now, how many persons are having this argument—one or two? The problem is that, having described the thought experiment from the inside - that is, having described it subjectively—as Einstein similarly described riding the beam of light from the subjective point of view—our traditional Closed Individualist intuitions are stretched beyond their limit.

Suppose we accept the tie condition and conclude that neither Y, the woman with the left hemisphere of the original brain, nor Z, the man with the right hemisphere of the original brain, are identical to X, the pre-operation person. Y and Z of course each thinks that he or she is identical to X. But, according to the Brain Boundary buttressed with the added tie condition, neither of them really is identical to X. Even if your intuitions aren’t troubled by this answer, the problem is nonetheless there.

Explicitly, the problem is this. In my view—which does not have the added tie condition—the man and the woman sitting on the sofa arguing about their own personal identities are the same person. This denies that the Spatial Border is necessarily a boundary between persons—it denies the Spatial Boundary. This, admittedly, is from our ordinary, every-day perspective difficult to believe. But suppose that, unlike my intuitions, your intuitions say that, given the possibility of accepting the tie condition, neither the man (Z) nor the woman (Y) are the same person as the pre-operation patient (X). (This, then, will also have been your view if you believed that the Y and Z half-brains, once separated, are not the same brain.) What, then, will your intuitions say when Y, the woman with the diseased left hemisphere of X’s brain, dies of her (his?) brain tumor? After Y’s death, there is no more tie. Does this mean that now, suddenly, the
moment she (Y) dies, somehow the man (Z)—in virtue of her having died—becomes the original person? How could that be? By what magic could he suddenly become someone who a moment ago he wasn’t? Considering such a possibility, Nozick says,

> It seems strange that at a certain time, without any (physical) change taking place in it, the new body could become the person when the old body expires. However, once we have become used to the idea that whether y at t₂ is (identical with) x at t₁ does not depend only upon the properties and relations of x and y, but depends also upon whether there exists a z of a certain sort (which more closely continues x), then perhaps we can swallow this consequence as well. [Philosophical Explanations, 1981, parenthesis his, pp. 43- 44]

Perhaps Nozick is right; perhaps we can learn to “swallow” such consequences somewhat in the way we learned, as children, to swallow bad-tasting medicine that, so we were told, would make us feel better. After all, our parents assured us, the alternative was awful: if you don’t take the bad-tasting medicine you will either shrivel up and die or the bugbears will get you. What, though, is the alternative to swallowing such nasties? If we refuse to do so will we die? What sort of bugbear would we have to face?

Let us view more closely Nozick’s version of the metaphysical scenario as painted by his Empty Individual View. Nozick claims elsewhere that the boundaries of personal identity are at least in part determined by our own choices. So whether there exists a “z of a certain sort (which more closely continues x)” will at least in part determined by how we choose. But why would we choose the way Nozick supposes? Because, says Nozick, given the fission example, that is the best interpretation. But why should we choose that way? And if what matters to us really is important, maybe we do not have to choose Nozick’s way—and, as we shall see, we do not. One bugbear, of course, to our not doing so is the denial of the (traditional Closed Individualist) idea that the Spatial Border is necessarily a boundary between persons, and the acceptance of the (Open Individualist) idea that a person can be at two different places at the same time (a key stepping stone between Closed and Open Individualism).

Supposing that a person can be at more than one place at a time is, admittedly, difficult to believe. But Nozick’s solution, designed to avoid having to accept the “absurd” conclusion that a person can be at more than one place at the same time, is also difficult to believe. First, Nozick’s claim denies the single continuous entity assumption. For if Z becomes X only after Y dies, then there was a gap in the life of X—the gap during which both Y and Z were alive. Thus keeping the individuation and separateness...
of persons assumption, as Nozick seems to want to do, and erasing from our conceptual framework the single continuous entity assumption, denies a basic and necessary structural tenet of Closed Individualism—namely that we are each a continuously existing entity.

Nozick’s view also denies the intrinsic features assumption, which says that a person’s identity depends only on the intrinsic features of that person. Erasing this assumption from our conceptual framework is also perhaps as bizarre as erasing the individuation and separateness of persons assumption. Without the intrinsic features assumption, my personal identity is affected by what happens elsewhere in the universe; how is this any less bizarre than supposing that I could be at two different places at the same time?\textsuperscript{10}

The single continuous entity and intrinsic features assumptions may indeed be expendable. But, the individuation and separateness of persons assumption is more easily expendable. Those theorists who, like Nozick, in trying to take account of the “fission” puzzles of personal identity, move away from Closed Individualism with new views that deny the continuous entity and the intrinsic features assumptions, assume that this is the only plausible way to go. We have an alternative. For if whether a person can exist at more than one place at a time is as Nozick argues itself, at least in part, up to us, then we have more room to choose at the beginning of the analysis, where Nozick does not ask us to consider all possible choices. Considering Open Individualism as a possibility shows us that there are more (real) choices than Nozick offers—perhaps even a better choice.

In the Dream Analog we saw how it could be possible that I “exist” at many “different places at the same time”—in my dreams. So while it may seem absurd to suppose that I could be at more than one place at a time, it seems less absurd when we realize that my “attention” can be divided by, and focused into, different sets of contemporaneous experiences. In dreams the vividness of the divided attention and the sharpness of the phenomenological borders created by that individuation is heightened and the Dream Analog relies on this heightening as a way of making a philosophical explanation. It is but a few steps from there to seeing how it is possible that one person’s “attention” or “awareness” is focused, and phenomenologically individuated by, causal loci of motion, themselves individuated by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, that obtain not merely on both sides of a psychologically-individuated borders but on both sides of a physiologically-individuated border and without being unified by co-conscious experience. This would of course be difficult to accept and would go against Closed Individualism. But this move must be weighed not
against Closed Individualism (which cannot deal with the puzzles) but
against the difficulty of going the other way in denying Closed
Individualism and erasing both the single continuous entity and intrinsic
features assumptions (and thereby, as I suggested, erasing ourselves from
the picture—one can almost imagine the Cosmos scolding the Empty
Individualists: “Just because you notice a few flaws in the picture, please
don’t erase what took eighteen billion years to draw!”)

If we hold the Spatial Boundary (and thus keep the individuation and
separateness of persons assumption) by inserting the tie condition, then one
plausible reading of Nozick’s view is that when Y dies Z becomes X. But
suppose you are Z and neither you nor anyone else knows she died. You
would in that case have incorrect beliefs about who you are. Is that right?
Would you in that case not know who you are? On what grounds? By
ordinary standards, you certainly know who you are. The character of your
subjective life has not changed since the operation and is indistinguishable
in every way from what it would have been like had you still had both
halves of your brain. That is, whether the woman lives or dies, nothing
about you, the living, breathing, thinking, man there, has changed. You
could finish whatever projects you (believe you) started, care for whoever
you (believe you) have been caring about, including yourself, and so on. It
is the same life being lived—you are who you are, it would seem,
regardless of who you believe yourself to be. To suppose otherwise seems
counter-intuitive: you are who you are, it seems, regardless of whether or
not some (literally) half-brained person is alive or not. To deny this seems
at least as counter-intuitive as denying that the Spatial Border is,
necessarily, a boundary between persons.

§ 4.4 HOW BIZARRE IS NOZICK’S TIE?

Nozick would not actually agree that the split-brain example as described
is a tie case. That is, Nozick would not have drawn the conclusion that
neither Y nor Z were X. Nozick, who calls his view the “closest continuer”
view of personal identity, would have claimed that Z—the healthy half-
brain in the original body—is the same person as the pre-operation person,
X. This is because Z is a closer continuer of X than is Y, the diseased half-
brain in the woman’s body. Z and Y both have half of the original brain; but
Z has both half the original brain and the whole original body and so is the
original person. On Nozick’s view, a particular individual, X, at a particular
time is the same person as an individual, Y, at some later time only if Y’s
properties stem from or grow out of X’s properties and no one stands in a closer (or as close) relationship to X as does Y. Thus, on his view, who we are is determined in part not just by facts about us, and by what matters to us, but also by who else exists and what they are like.

Like Parfit, Nozick treats the problem of personal identity as if it were merely a special case of how we construe various other more general sorts of (non-personal) identity relations—for instance, the identities of physical objects and social organizations, whose identities are extrinsic relations. And so, on his view, personal identity, too, should be understood as an extrinsic relation. The sort of extrinsic relation it is depends in part on our personal values: who we are is thus on his view in part determined by what matters to us.

Now, the move from an intrinsic to an extrinsic view of personal identity is a move from an absolute concept of personal identity to a relative one. Substance views, and even intrinsic relational views (such as Bernard Williams’s), are absolute in that they measure personal identity against a scale determined solely by facts internal to the individual organism(s), independently of whatever is going on elsewhere. Extrinsic views, such as Nozick’s, are relative in that they measure personal identity against a scale determined by both internal and external considerations. Thus, in an Empty Individualist View such as Nozick’s, whether you become a certain future someone or fail to become that someone may or may not depend on others. On an Absolute View such as the old-fashioned substance view (and even later intrinsic relational views such as Williams’s), whether you become a certain future person or instead fail to become that person does not depend on others. We can disagree with Nozick and Parfit and agree with Williams that personal identity is an intrinsic relation. However, we can disagree with Williams and agree with Nozick and Parfit that personal identity is determined in part by what matters to us so long as what matters to us is what really matters (and on my view what really matters is identity). Thus Open individualism, although opposed to elements of both the Absolute and Relative views, allows us to accept the most salient features of both while avoiding the pitfalls of both.

For instance, on some Empty Individualist Views, such as Nozick’s and Parfit’s, who I am does depend on others and this has some very odd consequences. Suppose you are Y, the diseased half-brain in the woman’s body. You then are not the same person as X, the original, pre-operation whole-brained person. Z, the other half of the original brain, is person X, since Z is located in the original body and is thus X’s closest continuer. It
would seem to follow from Nozick’s theory that if the doctors put you—Y, the diseased half-brain—back into the original body, then you would cease to exist and the diseased brain’s thoughts would now become the thoughts of the original person, X. Then, if the process were reversed, and the diseased half-brain were put back into the woman’s body, you would resume your existence.

Suppose that during this operation you recited to yourself Hamlet’s famous soliloquy, “To be or not to be . . .,” and suppose that the surgery was done by an extremely advanced device capable of connecting one half-brain to a body, then disconnecting it and connecting a different half-brain in its place, once every a second. According to the boundaries specified by Nozick’s theory, the identity of the person speaking the soliloquy would change several times during the soliloquy: the person who thinks “To be,” would be a different person from the one who thinks “or not to be,” in spite of it being the same half-brain that recites the words.

Or, suppose that you—Y, the diseased half-brain—during the sixty-times-a-minute operation of splicing and unsplicing the neurons between you and the body are working on some technical problem in logic. Are we really to believe, as Nozick would apparently have us believe, that during the mental activity of working out the problem you fluctuate in and out of existence?

Perhaps the deep truth is that, in such a case, you would fluctuate in and out of existence. But if upon viewing this example we judge that what really matters most to your continued existence does not fluctuate in and out of existence, then this is some reason for thinking it reasonable to suppose that, all else being equal, you do not fluctuate out of existence. In considering this example we can conclude that what really matters most does not fluctuate. We need not as yet speculate about what this is but, rather, merely suggest that in this case it is more reasonable to suppose that what matters has been preserved and thus that you survive, with identity, in spite of the bordered individualizations.

According to Open Individualism, we could thus claim that wherever the living, thinking brain (or half-brain) goes, there goes the person. And if the two halves of a brain go to two different places, there goes the person—to two different places at the same time. This of course leads to other difficulties, each of which we shall consider in turn. And it is a long way from Open Individualism. But let us continue, one step at a time, by asking, first, whether the individualizations and identifications sustained by the continued existence of the same physical brain is what really matters as a metaphysical boundary for the identification of, and the non-identity
§ 4.5 CAN TWO DIFFERENT BRAINS BE THE SAME PERSON?

We can perform thought experiments with which we can call into question even more dramatically the Brain Border as a metaphysical boundary between persons—as an excluder of Open Individualism. For instance, we imagine a case in which no transfer of any bodily organ or of any physical material occurs but about which our intuitions say the person has survived. Sydney Shoemaker offers us one such case by what he calls a “brain-state transfer procedure” (“BST procedure” for short), in which a person’s brain state—the information containing all the memories, psychology, etc., of the original brain—is transferred to a different brain and body while the original brain and body are destroyed:

Imagine a society living in an environment in which an increase in some sort of radiation has made it impossible for a human body to remain healthy for more than a few years. Being highly advanced technologically, the society has developed the following procedure for dealing with this. For each person there is a stock of duplicate bodies, cloned from cells taken from that person and grown by an accelerated process in a radiation-proof vault, where they are then stored. Periodically a person goes into the hospital for a “body-change.” This consists in his total brain-state being transferred to the brain of one of his duplicate bodies. At the end of the procedure the original body is incinerated. We are to imagine that in this society going in for a body-change is as routine an occurrence as going to have one’s teeth cleaned is in ours. It is taken for granted by everyone that the procedure is person-preserving. One frequently hears remarks like “I can’t meet you for lunch on Tuesday, because that is the day for my body-change; let’s make it Wednesday instead.” All of the social practices of the society presuppose that the procedure is person-preserving. The brain-state recipient is regarded as owning the property of the brain-state donor, as being married to the donor’s spouse, and as holding whatever offices, responsibilities, rights, obligations, etc. the brain-state donor held. If it is found that the brain-state donor had committed a crime, everyone regards it as just that the brain-state recipient should be punished for it. [Personal Identity, pp. 108-109]

Now, supposing that materialism is true, and that the people in the imagined society know this; would it be wrong for them to consider the BST-transfer procedure as person-preserving? Shoemaker answers:

There is no clear sense in which they can be said to be mistaken . . . . If we confronted such a society, there would, I think, be a very strong case for saying that what they mean by “person” is
such that the BST-procedure is person-preserving (using “person” in their sense). And, what goes with this, it would be very hard to maintain that they are being irrational when, being under no misconception concerning matters of fact, they willingly submit themselves to the BST-procedure. But there would also be a strong reason for saying that what they mean by “person” is what we mean by it; they call the same things persons, offer the same sorts of characterizations of what sorts of things persons are, and attach the same kinds of social consequences to judgments of personal identity - i.e., personal identity has with them the same connections with moral responsibility, ownership of property, etc. as it does with us. But if they are right in thinking that the BST-procedure is person-preserving, and if they mean the same by “person” as we do, then it seems that we ought to regard the BST-procedure as person-preserving. [p. 109]

Regarding the BST-procedure as person-preserving is another way of performing a Physiological Dissolve, since

the BST-procedure does not involve the transfer of any bodily organ, or of any matter at all, from the one body to the other. All that is transferred, it is natural to say, is “information.” [p. 110]

That is, the BST-procedure is an example in which X at time $t_1$ is the same person as Y at $t_2$ even though X and Y are not the same physiological brain; X’s brain was fried and fed to the BST engineer’s pet alligator after the transfer of the information—Y’s was not. Furthermore, if someone objects to our imagining such cases on the grounds that they are not encountered in ordinary, everyday survival, we could respond by asking why ordinary, everyday physiological continuity should be granted any privileged status as opposed, say, to physiological continuities that will, or could be, exemplified in the distant future. Why this heavy attachment to the status quo? Wittgenstein, for instance, wrote:

Under what circumstances do we say: “This is the same person whom I saw an hour ago?” Our actual use of the phrase “the same person” and of the name of a person is based on the fact that many characteristics which we use as criteria for identity coincide in the vast majority of cases. . . . for the ordinary use of the word “person” is what one might call a composite use suitable under the ordinary circumstances. If I assume, as I do, that these circumstances are changed, the application of the term “person” or “personality” has thereby changed; and if I wish to preserve this term and give it a use analogous to its former use, I am at liberty to choose between many uses, that is, between many different kinds of analogy. One might say in such a case that the term “personality” hasn’t got one legitimate heir only. [Blue and Brown Books, pp. 61-62]

(We will consider the Personality Dissolve, and other Psychological Dissolves, in full detail in Chapter 6.) What about ties in the BST-example? As in the split-brain example, we can imagine “fission” occurring; something goes wrong and instead of only one duplicate there
are two. In that case, there would be two contemporaneously existing people who are alike in every respect, each with two hemispheres containing the exact same information and with bodies that are atom-for-atom perfectly alike. This would be a much closer tie than in the split-brain example as we described it. What would we say about this case?

You have just gone in for your yearly body change. You step into a chamber where you are hooked up to an inert but perfect duplicate body. As you close your eyes, your present brain-state is transferred into the duplicate who experiences what appears as a sudden shift in perspective over a few feet and believes himself to now be looking through the eyes of a new body while the old body goes inert.

When you, the BST-produced person, arrives home, however, you find a message on the answering machine. You turn it on and hear what sounds like your own voice:

“Darling—went in for a body change but something went wrong with the BST-transfer device—to top it off, someone stole my car! Anyway, I’ll be home shortly.”

The message is for your wife. And it sounds as if you sent it. But you didn’t send it—nor was your car stolen, since you drove it home. You call the BST-transfer institute to find out what’s going on; they apologize, saying that they have been having problems with one of their engineers, a former philosophy professor who was dismissed from the university on grounds of moral turpitude, who rigged the BST device to transfer brain states into more than one replica body. Moments later, the door opens, and there you stand, apparently face-to-face with yourself. Now, how many persons are there in the room—one or two?

Such considerations have led some writers to abandon Closed Individualism by dropping the single continuous entity and intrinsic features assumptions, as has been the case with Nozick, Shoemaker, Parfit, and others. Nozick, for instance, would claim that there are two persons there because, since we have supposed that both persons are the product of the BST transfer device, neither is closer to the original than the other. Thus since we have a perfect tie and, according to Nozick, the Spatial Border must be preserved as a metaphysical Boundary buttressed with the tie condition, neither person is identical to the original person.

But how important is it that the Spatial Border be accorded the (metaphysical and metapsychological) significance to be viewed as an individuating Boundary between persons? It cannot be merely to hold on to Closed Individualism; personal identity “puzzles” such as the one just
described suggest that there is something deeply wrong with Closed Individualism and that some sort of departure from Closed Individualism toward a more Open View would thus seem to be required anyway.

Nozick, Parfit and others depart from Closed Individualism by inventing theories that deny, with varying degrees, the single continuous entity, intrinsic features and, as we shall see, the survival and identity assumptions. For instance, Parfit, Nozick, and Shoemaker claim that because of the fission cases identity is not what matters primarily in survival. But one can abandon Closed Individualism either by abandoning the single continuous entity and intrinsic features assumptions (and thus preserving the metaphysical and metapsychological significance of the Spatial Boundary and, with it, the individuation and separateness of persons assumption) or by abandoning the individuation and separateness of persons assumption (and thus dissolving the metaphysical and metapsychological significance of the Spatial Boundary by demoting it to status of Border but preserving the other three assumptions). At the same time we can believe that identity is what matters primarily in survival, and Open Individualism preserves this. Of the available views, then, Open Individualism may turn out to be the more conservative!

Nozick, Parfit, and others take the first way without ever seriously considering the second. (Parfit, however, comes very close to abandoning the view that the Spatial Border is a Boundary between persons, as we shall see in the next chapter.) Perhaps the reason they do not consider dropping the individuation and separateness of persons assumption is that this would be too bizarre. But I doubt this is the case, since their views, as we have already seen and shall see again in more detail, have at least as bizarre implications for personal identity as does my view. That is, I claim that the implications of their departure from Closed Individualism—such as that who you are, your personal identity, is at least in part determined by what is going on elsewhere in other parts of the universe—are as bizarre (or at least nearly as bizarre, though perhaps even more bizarre) as dissolving the Spatial Boundary. But how can the Spatial Boundary be dissolved without absurdity?
NOTES

2 “Survival and Identity”
3 “Sperry on Consciousness: A Critical Appreciation”
4 D.M. Mackay in Shalom’s The Body/Mind Conceptual Framework, p. 370.
5 See Sperry’s “A Reply to Professor Pucetti,” pp. 145-46, and Shalom’s The Body/Mind Conceptual Framework, footnote, where Shalom writes: “In a paper which Dr. Sperry kindly sent me, it appears that the ambiguity . . . has led him to adopt pantheism as a solution.” The present work, which as I have already commented suggests a sort of Enlightened (rather than problematical) e.g. IF (independence friendly) Solipsism, might thus add philosophical support to Sperry’s musings about the possibility (and perhaps necessity) of pantheism.
6 Or we can imagine that what some theorists believe—that the brain functions holographically—is true. In that case, any small piece of the brain might, like any small piece of a hologram, “contain the whole picture.”
7 See Eccles’s The Self and Its Brain, pp. 330-333.
8 Denying that X and Y are the same person would be especially difficult for a functionalist like Shoemaker who seems to think that functionalism, as a by-product, should solve the problem of personal identity.
9 “A sort of hobgoblin . . . supposed to devour naughty children; hence, generally, any imaginary being invoked by nurses to frighten children.” Oxford Shorter English Dictionary, as quoted by Dennett in Elbow Room, p. 4.
10 Discussed in much more detail in later sections of this and subsequent chapters.
I need not assume that my Replica on Mars is someone else... I can believe that I do now have another stream of consciousness, of which, in this stream, I am now unaware. And if it helps, I can take this view about my Replica.

Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*

§ 5.1 CAN ONE PERSON BE TWO DIFFERENT HUMAN BEINGS?

We can now begin to see what, given the various types of (real) Physical Border between us, it would mean to say that you and I are the same person. Recall John Locke’s distinction, which he illustrates with his prince/cobbler example, between the identity of a man (i.e., of a human being, an animal) and the identity of a person. A particular human being’s identity involves, according to Locke, the identity of an animal; a particular person’s identity does not. Thus, the particular human being that gets the conscious memories of the prince is according to Locke the same person, but not the same human being, as the prince. In other words, Locke would agree that the physical borders individuating one particular human being from another do not themselves signify the metaphysical boundaries (the identities) of persons; that is, without specifying what a person is, we can with Locke claim that the individuation of physical bodies is not metaphysically equivalent to the individuation of persons (without thereby necessarily accepting Locke’s positive thesis). Thus we can say without absurdity that even though I, a person, from my present point of view exist within the borders of this physical organism which I call, “my body,” I am not necessarily bound by these borders because it is not contradictory to hold that a person is a physical human body and yet is not identical to a physical body. As Shoemaker notes,

In taking this view one can allow that there is a sense of “is” in which a person is an animal. But this will not be the “is” of predication or of identity; it will be, perhaps, the sort of “is” we have in “The statue is a hunk of bronze” - it will mean something like “is composed of the very same stuff
In other words, although some border, B, can be a border both to X (a person) and to Y (a body), B may be the boundary of Y without being the boundary of X. To say, then, (1) “Kolak is body Y,” is to trace along these physical borders (Kolak’s body) and to say, (2) “Kolak is person X,” is also to trace along these physical borders, but these two border-tracings, (1) and (2), signify different boundaries.

Similarly, Parfit notes that the “is” in “a statue is a piece of bronze,” is not the is of identity. A statue and a piece of bronze are not one and the same thing. This is shown by the fact that, if we melt the statue, we destroy the statue but do not destroy the piece of bronze. Such a statue is composed of a piece of bronze. [Reasons and Persons, p. 211]

In other words, the borders of the statue and the borders of the bronze are coextensive but the borders that are the boundaries of the statue are not coextensive with the boundaries of the bronze. Shoemaker writes:

So two things, the statue and the hunk of bronze, can occupy the same place and share the same matter and the same non-historical properties . . .. The suggestion is that a person “is” an animal, not in the sense of being identical to one, but in the sense of sharing its matter with one. [Personal Identity, p. 113]

Thus given the alternatives, it is not absurd to suppose that one person can exist as two different human beings. We could understand this by saying that the boundaries of personal identity are not determined (fixed by) the physiological borders of a particular human being’s identity. And, furthermore, we can claim, if one and the same person can be two different human beings—one human being at one time and another human being at another time (as is also suggested by the BST example [§4.5]—then we are only a step away from accepting that one and the same person can be two different human beings at the same time. And here we are using “be” to signify “identical with,” in the sense that border B, which signifies both the individuation and separateness (determines the boundaries) of human being H1 and human being H2, does not necessarily signify the individuation and separateness of person P1 and P2, even though:

\(1\) P1 = H1
(2) \( P2 = H2 \)
(3) \( P1 = P2 \)
(4) \( H1 \neq H2. \)

This seems impossible, unless we understand the “=” in (1) and (2) to mean “share the same matter with,” and in (3) and (4) to mean, “is identical with.”

In other words, we can believe a person is a human being only in the sense that I, a person, share matter with a human being, this physiological and psychological locus to which I appear to be conjoined exclusively of all others. By “share matter with” I mean that I, this person who I am, and this human being, this physiology and psychology, occupy, roughly, the same positions such that one—the person—consists in the other—the human being. Thus “Kolak is a person,” and “Kolak is a human being,” are both true, but the first proposition signifies the boundaries of Kolak (for instance, I am not the Andromeda Galaxy, I am not the pebble, etc.), the second signifies the borders of Kolak: I, a person, am a particular human being, \( H \), without being bound by the borders of \( H \). Thus, the fact that there exist a plurality of numerically distinct human beings, each of whom at the present moment is experiencing different sensations, emotions, and thoughts, these distinct physiological and psychological individuations do not necessarily signify the existence of a plurality of persons. This (pointing to myself) is one human being, that (pointing to you) is another, but—in spite of there being these two different animals—it is possible to claim, without contradiction, that I am you.

Similarly, the reason we need not believe, for instance, that you and I are different persons is that we need not believe that the physiological and psychological borders delineated by the borders of human beings, per se—whether over time (as in the case of this body, 5’ 9” tall, weighing 155 pounds, here-and-now, and that body, 12” tall, weighing eight pounds, back there-and-then at “my” birth) or over space (as in the case of this body here and now [mine] and that body there and now [yours])—are necessarily boundaries between persons. In and of itself, this may seem extraordinary but what we have seen thus far is that it is neither incomprehensible nor absurd. The view that a person can in some significant sense survive as more than one human being is already accepted by many philosophers as not only possible, in varying degrees, but, also, as the best answer to the various puzzles. Some philosophers claim that a person surviving as more than one human being is possible (and is the best explanation) only in cases
where the change is gradual, as in the case of ordinary continuities in life. Others claim it is possible (and is the best explanation) even when the change is all at once, so that a person (or, at least, everything that matters) survives something like a BST procedure, where the survival is best interpreted either as one person having survived across contemporaneous Physiological and Spatial Borders constituted by two different living animals, or (in cases of fission) as everything that matters having survived across the borders (without identity, since in the Empty Individualist View ties destroy identity). There are many other issues involved and I intend to argue for the preference of the interpretation that a person can survive, with identity, as a plurality of contemporaneously existing human beings on the grounds that in survival it is identity that matters primarily. But, for now, it will be enough to see, at least initially, how Open Individualism could be true in spite of the fact that there exist many different human beings.

In ordinary language, of course, “person” and “human being” are often used interchangeably but the point is that there is the difference that proper language should track. What matters is not which word or words we use (which sounds we choose to stand for what) but that we make distinctions that denote, as best we can determine, real distinctions in the world. And since there are many cases in which one would wish to refer to a particular human being, an animal, without referring to the person who is that animal, our language should make this possible by tracking the distinction. (There are a slew of other logical possibilities—future robots, extra-terrestrials, God, and so on—which suggest “a person is a human being” is not an a priori truth.)

The distinction between “human being” and “person” may seem a departure from an essential feature of our ordinary view of what a person is. But this is merely due to the fact that, like Inaudians (§3.6) who always see a particular sound structure associated uniquely with a particular physical tape, ordinarily all we ever see is a constant conjunction between a particular person and a particular human being. What is considered essential in ordinary usage, in this case, does not track what is really essential. And so, for instance, the fact that sometimes we use “human being” and “person” interchangeably is in this case metaphysically and metapsychologically insignificant. We are trying to answer the philosophical question of what the true nature of personal identity is, not the question of how words are used. And sometimes we use “human being” to refer to ourselves as persons (i.e., to the self-conscious being, aware of its identity and its continued existence over time) and sometimes to refer to
some particular property of ourselves that does not belong essentially to us as persons but to some other aspect of ourselves, such as some element of the exclusively conjoined physiological and psychological bundle. This is a weakness not of any particular view but of our (conceptually problematic) ordinary view and so we must disambiguate our usage if we wish to construct a new and more coherent view.

By analogy, consider how we might say, for instance, after seeing a friend whom we knew twenty tears ago in High School, “He’s no longer the same person.” What we mean is, “That person there now, one and the same person we knew back in High School, now has a completely different personality.” Equating personality with person is like equating persona with person and also like equating human being with person. In such cases—whether saying “Jones is a particular human being,” or “Jones is a particular personality”—properly speaking, I claim, we should understand the “is” in the constitutive sense (i.e., “Jones is constituted in that matter,” and “Jones is constituted in that personality”). Such a constitutional relation is not necessarily all-inclusive; the whole of Jones need not be constituted in such-and-such a bundle of physical elements nor in such-and-such a bundle of mental elements.

Thus, when we say, “John Smith is that human being over there” we mean that there is a collection of coexisting qualities such as “white-skinned,” “thin-haired,” “skinny” “knowledgeable,” “self-conscious,” “lives in Princeton,” and so on. Some of these qualities are human-being specific (that is, they arise because the person is an animal and these are properties of that particular animal, that human being), while other properties may be person-specific (that is, they arise because that animal is a person and these are properties of that person).

For instance, if John Smith gained a lot of weight and had a liver, lung, heart and kidney transplants, plastic surgery to restructure his face, and so on (or there was a complete change in physiology using a BST procedure), the person, Smith, would not have, necessarily, thereby lost his personal identity. Like the statue and the heap of bronze, that person and that particular physiology occupy the same place and share the same matter, etc. On the ordinary view of persons, throughout these changes, the person who is John Smith would still be there.

On the other hand, suppose Smith went into a deep coma and ceased forever to be conscious. In that case the human animal would still be alive, existing, as skinny as ever, hooked up to a lung machine and still breathing. But he, the person who is John Smith, would no longer exist there (except
in a trivial sense). We can even imagine a strange and unusual sort of coma that left the physiology and personality intact without the conscious experiencer being there: the physiology would be in a sort of seizure, moving, talking, and sounding like the personality ordinarily identified as Smith without anyone being there, conscious, inside that personality and that physiology. We need not beg any functionalist objections here; we are simply saying that just as a computer animator could generate a facsimile of Smith such that we could recognize the simulated character as the personality of Smith the physicist rather than, say, Jones the comedian, we can imagine such a phenomenon occurring not in a computer but in an actual human brain. That is, if the computer can simulate (sans person) the personality character traits recognizable as those ordinarily accorded to Smith, without any conscious experiencer having to be programmed into that system, it stands to reason that a human brain could run these same personality character traits, sans person, that is, without the presence of the conscious experiencer who, ordinarily, is taken to exist in that system. Or, a good writer can capture the essence of Smith’s personality in a story that, when read, in the readers mind there is the feeling of the presence of Smith, even though smith is not actually present. We would thus, if Smith went into such an unusual coma, where the organism was “simulating” Smith’s personality without Smith actually being present, recognize both the human being—by its shape—and the personality—by its “psychological contours”—and yet, sadly, lament that the person Smith is not present in that [comatose but moving] physiology and [comatose but “moving”] personality. Indeed, we can imagine the human organism that used to be the person John Smith now flitting about, completely blind to itself and to its surroundings such that we would have to restrain the organism so that it did not hurt itself.

Thus, “John Smith is to the left of Paul Jones” does not automatically imply diversity of person; it tracks merely the fact that there are two (human) animals present: it traces the individuating borders of human beings. Suppose, for instance, that you, P1, are John Smith and I, P2, am Paul Jones. What would have to be established, if I ≠ Smith, is that

1) there is some property, P, that I have, which
2) if I did not have P, I would cease to exist, and
3) Smith does not have property P.

Out of the present analysis of the nature of our borders and boundaries there are emerging coherent philosophical doubts about whether (1), (2) and (3), together, hold and, furthermore, whether there is some property that meets
all three conditions. Hence while there are (real) borders between Jones and Smith, we need not highlight any of them into metaphysical and metapsychological boundaries between the referent of “I” who, on two separate occasions, in two different locations, in two different bodies, utters “I am Jones” and “I am Smith.”

According to Open Individualism, I am the person who is Jones and I am the person who is Smith and so Jones and Smith are one and the same person, numerically identical. I exist as one and the same (metaphysical and metapsychological) entity, personally identical, identified as these two animals each of which is (constitutively) non-identical to the other; that is, the animals consist in different exclusively conjoined physiological and psychological bundles—consisting, for instance, at this moment, in numerically different atoms of carbon and oxygen, numerically different sensations of pleasure and pain, numerically different thoughts, and so on—while I, the person, (metaphysically and metapsychologically) consist in both of the physiologically and psychologically individuated loci of motion. That is the view we are developing.

§ 5.2 THE TELETRANSPORTER

Let us return to our most recent example. Atom-for-atom, you (Y) and your exact double (Z) are indistinguishable from one another. You both think you are X, the person who went in for the BST-procedure, since you both have the same memories, the same character traits, the same personality, and so on. You were both created at the same time by the transfer of the same information from X into your respective numerically distinct but qualitatively indistinguishable physiologies. One major apparent difference between the two of you is that you, (Y), are standing several meters away from your perfect double, (Z). And you are each experiencing a different perspective on the world - for instance, each of your visual fields is slightly different. (Or, more precisely, each of the phenomenal fields within which your visual experience takes place is slightly different while the phenomenal character of your self-images are qualitatively [nearly perfectly] identical, except that you also each have slightly different memories of the last few minutes.) Nor can you hear each other’s thoughts, which are involved in a different “stream of consciousness;” he is still wondering who stole his car; you are about to tell him that you have the car. And so on.

Now, it might be the case that the reason the two of you are not the same
person is that you each have a different stream of consciousness, slightly different memories, etc. But though we will, in turn, consider in detail each one of these other types of Psychological Border, these are not the borders we are presently considering. Presently we are concerned only with the question of whether two qualitatively indistinguishable but numerically distinct psycho-physiological bundles—Y and Z—are two different persons merely due to their being constituted in numerically distinct physiologies and psychologies such that they are separated by a greater amount of space between each other than they are within themselves.

Notice that if someone believes that merely being numerically different physiologies is enough to make you (Y) a different person from your perfect double (Z), then this person would also have to believe that the BST-procedure itself, even when it is working properly (without fission), is not a way of continuing to live but a way of dying. But consider a slightly different example, where something like the BST-procedure is used not just to preserve the life of a person, but as a means of travel from one place to another. For instance, familiar to most science fiction audiences is the idea of a “teletransporter.” A computerized device analyzes your atomic structure at point A; then, while dispersing your atomic structure, it sends this information to point B, where you “re-materialize” out of new, or at least numerically different, atoms. When this happens in science fiction stories, as for instance when someone “beams up” from a planet’s surface to a spaceship, the crew do not hold funeral rites; they, like the audience, consider this a way of traveling, not of dying. This might of course be wrong for any number of reasons. But there is certainly no logical contradiction in supposing this to be a way of traveling and indeed it is perfectly conceivable, from the standpoint of physics, that we will have such devices in the future. Building “teletransporters” would require some new technology but it would require mostly applying already existing technology in (albeit, at present, technologically impossible) complex new ways.

The idea of traveling between point A and point B via a teletransporter sounds reasonable because we do not tend to think there is anything special about particular electrons such that if you had different electrons than you now have, arranged in exactly the same way as they are now arranged, you would be a different person than the person you now are. Nozick, writing about such an example, remarks:

Consider the mode of long distance travel described in science fiction stories, wherein a person is “beamed” from one place to another. However, the person’s body does not occupy intermediate
places. Either the molecules of the decomposed body are beamed or (truer to the intent of the stories) a fully informative description of the body is beamed to another place, where the body then is reconstituted (from numerically distinct molecules) according to the received information. . . .

... the readers of such stories, and the many viewers of such television programs, calmly accept this as a mode of travel. They do not view it as a killing of one person with the production of another very similar person elsewhere. [Philosophical Explanations, p. 41]

Such intuitions may or may not be correct. But if they are wrong, then on what grounds are they wrong? Is there perhaps something essential to the person that “ordinary” physiological continuity preserves but which the teletransporter case fails to preserve? What is missing? Unless we are willing to posit some “magical” properties to the individual electrons, it cannot be the physical matter of our bodies per se that carries the metaphysical significance so as to make it necessarily true that we must view the case as involving the death of one person and the birth of another; if we are to accord the proper metaphysical significance to these borders, it must be due to some other factor besides the fact that the two bodies are composed of numerically different atoms. Otherwise, we are like the primitive tribesman who refuses to have his photograph taken for fear he will lose his soul; he cares about preserving his image and his cares are to him significant but his cares in this case are metaphysically insignificant: if he understood what was really involved he would not care as he now cares. Caring must track something more than mere superstition and caring about the electrons of which one is constituted when one should be caring about identity, given what we know about such matters, seems inappropriate.

Another way to bring this point out is to suppose that the replica physiology into which your brain-state is transferred is created an instant after your original physiology is destroyed, in such a way that the new physiology is created out of the same atoms as your original physiology. That is, suppose that the atoms of the original physiology are put back together again by the teletransporter or BST-device in exactly the configuration of your original physiology, and the same information is encoded back onto it. We can even imagine this happening in the same place where your original physiology occupied an instant ago. The replica, in other words, is now made out of the same atoms as the original, with the same memories, character traits, etc; if this happened while you were speaking, for instance, you would complete your sentence uninterrupted and no one—not even you—could even in principle tell whether any change had occurred. (Consider the case of the Strange Xerox Machine. When we copy your latest research paper, as the copier makes each copy
we see that it erases the print from the original pages. It is not the fiber of the paper but what is encoded on it that matters for the identity of the manuscript; suppose, even, that the copies are made onto paper that is reconstructed out of the original fibers, in exactly the same configuration, that are destroyed during the brief instant that the photographic image is being picked up from the paper being copied [which is then destroyed] and then re-imaged onto a new piece of paper made from the fibers of the destroyed original."

In that case, from one perspective, your atoms came apart for, say, a billionth of a second and came back together again in exactly the same configuration and in exactly the same spot, with the exact same information encoded in their patterns. Suppose that it turns out that this actually happens, occasionally, in our own universe; that is, the universe occasionally “hiccups” in some spots, so that for one brief instant the atoms of whatever object are in that spot come apart and then come back together again in the exact same configuration. Suppose this just happened to you as you were reading the previous sentence. Are you now a different person from the person who began reading this paragraph? On what grounds—by what boundaries?

It seems extremely odd to suppose that in such a case you would become a different person from who you just a moment ago were. The reason it seems odd is that it seems to be a case in which everything that matters to preserving your personal identity is there on both sides of the border—before and after the Cosmic Hiccup. If that is not identity, what is? Perhaps nothing. But then there is no way to tell. It is the same bundle of matter and the same bundle of psychology. (Suppose I hit the letter “I” with the cursor positioned on the word “I” on my computer screen, with the “insert on” toggle off. Is the “I” now [after hitting the letter “I” on the keyboard] the same “I” as the “I” that was there before I hit the keypad? Suppose there were no way to tell what the computer actually does in a case like that. There may be an instant where it deletes the one “I,” so that (undetectable to the naked eye) there is during that instant a blank space, and then another “I” appears. It may just leave the first “I” in place. Or the two may be conjoined without any detectable gap. Indeed, the images on the screen themselves consist of a flickering series of electrons and so, in a sense, looking at the “I” and doing nothing is a way of generating an entire sequence of “I”’s. That is, in reality the computer screen replaces each “I” with each subsequent electron scannings, whether I hit the keyboard or not. When I contemplate this question I thus find that in a case like this the
posited border does not matter—it does not suffice as a boundary that, necessarily, destroys the identity of the “I.” And if it turned out that the universe is in some sense like the computer screen [indeed, as quantum mechanics suggests, all objects consist, in actuality, of a series of non-continuous, flickering quantum fluctuations], then understanding identity in this way may be, to borrow a phrase from Nozick, the best Parmenides can do in a Heraclitean universe. [Strange consequences follow, of course, but they follow on any coherent view, as we shall see yet again.]

Perhaps, however, if it is not the particular material per se that makes Y and Z different persons, it is the Spatial Border between them that makes the crucial difference. That is, when the BST-procedure or the teletransporter function normally, the existence of Y, a perfect duplicate of X, follows immediately after the disappearance of Y (and the “switch” occurs in the same spatial position), and this is why we are willing to believe that Y is the same person as X even though Y is not constituted in the exact same atoms as is X. But in the case when something goes wrong and Y does not come into existence in the place of X but alongside X, there is the additional fact of X and Y being separated by a Spatial Border.

In other words, since we have seen reasons why, by itself, Y and Z being constituted in different physical material does not necessarily individuate Y and Z into different persons, perhaps there is something special about the Spatial Border per se that makes (Y) a different person from a perfect double, (Z).

§5.3 APPARENT EXCLUDER (4): THE SPATIAL BORDER

There are several problems, however, with supposing that the Spatial Border is sufficiently significant (metaphysically and metapsychologically) to necessitate delineating along it a boundary between persons. For one thing, to claim that it is the controlling of spatially distinct loci of motion that makes two persons where before there was one would be to draw along the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border a boundary between persons, which as we have already seen is deeply problematic. Also, there is the problem of the time-travel example and of Dennett’s disembodied brain controlling a body across the Spatial Border. There is also the problem of how to understand the fact that I exist across the extensive and numerous Spatial Borders within this body.

There are, however, far more crucial difficulties. Let us suppose that the
difference between you (Y) and your perfect double (Z), is that the two of you are separated by the Spatial Border. There are, of course, the additional borders already mentioned—such as that you (Y) and your double (Z) are currently having slightly different experiences and thoughts within your streams of consciousness, giving rise in each of you to a steadily increasing store of new (and respectively different) memories. Since it is important that we stick to one border at a time (lest our intuitions flip-flop back and forth without our knowing why or exactly what it is we are actually considering), and since we will consider the various types of Psychological Border next, let us see if we can for the moment minimize our attention away from all the other borders between Y and Z and focus on the Spatial Border so as to test whether this and only this border is significant enough to create two persons where before there was one—whether we must necessarily draw along the Spatial Border the boundary between persons and thereby understand Y and Z to be different persons.

Let us return to Dennett’s example. Dennett supposes that when his brain is taken out of his body and put into the vat, where it is hooked up via radio links to his body in a way that makes it appear to him as if he were still in his body, the technicians had,

constructed a computer duplicate of my brain, reproducing both the complete information processing structure and the computational speed of my brain in a giant computer program. After the operation . . . they had run this computer system and [Dennett’s brain] side by side. The incoming signals from [Dennett’s body] were sent simultaneously to [Dennett’s brain’s] transceivers and to the computer’s array of inputs. And the outputs from [Dennett’s brain] were not only beamed back to . . . [Dennett’s] body; they were recorded and checked against the simultaneous output of the computer program . . . . Over days and even weeks, the outputs were identical and synchronous, which of course did not prove that they had succeeded in copying the brain’s functional structure, but the empirical support was greatly encouraging. [Brainstorms, pp. 319-320]

Dennett imagines that by throwing a switch he can shift the frequency of the transceivers on his body so that either they receive inputs from his brain or from the computer program. Since he is supposing that the (incredibly advanced) computer program duplicate of his brain and his actual brain are running in perfect synchronization, what happens when he throws the switch is that,

with the exception of the transitional click, I could detect no trace of a difference. I could switch in mid-utterance, and the sentence I had begun speaking under the control of [Dennett’s brain] was finished without a pause or hitch of any kind under the control of [the computer program]. I
had a spare brain . . . [Brainstorms, p. 320]

Now, there are of course in this example several questionable assumptions. For instance, we might wonder whether a computer program could ever be “conscious” in this way; but if we substitute for the computer the BST-procedure, so that the second brain is a perfect, atom-for-atom exact replica of Dennett’s original brain, we can avoid this problem. A much more serious difficulty is that,

[The computer program] is supposed to run in perfect synchronicity with [Dennett’s brain] for years on end without the benefit of any interactive, corrective links between them. This would not just be a great technological triumph; it would verge on the miraculous. . . . Even if we had such a brainlike computer, its sheer size and complexity would make the prospect of independent synchronic behavior virtually impossible. Without the synchronized and identical processing in both systems, an essential feature of the story would have to be abandoned. Why? Because the premise that there is only one person with two brains (one a spare) depends on it. [italics mine, The Mind’s I, p. 230]

Why, though, does the supposition that there is only one person with two brains depend on the synchronized and identical processing in both brains? Presumably because Dennett assumes, as do many others, “Y and Z have different streams of consciousness” entails, necessarily, “Y and Z are different persons.” The reader may recall our initial criticism of this supposition in the Dream Analog; in any case, we will see what happens if we draw along this border the boundary between persons, again, in Chapter Six where we will perform the Unity of Consciousness Dissolve. Presently, what we are concerned with is whether the Spatial Border between two disembodied brains running in perfect sync, by itself, signifies the existence of two different persons. Dennett, it would seem, would claim that it does not:

By the way, the two positions on the switch are intentionally unmarked, so I never have the faintest idea whether I am switching from [the computer brain] to [Dennett’s brain] or vice versa. (Some of you may think that in this case I really don’t know who I am, let alone where I am. But such reflections no longer make much of a dent on my essential Dennettness, on my own sense of who I am. If it is true that in one sense I don’t know who I am then that’s another one of your philosophical truths of underwhelming significance.) [Brainstorms, p. 322]

Dennett asks, “Where am I?” and in his example the best answer, it seems, is: at both places at the same time. He is one person with two brains (and two minds). The places are different but the person is the same. And if we can accept as coherent Dennett’s claim that two disembodied brains,
separated by space but running in sync, are the same person, then we have here not only a denial of the Physiological Border as a boundary between persons, but also the dissolution, on his view, of the Spatial Boundary (since we can see how it is possible that a person can exist as one and the same person on both sides of a Spatial Border). Anyone troubled by accepting Dennett’s thought experiment can imagine a less exotic version in Puccetti’s understanding of the Split Brain case; recall that, according to Puccetti, your left and right hemisphere are, in a sense, like Dennett’s original brain and Dennett’s computer simulation brain: under ordinary circumstances both physical realizers are realizing the same psychology and only when they “cross” can you notice that, even as you read this, you are, on Puccetti’s interpretation of the facts, “already” two.

§ 5.4 FISSION WITH IDENTITY: ARE YOU AN OPEN INDIVIDUAL?

Do the sorts of fission cases we have thus far considered destroy personal identity? Parfit, for instance, in the most recent version of his view, claims they do:

In the imagined case where I divide . . . personal identity cannot take a branching form. I and the two resulting people cannot be one and the same person. Since I cannot be identical with two different people, and it would be arbitrary to call one of these people me, we can best describe the case by saying that neither will be me. [Reasons and Persons, p. 263]

And yet, at the same time, Parfit claims that

Some people would regard division as being as bad, or nearly as bad, as ordinary death. This reaction is irrational. We ought to regard division as being about as good as ordinary survival. [p. 261]

Clearly, on the views of Parfit, Nozick, Shoemaker and a few others, fission is construed as preserving, at least some sort of, survival. The reason it can according to them be so construed is both because I, a person, can survive without identity or, as Parfit intends for his view to be understood, that while the resulting relation may not be one of survival, as we ordinarily understand it, it is as good as ordinary survival and so—although I do not survive—what matters does survive. The reason survival without identity is according to Parfit as good as ordinary actual survival is that, in Parfit’s (Reductionist) version of Empty Individualism, even in ordinary cases of moment-to-moment existence, identity is not what matters. On Nozick’s
(Closest Continuer) version of Empty Individualism, the solution to the problem is achieved by accepting the idea that identity is an extrinsic rather than intrinsic relation and thus that you lose your identity the moment there is a tie.

Many philosophers believe that survival without identity (i.e., that identity does not matter), or that personal identity is an extrinsic, not an intrinsic relation, is too hard to swallow. To these philosophers, both or either versions of Empty Individualism (Nozick’s or Parfit’s) appear unacceptable, even absurd. We need not consider this aspect of the Empty Individualist Views as absurd. But loss of identity is not the only possible response to fission. Part of the argument for Open Individualism is that an at least equally plausible response to fission is (contra Parfit) that identity is what matters in survival and that (contra Nozick) identity is an intrinsic relation such that (contra not only to both Parfit and Nozick but also contra their critics) a person can survive with identity because personal identity is not bound by individuating borders, such that a person is capable of existing simultaneously at more than one place at a time, independently experiencing each independently conscious first-person point of view.

Is a person incapable of being divided, actually or conceptually, without loss of personal identity? Most philosophers used to think so. Some no longer do. Extraordinary cases of actual division—the split-brain cases and also multiple personality disorder, etc., (to be considered in the next chapter)—and cases of conceptual division—fission through Star-Trek style teletransporters where the pre-fission individual is not destroyed, duplication of bodies and brain, etc.—have convinced them otherwise. However, I argue that such cases do not show what Parfit, Nozick, and other Empty View theorists think they show. Not because a person is incapable of being divided, either actually or conceptually, (as some have already argued but against whom I side with Parfit, Nozick, Shoemaker and others who hold that a person can divide), but, rather, because personal division (whether actual or conceptual) along individuating borders does not necessarily destroy personal identity. What fission shows, I claim, is not that a person is incapable of division (in the above sense) nor that because personal identity is closed under (bound by) our individuating borders a person can survive, without identity but, rather, that because personal identity is not closed under (bound by) our individuating borders a person can survive, with identity, across our individuating borders. In other words, fission cases show not that a person is incapable of division but, rather, just the opposite: what the fission cases show is that I, this very person, can
survive simultaneously as both offshoots, with identity.

As an analog, consider for instance how certain sorts of works of art can exist with identity at more than one place at the same time, where as others cannot. Their individuating borders do not close the identity of lithographs, musical symphonies, novels, etc., whereas their individuating borders do close the identity of original oil paintings, marble statues, performance art, etc. So how do we know which sort of identity ours is—closed or open? Not by the fact that a person can divide (conceptually, that is, in principle, as in the thought experiments, or in actual cases of psychological and/or physiological dissociation). The actual and conceptual possibilities of a person fissioning suggest at least two equally plausible (or equally implausible) alternative interpretations:

1. **personal identity is closed** under known individuating and identifying borders, such that personal identity across our borders is impossible
2. **personal identity is open** under known individuating and identifying borders, such that personal identity across our borders is possible.

Confronted with the problem of fission, Parfit chooses (1) without considering the possible development of (2) and in so doing jumps to the conclusion that personal identity is not what matters primarily in survival. I claim that confronted with the problem of fission, (2) is an equally plausible choice, because personal identity—like certain sorts of works of art whose identity is not closed by their individuating and identifying borders such that they can exist, with identity, at more than one place at the same time—is, likewise, open, such that a person can be at more than one place at the same time. (We take up the more specific issue of locality vs. nonlocality yet again in Chapter 8).

In other words, in my view what the example of fission shows is that a person is fissionable. But a person might be fissionable such that personal identity is not what matters primarily in personal survival. Choosing (1) as a response to fission in support of the view that identity is not what matters primarily in survival is no more plausible than choosing (2) as a response to fission in support of the view that a person can survive with identity across individuating borders.

Parfit, it seems, is ready to accept that an open identity interpretation of fission (as is required for Open Individualism) cannot be viewed as absurd and, within certain specified boundaries, is even possible. In my view we
can remove the caveat for those additional specified boundaries. To his claim that “the problem with double survival is that it does not fit the logic of identity” we can respond: “the problem with closed identity is that it does not fit the logic of double survival.” We can thus accept, without absurdity, that one numerically identical person can exist, simultaneously and with identity, at multiple places at the same time.

Admittedly, it seems strange to suppose that one and the same person could exist at two different places at the same time. It goes against traditional Closed Individualism. But Closed Individualism is not a viable alternative—it simply cannot answer the puzzles we have been considering. The alternative to dissolving the (metaphysical and metapsychological) significance of the Spatial Boundary which does solve the puzzles (by dissolving identity) also goes against Closed Individualism, and has just as strange consequences for our concept of a person as does demoting the significance of the Spatial (inter-personal) Boundary to that of a (intra-personal) Border. (Again, specific issues having to do with locality vs. nonlocality shall be taken up in Chapter 8.)

The problem that the possibility of fission poses is that if we suppose that you remain the same person across the split-brain operation, BST-procedure, teletransportation, and so on, we can also imagine the original material remaining without being destroyed, so that what we have is two qualitatively similar exclusively conjoined physiologies and psychologies existing contemporaneously where before we had one. Why would you, the (duplicate) survivor, if we consider you identical to the original person when the original physiology and/or psychology is destroyed, not be identical to the original person if the original physiology and/or psychology is not destroyed? Parfit writes:

I would survive if I stood in this very same relation to only one of the resulting people. It is a fact that someone can survive even if half his brain is destroyed. And on reflection it was clear that I would survive if my whole brain was successfully transplanted into my brother’s body. It was therefore clear that I would survive if half my brain was destroyed, and the other half was successfully transplanted . . . my relation to each of the resulting people thus contains everything that would be needed for me to survive as that person. [Reasons and Persons, p. 261]

Given the (real) possibility of fission, we do not have to give up (dissolve) the (metaphysical and/or metapsychological) significance of identity because we can give up (dissolve), instead, the Spatial Boundary. Instead of reasoning as follows,

since fission preserves what matters in ordinary survival, and (by
drawing the boundaries between persons along the Spatial Border)
fission does not preserve identity, then what we have learned is that it is
not identity that matters but something else,
we can reason that
since fission preserves what matters in ordinary survival, and in ordinary
survival what matters is identity, then fission preserves identity and what
we have learned is that the Spatial Boundary is not necessary a boundary
between persons.
In the Dream Analog we imagined experiencing the same scene from two
different points of view at the same time. One difference between the
Dream Analog and the “Real Life” Analog, as already mentioned, is that in
the former we have neither a Physiological Border involved nor an “actual”
Spatial Border, since ordinarily we believe dreams to be “mental images”
which take place, in some appropriate sense, “inside the head” (rather than
“out there” in “real space”). Once we move from “inside the head” to “real
space” we get both physical differentiation (the Physiological Border) and
“actual” spatial separation (the Spatial Border). But it is less of a conceptual
leap from a view in which no spatial separation of identity is possible
(neither across a Phenomenal Space Border nor across a Physical Space
Border, as in Closed Individualism) than from a view in which identity is
possible across phenomenal-space but not necessarily across “physical”
space—and the Dream Analog has already provided us with the second
view. And we have already dissolved the Physiological Border—we have
seen that the various types of Physiological Border need not be viewed as a
metaphysical boundary between persons. We are now contending with the
idea that the Spatial Border must somehow be (metaphysically and
metapsychologically) more significant—that the Spatial Border must be a
Boundary. For instance, consider Nagel’s remark, which is typical of the
way the Spatial Border is highlighted, without argument, to the
metaphysical status of Spatial Boundary:

[The post-branch survivors] cannot both be [the same person]; if they were, [the person] would be
in two places at once, which is absurd. Moreover, if they were both identical with [the same
person], they would be identical with each other, which is also absurd. [Mortal Questions, pp.
238-9]

We might ask: absurd on what grounds—as individuated by what border(s)? We have already seen in the Dream Analog how it is possible
that I, one person, could be experiencing, at the same time, two different
“places” within a phenomenological manifold of experience. Once we remember that what we are watching even now, while awake, is a phenomenal field generated through our brains (in response to external stimuli, we believe), and is not direct perception of physical space and so, again, when we are aware of this it is a small step from seeing how it is possible in the case of “phenomenological manifold” to seeing how it is possible in the case of a “physical manifold.” (And to think that the universe contains “physical manifolds” and “phenomenological manifolds” such that a person can, without absurdity, be at two different places in the latter but not the former is to have a naive and, ultimately, arbitrary bias with regard to what is and what is not absurd.) Indeed, to call it absurd is to claim that what we have conceived of in the Dream Analog and other cases of fission cannot be conceived of, which we have shown is false.

Most “revisionist” theorists such as Nozick and Shoemaker, never seriously question the Spatial Boundary. That is why in the “tie” case, which is the closest we can come to imagining a person being at two different places at the same time, Nozick, as we saw, evokes the “tie ‘boundary’ condition”:

The closest continuer view presents a necessary condition for identity; something at t₂ is not the same entity as x at t₁ if it is not x’s closest continuer. And “closest” means closer than all others; if two things at tₓ tie in closeness to x at t₁, then neither is the same entity as x. [Philosophical Explanations, p. 34]

(If we read “necessary condition” as “boundary condition,” then, on my view, we could say both individuations can be identified as one and the same a person whose identity is not bound by those borders.) Nozick’s view can take account of all the puzzles we have thus far considered, up to and including fission—but in a way that is not necessarily less bizarre than dissolving the Spatial Boundary. For instance, applying Nozick’s view to our split-brain thought experiment, we get the following answer: Z, the half-brain in the original body, is the same person as X because Z (who has half the original brain plus half the body) is a closer continuer of X than is the next likeliest continuer, Y (who has half the original brain and a different body). If, however, Z died on the operating table, then Y would be the closest continuer to X and would therefore become X. Again, such results, Nozick admits, may at first sound utterly bizarre:

However, once we have become used to the idea that whether y at t₂ is (identical with) x at t₁ does not depend only upon the properties and relations of x and y, but depends also upon whether there exists a z of a certain sort (which more closely continues x), then perhaps we can swallow this
Some philosophers such as, most recently, Brian Garrett, have argued that the view that the boundaries of personal identity are determined extrinsically is less absurd than the view that I could be in two different places at the same time. And there is a possible way to construe such views so that the results we have just described could be avoided, for instance, by claiming not that upon Z’s death Y becomes X but, rather, that upon Z’s death Y is the individual who now preserves everything that matters (which, on this version of Empty Individualism, never includes identity). That is Parfit’s view. Before Z’s death, on Parfit’s view, there were two (non-identical) people both of whom preserved everything that matters and now there is only one, Y; if Y had died instead of Z, then Y would be the individual who preserves what matters.

But consider how bizarre these modifications (generated, I claim, by an unwarranted urge to dissolve the importance, i.e., metaphysical significance of identity rather than dissolve the Spatial Boundary) can get. For instance, suppose we live in the society envisioned by Shoemaker, where once a year we go in for a BST-procedure. And suppose, furthermore, that I wanted to kill you but that, ever since my pigeon-torturing days, I have become so repulsed by the thought of drawing blood that I come up with the following clever scheme. I wait until you go in for your physiology-change, I bribe the corrupt engineer, we make two duplicates instead of one and, presto: instead of continuing to exist as a BST-preserved person, either (on Nozick’s version of Empty Individualism) you cease being the person you presently are or, (on Parfit’s version of the Empty Individualist condition that identity is not what matters), the survival that before the addition of the second individual was going on continuously is now suddenly disrupted by the existence of the second individual; survival can go on for a little while but on Parfit’s view will end as the psychological differences increase.

This seems an extremely strange way of killing someone or, even, a strange way of ending survival; would we be willing to prosecute such acts as being murder, for instance? Or, how has what matters here changed by an event that happens elsewhere? Yet such departures from our traditional view of “absolute” persons to a sort of “relational” view, Derek Parfit likens to the shift from Newtonian mechanics to Einsteinian relativity:

Newton believed that any physical event had its particular Space and Time. We now believe that a physical event has its particular spatio-temporal position in virtue of its various relations to the other physical events that occur. . . . We can claim that a particular mental event occurs within
CHAPTER 5

some life in virtue of its relations to the many other mental and physical events which, by being interrelated, constitute this life. [Reasons and Persons, p. 252]

This means, for instance, that since our personal identity is, on this new way of interpreting ourselves, still bound (following the old, closed individual interpretation) by our individuating borders such that a person can exist at only one place at one time, something extremely odd happens in the case of the tie:

How is the tie case to be described on [the closest continuer] view? I do not view a tie as like death; I am no longer there, yet it is a good enough realization of identity to capture my care which attaches to identity. [Reasons and Persons, p. 68]

This seems extremely odd. It is not even clear what Nozick means by this. If I have understood him correctly, however, Nozick means that some time in the future when I won’t be dead (“I do not view a tie as like death,”) I also won’t be there (“I am no longer there,”). But if I am not there, and I am not dead, what state am I in (perhaps some sort of weird existential status accorded to Schrödinger’s Cat or Wigner’s Friend?) According to Nozick, at this future time when there is a perfect tie I will not exist anywhere. This sounds to me very much like being dead. Yet, according to Nozick, I should care about the person similar to me just as if he were me, and that this somehow makes me, in some sense, not dead. Thus if you are X, wondering whether you will survive the operation, the only question you need to ask yourself, according to Nozick and Parfit, is this: Will there be someone after the operation who is similar enough to me? If the answer is Yes, as in the split-brain thought experiment, then a way to put Nozick’s view would be to say:

1) there is survival and,
2) if you are the person involved, whether there is identity will depend on what matters to you.

And one way to put Parfit’s view would be

1) there is survival (without identity) or,
2) you have as good as survived.

Similarly for the “tie” case: since both duplicates are similar enough to you, some sort of survival occurs (but note that this does not commit these theorists to claim that fission shows that you survive in both places, as I claim). On their views in the exact tie case you are not identical with either person (though you could be, on Nozick’s view, so long as it is not a perfect
tie, but not on Parfit’s)—yet in both cases you are not dead, either. Parfit thinks that one way to look at it would be to say that, when fission happens to you,

You will lose your identity. But there are different ways of doing this. Dying is one, dividing is another. To regard these as the same is to confuse two with zero. Double survival is not the same as ordinary survival. But this does not make it death. It is even less like death. [Reasons and Persons, p. 262]

Can this be right? It might be. It certainly solves one puzzle. But it solves one puzzle at the cost of raising others. Let us go back to the BST-example in which I have just “done away” with the original person (or ended what previous to my intervention was a case of survival with identity) by making two replicas instead of just one. If Shoemaker, Nozick and Parfit are right, it would be possible for someone to argue, as Swinburne does, that you could ensure your survival by killing your double, or, perhaps, that in some sense you could even “bring yourself back,” at least in the sense of bringing back a state that is “as good as survival,” or else perhaps re-establish survival with identity; either, on one possible reading of Nozick’s closest continuer view, you (one of the duplicates) could become identical to the person who went in for the BST-procedure (a person who, until the moment you kill your double, you were no longer identical to because of the tie) or, on Parfit’s condition that identity does not matter, re-establish whatever type of survival there had been before the tie and which the tie disrupted.

You could achieve whichever one of these possibilities is the actual state obtained, someone might argue, by killing your double. Swinburne, for instance, writes that if a non-branching condition (like Parfit’s) or a closest continuer condition (like Nozick’s) were true, then, in our split-brain operation,

The way for a man to ensure his own survival is to ensure the non-existence of future persons too similar to himself. Suppose the mad surgeon had told P1 before the operation what he was intending to do . . . P1 is unable to escape the clutches of the mad surgeon, but is nevertheless very anxious to survive the operation. If the empiricist theory in question is correct there is an obvious policy which will guarantee his survival. He can bribe one of the nurses to ensure that the right half-brain does not survive successfully. [“Personal Identity,” p. 237]

It is interesting to note how Shoemaker answers Swinburne’s objection. Shoemaker, like Nozick and Parfit, wants to get out of the difficulty by claiming that the tie case is not, let us say, as bad as death. But since Shoemaker, like Nozick, is working under the basic presupposition of the
Spatial Boundary—that the Spatial Border is, necessarily, a metaphysical boundary between persons—he cannot go as far as to claim that both persons in the tie case are, numerically, the same person. However, if they are not the same person (because of the tie), neither of them can be identical to the original. This, to Shoemaker, too, seems counter-intuitive because it would mean that, apparently, the original person, merely due to the tie (as Parfit so well puts it: “How can a double success be a failure?”), is now dead. So Shoemaker, like Nozick, and even more so like Parfit, as we shall see, ends up almost dissolving the Spatial Boundary. He claims that nonetheless actual death has not taken place so that (using “survival” as a state that in neither literal death nor literal survival) survival has in some (albeit non-literal) sense occurred:

What is at stake here is what it is that we really care about when we care about our own survival and our own future well-being. Swinburne makes the natural assumption that when I want to survive it is essential to the satisfaction of my want that I, the very person who is now wanting this, should exist in the future. But this can be questioned. [Personal Identity, p. 119]

Shoemaker cannot bring himself to accept that he, the very person who wrote that passage, could exist at more than one place at a time. But he can bring himself to accept that at some future time when he, the very person who wrote that passage, no longer exists, there has occurred significant survival. This means, either, that he can in some significant sense survive without being the same person he now is, or that although he cannot survive without being the same person he now is, there can hold between X and Y a relationship that would qualify as “survival” even though X and Y are not identical:

Consider another variant of our half-brain transplant case. Suppose that half of my brain and all of the rest of my body are ridden with cancer, and that my only hope for survival is for my healthy half-brain to be transplanted to another body. There are two transplantation procedures available. The first, which is inexpensive and safe (so far as the prospects of the recipient are concerned) involves first transplanting the healthy hemisphere and then destroying (or allowing to die) the diseased hemisphere that remains. The other, which is expensive and risky (the transplant may not take, or it may produce a psychologically damaged person) involves first destroying the diseased hemisphere and then transplanting the other. Which shall I choose? Notice that if I choose the first procedure there will be, for a short while, two persons psychologically continuous with the original person (me), and therefore that on the non-branching psychological continuity theory the recipient of the healthy hemisphere cannot count as me. If I choose the second procedure, on the other hand, then at no point will the recipient (the post-operative possessor of the healthy hemisphere) have any “competitor” for the status of being me, so it seems that he can count as me
Shoemaker recognizes that it certainly seems right to choose the first procedure. Yet if he chooses the first procedure, according to Shoemaker’s own analysis, the survivor will not be Shoemaker. If he chooses the riskier second procedure, and it is successful, according to Shoemaker’s own analysis, the survivor will be Shoemaker. In the first, “less risky” operation there is, according to Shoemaker’s own analysis, a zero percent chance that he, Shoemaker, will survive. In the second, “more risky” operation there is, according to Shoemaker’s own analysis, perhaps about a fifty-fifty chance that he, Shoemaker, will survive. How can a zero percent chance of surviving as the identical person you are be less risky than a fifty-fifty chance of surviving as the identical person you are? Here, again, is Shoemaker’s answer:

The reason is that whether the future person will be me is in a case like this of no importance to me. [pp. 119-120]

We need not here try to refute Shoemaker’s position on this point, which is that the choice would be less risky, on his view, relative to preserving what (according to him) matters to you. We can agree with Shoemaker that we could choose as he chooses. What I am claiming here is that the conclusion he draws from this—namely, that identity does not matter—does not follow; we would choose the overlap procedure because we believe that we will survive and since we can claim that what actually matters in survival is identity, there is identity across the Spatial Boundary. The bottom-line issue is what matters more—personal identity or the Spatial Boundary? That is, are we more willing to accept

1) dissolving (for now, merely in the tie case) the (metaphysical and metapsychological) significance of the Spatial Boundary, or

2) dissolving identity and accepting that a person can in some sense survive (or, at least as good as survive, in the sense of bringing about a future state of affairs that is not as bad as death) without identity.

Is (1) any more bizarre than (2)? Why? Because we tend to believe that a person cannot be at more than one place at a time? But the alternative asks us to accept the possibility that a person can, in some sense, exist (in the sense that the situation is not as bad as death) at some place (indeed, in the
Shoemaker of course does not have to accept that he will survive without continuing to exist and we do not have to interpret him in this way to show that his way of solving the problem (by dissolving personal identity, i.e., “identity is not what matters”) is at least as strange, if not stranger, than mine (by dissolving the Spatial Boundary, i.e., “the Spatial Border does not matter”). He claims that his relation to this future person, though not survival, is as good as what happens in ordinary survival. This may be true for two reasons: either because in ordinary survival identity is not what matters and so loss of identity is not a problem since what is lost by fission is never had to begin with, or because I, like the reader probably, find it difficult, if not impossible, to accept the wider view that identity is not what matters. We will return again to this point. The issue at hand is that, if we could grant what these philosophers are seemingly willing to go to any length not to grant—the dissolution of the Spatial Boundary—we can make a crack in the wall that separates us. And this crack we might then be able to widen enough to make room for Open Individualism.

The philosopher who comes closest to dissolving the Spatial Boundary is Parfit. In Section 97 of Reasons and Persons he discusses the case where his life overlaps with that of his Replica. He claims that his relation to his Replica is as good as survival because identity is not what matters. But since we ordinarily assume that identity is what matters,

I need not assume that my Replica on Mars is someone else . . . I can believe that I do now have another stream of consciousness, of which, in this stream, I am now unaware. And if it helps, I can take this view about my Replica. [Reasons and Persons, p. 288]

In other words, Parfit can regard himself and his Replica, though spatially separated (in his example, by the distance between Earth and Mars), as being the same person: if the Replica is not “someone else” then on this interpretation who else but Parfit could he be (except, possibly, no one)? And thus, ultimately, the difference between Empty Individualism and Open Individualism concerns not whether we can without absurdity give up the Spatial Boundary (Parfit is willing to agree that we can up to a point) but, rather, whether

1) in survival it is identity that matters and
2) what the real significance is of the metaphysical and/or metapsychological implications of identity not mattering as is supposed on the Empty Individualist view.
For even (2) is not as great as it may at first glance seem: for instance, it
does not entail there being a difference of life and death but merely limits
how far across the Spatial Boundary personal identity extends. Thus, on his
understanding of identity not being what matters, Parfit claims that he,
Derek Parfit, can
exist with a divided mind . . . I can say that I now have two streams of consciousness, one here on
Earth, and another on Mars . . . . It makes little difference that my life briefly overlaps with that of
my Replica.
If the overlap was large, this would make a difference. Suppose that I am an old man, who is
about to die. I shall be outlived by someone who was once a Replica of me. When this person
started to exist forty years ago, he was psychologically continuous with me as I was then. He has
since lived his own life for forty years. I agree that my relation to this Replica, though better than
ordinary death, is not nearly as good as ordinary survival. But this relation would be about as good
if my Replica would be psychologically continuous with me as I was ten days or ten minutes ago.
[p. 289].
And Nozick claims:
If the old body plus half-brain linger on for long enough, three years say, then surely that is the
person, and the person dies when that body expires - the duplicate does not suddenly become the
person after three years. A one-minute period of lingering is compatible with the new body-person
being the original person, a three-year period is not. [Philosophical Explanations, p.44]
Nozick’s view is especially odd in that, if we have the two-person case (as
demarcated using Nozick’s view of how to draw boundaries), what happens
when we throw into the picture Nozick’s following condition?
I suggest that there is not simply one correct measure of closeness for person. Each person’s own
selection and weighting of dimensions enter into determining his own actual identity, not merely
into his view of it. Because of our differing notions of closeness, for the same structural
description of a problem case we can give different answers about which resulting person would
be us, each answer correct. If the story were about me, then Z would be X and Y would not,
whereas if it were about you, Y would be X and Z would not. Which continuer is closest to a
person depends (partially) on that person’s own notion of closeness. [Philosophical Explanations,
p. 106]
For suppose it is a perfect tie and so, on Nozick’s view, neither Y nor Z is
X. Since we then have two persons, Y and Z, and “each person’s own
selection and weighting of dimensions enter into determining his own
actual identity not merely into his view of it,” suppose Y, who upon fission
reads Nozick’s book and, convinced, now really is not identical to Z who,
as it happens, upon fission reads my book and, convinced, now really is Y! From Y’s point of view, Y is not Z. From Z’s point of view, Y is Z. But suppose it is not a tie, so that Y is not the closest continuer. In that case, that Z is convinced by my book makes no difference: Z is not Y, nor X. Y is X but not Z.

This to me seems very strange. My point here is, first, that once we see how strange any real alternative is going to have to be to deal with the problems, the admitted strangeness of Open Individualism will seem, if not unstrange, then at least no more strange—but perhaps even less strange—than the other viable alternatives.

Second, the disagreement between Open Individualism and Empty Individualism is not whether the borders individuating contemporaneously existing human beings bind personal identity but, rather, to what extent we extend past our borders. The question, in other words, is not whether our personal identities (or, personal survivals) reach into each other. The question is how far.
NOTES


2 Perhaps it’s the type of cause that matters. We shall address this question in detail in Chapter 7, where we perform “The Causal Dissolve.”

3 See my “Art and Intentionality.”

4 See Sect. 6.4.

5 See Garrett’s excellent and tightly argued “Best-Candidate Theories and Identity: Reply to Brennan,” “Identity and Extrinsicness,” and “Personal Identity and Extrinsicness.”
According to Parfit, Nozick, Shoemaker, and other Empty Individual View theorists (but especially Parfit), each of whom in his own way is willing to lower the significance ordinarily accorded to the metaphysical boundaries between us (i.e., “open up,” metaphorically speaking), the remaining boundary—if we are willing to deny, as they are, the survival and identity assumption (the traditional Closed Individual View condition that a person survives only as long as there exists a temporally continuous entity identical to that person, i.e., that personal identity is closed under individuation and identification by such known borders)—should, or can most reasonably be drawn (i.e., closed) along our psychological borders. But the metaphysical (and metapsychological) significance of the Psychological Boundary can also be dissolved, further clearing the path to our Open Individual View of Personal Identity.

On the other hand, as we have already seen, instead of abandoning the survival and identity assumption, it is at least as reasonable, if not more so, instead to dissolve (i.e., “open up,” metaphorically speaking) the Spatial Boundary (the traditional Closed View condition that a person cannot exist at more than one place at a time, i.e., that personal identity is thus border-bound, i.e., closed under individuation and identification by such known borders) and thereby explain how it is possible that a person can be simultaneously the subject of multiple sets of disjoint experiences, i.e., “be” at two different “places” at the same “time” (raising further issues such as multiphrenic consciousness, locality vs. nonlocality, etc., to be further discussed again in some detail in Chapter 8). This too further helps clear the path toward the Open Individualism. However, thus far we have dissolved the Spatial Boundary only in cases where Y and Z have in their physiological and psychological aspects always been exactly alike. What happens when we start bringing in some qualitative psychological...
differences?

According to Parfit, Shoemaker and others who hold a psychological view—if not of personal identity (since they are not committed to the view that there is any, or that what there is of it is metaphysically insignificant) then at least of survival—the having of different memories, different streams of consciousness, and so on, are of such metaphysical significance they necessitate our drawing along them boundaries between persons. Philosophers sympathetic to such views would tend to claim that these types of Psychological Border do, if the rift is large enough, signify a boundary between persons (or at least between numerically distinct survivors). It is to this other type of apparent excluder of Open Individualism that we now turn.

§ 6.1 APPARENT EXCLUDER (5): THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BOUNDARY

One obvious difference between you and me has to do with our psychologies. We each lead different “mental lives.” My thoughts, experiences, memories, and personality are qualitatively different from yours. One reason, for instance, why the BST-procedure (§4.5) and teletransportation can plausibly seem to be ways of surviving is that your entire psychology, including personality and memories, is preserved so that the “new you” is psychologically similar to the “old you.” Are therefore you and I, in virtue of being separated by these various types of Psychological Border, different persons? It might at first seem obvious that we are—that the Psychological Border is an absolute and uncrossable boundary between persons. If some type of Psychological Border is a definite and uncrossable boundary between persons, however, then any time that X and Y have different memories, different character traits, different personalities (in the sense of larger, apparently unified bundles of such recurrent patterns), and so on, X and Y are different persons.

Drawing inter-personal boundaries along some such psychological borders, however, as we began to see in Chapter Two, is problematic. Psychological borders, by themselves, arguably do not have the metaphysical and metapsychological significance ordinarily accorded to them by traditional Closed Individualism. (If they did, for instance, the characters in the Dream Analog would, necessarily, be different persons. That is, if the other characters in your dream, separated from you [from the “central character” remembered and identified in your waking states] by the
Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, turn out to be minded, in so far as their psychologies are qualitatively different from the psychologies of the central character from whose first-person perspective the dream is, apparently exclusively, perceived, then—drawing the distinction between persons along this Psychological Boundary—they are other persons. Presently, however, we must consider more detailed cases in which the having of different memories, different personalities, and so on, is not necessarily a boundary between persons to show how these types of Psychological Boundary, by themselves, are merely apparent excluders of Open Individualism.

Ordinarily, we can, and do, believe that Daniel Kolak age 3 and Daniel Kolak age 46 are the same person. Yet there are many things DK age three did that I, DK age 46, no longer recall doing, our personalities are very different, etc. Suppose that DK$_{46}$ and DK$_{3}$ have, in fact, few or no psychological elements in common. In that case, if the Psychological Border is, necessarily, a boundary between persons, DK$_{3}$ and DK$_{46}$ are not the same person—which we already believe is false. We are of course not bound to this belief and are free within the facts to give it up. But drawing our boundaries rigidly along the Psychological Border, once again, draws us out of the picture.

A traditional Closed Individualist who wants to keep personal identity intact (i.e., “metaphysically closed,” or who thinks personal identity is what matters in survival) while wanting to separate (close off) himself (his personal identity) from others with some dividing boundary that does not exclude him from existing over time, could, as in the Physical Substance Dissolve case, move from an identity to a continuity view. For instance, one might suppose that what makes you and me different persons such that DK$_{46}$ and DK$_{3}$ are not different persons is that you and I are not psychologically continuous with each other in the way and to the degree that DK$_{46}$ and DK$_{3}$ are psychologically continuous. (However—as an initial analysis, at least—our Dream Analog II is also a Psychological Continuity Dissolve: dream characters, even if they are conscious, are not psychologically continuous with each other and yet we would not have to believe that they are necessarily, in virtue of being minded and psychologically discontinuous with each other, different persons and so it is possible that personal identity extends—that you extend—across such psychological borders. But there are many different supposed boundaries subsumed under the heading, “psychological,” and so we must slowly dissolve their metaphysical and metapsychological significance by
We began the Physiological Continuity Dissolve by considering, in the commissurotomy cases, how actual mental disunities, individuated from each other by physiological borders, can nonetheless be identified as the conscious psychological disunities of one numerically identical person. Just as we used actual medical examples of split-brain patients, so too in §6.6 ("Dissolving Our Selves") we will perform the Psychological Continuity Dissolve by considering mental disunity within a person using actual medical examples of "split-mind" patients, apparent victims of "multiple personality disorder," (MPD) and so on. Before we do, however, let us make clear some further distinctions.

§ 6.2 PERSONAS, PERSONALITIES, AND THE SUBJECT, TAKE ZERO: BORGES NOR I

Often we use the words “character,” “persona,” “personality,” “identity,” “self,” and “person” interchangeably. We say things like, “Jones is quite a character,” when what we mean, for instance, is, “Jones has a strong and resilient personality.” Likewise, we say, “Since quitting the band to take a job at the bank, Smith is a completely different person,” when we do not really mean that Smith the musician has died and been (reincarnated as? replaced by?) Smith the banker but, rather, that one numerically identical person, Smith, who had such-and-such a personality, now has taken on a qualitatively different personality. Or when we hear about the F.B.I. informant getting a new identity we understand this is an attempt to prevent someone’s untimely demise, not a way of assuring it. Or we might say, for instance, “That’s not his real persona,” when we mean, “That personality type is not the one he normally projects (into the public arena).” Looking at myself in the mirror, I can say: “You’re not being yourself,” when what I mean is not that I have become the wrong person, such as Napoleon but, rather, that I am acting “out of character,” that is, I am acting differently than I ordinarily act or would want (even at that moment) to act. And so on.

There is no question that within our mental lives over time we each exhibit recognizably different patterns of behavior, likes and dislikes, styles of expression, and so on, individuated in varying degrees within ourselves by borders at-a-time and identified, again, in varying degrees, across various changes over time. Your personality today is more than likely (and no doubt hopefully) quite different from that of the three-year-old child you
remember and identify with as having once been you. So we already have some, however vague, notion of a person being the subject of more than one personality over time without personal identity being thereby closed under individuation and identification by such known borders. Typically, we identify so strongly with our personalities that, often, we (laypersons, psychologists, and philosophers erroneously alike) equate personality identity with personal identity. What about different personalities at-a-time? We all exhibit and experience within our conscious mental lives various degrees of multiple attention, differing senses of self, different personality types, “dissociation,” etc. Attending closely to the contours of our psychologies often reveals many more borders within us than we may ordinarily notice. Indeed, both theoretical and empirical psychologists tend to distinguish persona—essentially, the way I appear to others in a role consisting in behavioral, character, and personality traits, and so on—from person, sometimes to the extent that the persona is conceived as a mere facade, a false or projected self. For instance, Jung writes:

Fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be. He takes a name, earns a title, exercises a function, he is this or that. In a certain sense all this is real, yet in relation to the essential individuality of the person concerned it is only a secondary reality, a compromise formation, in making which others often have a greater share than he. [The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious, p. 158]

Jung evokes an actor/mask metaphor to describe the relationship between the person and the persona, a distinction for him essentially between an “inner” or “private” personality (involving the anima in males, the animus in females, along with the shadow) not so readily disclosed to others and a “public” or “outer” personality (for Jung, the persona, typically, an archetype) presented to others in a social role much as an actor portrays various characters on stage. Often, however, as for instance Erving Goffman has argued, the mask or social role may come to seem more real than the actor, both to others and to the actor. (What “seeming to be real to oneself” consists in and who—or what—the actor is shall be discussed in due course.) Other psychologists who have evoked similar types of metaphor include Freud, Adler, Laing, Kelly, Erikson, Fromm, Allport, Maslow, and Rogers. According to these psychologists, behind this “false façade” lies an “inner” and on some views supposedly “more authentic,” “true,” or “inner” personality, demarcated along Jungian lines:

True, whoever looks into the mirror of the water will see first of all his own face. Whoever goes to himself risks a confrontation with himself. The mirror does not flatter, it faithfully shows
whenever looks into it; namely, the facade we never show to the world because we cover it with the persona, the mask of the actor. But the mirror lies behind the mask and shows the true face. 

[The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 37]

Such normal psychological borders—i.e., the way I present myself to others, vs. the way I present myself to myself—suggest that a person can “have,” or “be,” more than one personality and that, as Jung so cleverly hints in his work, that we are moreover as a matter of deep and hidden psychological fact not essentially bound to the psychological features of our various personalities. The implication is that the “true face”—the essential “mirror” that lies “behind the mask”—is itself blank and thus, capable, like a mirror, if truly true, of reflecting any and all psychological masks without ever being essentially bound (i.e., closed) to that or any other personality, whether “authentic” or “inauthentic.” Indeed, we will see evidence and arguments in this chapter especially but throughout the book suggesting that one essential (necessary) feature of personhood involves, arguably, privation of psychological essence, an amorphousness that allows the person to have, and be, more than one personality. One personality might be more “authentic” than another, or more dominant, and such dominances and authenticities may switch depending on the context, so that a person may be identified as a particular personality for a time without being essentially bound to that or any other personalities (whether “authentic” or “inauthentic,” “dominant” or “subordinate,” etc.). Indeed, we shall see a variety of ways in which our personalities—which, ordinarily, according to much popular and folk psychological belief, are often regarded as essential defining features of personal identity—do not constitute personal identity boundaries, i.e., that personal identity is not closed under individuation and identification by such known borders. (This aspect of my general theory has implications both for psychoanalysis and philosophical psychology quite apart from the special Open Individualist thesis.) The misconception that we are bound essentially to such (in this case psychological) borders—arguably, the Hauptvermutung of traditional Closed Individualism—stems from the conflation of psychological identification with personal identity.

Rather than starting with abnormal pathologies (which we shall discuss in detail later in the chapter) let us attend first to such normal borders within ourselves to facilitate an initial analysis based on our own experience, as a way of approaching the “Psychological Boundary Dissolve.” A good way to begin is with an appropriate literary passage that the reader can choose to regard either as an example of imaginary (fictional) introspection or an example of actual introspection, since initially the point here is not to
dispute or acknowledge the veracity of the description but merely to facilitate and generate the locutions necessary for further subsequent analysis. For instance, Jorge Luis Borges observes in “Borges and I,”

The other one, the one called Borges, is the one things happen to. I walk through the streets of Buenos Aires and stop for a moment, perhaps mechanically now, to look at the arch of an entrance hall and the grillwork on the gate; I know of Borges from the mail and see his name on a list of professors or in a biographical dictionary. I like hourglasses, maps, eighteenth-century typography, the taste of coffee and the prose of Stevenson; he shares these preferences, but in a vain way that turns them into the attributes of an actor. [Labyrinths, p. 246]

Such dissociations are easily recognized as a common ingredient of most normal psychologies. Unlike the often self-destructive or warring aspects so prominent in cases of full-fledged multiple personality, which we shall consider shortly, such “normal” dissociations within our psychologies do not, typically, bring about internal hostilities:

It would be an exaggeration to say that ours is a hostile relationship; I live, let myself go on living, so that Borges may contrive his literature, and this literature justifies me. It is no effort for me to confess that he has achieved some valid pages, but those pages cannot save me, perhaps because what is good belongs to no one, not even to him, but rather to the language and to tradition. Besides, I am destined to perish, definitely, and only some instant of myself can survive in him. Little by little, I am giving over everything to him, though I am quite aware of his perverse custom of falsifying and magnifying things. Spinoza knew that all things long to persist in their being; the stone eternally wants to be a stone and the tiger a tiger. I shall remain in Borges, not in myself (if it is true that I am someone), but I recognize myself less in his books than in many others or in the laborious strumming of a guitar. Years ago I tried to free myself from him and went from the mythologies of the suburbs to the games with time and infinity, but those games belong to Borges now and I shall have to imagine other things. Thus my life is a flight and I lose everything and everything belongs to oblivion, or to him.

I do not know which of us has written this page. [pp. 246-247]

Introspecting, the author identifies two distinct sets, or bundles, of psychological individuations—henceforth, “psychological complexes”—consisting in various likes and dislikes, character traits, behavioral dispositions, etc., personified into (relatively independent) personalities (regardless of whether that is the appropriate level of metaphysical significance that should be accorded to them). That is, while he identifies various internal psychological states—listening to music, reading philosophy, taking an evening stroll, etc.—as his own he is at the same time himself identified as a complex (more than one, in fact) of such
psychological states. Bordered (individuated) from each other at-a-time by qualitatively different likes and dislikes, qualitatively different emotional dispositions, qualitatively different developmental histories, qualitatively different character traits, and so on, these two personalities—roughly, one “private” or “inner” personality (unnamed and referred to during the writing of that passage in the first person as “I,” “myself,”) and one “public” personality (named and referred to during the writing of that passage in the third person, as “he,” “the other,” “the one called Borges”—are themselves in turn identified by the persistence of their respective psychological qualities over time.

Furthermore, his private personality appears during the act of writing to be dominant while the public personality appears to be more like a subordinate alter. That is, while he contains within himself two distinct sets of personified psychological complexes, one is personified from the first person point of view and one is (from that “dominant” first person point of view) personified from the third person point of view. In other words, while he identifies with both his public and private personality, during the writing of that passage he is identified as the one (private) personality (referred to in the first person, “I”) more than as the other (public) personality (referred to in the third person, “he,” “Borges”) but not, apparently, vice versa. Let us thus distinguish

1) a personified psychological bundle (complex) of individuations—i.e., “personality”—identified with (as one’s own), and

2) a personified psychological bundle (complex) of individuations—i.e., “personality”—identified as (one’s self).

The latter (2) occurs from a first-person point of view, not just allegorically or descriptively but actually, that is, experientially: the person becomes the subject of, and to, those mental states. The former does not and, typically, occurs from the third or second-person point of view: the subject in relation to which phenomena are individuated and identified (localized) in (perspectival, i.e., subjective) space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., “observed,” views these mental states, as it were, “from without.” (The requisite parallel distinction among different “orders” of identification is also further fleshed out below.)

Notice, however, that the above perspectival distinction is itself, from a purely logical point of view, first-person relative, that is, perspectival and subjective. In other words, to claim for instance that personality (2) is being appeared to by objects individuated and identified from the first person
point of view in relation to the subject therein exclusively conjoined, not just allegorically or descriptively but actually, that is, experientially, is to claim that the person becomes the subject of (and to) those mental states (thereby objectifying them) but this does not logically commit us in the absolute sense of precluding the same description holding of (1). That is, to thus by contrast claim that personality (1) has merely an allegorical subject in relation to which phenomena are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first-person point of view, i.e., observed, but not “actually,” in that it is “seen” or “observed” or “occurs” only from the third or second-person point of view, is to claim that within those borders there is no subject (qua subject-in-itself, “consciousness”) exclusively conjoined therein. Except that any such claim must be relativized to the subject making that claim, identified as bundle (2).

We thus see that a (good) bit of logical reflection on these sorts of psychological borders reveals that it is quite possible, from purely a logical point of view, that alter personalities identified from the third or second-person point of view of the dominant personality may from another perspective elsewhere in that psychology be likewise identified from a mutually independent first person point of view in relation to which the dominant personality is itself conversely identified not from the first but from the second or third-person point of view. We may find this from a psychological point of view surprising but as logicians we should not be too surprised. Just as we have seen how it is possible for a person to be the subject of more than one disjoint set of experiences (whether over time or at a time)—indeed, for there to be personal identity over time this condition is nothing less than necessary—we should not be overly surprised to find that a person can likewise be subject to more than one personality (whether over time or at a time), unless we are as it were ready to give up the ghost on personal identity (i.e., there just is no personal identity, or at least not for very long) and migrate into one of the Empty Individual Views (e.g. Peter Unger’s in which you last but a few years at most).

In any case, identified as the “private” personality (who in turn identifies with the “public” personality that—from the perspective of that personality—he is not identified as) during the writing of that passage Borges is not identified as the other: he is by his own account experiencing himself (his inner psychology) and his world (his perceptions) through (from “within”) the first person point of view of that personality apparently exclusively (that is, as seen through that first person point of view”) rather than through the other (“public”) personality, and not vice versa (again, as
seen through *that* first-person point of view\(^\text{13}\). Which is just to say that the dominant personality (while in the act of writing), a personified psychological complex, is a psychological identification from the first person point of view not just allegorically or descriptively but actually, that is, *experientially*: the person becomes the subject of and to that experience, the subject of and to that personality. (In which case the subject dependence/independence relations discussed in Chapter 2 apply, revealingly so, helping us to thereby further explain, via none other than FEC, how it is possible in the first place that phenomenologies should ever become as it were psychologically fractured within and among themselves, disjoined into mutually independent/dependent sub-systems, even with upwardly varying degrees of freedom [upwardly-generating dimensionalities].) While the subordinate alter, *described from that dominant personality’s first-person point of view during the writing of that passage*, is a psychological complex personified from the third or second-person point of view in so far as he, the author, is not during the writing of that passage also likewise identified as that (alter) personality, affording to it its own first-person perspectival point of view. The person *qua subject* (the subject-*in-itself*, i.e., consciousness) is not subject to that personality (objectification of the subject).

Moreover, notice the sense in which we can now say that the “*inner, ‘private’*\(^{14}\) personality can be dominant, and what that means, namely, that the person becomes the subject of and to that personality, conjoined (“locked”) onto the body/mind image\(^{15}\) via the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment. For although the dominant personality is aware of the alter personality, not only does the latter not seem to have the same sort of “conscious access” to the experience of the former (though, again, we must bare in mind the above relativity qualifier), more importantly, the dominant personality lacks the apparent ability to immediately control those borders directly in experience. There is “co-consciousness” between the two psychological complexes, but not “intra-consciousness.” (This would be the psychological analog to the one “shared” multiperspectival manifold of one multiply localized, i.e., “non-local” subject, discussed in §2.2.4.) Borges (from *that* dominant personality’s point of view) identifies *with* the alter (“public”) personality but not vice versa, such that although identified as the one personality he is aware of the other, the latter does not seem *at the moment from the point of view of the dominant personality in the act of writing* to have this same sort of access to the other. Perhaps there never is any identification as the alter personality and so the description is empty,
allegorical, fictional: the person never becomes subject to that alter personality. Or, perhaps, there is no identification as any such personality because he, the narrator, is himself an allegorical, fictional description and in reality there is no author (as for instance Foucault claims), not even anything that could be the proper referent of the subject (as for instance Dennett apparently believes) because e.g. “the subject” is itself some sort of elaborate illusion, delusion, self-deception, “center of narrative fiction” (Dennett’s phrase), etc. We need not now return to this sort of (ultimately metaphysical) issue, with which we have already dealt in Chapter 2 and will deal again further below and again in Chapter 8. The fact is that such personified psychological complexes do occur, independently of whether they describe anything real; it is the distinction between the two types of self descriptions—regardless of whether they describe something illusory or real—that our terminology is designed to capture.

To thus personify psychological bundles, or complexes, as relatively independent personalities to which the person becomes subject, is not necessarily to evoke multiple personality disorder (discussed in §6.9), separate (multiple) spheres of consciousness, independent causal agents and so on (though they may or may not be any or all of these); it is to accord to certain borders within us a relatively high degree of (metaphysical and metapsychological) significance in comparison with some others. Borges could just as well identify “the Spanisher” and “the Englisher” within his psychology and say that some of his works were written by the Spanisher (those written in Spanish) and some by the Englisher (those written in English) and some by both (those written and simultaneously translated with Norman Thomas DiGiovanni), such that he now wonders whether the Englisher or the Spanisher wrote that page. But clearly neither author is making that sort of mistake (neither Borges nor I) in personifying some psychological complexes over and above others and the correctness of the additional significance accorded to such borders in the conceptual framework (conceptual reference frame; see §10.1) can be judged independently of whether they really are distinct personalities, independent agents, different “selves,” and so on—that is, without our having to settle, just yet, the question of which such aspects of our psychologies are real and which mere hypostatizations, or reifications—noun substantives—fabrications or confabulations. Some such sets of psychological individuations do occur within us and are more naturally susceptible to personification from the first and third person points of view than are others and, typically, some such sets of psychological individuations are, as a
matter of psychological fact, thus personified at the exclusion of others.

Borges’s private personality (referred to by the narrator as “I,” apparently because that is the one during the writing of that passage he is identified as) is like a hidden personality rarely revealed to others and it is during the writing of the passage dominant. His public personality (referred to by the narrator as “Borges,” apparently because that is the one that during the writing of that passage he only identifies with) is during the writing of the passage like a subordinate alter, a role he sometimes plays. Apparently, the two personalities are further individuated by (partial) amnesia borders, such that the personality that he is identified as (from the point of view apparently of the personality dominant at the time of the writing)—the one that he is the subject of and to—identifies with both personalities but, apparently, not vice-versa. These types of Psychological Border help in the passage to individuate and identify

A) the experiences of Borges’s hidden or “private” (dominant at the time of the writing) personality, referred to in the first person, as “I”
B) the experiences of Borges’s “public” (alter) personality, referred to in the third person, as “Borges”
and
C) Borges’s “private” (dominant) personality from the “public” (alter) personality including any overlap.

From the perspective of the alter (“public”) personality (assuming, but regardless of whether, there is any such actual perspective) there is identification with (B) but little or no such identification with (A). This lack of identification may, if more pronounced, involve “non-identification,” a diffuse (non-localized) psychological “sense of otherness,” or “feeling of non-identity,” within one persona toward another—the beginnings of psychological dissociation. (As we shall see in §6.3, psychological dissociation and psychological identification turn out to be inversely related.)

The psychology of a person, \( P \), may thus contain a psychological complex of appropriately significant borders, \( p_2 \), which may justifiably be called “\( P \)’s personality,” even though

1) some other psychological complex of appropriately significant borders, \( p_1 \), is individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view in relation to the subject therein exclusively conjoined
2) \( p_2 \) is individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from
the second or third-person point of view from p1’s first-person point of view.

Let us not pass up the opportunity to notice that, first, because the individuation and identification (localization) of phenomena (e.g. the objects of experience) in (perspectival, i.e., “subjective”) space and time from the first person point of view in relation to the (reciprocally localized, in relation to said objects) subject would, typically, occur within the borders (onto which the subject is thereby exclusively conjoined) of p1, it follows that to the degree that I can seize control of my body I must in the process of becoming the subject identified as that personality become not only the subject of my own mental states and thereby relinquish to an inverse degree control of my own mind to non-conscious processes (as experienced in that first person perspective), I must as a matter of psychological fact also by becoming furthermore the subject to my own mental states become even more deeply entrenched in my psychology. Second, clearly, if p2 is justifiably called “P’s personality” so is p1 but the borders between them are of additional significance (whether “real” or not) and so we will soon have to enrich our terminology. “Borges and I” thus conceptually illustrates a case where a person, P, identified as p1, takes responsibility for and accepts p2, “recognizes” p2 as one of the many complex contours of the same psychology within which both p1 and p2 exist. (Again, the opposite would be a case where P identified as p1 neither takes responsibility for nor accepts p2, perhaps does not even recognize p2 as a part of P: identified as p1 P may even experience anger, or revulsion, toward p2, thereby psychologically distancing, or dissociating, himself from p2 [“I’m not myself when I’m like that,” “the devil made me do it,” etc.].) “P is identified as p1,” means p1 is a psychological complex personified from the first person point of view, not allegorically (descriptively, linguistically) but actually, that is, P experiences the personality within P, from the inside, as being me. The person finds himself, as it were, the subject of and to (conjoined onto and “projected” into) p1, bound to the psychological contours of that personality, experiencing himself (his inner psychology) and his world (his perceptions) from inside p1—the subject of and to those mental states—at the (apparent) exclusion of (dissociation from) any other p. P might, however, be identified as p1 while not identifying with p1—the beginnings of full-fledged dissociation typical of borderline personality disorders that may lead to a multiphrenic “personality split” or identification as an altogether different personality. For instance, after quitting the band for the bank Smith finds her former
behavior stupid and repulsive, but evolution through new psychological identifications may not “erase” the old psychological contours and Smith one day reverts to her former personality that, until then, has been dormant and now becomes dominant. In other words, what was once the dominant personality—the wild musician—became a dormant, subordinate “alter,” then re-emerged once again at some later time as the active, dominant personality. Or, it could be that the mechanisms by which changes in identification reify different psychological borders over time might fission a psychology into such borders at a time: two or more personalities emerge contemporaneously, perhaps vying for dominance—fighting for control of the body and mind—the sort of “personality split” associated with full-fledged multiple personality disorder.

Before we turn to look more closely at such bigger rifts within us let us ask in the Borges example where the other, “alter” personality is while the narrator (identified as the private, dominant personality) is writing that passage. One possibility is nowhere: the “public” personality is dormant, an empty mask, or persona, which Borges sometimes wears. Another possibility is that somewhere within his overall psychology the “public” personality is during the writing of the passage experiencing the activity not just allegorically or descriptively but actually, phenomenologically, from the first-person perspectival point of view, whereby the person (unbeknownst to himself from the mutually dependent but independent point of view of the dominant personality) is at the same time the subject of and to that experience, identified as that alter personality, which is by my lights exactly what apparently happens in cases of multiple personality disorder (and which would be akin to our Dream Analog II, discussed in §2.2.3). In that case, Borges would—again, quite possibly unbeknownst to himself from the point of view of his dominant personality—during the writing of “Borges and I” be within himself not only simultaneously identified as one personality that in turn identifies with another, one of which is the dominant one and the other which is the alter. Rather, he would be identified as both, becoming thereby the subject of and to those two qualitatively different sets of mental states occurring from within two mutually independent first person points of view simultaneously. Borges would in that case exist with a “divided” (e.g. multiphrenic, see §2.2.3.1) mind, having split into two separately flowing streams, simultaneously experiencing two different sets of mental states. (This would also be somewhat akin to the imaginary experience of Dennett’s two brains falling slightly out of sync only one of which runs his body.) Kathleen Wilkes
notes:

One day under hypnosis the patient [Christine Beauchamp] referred to [Beauchamp] not, as before, as “I” but as “she.” When asked why she did not think of herself as [Christine Beauchamp] . . . she [who would later come to call herself “Sally”] replied, “because she is stupid; she goes around mooning, half asleep, with her head buried in a book; she does not know half the time what she is about.” [“Fugues, Hypnosis, and Multiple Personality,” p. 123]

We can thus imagine the author of “Borges and I,” at a later point reading his earlier work and then writing a response from the other personality’s first-person perspectival point of view: identified as the public personality, the author would then refer to the hidden personality that during the writing of “Borges and I” was referred to as “he,” “Borges” and “the other,” not as he or other but as me, myself, as “I.” The (previously “dormant”) “alter” personality would in that case have suddenly become “active” and dominant, linked to the body via FEC, etc. Indeed, Borges implies such a “switch” can occur so easily and so quickly that he is not even sure at any particular moment which one he is: “I do not know which of us has written this page.”

Let us consider now a case where the borders are more pronounced, in ways that have been termed “doubling.” Jonathan Glover quotes from Robert Lifton’s stunning study of Auschwitz doctors,

Use of the term doubling, rather than mere splitting, calls attention to the creation of two relatively autonomous selves: the prior “ordinary self,” which for doctors includes important elements of the healer, and the “Auschwitz self,” which includes all of the psychological manoeuvres that help one avoid a conscious sense of oneself as a killer. The existence of an overall Auschwitz self more or less integrated all of these mechanisms into a functioning whole, and permitted one to adapt oneself to that bizarre environment. The prior self enabled one to retain a sense of decency and loving connection. [I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity, p. 23]

Glover comments that,

It is almost as though one life is lived by two people at different times . . . . It is almost like two people sharing a life. The lack of identification found in such cases is not multiple personality. When the Nazi doctor goes home, this does not bring on literal amnesia about his work. In the case of multiple personality, the suggestion is that child abuse presents a similar problem of integration, but that the child’s strategy for dealing with it is more drastic, leading to barriers of amnesia between the compartments. [pp. 23-24]

Suppose Dr. Jones is at different times within his own psychology
identified as either the “healer” or the “killer.” Which personality he then is identified as, becoming thereby the subject of and subject to those mental states, could at any particular time vary; the two qualitatively different personalities within that psychology thus could, at different times, each function as the dominant vehicle for that person’s behavior and experience.

Thus, as we are using the term, the “dominant” personality is not what personal identity consists in but only a psychological complex personified from a first-person perspectival point of view, that is, the personality is what psychological identification consists in, conjoined via FEC to the (“online”) mind/body image. It thus follows, as we shall see, both that a person can exist, in principle, without any personality and, in principle, (identified) as more than one personality, each one personified from the first person perspectival point of view, whereby the person becomes the subject of and subject to several mutually disjoint sets of exclusively conjoined psychological borders. The mind of such a person would be (quite possibly unbeknownst to him/herself) multiphrenic (§2.3, §5.4). One might thus in the “doubling” example rightfully ask Dr. Jones whether at present he is (identified as) the healer or the killer (or both), when what one is inquiring into is not the personal identity of Dr. Jones but, rather, into his dominant psychological identification.

Being identified as a personality means not only that I ascribe to that psychological complex the characteristics of a person (personification), I find myself, as it were, “projected” into that complex (into myself, literally), experiencing myself (my inner psychology) and my world (my perceptions) from that particular subjective, first-person point of view: I become the subject of and subject to that experience, as for instance described in the Borges, doubling and MPD examples. Compare this type of personification to Jung’s personification (at age eight) of a stone:

“I am sitting on top of this stone and it is underneath.” But the stone also could say “I” and think: “I am lying here on this slope and he is sitting on top of me.” The question then arose: “Am I the one who is sitting on the stone, or am I the stone on which he is sitting?” this question always perplexed me, and I would stand up, wondering who was what now. [Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 20]

Jung conceives of the stone as a person; the stone even comes to signify, or represent, the “Other,” a timeless, imperishable presence:

Whenever I thought that I was the stone . . . I would think . . . I was but the sum of my emotions, and the other in me was the timeless, imperishable stone. [p. 42]
The subject is not thereby, literally, projected into the object, i.e., the stone (into that part of his phenomenology, as is for instance possible in dreams and psychotic disorders), to become thereby the subject of and subject to the stone’s experience. Jung is still “Jung,” identified as and “located in” that personality and not identified as and “located in” the nameless stone; Jung is not, as it were, situated inside the stone, the subject of and to the stone’s phenomena individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view in relation to the subject, for the stone as far as we know is phenomena but does not have phenomena, because in fact the stone has no subject in any sense whatsoever (as far as he, Jung qua the subject of experience describing the scene, identified as a particular personality, “Jung,” knows!) but, rather, Jung finds himself located as such “outside” the stone, in so far as the subject is reciprocally individuated and identified (localized) in relation to said phenomena. Which is but to say that Jung does not find himself inside the stone, looking up at a boy named Jung from the point of view of the stone—Jung does not, in his psychology, become the stone. Rather, in such “outwardly directed” or “objectified” personification there is a clear experiential distinction between subject and object, i.e., between the subject identified as and situated in a personality (“I thought I was . . .”) and the object identified with (“. . . the stone”). Whereas in the case of “inwardly directed” or “subjectified” personification—that is, first-person personification within a personality toward its own psychological states—there is no such border; my being identified as and situated in personality $p_1$ means that while in the overall psychology within which $p_1$ subsists there may exist other personalities (even, possibly, minded), at present I find myself the subject of and subject to—“possessed by”—the borders of $p_1$ such that, experientially, I find myself situated in (and in varying degrees psychologically bound to) the borders of that personality. The question of multiplicity then hinges on explaining how a person can be identified as—the subject of and to—more than one personality at time, “situated” in multiple independent branching “streams” (speaking of which sensibly requires exactly the sort of branching quantifiers developed in IF Logic$^{28}$), the non-local subject-in-itself ($I$, consciousness) situated (localized) in more than one psycho-phenomenological space at a time, identified as multiple personalities (involving, from a logico-mathematical model-theoretic point of view, modulo Schrödinger-manifold, at the very least, what in §2.2.3.2 we called weak, or closed world, nonlocality).

To identify with a psychological complex is for the person to recognize an
experience, perception, thought, etc., as being *mine*; to be identified as a psychological complex is for the person to *be* a persona, personality, etc., *that is me,* such that I find myself situated *in* that persona or personality: the personified psychological complex becomes, experientially, one’s “self,” the personality as it were becomes one’s “psychological home,” illuminated form within by the person becoming the subject of and subject to, *i.e., occupied by* (and, inversely, *occupying*) someone who lives there. That within each human psychology there exists more than one such personality either over time but also at a time, there is little doubt; the question is whether, and how, “simultaneous occupancy” by the person becoming the subject of and to multiple concurrent (but not co-conscious) personalities is possible. (Notice that explaining how such multiplicity is possible or, even more than that, seeing that it is *actual,* is not the same as demonstrating that the Open Individual View is the case, since the question of personal identity is not *thereby* automatically solved.)

The personality is not the *I*—the (*un*identified) subject-in-itself, “consciousness”—who lives, like a tenant (or, perhaps, more accurately, to a certain degree as a prisoner, conjoined onto and locked into those borders) within the confines of a personified psychological complex; a personality is the personified psychological complex that the *I*—the subject-in-itself, “consciousness,” lives in. In that sense identification as personality *p* is not something *I* do but rather—to paraphrase Wittgenstein’s comment about thinking—something that happens to *me:* *p* is the psychological address onto which I am conjoined and into which I am locked, the subject of and to that experience.

Which is *not* to say that necessarily I cannot do this, or that I don’t have “free will.” Actors are famous for (literally) taking off one psychological mask and donning another at will, so much so that great actors will in many cases retain various characters or personalities which they then apply varyingly in particular situations, both on and off the stage. But most of us cannot do this easily. Consciousness—the subject-in-itself, the *I*—becomes thus within us “trapped,” psychologically “bound,” in a personality much in the way that a neurotic becomes trapped in a particular behavior pattern. Typically, we can no more consciously *choose* to re-identify ourselves as a different personality than we can at consciously choose to love or hate someone, go to sleep, have a particular dream (or direct our individuation/identifications from within even a lucid dream), and so on.  

The psychological power of the personality (the *objectified* subject) over the (*un*identified) subject (the subject-in-itself, consciousness), while
predominantly passive, consists in the imposition of limits via behavioral dispositions, likes and dislikes, including social, political, religious and personal values. The personality acts like a net or filter `imbibing amorphous consciousness (the subject-in-itself) with a morphology, the predispositional patterns encoded in that personified psychological complex.  

For instance, within the personality from whose first-person perspective these words are being written there is identification with some (relatively non-complex) beliefs (that only through philosophy is self-knowledge possible, anger at dogmatic religions, etc.) but not others (that real self-knowledge may be impossible, the fear that philosophy may be but an elaborate self-deception of the brain, etc.). There is at present also identification as a particular personality in which I, qua subject, am identified as (thereby becoming the subject of and to) that personality, experiencing myself and the world from this first-person perspectival “point of view,” namely, the obsessive philosopher/writer, at the exclusion (at least apparently, from this first person perspectival point of view) of other such personalities (e.g. the devoted husband/father, the laid-back musician, etc.) in relation to which there is nevertheless, also, identification as and with. All these psychological complexes get to some extent personified, over and above psychological formations of lesser metapsychological significance (bouts of anger, fleeting thoughts, etc., that I also merely identify with). The point is that psychological identification as may occur “from the ‘outside’”—from the third-person point of view—or “from the ‘inside’”—from the first-person point of view and not just allegorically but actually, that is, with the person thereby becoming the subject of and to (conjoined onto and locked into) those borders. In the Borges example, for instance, there seems to be only one such personality (as we are presently using the term) until the end of the quoted passage when, suddenly, there seem to be two.

In sum: psychological (qualitative) identification at any level is not what personal (numerical) identity consists in. Personal identity is not closed under individuation and identification under such known borders. Those who believe otherwise confuse psychological identification with personal identity. Within our actual human psychologies we are already more than one personality over time and it is quite possible that we can be more than one personality at a time, as would be the case if more than one personality were simultaneously personified from the first-person point of view not just allegorically but actually, that is, with the person becoming thereby
experientially bound, the subject of and to those borders. In that case the
traditional Closed Individualist assumption that to be a person is to be
necessarily limited to existing within (being bound, or closed, by) one some
such set of psychological borders—that such psychological borders are a
personal identity boundary, that personal identity is closed under
individuation and identification by such known borders—would be false
and the Open Individualist thesis that it is possible for one and the same
numerically identical person to be identified as more than one some such
set of psychological borders simultaneously would be a perhaps hard to
believe truth about us. Before proceeding further, however, let us at this
point more clearly distinguish our four importantly different levels of
identification.

§ 6.3 PRIMARY, SECONDARY, TERTIARY AND
QUARTIC IDENTIFICATION: THE FOURFOLD ε/δ
MANIFOLD

Take an ordinary object: the blue towel. I do not see a color patch, cloth
rag, flag, etc., I see a towel: the perception arrives in my experience already
identified as a towel. That is, the psychological state is interpreted—
automatically (i.e., compiled)—by the mind within which it subsists not as a
mental or psychological state but as an object. Say I also identify with
the blue towel; it belongs to a conceptual category to which I also belong and
thereby, psychologically, I personally “connect with” the towel—in effect,
by valuing it and, thereby, psychologically attaching myself to it: I am a
member of the LA Blue Gang and you, a member of the Red Gang, stole
that blue towel in a fight to the death with one of my “Blue Brothers.” I
wrestle it away from you and now I possess the blue towel but also, in some
weak psychological sense, the blue towel possesses me. This is because I
may through such identification with an object become, over time,
progressively more drawn toward and attached within my overall
psychology to a particular personality. That is, in addition to identifying with
the color blue and identifying with the blue towel—thereby being
psychologically drawn toward and attached to the color blue and to the blue
towel, while psychologically distancing myself from other colors, etc.—
identification may lead me to experience myself as a member of the Blue
Gang, psychologically drawing me toward, and attaching me to, that
particular persona. The blue towel may thus help foster within my overall
psychology not only a sense of “outward” connectedness (with the Blue
Gang, with my dead Blue Brother, etc.) but also a sense of “inner” connectedness—that is, personal connectedness with some aspect of my psychology.

I want to stress, however, that psychological identification is but one half of an inversely proportional relation the other half of which is psychological dissociation. Indeed, psychological identification is achieved through psychological dissociation, and vice-versa; psychological identification is inversely proportional to psychological dissociation. If we designate identification as $\varepsilon$ and dissociation as $\delta$, we can write:

$$\varepsilon = \frac{1}{\delta}.$$ 

Psychological identification and psychological dissociation supervene a fourfold inverse relation upon the experiential “manifold of goings-on,” to again use Erwin Schrödinger’s quaint phrase (where *mannigfaltigkeit* [manifold] is, roughly, the Kantian “totality of experience as it is presented in sense”), between the subject and its objects, what I call the “fourfold $\varepsilon/\delta$ manifold:”

1) **Primary (first order) identification**: a particular psychological individuation (e.g., a blue patch) is identified as an object (e.g., a towel) and thereby ascribed a particular identity.

2) **Secondary (second order) identification**: an identified object, concept, ideal, phenomenological complex, etc., is identified with (“that’s my towel,” “that’s my country,” “that’s my [type of] music,” “that’s my religion,” “those are my people,” etc.).

3) **Tertiary (third order) identification**: a personified psychological/phenomenological complex is identified as oneself (i.e., “this is my body,” “I am that outgoing personality,” “this is my self,” etc.).

4) **Quartic (fourth order) identification**: a personified psychological/phenomenological complex is identified as other (i.e., “that is my friend,” “you are my mother,” “that man there is my father,” etc.)

I want in this way to draw our attention to the fourfold aspect of the experiential divide between intentional “self” and intentional “other,” i.e., between the subject *qua* unidentified subject-in-itself identified as self and the subject *qua* objectification of the subject [mis]identified as “other,” itself one of the necessary conditions (as we saw in §2.1.1.1) for the having of experience as we know it. For although what I call the (arguably
Kantian-inspired) transcendent and transcendental illusions (see also Chapters 8 and 10) may be necessary (“user friendly”40) illusions from a metaphysical standpoint their effects are in the main psychological and their cause is metapsychological, that is, their necessity as such is a derivative of the fourfold εδ manifold.31

Each aspect of the fourfold identification/dissociation relation can be directed either “outwardly”—towards the blue towel, towards mother, etc.—or “inwardly,” toward one’s own thoughts, emotions, etc. This is true ever of quartic identification and not only in the case, for instance, of schizophrenics who hear the “voice of God,” “demons,” or see and talk with imaginary friends and enemies, etc., but also in ordinary dreams where we meet and converse with other dream characters. In each case, (1)-(4), the identification/dissociation relation is between the subject (i.e., the subject-in-itself) and its objects (i.e., objectifications/[mis]identifications of the subject). The εδ manifold thus relates subject to object, i.e., intentional “self” to intentional “other,” regardless of whether the intentional “other” consists of psychological (and/or phenomenological) objects created (e.g. by the subject as a psychological analog to Brouwer’s mathematical sense) through secondary identification, or whether the intentional “other” consists of minded (i.e., “conscious”) objects (inclusive of the subject-in-itself, the I, “consciousness,” qua the ASI Border) brought about by quartic identification. Again, let us bear in mind that by “objects” here I mean perceptual (i.e., phenomenological, intentional) objects (see the discussion of Phenomenological Borders in Chapter 10, esp. §10.3). Anything I see and am conscious of directly and immediately as an object in experience, whether presented visually and/or tactilely, is of course interpreted automatically (i.e., compiled) to be not a perceptual object but a “physical object.” (Hence the transcendental illusion, one of our necessary, “user friendly” illusions.) Whereas “psychological objects,” such as thoughts and emotions, are presented more correctly as what they are, namely, thoughts, ideas, feelings, and so on. The point here is that, again quite independently of any ontological or metaphysical commitments, the fourfold identification/dissociation relation structures both types of objects in our experience (whether as representors of the physical or of the psychological). Such borders may themselves become fuzzy, not just in the (e.g. Independence Friendly) logical sense but in the psychological and metapsychological (i.e., extremely unfriendly, pathological) sense: there are for instance a variety of actual schizophrenic and multiphrenic identification disorders where, to take but one extremely bizarre case, a
patient “thought that he was Switzerland.”

Suppose then that I have a shy, introverted personality and a bold, extroverted personality toward both of which, and between which reciprocally, there is secondary identification. In that case, I might say: “Right now I am the extrovert, not the introvert.” That is, even though (from my present first-person point of view identified as the extrovert) there is (secondary) identification with both personas (rather than, say, dissociation between one or the other to such an extent that it feels like a “foreign demon in my head”), I am identified as only the one, not the other. This is tertiary identification.

Psychological attachment through tertiary identification connects psychological states (within which the person becomes, thereby, the subject of and to those states as follows. When in one’s psychology there is not only identification with the Blue Gang (“I really like those tough guys,”—secondary identification) but also identification as a member of the Blue Gang (“I am a ‘Blue Brother,’ one of the tough guys”—tertiary identification), there now subsists, within that psychology, an exclusively conjoined personified psychological complex (personality) that imparts to me, the (amorphous, unidentified) subject—I, consciousness, explained in §2.1.1, refined in §2.1.1.1, and related to self-consciousness in §6.6.1)—the feeling or impulse to avenge my brothers, to act tough, and so on. Identification as that personality over time solidifies out of the psychological flux a distinct and persistent morphology onto which the subject is conjoined and into which I am thereby, as it were, not only directed but, in the sense explored in §2.1, locked. (Again, we should bear in mind that the fourfold manifold supervenes upon all aspects of experience, so that to the degree that I associate with some behaviors I dissociate with other [usually antithetical] ones, thereby typically finding myself repulsed by “others” who indulge in behaviors antithetical to the sorts of behaviors with which I associate.”) Filtered (or, in more precise mathematical parlance, ultrafiltered) through the psychological contours of that persona, distinct physiological and behavioral patterns are imposed upon the person who becomes thereby the subject of and to those states, such that I—the (unidentified) subject-in-itself, “consciousness”—am then to those borders psychologically bound (as in a dream, §2.1.1), with (at most limited) access to the physiological and psychological control mechanisms within which the person qua subject now subsists. So while the blue towel that I identify with may acquire, as it were, the psychological significance of a flag, the psychological complex that I am identified as
may acquire, as it were, the metapsychological significance of a “self”: just as people can and often do join themselves to each other socially by differentiating themselves into political groups and then identifying themselves with a group via a flag (and thereby, of course, dissociating themselves from other such groups), so the undifferentiated (amorphous, unidentified) consciousness (i.e., I, the subject-in-itself) can be objectified, identified and thereby differentiated into psychological complexes that through identification with some particular psychological type (for instance, a Jungian archetype) are joined to themselves over time (and thereby in turn necessarily reciprocally dissociating themselves from other types, up to and including archetypes). And just as I can forge for myself a real social identity via identification as a Christian (and then further on down the line as Catholic, Protestant, Born Again, etc.) Buddhist (Mahayana, Theravada, etc.), Muslim (Suuni, Shiite, etc.), Frenchman, Englishman, Russian, Jew (Reformed, Orthodox), Palestinian, European, Yugoslav (Croat, Serb, Bosnian, etc.), American, and so on, with levels within levels (with no doubt something like powerset relations adding a particularly heinous twist to the underlying and overlying FEC dynamics) etc., up to and including limiting myself to specific and rigid manners belonging to some group or subgroup or combination thereof, so too I can forge for myself a real (albeit qualitative, not numerical) “psychological identity,” my personality identification, by becoming (to once more echo Jung) what I pretend to be.

§ 6.4 THE SUBJECT, TAKE ONE: FREEDOM FROM THE SELF

This may be the perfect place to stress again that, typically, identification is not something I (consciously) do but, rather, something that happens to me. Because when I—the (unidentified) subject, the subject-in-itself, refined in §6.7, what ordinarily we simply and naively (pre-theoretically) call “consciousness”—become the subject of and to a particular psychological complex, consciousness as it were takes a back seat to the dynamics of the psychological complex in which (the manifold of) experience unfolds, there is at present, for reasons that shall become progressively more clear (and hence philosophically, if not psychologically, defeatable), little if any conscious choosing of our selves. Not that there couldn’t be; it’s just that, as a matter of psychological fact, what could be achieved purposefully and intentionally by and in an act of reflexive self-
consciousness (itself defined and refined below) is given over—as are so many things in life—either to haphazard randomized choice sequences (Brower’s “second act” of intuitionism) or to sequences of automatized, mechanical or programmatical (“compiled”) processes. Like falling in love, hating, and a slew of other psychological binding forces based on drawing boundaries along what one cares about (“what matters”), once I am identified as and situated in a particular personality I would, ordinarily, no more think to choose consciously to re-identify myself as a different personality than ordinarily I would think to redefine myself by choosing to love or hate differently than I do; a personality is in that sense for most of us not a chosen “self” but, rather, as it were, “self-chosen.” (I will use scare quotes until we define and refine the concept of Self in §6.8.) That is, ordinarily most of us do not pick a personality for ourselves the way we pick out our clothes; our psychologies in that sense are as imposed upon consciousness as is the world. (Here it seems that Sartrean notions of radical freedom or even Krishnamurti’s of unconditioned consciousness may here to some degree apply, including and especially Sartre’s notion of self-deception and bad faith as means of avoiding the angst associated with such extreme, open, or unbounded, creative freedom.) All else being equal, when the subject becomes identified as a personality, the personality that thus becomes my “self” has little, if any, causal powers over the psychological contours within which it subsists (as Hume, Wittgenstein, Freud and Jung each in his own way and in varying degrees realized); and once I—the unidentified subject, “consciousness”—am then actually situated, literally, “in” it, I thereby become as it were twice removed, via tertiary identification, from the psychological contours within which I, qua subject, subsist identified as that bordered psychological complex. And that it is how, and why, we achieve the desired affect of finding ourselves as we now mostly do in the double bind of being psychologically unable to choose and create our Selves without self-deception, that is, perspicuously, openly, with maximal and virtually absolute freedom but—and I, there’s the Sartrean rub—responsibly.

Which, again, is not to say that I don’t have “free will.” On the contrary. Rather, it is to say that to the degree that I am identified as a particular personality in which I am situated and through which I am thereby psychologically attached—literally, psychologically “bound”—to my “self” I am, as a result, attached to what is conditioned, inattentive, unintelligent, virtually unconscious, eminently unreasonable, brutally selfish, philosophically irresponsible . . . and that is the degree to which I have no
free will. That is why, in fact, as we shall see, the path toward freedom lies in liberating ourselves—i.e., liberating the subject (consciousness, the unidentified “subject-in-itself”—from our “selves” (our identifications) not in the sense of “getting rid” of the “self” (§6.8), of becoming “no one,” or by being the subject devoid of personality but, rather, in the sense of getting rid of the psychological attachment (to the personality, an exclusively conjoined psychological complex personified from the first person point of view that functions both from a psychological and cognitive standpoint as my “self”).

What, though, is liberated from what? The unidentified subject of experience—I, “consciousness”—what is essentially unconditioned and therefore free—is liberated from what is essentially conditioned and therefore not free. But let us be extremely careful here. Objectification of the subject enabled by identification through the fourfold identification/dissociation manifold is one of the requisite necessary tools of subjectivity and, as such, a psychological virtue but the psychological attachment of the unidentified subject—the I—to those objectifications is a psychological vice. That is a very fine difference very easily overlooked, so much so that I believe it mars typical western attempts to understand both eastern philosophy and certain aspects of western theology. We might put it this way: You don’t get rid of what you can’t get rid of (i.e., the personality that is your “self”), you get rid of what you can get rid of, i.e., your psychological attachment to your self. One way to do this is to realize as Open Individualism allows that although you qua subject are your “self,” this is the is of identification, not the is of identity. In Open Individualism you, the unidentified subject, are more than who and what you believe you are, not less. Freedom means liberating you from your “self.” The goal is the liberation of the subject from psychological identification with, not as, the self.

Nor does Open Individualism get rid of the notion or significance of personal identity, as Parfit and other Empty Individualist theorists would have us do. Nor does Open Individualism ignore, as Closed Individualism does, the significance of the subject, which is necessary for the having of experience as we know it, nor thereby of consciousness (to the degree that the terms are synonymous), nor even of self-consciousness (both notions refined below). On the contrary: the liberation of (“return to” e.g. in Longergan’s sense) the subject from the self is one of our primary objectives. Open Individualism seeks therefore not to liberate the subject from subjectivity in favor of objectivity or vice versa but, rather, to put
psychological identification and dissociation into proper philosophical perspective. Open Individualism seeks to create in the human being a model of the new, open individual, as the next step in the evolution of the subject by arming the philosophy of personal identity with a personal philosophy: to critically distance the subject from identification as a particular personality and thereby liberate us not so much from our “selves” as from our attachment to our “selves.” Open Individualism—contrary to what the reader may at first glance think—is thus a call for transformation from the traditional “community” moral consciousness of Closed Individualism to the new individual moral consciousness of Open Individualism. Which, after all, should not really be surprising; communities of any kind end up, in the long and final analysis, being predicated upon and involving, in one often disguised form or another, the repression and bondage of subjectivity in general and of the subject (as no one realized better than Kierkegaard). Group identifications of any kind only deplete, through unnecessary repetitions—what Borges called, “the abomination of the mirror”—not ourselves (since we all already are one and in that regard infinite and unlimited) but, rather, our necessarily limited access to our sufficiently unlimited resources.

§ 6.5 THE SUBJECT, TAKE TWO: SELF AND OTHER

Note that even ordinary objects may help connect the subject—the “me-here-and-now”—not just with some past complex but as some aspect of that past complex, thereby functioning as a sort of “psychological glue” with which ephemeral psychological states get to a certain extent, and in varying degrees, unified (both at a time and over time). That tertiary identification is a deeply powerful binding force capable of functioning independently of the (intentional) object(s) identified is evidenced by the fact that people can, and typically often do, identify so strongly not just with particular religions, political movements, and so on but, even, as in the example above, with ordinary colors (witness e.g. the notorious “Color” gangs in California). Indeed, some people may literally “fall apart,” psychologically, without some such psychological-attachment-through-identification to serve as “psychological glue” or, even, as some also actually do, they may give up their own actual lives—their personal identities—in the defense of their psychological identifications. That is, a valuer engaged in the world may value his valuing not only more than the thing valued, but even more than what is, in part, the psychological by-product of that valuing—himself, the
valuer. Typically, people conclude on the basis of the strength of their identifications that the object(s) of their valuations must, in virtue of being of such great value in their lives, be of great value to their lives. But of course it may be the fact of identification itself, rather than the object(s) identified, that often (perhaps always) is the cause, not the effect, of such valuations—up to and including the case where, we might suppose, the valued object produced by the identification is that aspect of the valuer’s psychology bound into the “personality” that becomes one’s “self.”

Suppose I, a man, identify with women: “I like women more than men, I am closer to women, etc.,” thereby connecting, psychologically, with women. This is secondary (second order) identification. Or suppose that in my psychology I find myself identified as a woman: “I feel and think like a woman, etc.,” such that I am thereby connected, psychologically, with myself over time. That is, I may recognize myself over time to be a woman, even while, intellectually, the category to which I know I belong, and am individuated by, is, properly, that of a man. So it may be not that I merely identify with women more than with men, say by identifying with the plight of women, with feminist theory, etc. (secondary identification): as a woman I feel, deeply and emotionally, that I am a woman and that it is as a woman that I am known to myself as myself, that is, recognize myself over time; I am bound to, and being in turn bound by, those psychological borders within the overall psychology in which I subsist. That is tertiary (third order) identification.

“I, Daniel Kolak, am a man,” would, ordinarily, be considered part of a straightforward scientific taxonomy, based on physiological boundaries traced over physical borders that themselves exist as conscripted within the so-called “real” universe. “I, Daniel Kolak, am a woman,” would, ordinarily, if it were taken as a serious utterance of a rational male human being with a properly functioning visual and tactile apparatus, etc., be considered part of a taxonomy of psychological preferences which, in relation to the “real” physical objects, exist only in some lesser taxonomy of the subjective states of the human mind. But in the case where I am identified as a woman such that, within the psychology in which I, qua subject of experience exist, this is a way of connecting various psychological complexes together over time as myself, emotionally, intellectually, etc., then besides just claiming “I am a woman trapped inside a man’s body,” and not wishing to be categorized with males because I claim to be like a female, I actually do, as a matter of fact, think, feel, respond, behave, etc., as a woman. In that case, a personality may be
constituted in my psychology, over time, in the psychological contours of a woman, perhaps to the extent that except for the fact of my genitals, etc., most people who knew me would say, “You know, Kolak is, really, a woman—not physically, of course, but psychologically I don’t see why anybody who knows him and who also knows what women’s psychologies tend to be like would rationally think otherwise.” Although I should not wish to push this analogy too far, it is a useful, if somewhat limited, illustration of how tertiary identification as a particular psychological complex can, as it were, bind certain aspects of one’s psychology into a particular personality that thereby becomes one’s “self:” if identification is the glue that binds together the experiences of a person over time and concepts—or, the conceptual framework (conceptual reference frame), up to and including one’s self-concept—are the canvas onto which the psychological individuations are glued, then changes occurring either in the glue or the canvas may affect a change in one’s actual experience of one’s personality from the first-person point of view that, ordinarily, we call, my “self.”

Consider another example. After an accident my face has been bandaged and I have forgotten that I am a forty-six year old philosophy professor named “Kolak.” I now firmly believe I am a twenty-five year old philosophy student named “Scott” (my long-time protégé who died in the gruesome accident). The doctors tell me I am the professor, Kolak, not Scott, and that I only think I am Scott mainly for psychological reasons that, so they tell me, have to do with a combination of amnesia and guilt at being at the wheel when the drunk hit my car and accidentally killed Scott, conditions severely aggravated by a concussion.

Sitting there, partially paralyzed in my wheelchair, I do not believe the doctors. When they play a videotape of Scott, I point to the young man on the screen and say, “That’s me!” When they play a videotape of Kolak, I point to the middle age man on the screen and say, “That’s Kolak, my mentor.” When the doctors insist that I am the professor, not the student, I think they are joking or perhaps this is just another one of Kolak’s deviously clever experiments cooked up by him to pull the philosophical rug out from under me. Such a state of affairs, implausible as it may seem, has nonetheless been observed clinically:

Of particular note is the role of identification in the fashioning of a secondary personality. Margaret B., for example, when she was a little girl, had had a playmate, Harriet, to whom she was devoted. When they both were 6, Harriet was suddenly taken ill with an acute infectious disease and died in 3 days. Margaret was deeply upset at the time and wanted to die in her friend’s
place. At some undetermined time after that event, Harriet went “inside Margaret,” as Harriet reported when she held sway in consciousness, and she lived there quite happily for many years until Margaret “got religious” and their formerly common tastes for entertainment and pleasure diverged. Internalizing the image of her dead friend appeared to have protected Margaret from the despair and sorrow . . . that emerged unspent and unabated, to be observed in all its poignant strength when, under hypnosis, the adult patient was directed to revive these memories of an event then 30 years in the past. [Nemiah, “Psychoneurotic Disorders,” in Nicholi, Ed., The Harvard Guide to Psychiatry, pp. 234-258]

In the Kolak/Scott thought experiment, when I say, “That’s Kolak,” I am identifying properly: pointing, I say, “That’s Kolak, a philosophy professor, author of On Hintikka,” etc., and I give lots of correct biographical information that properly delineates Kolak from other people. After therapy, I begin to believe, intellectually, that this is no joke but that, in reality, I am Kolak, not Scott. When the videotape of Kolak and Scott is now played, I no longer identity with Scott as before and now, in addition to being able to identify Kolak, I identify with Kolak. But this (secondary) identification functions at a purely intellectual level. I can point to Kolak in the video and say, “That is who I am, Kolak,” etc. I am referring to myself properly. I now believe I am Kolak, I identify with Kolak, etc., but I don’t feel I am Kolak, in spite of referring to myself properly. Nor do I behave like him; within my overall psychology I am not identified as Kolak. 49

What is missing, of course, is the correct mode of presentation. When (still feeling that I am Scott) I say (because intellectually I now “understand” what psychologically I still don’t feel), “I am Kolak,” I am identifying myself properly to others and even to myself. But within the overall psychology in which I subsist as the subject I am not identified as Kolak. It still feels to me as if I am Scott, not Kolak. I can refer to myself as Kolak but I do not have the first-person point of view on myself as Kolak: I identify with Kolak (secondary identification) but am not identified as Kolak (tertiary identification)—which is not to say that there is “no one there inside my head.” Rather, it is to affirm that throughout the ordeal there is someone there, “me,” the subject in relation to which phenomena (e.g. objects) are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time (localized) from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, experiencing the world and being influenced through the psychological contours of a particular personality that I am identified as: I behave like and think I am Scott, not for instance Napoleon. As the therapy progresses further, however, becoming identified as Kolak (not just having the intellectual ability to refer to myself as Kolak) suddenly (and these kinds of shifts in
actual pathological psychological cases, discussed below, are almost invariably virtually instantaneous) recurs, at which point in addition to identifying with Kolak I am identified as Kolak.

Throughout the ordeal the subject is there (situated) in and among those varying psychological borders, “correctly” identified as Kolak, then “falsely” identified as Scott, and so on: when I think I am Scott, I, the subject, am identified as Scott. When I think I am Kolak, I am identified as Kolak. But, then, first, who is the I identified as the one self and then the other, and, second, who is the self and who is the other that I am identified as?

Before addressing either of these questions, let us first ask: what mode of error is this? Identified as Scott, am I mistaken about my identity? One is tempted here perhaps to answer yes; let us for a moment suppose it to be so. Am I then also mistaken about my existence? Well, clearly, unless we are prepared already at this point to split metaphysical hairs about the term, “existence,” if we are now for the sake of argument supposing the answer to the identity question to be yes then on the existence question the answer clearly cannot be yes, it must be no. Being mistaken about who I am can only reinforce the fact that I am. If, before the accident, I say: “I think I am Kolak, therefore I am,” and after the accident, “I think I am Scott, therefore I am,” and after the accident, “I think I am Scott, therefore I am,” and the intended denotation of the phrase, I am, is the proper name, then in neither case is the statement true. Not because I am not Kolak, but because what establishes the truth of the statement, “I am Kolak,” is not my thinking it. On the other hand, if the intended denotation of I am is in neither case the name being as it were pointed at but, rather, the I doing the as it were pointing, i.e., the intended denotation is the subject itself, the I, then in both cases the statement is true.

Perhaps not surprisingly, then, we may thus think to find ourselves agog here in old Cartesian territory, stumbling across our long banished unfamiliar familiar, the Cartesian Ego. Certainly a nothing, a nonentity, cannot be deceived about anything, least of all its own (non)existence. But how could the subject who as such cannot be mistaken about its own personal existence be mistaken about its personal identity? Impossible! Which is but to stumble back onto the fact that personal identity resides not in the identified persona, hidden, as it were within the psychology, but in the unidentified subject-in-itself.

Here we are in a position to discover not only the affirmation in the act of doubting of the “existence” of the doubting subject but the subject’s intuition (in the act of identification) of its own existence and identity as the
identifying subject: the subject is me, I am the subject, I am I. Here not the (false) ego of psychological identification but the (true) intuition of the subject-in-itself—the intuition of personal identity—rears its nonexistent head, the self-consciousness behind the mask of identification. For what I precisely cannot be mistaken about in this and other such examples of misidentification is the existence and identity of the subject, in so far as I know with absolute certainty that I exist, I am, and that I am me, that I am I. Indeed, the metaphysical misidentification reveals what the psychological identification conceals, namely, that the psychological objects of my psychologically binding identifications do not bind my personal identity. Personal identity is not closed under individuation and identification by any such known psychological borders. Or, to put it slightly differently: the borders of psychological identifications as such are not the boundaries of personal identity. We are now in a position to see why.

Clearly, it is Scott’s “public,” “outer,” personality, or persona, that after the accident I am (falsely) identified as. I am, in that specific sense and to a certain limited degree, “possessed” by Scott. Or, we should say: “Scott”—in so far as I, qua the subject am identified as (subject to) the psychological contours of that personality—“possesses” me. “Scott” possesses the subject. “Scott” becomes my “self,” I become “Scott’s” subject. I the subject cannot be identified as Scott’s “private,” “hidden,” or “inner” personality for the obvious reason that I-the-subject-identified-as-Kolak-about-to-be-jarred literally-out-of-my-self-by-the-impending-car-crash, have no direct access to anything but my own representations as presented to and through Kolak. All I the driver of the car know of Scott the passenger is the personality he projects to others. So the “other” that I am identified as after the accident is Scott’s public personality, or persona, represented to me in the overall Kolak psychology in which I the subject identified as Kolak subsist as Kolak’s subject, literally subject to those psychological contours. Now, if Scott’s public personality, or persona, becomes, in the driver’s psychology, the personality that I am then identified as—my primary psychological identification—who then—or what—in the driver’s psychology is the identifier? I, the (unidentified) subject, am the identifier, yes, but I who? It cannot be my (“Kolak’s”) public personality, or persona, which since the accident has, as it were, “abscended” from my psychology (taking flight [fugue] in, or being filed away into, the unconscious like a stored mask). Perhaps, then, the identifier is some aspect of my (Kolak’s) “private,” “hidden,” or “inner” personality. But that too is but an exclusively conjoined personified psychological complex that ordinarily I am identified
as and the personality that I am now identified as—my tertiary psychological identification—is the Scott-personality, not the Kolak-personality! What, after all, does “identified as the Scott-personality” mean? Finding myself identified as that persona means I experience myself (my inner psychology) and my world (my perceptions) from the first-person point of view of that personality; it means I find myself—my behavior, my likes and dislikes, my (seeming, or apparent) memories, my beliefs, and so on—psychologically bordered by and exclusively conjoined onto the complex of psychological individuations ordinarily recognized to be, and ordinarily called, “Scott.” Scott is my tertiary identification, my “personality (psychological, qualitative) identification.” But I who? Who is the person being thus identified as Scott? The question now is who the subject—the I, consciousness, the subject-in-itself—is that is being thus identified as the Scott personality? Again I answer: the subject is me, I am the subject, I am I, that person is I, myself. And when above I said that the misidentification reveals what the identification conceals I meant precisely this: my psychologically binding identification as Kolak does not bind my personal identity—my existence as a person is not closed under individuation and identification by such known borders.

What we have here, in other words, is personal (numerical) identity without psychological (qualitative) identity. This is what below we shall define in terms of the intuition of the subject-in-itself, what I call the intuition of personal identity. Denoted and expressed simultaneously to speaker and hearer, i.e., communicated, by two first-person indexicals conjoined by the copula, I am I, the intuition of the subject-in-itself is what ordinarily we simply and naively call self-consciousness.

But notice, first, again, that if we ask who the subject is that is being thus identified as the Scott-personality, the answer can’t be the Kolak-personality. Even when, after therapy, I will once again (even if once again for the first time!) identify with the Kolak-personality, I am still then identifying with a personality but am not as yet experiencing that personality from a first-person point of view—I am not identified as that personality, it has not yet become my primary psychological identification; I am recognizing, intellectually, that this personality—“Kolak-the-philosopher,” etc.—may be my “original” or “true” personality (rather than “Scott-the-philosophy-student,” etc.), but I am not yet experiencing myself as that personality from the first person point of view: experientially, it has not yet become my (dominant) personality, my psychological domain, my existential home. Hence our present puzzle: if the exclusively conjoined
psychological complexes that I am calling “personalities” become what I am calling the identified personalities, who, then—or what—is the identifier? I am, in both identifications, there, first identified as Kolak, then as Scott, then as Kolak again. So if the exclusively conjoined psychological complexes (“Kolak,” “Scott,”) alternatively become my identified personalities, to whom then am I, qua consciousness, the subject-in-itself bound? I will answer: to no one.

But let us be very clear here. Why is there even a puzzle here, really? Well, because ordinarily (in the Received View of Persons, i.e., Closed Individualism) we assume that there are but two possible answers to the above sorts of questions, only one of which is plausible: either it is Kolak or Scott who is the identifier and that, since in this case it is the Scott persona that obviously is the false one, the only possible answer must be “Kolak.”

But as we are taking great pains to show, Kolak turns out to be not even a possible answer to the question. The reason why Kolak turns out not to be a possible answer is that by disambiguating the reference of the name “Kolak” as we have done and are continuing to do, “Kolak” designates not the subject-in-itself—consciousness, subjectivity, the I—but the personality that the subject-in-itself is—that I am—identified as.

Now, of course, ordinarily, in Closed Individualism, I—the subject-in-itself, “consciousness”—am conceived being bound by, and belonging to, the personality (or the Self, as defined below), just as in the above case it seems at first that I belong to “Kolak” (or “Scott”). This is the standard, received view according to which the subject is the private property of the psychological object, i.e., the personality, or self, to whom it “belongs.” The problem with that view which we are uncovering here is that, as we have only begin to understand in the above sorts of cases, that is not the case. Open Individualism dispenses entirely with the concept of the subject (consciousness) as private property. The subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity—consciousness—is owned by no one, and no less so than is the intuition of the subject-in-itself, i.e., the intuition of personal identity—self-consciousness—common to all.

§ 6.6 THE SUBJECT, TAKE THREE: COGITO, ERGO QUIS EST?

As the therapy progresses further, becoming identified as Kolak (not just having the intellectual ability to refer to myself as Kolak) slowly returns until there is, in addition to identification with Kolak, identification as
Kolak. I am now situated in that Kolak-personality, experiencing myself and the world from the first-person perspective of that personality. My doctors rejoice because I have “come to my senses” and now I, as well as they do, think I am Kolak. Just as formerly while situated in (identified as) the Scott-persona I thought I was Scott, now I think I am Kolak. To whom, then am I, identified as and situated in the one personality, and then other, bound? Again, I answer: not the Kolak-personality, not the Scott-personality; I was (and am) them, those psychological structures were assemblages of my own mind, not anyone else’s.

Having thus finally “come to my senses” I now think I am Kolak, I find myself identified as that personality, etc. There I am now—the subject-in-itself, I—identified as and situated in that Kolak-personality, experiencing myself and the world from the first person perspective of that that personality, just as I was identified as and situated in the Scott-persona. I thought I was Kolak; now I think I am Scott. Who, then—what—am I, this subject-in-itself intuiting not only of the objects in experience but also itself—what we have named, the intuition of personal identity? Let us first go back to some of our earlier refinements to help us now define this new notion a little better.

§6.6.1 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED: THE INTUITION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY (I AM I)

Back in Chapter 2 we encountered our second apparent excluder, namely, the Alter Subject Identification. That you are to yourself the subject—which translates albeit ungrammatically into the statement that “you are I”—is for me, putting it still simply albeit more awkwardly, an intuition. To this we already alluded by noting that from a sortal point of view identifications are not interpretations but facts, albeit special sorts of facts, the way experience can be stated in incorrigible terms (e.g., I am being appeared to greenly). Now, in so far as this intuition as it were of “the subject in the object” (e.g. you) informs me that you, a fellow human being, have like me an internal, subjective mental life, that you are “subjectively illuminated from within” in the way ordinarily we suppose human beings, unlike rocks, amoebas, etc., are, it is the “independence” therein communicated that describes the sense in which to me you are to yourself once removed (phenomenologically and hermeneutically distanced) from the objects in your experience by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, whereby the subject therein thus exclusively conjoined is apparently able to immediately control some borders directly in experience individuated and
identified from the first person point of view as the exclusion of others. That is what it means, to me, to say that you, \textit{that body there}, are not “dark” inside—you are not an automaton, a “zombie,” etc.—which is but to repeat again in the more specific and for now only slightly more technical terms of our discussion above, that among the borders individuated in my experience some, like you, are identified not as mere appearances, empty of subjectivity but, rather, as having within themselves the subject therein exclusively conjoined, etc. Which is but to go back to saying yet again that while a border such as I encounter experiencing for instance a tree or a cloud is as a matter of fact identified in my experience as \textit{object} (objectification of the subject) in virtue of the relevant border dynamics, a border such as I encounter experiencing for instance you is, as a matter of fact, identified by me as containing within itself experience requiring within itself the subject, \textit{intuited as such in the object}, also in virtue of the relevant border dynamics (seemingly purposeful behavior, etc.).

Alter Subject Identification is thus, in affect, what can be expressed as \textit{an intuition of the subject in the object}. Given our locutionary dispensations above, this means that you (\textit{that border there}, the body individuated and identified as such in relation to me, \textit{this} subject of experience) are not \textit{empty} but have right there (somewhere) within those borders there what we call \textit{experience}, consisting of phenomena individuated and identified in (a mutually independent subject-dependent) perspectival space and time (localized) from the first person point of view, i.e., ‘observed,’ in relation to the reciprocally individuated and identified (localized) subject exclusively conjoined therein, etc. Now, in the same sense that the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment in virtue of the (internal) relation \textit{onto} locks me \textit{into} (my) experience, Alter Subject Identification locks me “out” of (your) experience (assuming you have any) while thereby locking you (assuming that you are there) out of mine, in virtue of the mutually “independence friendly” relation described above, locking us as it were \textit{onto} each other’s \textit{mutually inclusive “independence-friendly” exclusions}.

Thus, as we already pointed out, that you are not a zombie or a mere apparition but, rather, that within that object there too is the subject in relation to which objects are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time (localized) from an alter first person point of view, i.e., \textit{observed}, translates, albeit ungrammatically, into the statement “you are \textit{I} as I am \textit{I}.” This identification is, as I say, for me, an intuition of the subject in the object. It tells me that among the observed (individuated and identified in relation to me, the observer) there are multiple observers, each
one as it were “fixed” (again, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem) in a uniquely ostensibly described (axiom separable) perspectival space characterized by its vanishing point and unique point of convergence. Now, I cannot see these vanishing points but alas if I am a good enough mathematician I can construct them and, if I am a good enough mathematician and logician, appropriately relate the constructions with an “independence friendly” logic with (branching quantifiers) provided that my map of all maps is, as some of us (e.g. Eklund and Kolak) have argued it could be made to be, first-order.

Let us now thus primed address what we are presently in a rather better, perhaps even philosophically speaking privileged, position to do, as no doubt in their own way the good René and perhaps the not so good Augustine tried to, namely, to see that I am I—my intuition of the subject-in-itself—is also indeed an intuition, albeit of a quite different and perhaps very special, even unique, sort than is my intuition that, as above we managed to sort of put it, you are I—my intuition of you qua subject. The latter, stated in terms of Alter Subject Identification, is as we just saw semantically equivalent to “the intuition of the subject in the object.” In other words, that to yourself you are the subject in relation to which objects are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time (localized) from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, is to me an identification involving, also, an individuation, of the subject (qua mannigfaltigkeit [manifold], the Kantian “totality of experience as it is presented in sense”) by the subject (me) in relation to which objects (you) are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed. Now, the kicker: in my own case that is not the case. That I am I is for me not an intuition of the subject in the object (though very easily misinterpreted as such, due to what we defined in terms of tertiary identification as) but, rather, an intuition of the subject-in-itself, which we shall now flesh out as follows.

By “consciousness” we mean:

\[
\text{Consciousness}_{\text{def}}: \text{the subject-in-itself in relation to which objects are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed (“individuation” and “identification” themselves being intuitions of objects in space and time, respectively), denoted and expressed simultaneously by } I.
\]

By “self-consciousness” we mean:

\[
\text{Self-consciousness}_{\text{def}}: \text{the intuition of the subject-in-itself resulting}
\]
from the cross product of the (space-like) intuition of the subject (what we might think of, with a slight variation on the theme by Husserl, as “internal space consciousness”) and the (time-like) intuition of the subject (what we might think of, again with Husserl, as “internal time consciousness”), denoted and expressed simultaneously by I am I.

Over and above the intuition of personal identity, I am I—“self-consciousness”—is the intuition of the subject-in-the-not-itself, what I call, “moral consciousness,” denoted and expressed simultaneously by I am you; see §11.3.

Thus when we speak of the subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity (in contrast to the ego of psychological identification), and the intuition of the subject-in-itself, the I am I, the intuition of personal identity, what we mean is consciousness (the I) and self-consciousness (the I am I), respectively. That is, besides being aware of

1) objects in consciousness from which I am dissociated (e.g., clouds, tables, chairs, dogs—“That is not me, I am not that,”) and

2) states or events in consciousness that I associate (identify) with (e.g., thoughts, various beliefs, emotions, pains, pleasures—“Those are my thoughts, my emotions,”) and

3) structures in consciousness that I am identified (associated) as (e.g., the introvert, the extrovert, the private persona, the public persona, “Kolak,” “Scott,”—“That is me, that is who I am, that is my Self,”

I am also aware that

4) the subject of (1), (2) and (3) exists and I am the subject, I am I.

The intuition of personal identity is not the rational judgment, “I am so-and-so,” or the interpretation, “I am such-and-such;” rather, it is the formal (uninterpreted) intuition that I am someone, anyone at all, the subject qua subject, a “feeling of subjectivity,” of “I-ness,” of someoneness, the vague (but not unvivid), non-localized awareness of “my own presence” bordered apparently within whatever psychological bundle I, the subject-in-itself, find myself identified as, the I of personal identity situated as the fulcrum of space-like and time-like consciousness at the vantage point, the center of my world.

Elsewhere I have written about one of Descartes’ great contemporaries, the 17th century thespian Gaspard Teyssier,
an actor who knew his roles better than he knew himself, who could give up one role only to take
up another. He could never be without a mask, always he had his role to play, whether in the
theater or upon the stage of the world. Between roles Gaspard played at being himself, his greatest
role, to hide the darkness of his talent, the hidden flaw that made him a great actor, the greatest of
our time: that behind his many masks he was no one. . . . the ineffaceable horror that made it
possible for him to be anyone was the knowledge that he was no one, the emptiness of his
existence, vanity, pure, existential, vanity . . . . Behind his face was the nothingness of the mirror.

Descartes himself remarks, famously but perhaps not famously enough,

Just as comedians are counseled not to let shame appear on their foreheads, and so put on a mask:
so likewise, now that I am to mount the stage of the world, where I have so far been spectator, I
come forward in a mask. (Philosophical Writings, p. 3)

Unmasked (uninterpreted) from my tertiary identification by the
intentional act of, as it were, “un-identification,” in and of itself,
“unidentified (i.e., uninterpreted) identified” consciousness—the “I am p₁,”
“I am p₂,” etc., turned away from the p back in on itself—reveals itself to
itself as a particular someone—this I, this subject, this someone—appearing
always through a mask yet bound to no mask in particular, the un
apparently featureless form of consciousness, of subjectivity aware of its own
existence and identity, capable of taking on any apparent form p, of being
identified as any p. This self-conscious experience of myself not as
personality or “self” but as the subject-in-itself aware of its existence and
identity in space and time, respectively—not “I am Kolak” but “I am I”—is
me, the subject, as it were “caught” in the act of trying, without possibility
of success, to become its own object of experience, like an empty mirror
turned back in on itself reflecting nothing but its own reflecting (e.g.,
Jung’s “mirror that lies behind the mask and shows the true face”53). We
could try thus to understand the intuition of personal identity (the I am I)
by which the subject-in-itself, i.e., the intuition of personal identity, the (un)
self-conscious experience denoted and expressed simultaneously by I am I, as a
matter of phenomenological fact, is the subject as it were looking to itself
for its intended “object,” the intuition of personal identity obscured by the intentional act (the psychological object) of (“non-Self”)self-identification. Because of the virtually constant conjunction of the I (the subject qua its psychological function as identifier) with its designated object of identification, primary identification (i.e., identification as), the I’s primary phenomeno-psychological function

I am (p) [e.g., I am (Scott), I am (Kolak)]

is thus erroneously conceived by the subjects effort at self-conception in terms of the simple equation,

I = a [e.g., I = Kolak, I = Scott, etc.]

thereby alienating consciousness, subjectivity—I, the subject-in-itself, consciousness—from itself: personal (numerical) identity obscured through psychological (qualitative) identification, i.e., essential subjectivity obscured by the intuition of one’s own existence and identity.

Here we have arrived at that aspect of our existence that not only gives to our psychologies (i.e., to our psychological identifications, our personalities, our “selves”—see §6.7) our first-person points of view on our ourselves and our worlds but is necessary for the having of any such minded perspectives. It is what makes an analytic statement like “These experiences are my experiences,” a necessary truth, and why the indexical word “I” is indeed most aptly suited for simultaneously denoting and expressing the subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity. It is by reference to myself as the subject-in-itself (I) that the word “I” allows me to say (as I do in the various Border Dissolves) that I am not my brain, I am not my body, I am not my personality, I am not (as we are about to see in more detail) even my self. What I, the subject-in-itself, am—my personal identity—is revealed in and shown in the self-reflexive expression “I am I,” but hidden (masked) in what I am identified as, namely, the (psychological object of) my identification, “I am Kolak.” I, the subject-in-itself, thereby come to intuit myself as the subject-in-itself—I am I—in the self-reflexive act of intuition defined above as the intuition of personal identity in which I, the subject-in-itself, become, as it were, “the intended subject of experience.” The brain, the body, the personality, etc., may be necessary conditions for my existence as such (or not) but they are not sufficient for my existence the way that consciousness, subjectivity, the subject-in-itself, is.

The problem, in other words, with our seeing this is that in our experience
almost always we are identified as someone. Our solution to this problem, as the various examples show, is not to achieve some super-conscious or transcendental state in which I, the subject-in-itself, become as it were unidentified from my identifications (e.g., a “mystical” experience of cosmic unity), but by our various Conceptual Boundary Dissolves showing that where consciousness is (or goes) there I am, personal identity resides not in the psychological identification but in the subject-in-itself, regardless of the underlying cause (here too it is the effect that matters, not the cause). Indeed, the way I come to know myself as such is through the intuition of personal identity—self-consciousness, which is but the intuition, by the subject in relation to which objects are individuated in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, of the subject-in-itself, resulting from the cross-product of the space-like intuition of the subject and the time-like intuition of the subject.

Thus even when, as in the Kolak/Scott example, I experience myself and my world from the first-person point of view of the Scott-persona, the personality that after the accident I am identified as—that is, experience from the first-person point of view as myself—the subject-in-itself, consciousness, is there bordered, along with the intuition of personal identity: the Kolak-persona is gone but the subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity, is there; moreover, the awareness that someone present is identified as the Scott-personality and that I am that someone, is there: “I am, I exist, I am I.” That is, even though I may be mistaken about “who I am” or suffering from amnesia, that I am, namely, the intuition of the subject-in-itself—i.e., the intuition of personal identity, simultaneously denoted and expressed by “I am I”—is not only something I still do have, it is something I still do have vividly. Indeed, getting a sudden bout of amnesia would heighten the experiential vividness of the intuition of personal identity, and make me scream: “Who am I?”

So if the exclusively conjoined psychological bundle personified from the first person point of view that is a personality is experienced by the subject “from the inside” as the identified psychological bundle, then the I am I, itself the cross-product of the space-like intuition of the subject and the time-like intuition of the subject, the intuition of there being a person apparently bordered within that exclusively conjoined psychological bundle—the intuition of personal identity, whatever that ultimately is or may be from a metaphysical or ontological point of view (even an “illusion”)—is consciousness, subjectivity, as it were in the act simultaneously denoting and expressing itself by “I am I.”
I believe it is precisely here that the metaphysics, philosophy, and psychology of personal identity intersect. For it would be easy for some philosophers to try and diminish the significance both of the subject-in-itself—consciousness, the I of personal identity—and the intuition of the subject-in-itself—self-consciousness, the intuition of personal identity, the I am I—on grounds that in the one or in the other or in both cases we are talking merely about something psychological or even a psychological illusion (discussed again in Chapter 12). And it would be easy for some psychologists to try and dismiss our analysis of personal identity on grounds that we are talking merely about something metaphysical—such as, for instance, a concept—seeking logical conditions for what is not logical but psychological. But here, as we shall see in progressively more detail, the metaphysical, conceptual world and the experiential, psychological world intersect by both touching upon, and in turn being touched by, one and the same phenomenon, namely, the intuition of the subject-in-itself, I am I. This, the intuition of personal identity, is the I unidentified from its identifications, self-consciousness unmasked in the awareness of one’s own existence and identity. This phenomenon may be no more “real” than, say, the phantom limb phenomenon, an amputee’s awareness of his leg (which is no longer there)—a sort of “phantom identity”—and so may not be an experience of anything real but it is, at least, nevertheless, a real experience.

The subject-in-itself is not a persona, personality, nor “self.” It is the consciousness behind the mask. And the intuition of the subject-in-itself—the existential experiential component of the conceptual personal identity equation—is what psychological identification as a persona, or as a personality, itself, feels like. The persona is but a mask. The subject-in-itself—the I of personal identity—is the featureless form of consciousness, pure subjectivity, that lies behind the mask. The intuition of personal identity—the I am I—is the self-consciousness that makes it—or any other mask—feel as if it (and only it) is one’s own.

§6.6.2 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS LIBERATED: AVERROËS STRIKES AGAIN FOR THE FIRST TIME

In sum: consciousness—the subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity—is subjectivity situated within itself; this is the unique “insideness” aspect of what it means to be a mind rather than, say, a rock. There is of course a non-subjective sense in which the rock has an inside—you crack the rock open, expose the crystals in the middle, and so on. But you’re still just dealing with surfaces in that an object exists in the same 3-space that you,
as the subject in relation to which, etc., experience an object (you see the three dimensions of space but not the one of time). There is no subjective insideness to the rock, no subjectivity. To be the subject is to be on the inside in the orthogonal (i.e., mutually perpendicular, as when vector functions the integral of whose scalar product throughout space is zero) 4th direction, not “inside” in the 3-space sense. (Thus, trying to reduce consciousness—subjectivity—to the brain or anything else that is essentially but a surface is not an ontological problem but a mathematical misunderstanding of the worst kind, what in mathematics we call a howler.)

Likewise, and moreover, self-consciousness—the intuition of the subject-in-itself, the intuition of personal identity—is the minimally highest form of consciousness presently available to us (moral consciousness being one dimension, i.e., one degree of freedom, higher). However, in so far as what we mean by self-consciousness is not just temporal but an activity of the subject in time, not only must there be a point of view in the experiential, spatial sense of “view”—what I call, “the passive mode”—there may also be a point of view in the intellectual sense of “view”—what I call, “the active mode.” When experience (in the Cartesian 3-space manifold, \(x, y, z\)) converges to the point from which self-consciousness as such “emerges” (the fourth vector coordinate, \(t\)) what we have then emanating at the intersection \((x, y, z, t)\) is the active self-consciousness of the sort that any living being who is a person, such as we are, has and that any living being who is not a person, such as a bird, bee, or horse lacks. The bee’s degree and mode of mentality is such that I would be tempted to call the bee conscious in the sense that within those borders there is (I have no doubt, having been stung) the individuation and identification (localization) of phenomena (e.g. the objects of experience, e.g. my butt) in (perspectival, i.e., “subjective”) space and time from the first person point of view in relation to the (reciprocally localized, in relation to said objects) subject, except not denoted and expressed simultaneously to speaker and hearer, i.e., communicated using the first person indexical, \(I\), in so far as the bee has not the requisite language skills. Because bees have a point of view in the passive (purely phenomenological) sense but not in the active sense, under no stretch of the imagination would I call a bee self-conscious (it has no intuition of personal identity).

Bees, in other words, have “minds.” They are conscious (to the “dimmed” degree that subject sans language makes possible) but they certainly are not “self-conscious” in the way that we are: they do not have the intuition of personal identity. Nor is the bee actively self-conscious. That is, bees have
an “inside” in the orthogonal sense above; there is, literally, a light on inside their heads (light in the phenomenological sense, which is what we, too, call “light”—recall that “physical light” [photons, or quanta] is not bright, that is, that there are no brightness qualia supervening on those wave structures). But because they do not have language, nor a point of view in the intellectual sense (conceptual reference frame), and no intuition of the subject-in-itself—the intuition of personal identity, communicated by I am I—bees are only, at best, conscious, not self-conscious; putting it all together what this means is that the bee is therefore clearly not a person. The mind of a bee has what I would call phenomenologically locked (as in our dullest, most nonvivid and nonlucid dreams) consciousness (the subject-in-itself sans language and conceptual reference frame) but not phenomenologically liberated self-consciousness (the intuition of personal identity, liberated by language and conceptual reference frame), what (if and when need be) can function for us as a virtual minimal and necessary condition for personhood. Descartes, who I believe realized something akin to this, has also I believe been grossly misunderstood for centuries on this very point.

Self-consciousness liberated (i.e., unlocked from its phenomenology, the containing ε/δ manifold) is I believe the “active intellect” that Averroës claimed was numerically identical in all human beings. This can (if an when need be) answer the Cartesian problem of “I think therefore I am what?” with, “I think therefore I am a person.” What personhood requires can, if and when it needs to be stated in positive, minimalistic terms (rather than via negativa), be defined as self-consciousness (the intuition of the subject-in-itself, i.e., the intuition of personal identity, the I am I), liberated from the fourfold ε/δ manifold of its identification phenomenology. Thus ultimately to say that we are all the same person means that we are all the same subject-in-itself, the same consciousness, aware of its existence and identity (I am I), the same self-consciousness, liberated: the same open (non-local) self-conscious individual.

Subjectivity (e.g., self-consciousness) can thus be regarded as the “fifth, non-containing, or open” dimension (degree of freedom) of the “objective universe,” one and the same self-conscious being (the subject-in-itself, more fully explicated, from a philosophical point of view, than in Schrödinger’s and Wheeler’s quantum theoretical sense) localized at each and every space-time intersect of situated subjectivity, the multiperspectival open individual I limited to being literally no one and being therefore literally everyone, the existential fulcrum to all our many worlds.
§6.6.3 THE SELF AND I: IDENTITY FOR IDENTITY’S SAKE

Returning now once more to the more mundane, i.e., psychological, question raised above in the not so mundane Kolak/Scott example, let us ask: Who am I—Kolak or Scott? We can now answer: I am both. That is, when in the example I say “I am Kolak” (before the accident) and then say, “I am Scott” (after the accident), I am in both cases stating my (tertiary) identification as a particular personality that functions (through tertiary identification) as my “self” (defined below as consisting of phenomenal body + phenomenal mind, the phenomenal “body-mind” that I am identified as). That is the sense in which my “psychological (qualitative) identity” (i.e., my personality identification) has not just changed but changed completely—I have lost my personality identification, my “psychological identity” has changed, etc.—while I have not thereby lost my personal (numerical) identity. Clearly, there is a well-understood psychological sense in which the accident did in fact produce an alteration in my personality identifications, my “psychological identity,” but not a cessation of my personal identity. And there is also a clear and well understood philosophical sense in which I am the same person before my identification as Scott (when I was identified as Kolak), during my identification as Scott, and then after my (re)identification as Kolak. “Kolak” and “Scott” are in both cases personas, or personalities (the distinction between which I define below): I am identified as those personas. The accident altered, for a time, my psychological identifications (specifically, it altered my psychological identification as a particular persona), created for me a different “psychological identity.” Personal (numerical) identity is, logically, a transitive relation; if A = B and A = C, then A = C. “Psychological (qualitative) identity”—i.e., primary identification—however, is not; “I am Hamlet” and “I am Romeo” can be true of an actor who plays different roles but it does not thereby follow that Hamlet is Romeo. However, in so far as it can be shown that personal (numerical) identity is not the same as psychological (qualitative) identity, there can be one person who is (identified as) more than one personality. Thus, once again, in so far and to the degree that I am Kolak and I am Scott, within the mind-body complex within which I exist, “Kolak” and “Scott” are names for two qualitatively different personas, or personalities, each of which variably can function as my “self,” who are numerically one and the same I, that is, the same consciousness, meaning the same subject-in-itself.

Thus had the accident left me simultaneously identified as both the Kolak and Scott personae—e.g., I now had MPD—looking into a mirror I, Kolak
could say to Scott, or vice-versa, “I am you,” meaning not that Kolak and Scott are the same persona but that two different personas or personalities are, to borrow a psychological variant on a locution from Peter Unger, what we might think of as the psychological realizers, as it were, of one and the same I, that his thoughts, his emotions, his pains and pleasures, etc., are also simultaneously (without our being co-conscious of them) mine. This would then be a case of Local (“Insular”) Open Individualism; the explanation of Global (“Non-Local”) Open Individualism would then hinge on how it is possible that I identified as Scott in that mind-body complex over there and I identified as Kolak in the mind-body complex over here are one and the same person in spite of the I’s being in that case situated in numerically different mind-body complexes. Indeed, we have already seen arguments to the effect that such borders do not sufficiently significant metaphysical boundaries make, and shall do so yet again in much more detail. Dissolving the metaphysical significance of identification as Scott there and the identification as Kolak here when the shift occurs within the same mind-body complex is thus only a metaphysical step away from Open Individualism.

Is Kolak a person? As ordinarily understood, yes: proper names are used to refer to persons. Is Hamlet a person, is Romeo? Yes, as ordinarily understood—except in the latter case it is also true that there is no person who is Hamlet or Romeo unless someone at the moment is playing them on stage in which case yes, in that limited sense, there is. Where as there is presently a person who is Kolak. To say that I am that person is not to express the empty tautology, “Kolak is Kolak.” It is to say that I am here identified as a particular (dominant) personality that thereby functions as my “self” (the dominant personality/body-mind image) and, furthermore, that is “who I am” (i.e., who the subject-in-itself is). There is thus also an important sense in which proper names like “Kolak” can (and are) used to refer not to the person as such but to what a person is identified as. This is what Borges does in “Borges and I,” in which the thinking subject (i.e., the naked unidentified subject-in-itself in its cognitive mode) comes to realize, perhaps with some metapsychological and metaphysical vertigo, that—to put it somewhat paradoxically—“I am not what I am,” which can make sense not just in the case of the characters in Shakespeare’s plays (e.g., Iago) but also in the case of ourselves; our personalities are in that particular sense like fictional characters. Except in our case we are not works of fiction, there is a real person there, the one subject capable of living many lives. In that sense the subject is like an actor who plays many
roles: the person who I am—the subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity—is one numerically identical being capable of being identified as many different Selves.

When I am identified as Kolak that is the (dominant) personality functioning thereby as my “self;” I am Kolak. Ordinarily we would say this was my “true” personal identity,” meaning that my existence as a person therein consists. But, according to the view that we are here developing, I am Kolak, Kolak is the personality that functions as my “self,” which is to say that I am identified as Kolak but not that therein is my personal identity bound, that my existence begins and ends with Kolak. According to traditional Closed Individualism of course I cannot be anyone other than Kolak. But I can, as we have seen and will continue to see in more detail. And since I can and in so far as I can it would seem that Kolak can, because I am Kolak. But to the degree that Kolak can’t is the degree to which I and Kolak can be viewed as supervenient but not co-extensive. If “Kolak” refers to the body-mind image, my “self”-image, that I am identified as, such that Kolak is my “self,” then that self cannot be Scott or another other self, any more than Hamlet can be Romeo. But I can. This sort of (primary) identification is all there is to “self (qualitative) identity” (i.e., personality-identification) as opposed to personal (numerical) identity. This doesn’t mean that there is no Kolak or that Kolak is a fictional or imaginary character but, rather, merely that Kolak is like a fictional or imaginary character in that the name “Kolak” can clearly and distinctly in my psychology be used to refer to a role I “play” (in the identification game).

Likewise, when I am identified as Scott that is my “self.” Ordinarily we would say that Scott, however, was my “false” personality,” a “false psychological identity.” Which is just to claim that who I “really” am is Kolak, not Scott. Which is to presuppose that what personal identity consists in is some deeper (i.e., further, in Parfit’s terminology) fact such as physiological or psychological continuity. And here I claim, in tandem with Parfit, that there are no such continuities and no such further, deeper, overriding physiological or psychological facts—that is, no necessary or uncrossable borders, no boundaries. There is only the one fact that they both (e.g., Kolak and Scott) have in common: the subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity—consciousness—is that fact. And that is why I say that identification as a personality that functions as one’s “self” delineates the boundary of personal (qualitative) identity, up to and including “psychological identity,” but not the boundary of personal (numerical) identity. What this means is that personal identity is not one-one—a
relation, say, between person-stages, or personalities functioning as “selves” (bodies, minds, or any other sort of physiological and/or metapsychological person-stages) over time (as the fission cases already show)—but, rather, personal identity is one-many (one [nonlocal] I, many “selves”). Personal identity does not guarantee psychological or physiological uniqueness; in fact, it does not even require it.

This of course is rather difficult to believe. But this should come as no surprise. Deep philosophical truths about the world—consider, for instance, what quantum mechanics has to say about the nature of our universe—are often hard to believe; why should we expect any less of philosophical truths about ourselves? Parfit and many others have already realized this (i.e., his chapter, “How We Are Not What We Believe,” (Reasons and Persons, pp. 219-244). Parfit understands that if there is no personal identity, then there is no personal separateness:

If some unity is less deep, so is the corresponding disunity. The fact that we live different lives is the fact that we are not the same person. If the fact of personal identity is less deep, so is the fact of non-identity. There are not two different facts here, one of which is less deep . . . while the other remains as deep. There is merely one fact, and this fact’s denial. The separateness of persons is the denial that we are all the same person. If the fact of personal identity is less deep, so is this fact’s denial. [p. 339]

Such moves away from traditional Closed Individualism weaken the (metaphysical significance of the) boundaries between us. What Parfit and others already sympathetic to this sort of move lack, however, is an understanding of the degree to which there can be personal identity without personal separateness. For in so far as we can explain how it is possible that one and the same subject can be simultaneously identified as multiple personalities—be many “selves”—i.e., multiple identification without separateness of personal identity between my many “selves.” This possibility can be explained in a variety of ways that illustrate how the fact of personal identity is not bound to (closed under) some particular (interpretation of) “self identity” (i.e., the identification of the subject as a particular “self”). Later in this chapter in my Omni dissolve (§6.9), for instance, I will demonstrate in more detail how my existence as a person can be viewed as numerically identical across a variety of qualitatively different “selves.” Such changes are merely changes in (primary) identification as and describe not personal, numerical but psychological, qualitative identity. If one and the same person can thus survive such
changes so as to exist as one and the same numerically identical person, it
doesn’t mean that I have no personal identity but, rather, that personal
identity is not bound to “self identity.” I am capable of being many “selves”
such that these are the multiple instantiations of one and the same
numerically identical person, me, the subject; the one (I, who) is the many.

In other words, the direction my various examples, thought experiments
and arguments thus far point to is not that we are less than what we believe
such that there is no personal identity worth caring about (Parfit’s view) but
because the way we are less than what we believe (i.e., there is no one in
particular to whom I am bound) we are one person who is the multiply
realized, nonlocal subject of many “selves.” It is of course surprising even
to me to think that I can be anyone else other than Kolak; but I should not
be so surprised once I examine carefully

1) the question of how I came to be Kolak in the first place
and

2) the degree to which there is not any one “self” who is “Kolak” but
that there are actually a plurality of many such “selves” and I am all
of them.

In other words, I don’t lack identity; the sort of identity I do have (i.e.,
open) ensures that I, the subject identified as multiple personalities each of
which can function as my “self,” even though my existence as such is not
bound to any of them. I am bound to no one not because I do not exist but
because personal identity—my existence qua the subject-in-itself,
consciousness, the I of personal identity—is not limited, or bound, to the
psychological and physiological complexes in which (qualitative) “self
identity” consists.

We are here thus beginning to see what in sections below and in
subsequent chapters I will flesh out in much more detail, namely, the sense
in which “I am Kolak” and “I am Scott” can (and will) both be true, even
the sense in which “Kolak and Scott are the same person” is also true, even
though Kolak is one “self” and Scott another. “Kolak” and “Scott” in such
contexts are names of particular “selves,” in relation to which the person is
the essentially open I. We will thus continue to explain, in progressively
more detail, how it is possible that one and the same numerically identical
subject can be identified as two (and more) “selves.” This is the
(“psychological nonlocality”) possibility, in the above example, of me
finding myself identified as “I, Kolak” (the “Kolak self”) at one time and
identified as “I, Scott” (the “Scott self”) at another, then identified as “I,
Kolak” yet again. These different “selves” are all one and the same person.
In this and many of the examples we shall consider, one “self” has ceased and been replaced by another without breach of personal identity. One person, multiple “selves.” Usually it is thought that the relationship between the two supervenes, it is one-one. But as we have seen time and again not only can I continue to exist across a change in “self,” I can just as well altogether lose my “self” and continue to exist with identity. My existence as the subject—the I of personal identity, what not only matters but matters most to my existence as a person—is in that sense independent of the very physiological and psychological borders that I (the subject) am identified as. It is in this subjective light that Wittgenstein construed what he called the philosophical I, the metaphysical subject:

The philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body, nor the human soul with which psychology deals. The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the boundary - nowhere in the world. [Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 38-39]

Another philosopher who clearly saw the primacy of the subject in its proper light and its subversive power to overthrow all received views was Descartes. For among the many perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc., experienced by his variation on the subject, there is—besides the fact of perspectivality, discussed above—what Descartes referred to as the rational intuition of his own existence, beautifully and famously described in his most oft quoted passage:

I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the ‘I’ who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth ‘I think, therefore I am’ was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I was seeking.

Here then is the self-conscious subject, rightful heir unapparent to the throne made vacant by the banishment of our Cartesian Ego: I, resurrected.

§6.7 DISSOLVING OUR SELVES: THE ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER

Identification with a bundle of psychological individuations p, identification as a bundle of psychological individuations p and dissociation from p, etc.—the inverse fourfold identification/dissociation relation structuring consciousness (the fourfold ε/δ manifold)—are common
to normal human psychologies and seem to function as a sort of psychological “glue and scissors,” contributing importantly to how, within the ephemeral flow of one’s mental events, our lives get unified and separated to the degree that they do. The identification/dissociation relations between subject and object may thus point to some underlying mechanism(s) that when amplified becomes full-fledged multiple personality disorder (MPD). There is some controversy about whether MPD, as an actual psychological phenomenon, is real (i.e., whether there are, actually, such exclusively conjoined psychological complexes personified from a first-person point of view, separated from each other by a variety of psychological borders, including identification and dissociation, etc., as reported by patients). Among psychiatrists there are a slew of controversies—for instance, whether MPD occurs on its own or whether it is a phenomenon created at least in part by therapists. Among analytic philosophers, the controversies, even as they relate to the question of personal identity, take on more of a logical form. Ironically, Freud, who recognized the profound function identification plays in ego formation,

*Multiplicity of Psychical Personalities* - the fact of identification may perhaps allow of this phrase being taken literally (The Origin of Psychoanalysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Drafts and Notes, 1897-1902, p. 199)

already had this to say:

I did not even convince my philosopher even while he was providing me with the most admirable confirmatory material. Intelligence is always weak, and it is easy for a philosopher to transform resistance into discovering logical refutations. (pp. 304-305, my emphasis)

Until 1980, there were only 200 cases of MPD reported world-wide; during the next four years there were 1,000 patients known to be in treatment. Today there are about 4,000. The *DSM-III* manual defines the disorder as follows:

Multiple Personality. 1. The existence within an individual of two or more distinct personalities, each of which is dominant at a particular time. 2. The personality that is dominant at any particular time determines the individual’s behavior. 3. Each individual personality is complex and integrated with its own unique behavior patterns and social relationships. [*DSM-III*, p. 259]

The number of personalities varies from two or three to twenty or more. The difference between pathological cases and ordinary cases may not be as great as we might suppose. Psychotherapist John Beahrs, a specialist in MPD, claims that we are all multiple personalities, that the difference
between the psychological disorder and the psychological norm is one not of type but of degree; in the normal person there is stronger psychological identification across the psychologically individuated borders, or personalities, while in the disordered person the personality borders take on a far greater significance, causing widening psychological rifts (there is a weakening of psychological identification [association] between one exclusively conjoined personified psychological complex and another and a strengthening of psychological dissociation within and among them).

According to Beahrs,

... we are now faced by an unavoidable and somewhat disquieting new datum about consciousness. In normal human individuals, at least while hypnotized, there may be two personalities or more, each with his own consciousness, of which the other part(s) may or may not be aware. As we recognize that boundaries between hypnosis and the usual waking state are fuzzy, if present at all, there is the likelihood that consciousness occurs simultaneously at different levels within any human mind. [Unity and Multiplicity: Multilevel Consciousness of Self in Hypnosis, Psychiatric Disorder, and Mental Health, p. 28]

Apparently, in the normal person there is stronger identification between personalities, while in the disordered person the personality borders take on a far greater metapsychological significance, causing widening rifts (there is a weakening of tertiary identification between one personified psychological bundle and another and a strengthening of \textit{dissociation} within and among them). Different personalities can have different psychological and different physiological characteristics. Apparently, for instance, when one (multiple) patient’s dominant personality was in charge it took only five milligrams of Valium to sedate him; but while the dominant personality was in charge, even a fifty-milligram intravenous dose, which produces anesthesia in most people, had no effect and there is evidence of changes in right-to-left handedness, evoked response brain activity, cerebral blood flow, as well as differences in allergic reactions. In “Speaking For Ourselves: An Assessment of Multiple Personality Disorder,” Humphrey and Dennett report:

Well-controlled scientific studies are few (and for obvious reasons difficult to do). Nonetheless, what data there are all go to show that multiple patients - in the context of the clinic - may indeed undergo profound psychophysiological changes when they change personality state. There is preliminary evidence, for example, of changes in handedness, voice patterns, evoked- response brain activity, and cerebral blood flow. When samples of the different handwritings of a multiple are mixed with samples by different hands, police handwriting experts have been unable to identify them. There are data to suggest differences in allergic reactions and thyroid functioning.
Drug studies have shown differences in responsivity to alcohol and tranquilizers. Tests of memory have indicated genuine cross-personality amnesia for newly acquired information. . . . [p. 155-156]

To those steeped in a physicalist approach, such data should lend credence to the idea that MPD is real. In any case, Humphrey, a theoretical psychologist, and Dennett conclude, after a lengthy observation and analysis of MPD:

There can be no doubt that what might be called a “candidate phenomenon” exists. There are literally thousands of people living today who, in the curse of clinical investigation, have presented themselves as having several independent selves (or “spokesmen” for their minds). Such cases have been described in reputable scientific journals, recorded on film, shown on television, cross-examined in law courts. We ourselves have met with several of them and have even argued with these separate selves about why we should believe the stories that they tell us. Skeptics may still choose to doubt what the phenomenon amounts to, but they should no longer doubt that it occurs. [p. 153]

Philosopher Kathleen Wilkes, after examining the spectacular case of Christine Beauchamp, writes,

. . . we ought to conclude that . . . Prince [Beauchamp’s therapist] had three people to deal with. Arguments in favor of affirming plurality are more numerous than those suggesting singularity. [“Fugues, Hypnosis, and Multiple Personality,” p. 132.]

I too would agree that MPD is a real phenomenon. However, I think it is a gross conceptual error to call the multiple personalities “multiple people,” as Humphrey and Dennett do, that is, to conflate multiple personality disorder with what is being (I claim) (mis)conceived as a “multiple person disorder.” MPD is best understood as a disorder in which one person is numerically identical to a plurality of qualitatively different psychological complexes: borders that occur within a person over time happen to occur at a time. The shocking news is not that I can be many people—exactly the sort of logical paradox that, rightly, troubles and alienates most philosophers from the discussion—but, rather, that one person can be simultaneously identified as many personalities or “selves.” The terminology I have fashioned in the previous sections should thus satisfy not only the philosopher and the psychologist but perhaps even the theologian and thereby open the door to the real possibility that there is more to being a person than can currently be conceived of in our philosophies and represented in our psychologies.

Humphrey and Dennett have come up with the following five criteria for
what it would mean that MPD is “real”:

1. The subject will have, at different times, different “spokesmen” . . . . Both objectively and subjectively, this will be tantamount to having different “selves” because the access each such spokesman will have to the memories, attitudes, and thoughts of other spokesmen will be, in general, as indirect and intermittent as the access one human being can have to the mind of another. [“Speaking for Ourselves,” p. 153]

In other words, the access of one exclusively conjoined set of psychological individuations,

\[ a_1, a_2, a_3 \ldots a_n \]

to the psychological content of some other set,

\[ b_1, b_2, b_3 \ldots b_n \]

where each \( b_n \) has content-access to each \( b_{n-1} \)

and each \( a_n \) has content-access to each \( a_{n-1} \),

is apparently disrupted, such that, for instance,

\( b_2 \) has access to \( b_1 \) but not to any \( a \),

while psychological identification (within any \( a \) or \( b \)) occurs such that, for instance,

any \( b \) is to \( a_2 \) what \( a_3, a_4 \ldots \) are to \( a_2 \).

One of my other personalities may thus be as inaccessible to the “personality-here-and-now” as is the “personality-of-tomorrow.” My present personality seems to me right now to be real in a way that the personality of tomorrow (assuming, as is more than likely, that there is some change) is not and the personality of ten years from now is even less so: any future personality does not from my present perspective yet exist; the present one does. “He” is not right now real. “I” am. MPD is apparently a case where such phenomenological borders occur contemporaneously, such that from the first-person point of view of a particular personality there is the psychological conviction that it, the present personality, and only it, is the “real” one. Thus the cares, likes and dislikes, memories and anticipations, as they occur within any \( b \) will by association be weighted more toward “past and future” \( b \)’s than toward past and future \( a \)’s. The
borders of the $b$-set can in turn become so pronounced that when $a$’s cares, desires, and so on, conflict with $b$’s, there may occur various psychological “internal hostilities” among them. That is, within some $a$ there may be no identification with any $b$. As these differences become heightened, there may then occur, within any $a$, not only the lack of identification with any $b$ but the additional generation, within any $a$, of psychological dissociation toward any $b$; that is, there may occur, within the phenomenology of any $a$, the psychological feeling of “personal otherness” toward any $b$: the feeling, or sense, that $a$ is not $b$. This “feeling of non-identity” results from such quartic identification in direct contrast to the “feeling of identity” resulting from primary identification that any self (i.e., the self-conscious subject therein exclusively conjoined) feels towards states that it regards as one’s own. But within each $a$ there will be psychological identification with other $a$’s (tertiary identification) that are then in turn identified, by each subsequent $a$, from the first-person point of view as $a$, as the same personality within which the entire sequence of exclusively conjoined bundle of psychological identifications occurs:

2. Each self, when present, will claim to have conscious control over the subject’s behavior. That is, this self will consider the subject’s current actions to be her actions, experiences to be her experiences, memories to be her memories, and so on. (At times the self out front may be conscious of the existence of other selves - she may even hear them talking in the background - but she will not be conscious with them.) [“Speaking for Ourselves,” p. 153]

Identification thus functions importantly as a sort of psychological “glue,” stringing various psychological individuations within and among which it occurs—the persona—into an emergent concept of “self”—a (metapsychological and metaphysical) unity, which the subject is identified as. But what, from the standpoint of, say, neuropsychological theory, is “(primary) identification as?” I believe it may be a neuropsychological analog of what Freud in his Project (for a neurological model of the mind) referred to as Besetzung, neurons “filling up” with the “flow of energy” (electro-chemical discharges). Where as the German word means “fill up” or “occupy,” Freud’s translators—seeking to make Freud sound as technical as possible—chose Cathexis, whose Greek root means “to hold on to.” I would speculate that primary identification is a neuropsychological analog to some such physiological process, where the subject, the $I$—the self-conscious subject, capable of taking on any form—“fills up” and occupies a particular psychological structure and thereby “holds on” to itself through
remembering: speaking anthropomorphically and with philosophical tongue in cheek, one might even say that it is almost as if the subject—consciousness, subjectivity—so fears its own amorphousness that it prefers instead to suffer any bondage, any objectification of itself.

In MPD, each personality functions as an apparent unity but with significant conscious psychological individuation and dissociation, from other such unities. Thus,

3. Each self will be convinced - as it were by “her own rhetoric” - about her own integrity and personal importance. [“Speaking for Ourselves,” p. 153]

(I will argue later that the “rhetoric” may better be understood as a rationalization that is itself more of an effect of psychological identification, less its cause.) Furthermore, both

a) the “other” (psychologically individuated) “personalities” within the one human being and

b) the other “personalities” in other human beings (for instance, the personality of the therapist), will accord to these psychological borders the same metapsychological and metaphysical significance:

4. This self-rhetoric will be convincing not only to the subject but also (other things being equal) to other people with whom she interacts. [“Speaking for Ourselves,” p. 153]

Finally, each personality will function as an apparent unity but with significant conscious psychological individuation and dissociation, from other such unities:

5. Different selves will be interestingly different. That is, each will adopt a distinctive style of presentation, which very likely will be associated with differences in physiology. . . . [“Speaking for Ourselves,” p. 153]

In calling each personality a “self,” Humphrey and Dennett are tracing the boundaries of the “self” along borders described in large part by what (in Chapter Two) we called, “the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment.” If it is possible to view such instantiated borders both as “selves” and as the individuated selves of one individual subject, a person who has the multiple “selves,” then MPD is a real-life psychological analog to our split-brain Physiological Dissolve. That is, just as we imagined how it is possible that one (numerically identical) person could be more than one human being, more than one brain, etc., we can imagine how it is possible that one person could be more than one “self.” Multiple personality disorder may thus be a real-life version of what we imagined in the minded version of the Dream
Analog, where the minded characters are individuated and identified by

1) the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border,
2) the Assumption of Mindedness Border, and
3) various types of Psychological Border, such as content-access, personality or character type, and unified, to the degree that they are, by psychological identification.

§6.7.1 PERSONAS, PERSONALITIES, AND SELVES: FROM A METAPHYSICAL AND METAPSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

What then, is meant by a “self?” It depends on which borders are being referred to and how much (metaphysical and metapsychological) significance is accorded to them. What MPD shows is that apparently within us there can occur a plurality of psychological bundles personified from the first-person point of view: simultaneously the subject is identified as each persona, resulting in multiple “streams of consciousness,” without “co-consciousness,” separated from each other by a variety of borders very much like the ones we imagined in our Dream Analog II. Since there are at least three distinct levels of psychological significance our concepts can track, I choose to use the following as a way of avoiding the potentially confusing synonymous usage of “persona,” “personality” and “self.”

**persona**

*def:* an exclusively conjoined personified psychological complex individuated from other such complexes via qualitative differences in style, behavior, expression, etc.

**personality**

*def:* a persona within the psychological borders of which the subject is exclusively conjoined.

**self**

*def:* a personality where there is

1) little or no psychological content-accessibility (via FEC) to that personality from any others
2) where there is psychological identification from the first-person point of view as that personality (primary identification) at the exclusion of any others toward which
3) there may be psychological dissociation (up to and including quartic identification) and
4) this entire locus of intentionality as such is conjoined (via FEC) to the phenomenal body-mind.

Suppose I have both an extroverted, ruthless, bold persona and also an
introverted, sensitive, meek persona. Suppose, further, that when identified as either persona—that is, when one or the other persona becomes, within my psychology, the currently worn mask to which the subject is exclusively conjoined, thereby functioning as my personality—I not only identify with the characteristics of each persona I also am identified as one or the other of them. That is, there is within these two personalities when either of them occurs,

1) content-accessibility,
2) psychological identification both as each complex and with each complex, and
3) little or no psychological dissociation between them.

Since there is no additional psychological identification and dissociation to further individuate these psychological complexes, let us call them \textit{personalities}, either one of which can become a \textit{self}. The two distinct complexes would thus be the two personalities of one self.

By \textit{self}, on the other hand, I mean a personality that I am identified as but bordered from the rest of the psychology (within which I thereby subsist) by more than mere differences in style and behavior. The individuated stylistic differences may be buttressed by FEC (the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment) Border, both of bodily control and of psychological control (for instance, psychological content accessibility, memory access, and so on, via identification as the body-mind image). In that case we shall mark the added (metapsychological and metaphysical) significance of these borders by calling the complexes individuated by them, “distinct selves”—rather than calling them, merely, “distinct personalities.” We could choose to use our words differently but this is not important so long as we are aware what borders our words are tracking and we do so consistently.

Understood in this way, \textit{persona}, \textit{personality} and \textit{self} denote increasing levels of metapsychological and metaphysical significance accorded to various exclusively conjoined complexes of personified psychological individuations. To ask whether such psychological borders amount to boundaries between persons is to ask whether such borders signify the boundaries of personal identity so that we have, thereby, due to those borders, necessarily, the existence of more than one person. To thus claim that I have a self and that I, a person, can \textit{be} more than one self, is not to deny these borders but, rather, to deny that these sorts of borders necessarily signify the boundaries between the life and death of one person and the beginning of the life and death of another. (This for instance implies
that legal cases where the status of a multiple’s selves as moral agents—i.e., persons—is at issue, the best answer is that MPD does not a multiple person make: we are in all such cases dealing with one person who is many selves.)

Indeed, unless personal identity can be understood as more than mere personality identity, the resulting awareness of one’s identity and continued existence over time is merely but a false psychological appearance. (There may not be any such personified psychological complexes, of course. There may only be the borders without any such requisite significance.) In that case, the subject itself—consciousness, the I of personal identity—as such would be but a type of psychological illusion, as would self-consciousness (the intuition of personal identity) be even more so. Indeed, it seems, in that case, we would be an illusion. (That is, in the traditional Closed Individual View there would in that case be no persons and so our present system of carings would turn out to be much ado about nothing.) After all, what allows, or makes it possible, for me to identify myself—in spite of noting various personality differences—over time to the extent that I do? My present personality is very different from when a young boy. If personal identity consists just in personality identity, then it is not possible for me to be identical with any or my past selves, any more than for one experience or sensation (say, the pressure of the keypad against my fingers) to be identical to some other, qualitatively different, experience. Indeed, even in the case where experience \( e_2 \) at time \( t_2 \) is qualitatively identical to experience \( e_1 \) at \( t_1 \), unless there is the subject in relation to which the qualitatively different experiences are individuated and identified (localized) in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, then \( e_2 \) and \( e_1 \), two qualitatively identical experiences, are not actually identity-related. They would merely be misconceived as being identity-related.

Thus, noting the difference between a Personality Border without the added Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border (including both accessibility to the physiological control system and accessibility to psychological content via identification as an “on-line” body-mind image), etc., and a Personality Border with the added FEC Border, etc., we are using “personality” to refer to the first, and self to refer to the second. Humphrey and Dennett, in writing about the “alters” (differing personalities) who apparently co-exist within one person, suggest:

. . . alters must in general know perfectly well that they are not “people”; they are basically sane and well informed, and capable of roughly normal reality testing. But if they are not people, what
are they? They are what they are - selves, for want of a better word. As selves, they are as real as any self could be: they are not just imaginary playmates or theatrical roles, on the one hand; nor, on the other hand, are they ghostly people or eternal souls sharing a mortal body. It is possible for some therapists, apparently, to tiptoe between these extremes, respecting without quite endorsing the alters, sustaining enough trust and peace of mind in their patients to continue therapy effectively while eschewing the equally (or even more) effective therapeutic rout of frank endorsement (with its attendant exaggerations) followed by “fusion” or “integration.” Anyone who finds this middle road hard to imagine should try harder to imagine it before declaring it a conceptual impossibility. [“Speaking for Ourselves,” p. 160]

In my view, we can understand “fusion” and “integration” as

1) the occurrence, within two exclusively conjoined selves, of identification with or even identification as the other,
2) the cessation of psychological dissociation between them and
3) the designification, within the conceptual framework, of the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment and other such borders along which various identified personalities may be individuated. (For instance, while my extroverted personality is at full rage the introvert may not be able to soothe the emotions of either the extrovert nor of some “external” personality being extroverted upon, due to the fact that the introverted personality cannot “get a word in” or that it cannot “get an emotion in” or that it cannot “get control of the body,” and so on, but this dynamic could suddenly change).

For our purposes what is required is not that MPD is real but that it illustrate the range of what is possible so that we may then better explain how it is possible. In seeing how it is possible that one person can have multiple personalities, individuated from each other via FEC and other types of Psychological Border so as to be more than one self, within the physiological and psychological borders that constitute one human being, we can begin to understand how it is possible that one person can be more than one self even when the multiple selves occur in more than one human organism.

§6.7.2 FEC, EMOTIONS, AND METAPHYSICAL REVERSAL

Typically, we do tend to experience ourselves identified as our selves; there is accorded great significance to such psychological borderings within our psychologies—not just theoretically but experientially. This occurs not via the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border but, oddly enough, on just
the reverse of FEC. That is, typically, those aspects of our behavior that seem to be changeable or controllable at will (from the perspective of whatever personality or self we find ourselves most identified as), we (from that first-person perspective) do not identify with as our own: that is, we do not take them to be the actions of our actual, or “true” selves. Rather, we take them to be mere performances, acts “faked” by our true selves. On the other hand, those aspects of our behavior that (from the first-person perspective of whatever personality we find ourselves most identified as) cannot be changed or controlled at will, we do tend to identify with as aspects of our “true” selves. It is as if when we turn inwardly the meaning of FEC gets reversed, as if reflected in a metaphysical mirror.

For instance, if I ask you whether on some occasion you were really angry, in answering you would probably look to see whether your anger was apparently controlled by you (whether you “possessed” it) or whether your anger was apparently controlling you (whether it “possessed” you). 69 If the psychological individuation we ordinarily call your “mood” (how you feel presently about your occurrent psychological states) was an effect of the anger, typically, the anger is identified as being “you,” where as if your conscious psychological state was the cause of the anger, the anger is viewed as a sort of clever deception, an act: you identify it with an aspect of your psychology (“I was just pretending, making up the emotional state to achieve affect so-and-so”), but not as you (“my emotional state made me do so-and-so”). When the self from whose first-person point of view you happen to be experiencing yourself and the world is the acted upon (by whatever emotions are present among your conscious psychological states), the emotions and states are identified as belonging to you; you “are” them—they “possess” you. Where as when the self from whose first-person point of view you happen to be experiencing yourself and the world is (appears to be) the actor, these same emotions are dissociated from, that is, are interpreted as not you—they are recognized as “yours” in the sense that they are being generated by some aspect of yourself, but you do not consciously identify with them as being really you,“ in the sense that you are yourself in part generated by, or sustained by them (you do not seem, to yourself, to consist in them); you “are not” them—you “possess” them. Now, why should it be that when looking outwardly at physical appearances the FEC Border is interpreted as signifying a boundary between self and other, while looking inwardly at psychological appearances the FEC Border is interpreted in exactly the opposite way? Again, the interpretation of the FEC Border reverses itself as if in a
metaphysical mirror: what used to be identified within the FEC Border as self now becomes excluded without the FEC Border as “Other.”

I believe the answer may be that, roughly, deep down we realize that the self is, as I have argued, an effect, not a cause. That is, the self that I am identified as, along with the entire body-mind image to which I am thereby exclusively conjoined (via FEC) is recognized as not being an “agent,” a “real” being, i.e., not the cause of itself. Whatever is thus apparently generated by the self is in reality the (seeming) effect of an effect and hence a type of psychological illusion that is itself part of an elaborate self-deception—albeit a necessary (“user friendly”) one.

§6.7.3 ALTERING OURSELVES PHILOSOPHICALLY

Typically, when the individuation and separateness of persons assumption (pg. 7) is formulated within one’s conceptual framework (Conceptual Reference Frame), it is done in large part on the basis of personality borders. Recognizing the fluidity of these borders within ourselves, we identify within ourselves, via FEC, etc., a sense of seeming psychological fixity: the “inner” or “true” self—self the creator—vs. the persona, or “public,” or “false” self—the self created. By “seeming psychological fixity” I mean, for instance, my perception of my inability to act, within some specified range of possibilities, one way rather than another. I, identified as a self, am at present both interpretatively and emotionally bound to the exclusively conjoined personified bundle of psychological individuations, identified as this personality and these emotions, etc., which apparently fix the bounds of “my” behavior and which are themselves generated not by that of which I am cause but by that of which I am effect.

For now let us simply note again that within any personified psychological complex identified as self there is identification with some psychological individuations and dissociation from others (in both cases, typically, toward individuations not present in one’s occurrent psychology) as follows. In the case of externally directed identification, there is identification toward the inside of whatever psychological unity is drawn by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border, while there is dissociation toward the outside of the FEC Border. Where as in the case of internally directed identification, there is identification toward the outside of whatever psychological unity is drawn by the FEC Border, while there is dissociation toward the inside of the FEC Border. This suggests that the identification/dissociation relation structuring consciousness—the fourfold
manifold—does not occur consistently. We are led by psychological identification to draw the distinction between self and other first one way, then the other, independently of the nature of the borders towards which the identifications and dissociations occur: in the one case FEC defines my extent—how far my perceived identity, delineated outwardly from the inside by FEC, extends and then stops—in the other FEC defines my limit—how far my perceived identity, delineated inwardly from the outside by FEC, reaches and where my identity begins.

I have argued that it is identification and dissociation that generate, within and among the psychological complexes within which they occur, the attachment of, say, a particular “outer” persona to the subject. In other words, besides a variety of “empty” psychological complexes—memories, sensations, emotions, thoughts, non-conscious dream characters, etc.—among which there is no identification as self—there can occur personas with the subject—i.e., personalities—among and within which the subject is thereby (primarily) identified as self. Indeed, the “psychological power” of the subject over the self seems to create such a strong sense of obviousness in the subject that the distinction between self and other seems utterly impenetrable by reason, like a cloud of emotion that no amount of reasoning can dispel.

If such an analysis is, roughly, viable, it would suggest that—leaving aside for the moment borders described by psychological content-accessibility such as memory, to be discussed next—a change in identification/dissociation within my occurrent psychology would cause a subsequent change in my self in that it would change the sensed borders, within my occurrent psychology, of me: it would change how the elements of my psychology were weaved with the subject into a self, altering which personality I am—thereby altering how I actually felt, psychologically, about who I am. Such a change could come about as a result of a change in my concept of personal identity. This is because—although identification and dissociation function, in large part, as the psychological “glue and scissors” of the self—\footnote{71}{The identification/dissociation relation is itself not the cause of one’s concept of personal identity. Rather, the identification/dissociation relation is itself, in large part, an effect of the conceptual reference frame (a concept derivative). It is as if identification and dissociation are “psychological middle-men” connecting psychology of self with philosophy of self. In that case, if I am on this point correct, becoming consciously aware of these distinctions may by altering our philosophy thereby alter our psychologies.} the identification/dissociation relation is itself not the cause of one’s concept of personal identity. Rather, the identification/dissociation relation is itself, in large part, an effect of the conceptual reference frame (a concept derivative). It is as if identification and dissociation are “psychological middle-men” connecting psychology of self with philosophy of self. In that case, if I am on this point correct, becoming consciously aware of these distinctions may by altering our philosophy thereby alter our psychologies.
There is some extremely interesting—though as yet incomplete—empirical evidence that such psychological change through conceptual analysis is in fact possible. For instance, although accounts of multiple personality disorder usually focus on the therapist and the multiple’s condition while a multiple, and not after the “cure,” there are extremely dramatic and perhaps revealing accounts of how the multiple feels after the cure. Chris Sizemore, the Eve of the “three faces of Eve,” writes,

I am frightened, just a little frightened. . . . If knowing the truth makes one free, it also makes one naked, exposed, unguarded, afraid. Where are they [her other “selves”]? Where did they go? Before, they have always come when I needed them. I was we; now I am I. “I” is so cold, so alone. Who am I? Where are we? O, my God, is this sanity, is this what they [the doctors] have been trying to bring me to? Why didn’t they leave me alone? They’re all so sure, so confident, so smug. Why did they have to tell me? I didn’t believe them at first, I was angry, I felt betrayed. I knew what I knew, and they knew, too. Everybody knew; it is even written in books. . . . How can something that has always been true become false just because they say it is? But it did become false; even as they were saying it, it became false. And I knew that it did. With all of my being struggling to hold it, it vanished. My place, my world, my selves - vanished. . . . They tell me that I am real, that I have always been here and been real - the only real one. But how can it be? I knew them [the other personalities], saw them, touched the work they produced, kept the possessions they left, felt their parting agonies. I have notes they wrote in the diaries, paintings. . . . It was not Eve, not Eve White or Eve Black - anyway, that’s just what the doctors called them. But I was Eve, I know I was Eve - and now I am not Eve. They say I was Eve and that I am still Eve, but she is gone - she left, she died, they died. If I were Eve then, did I die, too? My mind closes, it shuts it out. Can you die and still live? [I'm Eve, Preface]

The passage is suggestive of how the philosophy of what a person is can affect a change in the identifications and dissociations by which the subject weaves through a psychology, thereby changing the actual contours of the self (or selves). It is as if our self-concepts guide the identifications and dissociations which string together various complexes of psychological individuations into a self, thereby connecting our philosophies with our psychologies and contributing importantly to the ways in which we actually experience ourselves. That is how it is possible that changing the fundamental ways we conceptualize ourselves can change our selves, in the sense of altering our actual psychologies. It is in that sense that we are not just biology and psychology: we are also philosophy.

This will has of course important ramifications to the whole question of personal freedom, i.e., what in my view amounts to freedom of the subject from attachment to the self (e.g., §6.4). In the Chris Sizemore case—as in
the case of most psychotherapeutic alterations of the self—the “upside” is the improvement through unification of proper functionality but there are at least two downsides. One is an aspect of the unification itself that, because it is achieved in effect by eliminating or absorbing the other selves, is a way of becoming less than what she was before the alteration, as she herself laments: “. . . I was we; now I am I. ‘I’ is so cold, so alone . . .”. The second is that the alteration of the identification/dissociation relation is achieved through an “other;”—i.e., the therapist, a psychological structure toward which, from Eve’s first-person perspective on herself (her apperceptions and inner psychology) and her world (her perceptions)—toward which there, there is quartic identification. To put it, for now, in the most simple and straightforward terms: unification achieved through quartic identification is a formula not for freedom but servitude of the subject. It is to subjugate subjectivity to objectivity and thereby restrain or even preclude the possibility of a true evolution (revolution) of consciousness.

In any case, understood in this way, psychological borders between you and me signify, according to traditional Closed Individualism, boundaries between two different persons. What for our present immediate purposes is deeply revealing about MPD is that when apparently such borders occur simultaneously within one human being they can and should be viewed (and, typically, are so viewed) not as boundaries between persons but as the borders within one person. What makes it possible within Closed Individualism to view such borders this way is that they occur within one human organism. But we have already seen how the various types of Physiological Border that signify numerically distinct human beings do not thereby necessarily signify different persons. And so the fact that the above sorts of personified psychological complexes (personalities) occur within one human organism over time vs. within different organisms at a time seems a less crucial difference that supposedly makes for the (metaphysical and metapsychological) individuation and separateness of persons.

It is of course surprising under Closed Individualism that I could be viewed as being identical to more than one self (in the way that we are using the term), each of which is qualitatively different from the other. But it is surprising only as long as we do not attend carefully to what is actually going on within our own psychologies. Such borders occur regularly within us—it is just that ordinarily we do not consciously notice them (though they can be noticed). It requires, for one thing, understanding the nature of the relationship between I and self, i.e., between the subject and the self. Multiple personality disorder presents us with cases where, apparently,
what goes on unnoticed within us, ordinarily smoothed over within and among psychological individuations, becomes apparent both within the psychological complexes in which they occur and also among the complexes within which they do not occur (that is, noticed by “other” selves “within” that body and by “other” selves “in” other bodies).

Now, typically, there is little or no (primary) psychological identification between me and you and plenty of dissociation. That is, looking at you is very different from looking at my reflection in a mirror (over and above the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment; even if your limbs moved as my limbs move in a mirror, it would not feel as if I were looking at myself. Many lovers, however, report that there occurs not only identification with the other but even, to a certain degree, identification as the other.) What MPD illustrates is that apparently one person can be identified as more than one self: I within the confines of my own mind can be the (nonlocal) subject “localized” within more than one simultaneously existing personality separated from other such personalities by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, etc.—just as in our Dream Analog II. In other words, MPD illustrates that what is going on, psychologically, between us—tertiary identification as more than one self—can also be going on, psychologically, within us. It means that at this very moment I can be more than one self. For now, how this is possible is revealed only locally, that is, within one human being. But, as I said earlier, from there it is a small step, as we shall see, from traditional Closed Individualism to Open Individualism.

For now we are thus free to conclude that, by themselves, such psychological borders are not of sufficient metapsychological significance to merit drawing the boundaries between persons along them. But perhaps this is only because the possibility of identification as more than one self occurs within one human organism that makes it plausible that I could be, as we have been using the term, more than one self. And there is still the Psychological Border individuated by psychological content-accessibility. What happens if—as we believe to be the case between you and me—there is no psychological continuity at all?

§ 6.8 THE MEMORY DISSOLVE

It is fairly easy to imagine a case in which a person survives across a complete break in psychological continuity. You have just contracted Memoraids, a dreaded and incurable new brain virus that feeds on certain information stored in the neurons of the cerebral cortex so that you will
gradually get complete amnesia. Not only this, but your personality along with all your psychological character traits will gradually dissolve while otherwise leaving your neurons perfectly intact. Then, after some breeding time, the Memoraids Virus will secrete foreign information onto the neurons, giving you new memories, a new personality, and so on. What this means is that, as the virus begins to eat away at the information in your brain, you will after a while no longer remember who you are and your personality might change in various ways.

Is Memoraids death? Or is it amnesia plus personality change? If this type of Psychological Continuity—continuity of memory—is what matters primarily to one’s existence as a person then the Psychological Continuity Border is a definite and uncrossable boundary between persons and getting Memoraids is a way of dying. This would mean that the description just given in which the person undergoing Memoraids is referred to, simply, as “you,” is itself a bogus description in so far as it begs the personal identity question. I believe, however, Memoraids is not a way of dying but a way of getting new memories and a new personality. I thus believe the description above given in the second person is a possible description. Here is why. Suppose Memoraids turns out to be worse than I have thus far described. During the amnesia period, you will undergo horrible suffering. Excruciating physical pain unlike any you have ever imagined will overtake your entire body. No pain killers can cure it; it turns out that general anesthesia, if administered to a person who has Memoraids, is lethal. You will thus have to be restrained by a strait-jacket for those several agonizing days during which you will scream and howl incessantly. Then, after this ordeal is over, the virus gradually begins to secrete new memories into your neurons. This process wipes out all memory of the horrible pain you will have just undergone. Finally, in the last stage, after new memories and psychological characteristics have been secreted into your brain, there is another bout of horrible pain that lasts for several more days until, by some mysterious process, finally the virus leaves with its new information to go searching for a new victim.

Now, you have just been told you have Memoraids. What are you afraid of? Death or pain? If you draw a distinction between one person and another by tracing metaphysical boundaries across the Psychological Continuity Border—that is, if you believe it is psychological continuity that matters primarily in personal identity—then it is your imminent death that you are afraid of. Moreover, again this would imply that the description above is bogus in so far as the reference of “you” before the Memoraids and
the reference of the “you” after the Memoraids is not the same reference. But that assumes, without argument and against the arguments we have already considered against the notion that what “you” refers to is not your persisting memory-complex but, rather, the subject. If, on the other hand, you fear the imminent pain, then to you the existence of such psychological borders does not, in and of itself, signify metaphysical boundaries between persons: such borders are not, necessarily, boundaries where one person ends and another begins. Personal identity, then, which often seems to go together with psychological (qualitative) continuity, is on your view not bound by such borders. Whatever it is that matters primarily in your personal identity, if you survive Memoraids then it is not psychological continuity that matters since the person you are, you believe, exist on both sides of a Psychological Continuity Border.

Since in my own case I am sure if I had Memoraids I would be afraid of pain, not death, I believe that it is not the Psychological Continuity Border that defines where I as a person end at a boundary where there then begins another: the Psychological Continuity Border does not have the metaphysical significance ordinarily accorded to it. Put most briefly: psychological continuity is not what matters primarily in personal identity. Or, to put it another way: personal identity does not consist in memory identity, personality identity, nor any other such psychological identification. The “you” in the above descriptions refers not to any aspect of the persisting psychological complex but to the subject.

Thus if I found out I had Memoraids, I know I would fear the pain. Why? Because I believe the description given above is a possible one; “you” does have a reference, namely, the subject, who would be experiencing that pain. I know I would be upset at the prospect of losing my memories, though not upset about losing all of them since some of them are unpleasant. I am not so sure I would be anywhere nearly as upset about losing some aspects of my personality—I might even welcome a few of the changes. But I know that I would not consider Memoraids to be anything at all like death.

In Problems of the Self, Bernard Williams argues that in a case like this he, too, would fear pain, not death. From this he concludes (correctly, in my view) that it cannot be psychological continuity that matters, and (in my view, incorrectly) that what does matter is bodily continuity. I thus agree with the negative theses of both the psychological continuity theorists and the bodily continuity theorists, but disagree with their respective positive claims. The conclusion I draw, via negativa, is that whatever a person is, a person is not a body, not a psychology, and soon. Compare to the famous
passage from *The Upanishads*: “The Self is to be described as not this, not that,” (as quoted in Stace’s *Mysticism and Philosophy*, p. 166).

According to those philosophers who, like Locke, Parfit and Shoemaker, believe that what matters in survival is psychological continuity, if you got Memoraids, during the first pain interlude it would not be *you* having the pain (though they allow that you might care about that person more than about other persons). We do not know who it would be—it might not in fact be anyone. Is that what your deep intuitions say—that when the Memoraids virus carried away your memories and psychology it carried *you* away? My deep intuitions say that if I get Memoraids it will be *me* having that experience of pain, that *I*, this very subject who is now *here* will be *there*—that the virus carried away my memories, not *me*—and that, from the looks of it, the pain will be so awful that more than likely I will not even be aware of the amnesia. It will be like waking suddenly from a deep sleep with awful cramps all over your body and without knowing where you are and without having any occurrent memories at all, just being there, the self-conscious subject aware of waking up with a tumultuous pain throughout your body.

Similarly, during the second pain interlude, which occurs once the new memories and psychology are in place, according to the view that the Psychological Continuity Border matters such that persons are individuated by the Psychological Continuity Boundary, it would not be *you* having the pain. *Whose* pain would it be? Someone else’s. If this is what you believe, then what matters to you in this case is different from what matters to me. What matters to you is more in line with values that Anthony Quinton expresses as follows:

In our general relations with other human beings their bodies are for the most part intrinsically unimportant. We use them as convenient recognition devices enabling us to locate without difficulty the persisting character and memory complexes in which we are interested, which we love or like. It would be upsetting if a complex with which we were emotionally involved came to have a monstrous or repulsive physical appearance, it would be socially embarrassing if it kept shifting from body to body while most such complexes stayed put, and it would be confusing and tiresome if such shifting around were generally widespread, for it would be a laborious business finding out where one’s friends and family were. But that our concern and affection would follow the character and memory complex, and not its original bodily associate, is surely clear. In the case of general shifting about we should be in the position of people trying to find their intimates in the dark. If the shifts were both frequent and spatially radical we should no doubt give up the attempt to identify individual people, the whole character of relations between people would change, and human life would be like an unending sequence of shortish ocean trips. (In Perry,
Such a view of what matters (not one that Quinton is necessarily committed to\cite{3}) might differ depending on whether one’s personality was that of an upright intellectual or, say, that of a wild rock-and-roller. Nozick makes a remark in a similar vein when he asks what would matter more to a star basketball player, the preservation of his body (physiology) or of his psychology?

If, however, what matters to you is such that you believe that neither does physiology define the boundaries of personal identity nor that physiology is what matters primarily in survival—don’t worry. I think you are absolutely right.

§6.9 The Physiological Border Retreat

One might suppose that since our deep intuitions say that regardless of what various sorts of drastic psychological changes your physical brain undergoes you would still be there, you would still be you, what matters is not the Psychological Continuity Border but, rather, the continued existence of your physical brain. However, we have already performed the Brain Dissolve; and we can do so again in a way similar to the Memoraids example.

Let us begin by considering the practical side of the Memoraids example. Suppose it turns out that the way Memoraids works is this. Whenever Memoraids infects a brain and depletes the host’s neurons of the information in which the host’s memories and psychology consist, it stores them in its own DNA and RNA structures until it reaches the next host’s brain where, after it sucks up the memories and psychology of the new host’s brain, it secretes the information from the previous host’s brain into the new host’s brain. Thus, let us suppose I got infected by the Memoraids virus which had just “fed” on the brain of ex-president of the United States, Bill Clinton. After the ordeal is over I have all of Bill Clinton’s memories, psychological characteristics, etc., and none of Kolak’s; I remember being Governor of Arkansas, running for President, serving two terms in the White House, the whole sordid Monica affair, and so on; all I know of Kolak, if anything, is that he is some philosopher who thinks we are all the same person. Now, let us ask whether it was Bill Clinton who had that second bout of pain, or whether it was I who had it. Arguably, in the first run-through of this thought experiment, we would say that I, not Clinton,
had the pain because I did not leave my body when the virus left. The virus carried away my memories and my psychology but not me. I am still there—the same person—having suffered two terrible bouts of pain, during the first of which I had amnesia and during the second of which I became identified as a different self, namely, Bill Clinton.

But, now, what should be done with me? Suppose I demand to be taken to Clinton’s home. Senator Hilary might have qualms about sleeping with me, and Kolak’s family might insist that I continue living with them. But for instance Government officials who knew everything that we know in having described the situation would more than likely insist (and I would certainly agree) that I should now be treated in the way any former president would be, and for good reason. The body that, by outward appearance, is Bill Clinton—but whose brain had been infected by the strain of Memoraids which I got—was infected with someone else’s memories, such that the subject there now insists his name is Wung-Li, a Chinese Acrobat/spy who wants immediately to fly to Beijing and be reunited with his family. Within the body that by outward appearance looks like Kolak, on the other hand, the subject claims to know all sorts of U.S. state secrets which government officials can verify, and so on.

There are two questions here. One is the practical “external” question of how the individuals in the case should be treated. Probably, if the right sorts of verification procedures could be implemented, I should in most crucial respects now be treated as Bill Clinton. I might, even, by special government decree, be given the legal right to assume all the legal, social and personal responsibilities of the former president of the United States.

The second, “internal,” question, is not so much practical as it is both metaphysical and metapsychological. Think for a moment about the psychology of the change. What would it feel like for Bill Clinton to suddenly have all my personal memories? Would it perhaps feel exactly like what I feel right now, including what ordinarily we would take to be my special “conscious presence?” What, if anything, is special about ‘the insideness’ of my experience that makes it mine? When these sorts of questions arise in the various puzzle cases they are generally regarded as notoriously difficult, perhaps impossible, to answer, in part because our intuitions can “flip-flop” depending on the mode of presentation, as Bernard Williams has argued, or because there simply is no fact of the matter, as Parfit and others have argued. But given the groundwork we have laid down it clear that after the Memoraids ordeal the same subject is still there, is still the same person, identified now as a different Self, namely,
that of former president Bill Clinton, whereas the fellow who by outward appearance looks like Clinton is now locked up in Naval Medical in Bethesda, doing pirouettes and singing rousing Chinese Communist songs, because the subject there no longer is identified as Bill Clinton but as Wung-Li. Where, then is Kolak? As the Memorails virus that took my Kolak memories infects a cab driver out on the street, the experience of the subject there will be to seem suddenly to find itself in a new location, inside a different body: it would be just like the teletransportation thought experiment except that the Kolak-self finds itself inside a numerically different human being; the cab driver might pull into Kolak’s garage, go up to Kolak’s family, wondering what is going on, claiming that he suddenly found himself in a different body, and so on.74

If that is not how you would choose to respond to the thought experiment (say because you believe it is some sort of Physiological Continuity Border that matters for personal identity and so that it is some sort of Physiological Boundary that individuates persons), consider the following situation. I have just contracted Neuraids, a new virus similar to Memorails except that Neuraids feeds on individual neurons, not memories. The virus does this very, very carefully, and always in exactly the same way, sucking up one neuron after another. Then, in each case it secretes another exactly similar neuron that it puts back in the original neuron’s place. It does this until every one of the neurons in my brain has been replaced by an exact replica, with the information from the original neuron being in each case transferred without any errors to the new neuron. This, in effect, is like Shoemaker’s BST procedure, except it all happens inside the same head. (Notice how easily our intuitions can be pushed one way or the other depending on as trivial a fact as whether the change is inside or outside the head; for instance, although we constantly swallow our own saliva typically we are repulsed at doing so once it is outside, say, in a glass.75

According to the view that it is the Physiological Continuity Border that matters for personal identity (that the Physiological Border is a Boundary between persons) getting Neuraids is as good (or, I should say, as bad) as death. Is that what your deep intuitions say? According to my intuitions, if I got Neuraids the only thing I would be concerned with is whether it involved any pain. If I found out that I had the particular strain of Neuraids that caused no pain, I would be relieved. If a doctor then offered me, for the fee of $10,000, an antidote, I would not pay her any more than I would pay a doctor $10,000 for the antidote to Physaids, a virus which in the course of seven years replaces all the regular (non-neural) cells in my body with exact
replicas. That is how little I believe the physical stuff of which I am composed matters. In fact, I believe I already have Physaids (we all do) and it does not seem to prevent us from being the persons we are (it might be viewed as so doing but, again, not necessarily without erasing us from the world). So if there are no harmful side-effects, it makes no difference whatsoever to me whether I have Neuraids or not. Neuraids is to my brain nothing more than a speeded up version of what is already happening in my body naturally. If it makes no difference to you, either, then you too have substantial doubts about whether the Physiological Continuity Border signifies a boundary between persons and whether the Neurological (Brain) Border signifies a boundary between persons. But if neither the Psychological Border nor the Physiological Border matter in this way, what then does matter? I do.

§ 6.10 THE OMNI DISSOLVE: DANIEL KOLAK THROUGH KRISHNAMURTI BECOMES ANN-MARGRET

To me the lesson to be gained from having successfully imagined the various Physiological, Spatial, and Psychological Dissolves, is this: the boundaries between persons, contrary to what we ordinarily believe, do not consist in the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border, the Physiological Border, the Psychological Border, and so on. But each Boundary Dissolve has thus far been considered at the exclusion of the others. What happens when we perform the various Boundary Dissolves together?

An advertisement in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* announces that the Krishnamurti Foundation is offering to implant Krishnamurti’s memories and psychology, which have been recorded at his time of death into a new digital Supercomputer called a “Memorizer,” into someone’s living brain, and they are looking for a volunteer. The process of encoding Krishnamurti’s memories and psychology onto the volunteer’s brain will erase the volunteer’s previous memories and psychology without destroying any of the brain tissue.

When I receive K’s memories and psychology, at first there is a sudden surprise of finding myself sitting in the laboratory, since the moment Krishnamurti’s memories and psychology enter my brain I seem to remember having just been a ninety-one year old man on my deathbed. This experience might be like being suddenly swept away in a movie, except in this case “the movie” has been beamed directly into my cerebral cortex.
The doctors explain to me what has happened, that I am not (according to their bodily continuity view of personal identity) really Krishnamurti, that I am really (in their view) Daniel Kolak, a philosopher who because of his unorthodox view of personal identity volunteered for this memory transfer, and so on.

Thinking through what this experience would be like, I find not only that I would not consider it at all like death but that, though I would now think I was Krishnamurti and not Daniel Kolak, I would still be there, perhaps somewhat in the way that I occasionally find myself in a dream where I am very different from the way I am in my waking life. It’s a change of self—a different self than the one I am ordinarily identified as—but it is me, I, this present subject, the same person. For instance, in my “The Experiment,” “Experiment II,” and “Experiment III” I discuss an isolation tank experience in which I find myself in a series of dreams in a fishing village, surrounded by people and friends who are very different from those in my waking life, people who in the dream I seems to know and who seem to know me. In this dream I am identified as a member of the fishing community, and have memories, personality, and apparent physiology (body image) very unlike that of my waking life. I am in that dream a completely different self (in the dream, identified as Petrov, I know nothing of Kolak; indeed, in one dream in which Kolak appears to Petrov I, Petrov, regard him as an unfamiliar stranger.) Yet, how is it that I recognize myself in such a dream? Not by my name, which in the dream is not “Daniel Kolak” but “Ivan Petrov.” Nor by my body image, which in the dream is different from my present body; my body in the dream is swarthy, with windburnt skin, black-haired. Nor by any aspect of my mind-image, such as my memories, which in the dream are different from my present memories. Nor by my personality, which in the dream is also drastically different. Not by any of those things—yet the phenomenological quality of my subjective experience, of my intuition of myself as being a particular person—the subject bordered apparently within, or behind the persona—is in the dream (as far as I can tell) every bit as vivid and as much like the phenomenological quality of my present, “waking” subjective experience of myself as a person. And of course it goes without saying that Kolak’s World is completely different from Petrov’s World. (I also explore this theme in my In Search of Myself: Life, Death and Personal Identity, wherein Descartes and I meet in a dream and he convinces me in my dream that he, not I, is “real,” that he is the one dreaming me.)

Furthermore, I feel like the same person in both situations in spite of the
fact that all the elements of the self—up to and including all the phenomenologically active contents of my psychology—are different. The personas are, qualitatively, completely different but the subject is, qualitatively, in both cases the same. In other words, across the various changes in the content of my psychology there is, among this changing content, psychological identification _as_ the various (qualitatively different) psychological individuations. This fact of psychological identification is not the effect of any content similarity (indeed, there is no psychological time for such a comparison). Rather, the psychological identification _as_ that psychology occurs contiguous with the content of the occurrent psychology (i.e., it is not inferred from it).

It is as if identification and dissociation function as phenomenologically active “markers,” within any emotion, sensation, or thought, (including complex combinations, such as memory). On what basis do the markers work? How can they be checked? By qualitative similarity? Hardly, since, typically, each psychological individuation (say, a memory) is qualitatively very different from any other. Second, there seems little, if any, psychological time, within any one psychological individuation, to do any such qualitative comparison. Third, there is no actual checking done, say via the projection of a semi-transparent past “psychological image” against a present “psychological image.” The fact is that psychological identification and dissociation arrive, as it were, “readymade,” projected into the Self, regardless of the content of its occurrent psychology, along with the psychological individuations within which they occur.

If you have ever had dreams like my Fishing Village dream, do you ever upon waking consider yourself as having just been another person? When I recall such dreams, I find that since I believe that I was there in the dream, no matter how different the particulars, I not only _can_ believe that the person who I am was there, I actually as a matter of fact _do_ believe it. Why, though, do I, the self-conscious subject, think that _I_ was there? There is the conscious memory that is itself a re-creation, within the specious present within which conscious experience as such occurs, of the experience within the dream that is not itself, content-wise, the same experience as the original memory. There is also, within this conscious memory (within the experience of the re-created, or “remembered” experience), the psychological identification of this (qualitatively distinct) psychological individuation (the present act of intuition) with that psychological individuation (some past act of intuition). Psychological identification _as_ is the “psychological marker” by which the experience is “recognized” as
mine. Thus for instance the experience of suddenly having all my memories and psychology exchanged for Krishnamurti’s memories and psychology would, I can imagine, in many ways be similar to what happens to “me” in such dreams, or when I suddenly recall a dream I had forgotten.

Note that we are not in such examples required to suppose that the identification of psychological individuation $p_2$ with psychological individuation $p_1$ is sufficient, nor even necessary, for $p_2$ and $p_1$ to be the individuations of one entity, personally identical, nor even for them to be psychologically identical. Rather, we are merely seeing how it is possible that everything which obtains in the continued life of Kolak across, for instance, borders described by there being the present experience we might call “Daniel Kolak the philosopher writing a book on personal identity” and there being the recalled experience we might call “Ivan Petrov the fisherman sailing his boat out to sea,” also obtains in the change (in psychological content) from Kolak as Ivan, to Kolak as Kolak, to Kolak as Krishnamurti. Again, this may only signify the illusion of personal identity such that identity may, in every one of these cases (across psychological content change), be just that—an illusion. The point is merely that, ordinarily, we do not notice that the sorts of psychological borders that occur between Kolak-memories and Krishnamurti-memories in the above example occur also within (between) what we take to be the continued life of Kolak. Realizing this can lower our propensity to view one relation as identity and the other as non-identity; it ties for us the two, apparently significant, different cases into one single case. We will return to these points and examine them more closely later when we hone in more directly on the nature of the I and how it is capable of being identified as many Selves. For now let us see what happens when we push our present thought experiment even further.

Having gone through with the implant of Krishnamurti’s memories into my brain, some months later I see an advertisement in a film magazine offering for sale the living but brain-dead body of a Hollywood actresses, Ann-Margret. (She is brain-dead due to a recent head injury.) Scientists are offering to transplant a philosopher’s brain into her body, as she in her will happened to specify should be done in such circumstances. I (who now call myself “Krishnamurti” and feel as if I have been “resurrected” in the body and brain of Kolak, a philosopher) volunteer and so my brain is put into Ann-Margret’s body. Several years later, however, I find I had recently contracted Neuraids, which means that somewhere along the way new neurons replaced the old neurons (in such a way that the information on the
old neurons was preserved, up to and including memories). And, by an incredible coincidence, it just so happens that these new neurons, now secreted in place of the old ones, before they were “sucked up” by the virus and stored in a spacewarp, used to belong to Ann-Margret.

As if all this were not enough, finally it turns out that Ann-Margret, like Krishnamurti, had her entire psychology (memories, personality, etc.) recorded just before her death. I now decide I want to be an actress and so, wishing at the same time to make a philosophical point, I go and receive Ann-Margret’s memories and psychology in place of Krishnamurti’s memories and psychology. Which brings me full circle: I now have Ann-Margret’s body, even Ann-Margret’s original neurons arranged in exactly the way they were arranged in her head, and have her complete memories and psychology.

What, then, happened to Daniel Kolak? Is he long dead? If by “Daniel Kolak” I mean not this particular human physiology but the person qua subject—the I, the self-conscious subject-in-itself—then I can plausibly conceive that I am still there. But how is it that I can conceive of myself as surviving this Omni-Dissolve? Not one of my present physiological and psychological elements—my bodily parts, my present memories, and so on—by which I recognize and conceptualize myself as Daniel Kolak, survives. That is, it seems that the human physiology that at this moment is coexistent with this person does not survive, since what our intuitions would more than likely say about the far end of the spectrum is that a completely different human physiology is there. This other human physiology is coexistent with someone whose name, there, is Ann-Margret, not Daniel Kolak. Since I can conceive that Ann-Margret would indeed be there, and that I, Daniel Kolak, would be there, because I who am Daniel Kolak would still be there, it seems in that case I can conceive that my personal identity does not begin and end within the borders of what, ordinarily, we would call “Kolak” and that I am at least in that case personally identical both to Daniel Kolak and to Ann-Margret, at least to the extent that I am (if I am) personally identical to Kolak here and now and Kolak twenty-five years ago.

What, then, is the connection, throughout the various changes in this Omni-Dissolve, between Daniel Kolak at one end of the spectrum and Ann-Margret at the other that makes it seem plausible that I exist all the way from Daniel Kolak, through Krishnamurti in the middle, all the way to Ann-Margret? To claim that now this body, the human physiology coexistent with the person, Daniel Kolak, or some part of this physiology, is inside
Ann-Margret seems not only wishful thinking but, alas, false. That is, the persisting physiological-psychological bundle that usually goes where Kolak goes is no longer there. Ann-Margret was born in Sweden and has no beard and thinks she is an actress. Kolak was born in Croatia and has a beard and thinks he is a philosopher. Since at the two extreme ends of the Omni-Dissolve there are two completely different physiological-psychological bundles, two completely different human beings, and I can conceive that I am there, I can conceive that I am both of those different human beings: that is, I can believe that Kolak and Ann-Margret are one and the same person, *me*, this very subject.

Let us however focus more closely on how it is possible that I can conceive myself as existing throughout the Omni-Dissolve. There are three possibilities. First, the fact is that the Omni-Dissolve does not seem to me at all like death. That is, I find that I can perfectly well understand and believe that what matters to me existing as me, the person writing these words right now, would still be there, existing as me, the person no longer writing this book who no longer even remembers doing so but who is there experiencing something completely different. I might not then remember having written these words, and would perhaps instead remember having done things like performing the steamy bedroom scene with Jack Nicholson in the movie *Carnal Knowledge*, and I would have a woman’s body, and so on, but the imagined case seems to me one in which I would still exist.

Second, suppose it turned out that when an objector, Jones, considers the Omni-Dissolve case, he reports that in all honesty it does not seem to him that he survives. We can then ask Jones at what point he thinks he ceased to exist and why. Jones then specifies some border, *b*, which according to him has the metaphysical significance of a boundary between persons. We then stick only to *b* and we go back to our prior analysis of *b* and show to Jones how it is possible

1) to dissolve the metaphysical significance which he accords to *b*, or
2) that given what Jones really cares about when he considers his continued survival as a person, on Jones’s own view, is, in reality, not disrupted by *b*, or
3) that if we accord to *b* the metaphysical significance which Jones says he accords to it, then Jones in ordinary, day-to-day living does not really survive as the same person for very long, or
4) that the reasons why *b* matters to Jones in the way that he claims it does are bad reasons. And so on.
(Keep in mind that we are presently not trying to prove that I survive the Omni-Dissolve but, rather, to show how it is possible that I survive it within the range of possibility ordinarily accorded to ordinary survival.)

Third, we can even imagine the Omni-Dissolve happening all at once, within a few seconds, while I am suffering a pain so horrible and tumultuous that, with my eyes screwed shut, I would not notice any change until it was over. We do not have to imagine bizarre, unusual torture; my visit to the dentist when I got my wisdom teeth pulled would suffice, as would my collision, while on my bicycle, with a speeding car: while I lay there on the street, paralyzed with pain, the entire Omni-Dissolve could have gone full circle, from Kolak to Ann-Margret and back to Kolak, and so on, once every second and I do not believe I would have even noticed the changes. (Actually, it is interesting to note that, even then, with each complete new set of memories, etc., I would not sense any change, since there would be, in the imagined example, psychological identification as the changing psychological bundles as manifested by the subject so as to make each change seem not to be a change at all. That is, unless there was psychological dissociation generated along with the changing psychological bundles, I would not sense the changes.)

But, even if one’s intuitions here agree with mine—one must still ask—how is this possible? That is, how is it possible that my intuitions could give rise to such a strange interpretation of the facts? When I say that across all these changes in both psychological content and in the physiological realizer of that content, it is possible to say that “I am suffering such pain” that “I don’t sense the changes,” who, or what, can it be that I am? What is it that Kolak and Ann-Margret could possibly have in common that makes it possible that I can be conceived of as continuing to exist throughout the entire spectrum of the Omni-Dissolve, both as Kolak and as Ann-Margret?

It cannot be in virtue of there being, across the Omni-Dissolve, continuity of the content of consciousness; in the example, the content of consciousness is at each instant always and abruptly changing. Nor can it be in virtue of a comparison, within any particular experience, of content-now with content-then such as to determine that the changes of content have been gradual and continuous so as to preserve personal identity; again, there is no psychological time for such a comparison to be made nor is it clear by what conceptual and/or experiential “check” such a verification could occur. Indeed, such psychological identification does not occur at the content level at all; it occurs contiguous with each qualitatively different experience, independently of whatever changes there are in and among the
contents of those conscious experiences. That is what I mean when I say that psychological identification is not a conceptual deduction derived from qualitative comparisons of psychological content \( a \) with psychological content \( b \), and so on but, rather, occurs contiguous with the content: the subject occurs contiguous, apparently from within, the persona. Psychological identification is, in that sense, a phenomenological perception precipitated into consciousness from outside, or beyond, the content of any particular act of consciousness within which it occurs. (Again, this will be developed further in later chapters.)

In every conscious memory there is the event remembered and the subject remembered as the same experiencer who is now experiencing the act of remembering: the subject is apparently bordered within what the subject is identified as—the psychological complex personified from a first-person point of view, the experiencer remembering—and is at the same time projected into—identified as—the remembered occurrence of some past first-person personification—the experiencer remembered. (One can even to a degree “re-live” a past experience in the imagination by, in effect, being identified not just with but as the experiencer remembered.) Now, of course, we need not here claim that, in virtue of the subject there is, necessarily, personal identity between the experiencer remembering and the experiencer remembered. All that is required is that we see how it is possible that such re-cognition within consciousness (that is, within any experience) of an experience identified as one’s own, is achieved via psychological identification as that psychological bundle occurring within the borders of any particular conscious sensation or conscious memory. The subject is what across the various changes in physiological and psychological continuity described in the Omni-Dissolve as a matter of psychological fact does occur (independently of how such a fact should be interpreted) such that across the borders it does, as a matter of psychological fact, seem from each individuation that a person is identical across the bordered individuations and that the person is oneself, the same person over time.

In other words, what the Omni-Dissolve shows is that the fact of the subject is such that from within each bordered individuation, even when qualitatively radically different from the next, there is within our lives psychological identification strong enough to nonetheless make it seem—in spite of the extremely radical changes of qualitative content—that the subject is not necessarily bound to (or by) the content of consciousness, nor by the continuity of that content, nor by (or to) the physiological realizer of
that content. We have evoked one border after another in such a way that the subject can in each case nonetheless generate psychological attachment such that from within the new occurrent psychological bundles there is still the conception of being not bound, that is, as not individuated, or delineated, by content or by continuity of content. But, then, is the subject which is here-and-now (say, Kolak about to receive Krishnamurti’s memories) identical to the subject there-and-then (say, Ann-Margret’s body about to receive Ann-Margret’s memories)? To answer, “No,” is to claim that the boundaries of personal identity are necessarily determined either by the continuity of the experiential (qualitative) content of consciousness or by the identity of the physiological realizer of that content. It is to accept some version of Closed or Empty Individualism. To answer, “Yes,” is to claim that it is not and to thereby take yet another step towards Open Individualism.

If “No,” then, there can be personal identity only so long as there is psychological (qualitative) content identity, or continuity of content between individuated psychological states, or if the physiological realizer of such psychological states is numerically one and the same physiological realizer across the psychological changes. If “Yes,” then, what matters for personal identity is not determined by the continuity of the content of consciousness but, rather, by the continuity of some particular aspect of consciousness, subjectivity—the subject-in-itself, “consciousness,” the I of personal identity—indeed content. A Closed or Empty Individualist would answer, “No.” An Open Individualist would answer, “Yes.” We need not yet settle this issue now with finality. For, in either case, the fact still is that there is no continuity of consciousness between you and me. That is, among the contents of your psychology there is, in fact, no apparent Unity of Consciousness between you and me. (This is of course not merely due to lack of content continuity, since there may be lack of content continuity between me now and me twenty-five years ago.) The fact is that a formidable Unity of Consciousness Border separates you and me, like all human beings. Will we here, at last, find a border between us to which we must accord the metaphysical and metapsychological significance of a definite and uncrossable boundary between one person and another?

§ 6.11 APPARENT EXCLUDER (6): THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS DISSOLVE

In the Dream Analog we conceived a case in which your stream of
consciousness split into several “tributaries,” so that in your dream more than just the “central” character (the persona you are identified as, from whose first-person point of view you seem exclusively to observe the dream), is minded. The other characters, or personas, in your dream, we supposed, are just as minded, just as conscious, just as “inwardly illuminated,” as the “central” character: that is, located within the borders of each persona there is the subject. Thus, in the Mugging Nightmare, the only difference between the Muggers and the Muggee is that, later on after you wake up, it is the experiences of the Muggee, rather than the experiences of one of the Muggers, that are connected to your waking stream of consciousness (via memory access personified from a first-person point of view and the generation within experience of appropriate psychological identifications). We successfully imagined how it could be possible that this would be a case of one person having several different streams of consciousness, i.e., a multiperspectival individual. Indeed, as we have seen, real people who are classified as having MPD claim to experience something very much like this in the actual world. There is more than one Self within them, warring for dominance over that particular body/mind. (There is also the famous example of a commissurotomized patient who while hugging his wife with one arm pushed her away with the other.)

So if we can conceive of a case in which one person has more than one stream of consciousness, then the Unity of Consciousness Border is not necessary a boundary between persons. We have already successfully performed, in the Dream Analog, the “Unity of Consciousness Dissolve.” That is, we have already successfully imagined a case in which, in spite of there being no Unity of Consciousness between two Selves, the border that individuates these two psychological complexes would not thereby automatically signify a boundary between one person and another but could, in fact, be viewed as one and the same subject having simultaneously two different sets of experiences—what I call, “omnipresence”—such that the borders are all within one person. We could, without absurdity, count not “two” persons but “one.”

Parfit takes the Sperry split-brain experiments to be evidence that such a Boundary Dissolve is possible not just in a thought experiment but in the actual world. Going then further, he imagines that he is one of a small minority of people whose right and left hemispheres are identical, and also that he has been equipped with some device that can block communication between the two identical hemispheres and then re-unite them. Connected
to his eyebrows, this device gives him control of the splitting during a physics exam, so that by raising an eyebrow, he can divide, and then later reunite, his mind. Thus, during a physics exam in which he sees two different ways of approaching a problem, he divides his mind so that his left “stream of consciousness” takes one approach, the “right stream of consciousness” takes the other. What would this experience be like?

When I disconnect my hemispheres, my stream of consciousness divides. But this division is not something that I experience. Each of my two streams of consciousness seems to have been straightforwardly continuous with my one stream of consciousness up to the moment of division. The only changes in each stream are the disappearance of half my visual field and the loss of sensation in, and control over, one of my arms.

Consider my experiences in my “right handed” stream. I remember deciding that I would use my right hand to do the longer calculation. This I now begin. In working at this calculation I can see, from the movements of my left hand, that I am also working at the other. But I am not aware of working at the other. I might, in my right-handed stream, wonder how, in my left-handed stream, I am getting on. I could look and see. This would be just like looking to see how well my neighbor is doing, at the next desk. In my right-handed stream I would be equally unaware both of what my neighbor is now thinking and of what I am now thinking in my left-handed stream. Similar remarks apply to my experiences in my left-handed stream.

My work is now over. I am about to reunite my mind. What should I, in each stream, expect? Simply that I shall suddenly seem to remember just having worked at two calculations, in working at each of which I was not aware of working at the other. This, I suggest, we can imagine. And, if my mind had been divided, my apparent memories would be correct. Reasons and Persons, pp. 246-247]

Responding to the possible objection that in his physics exam example he is ignoring “the necessary unity of consciousness,” Parfit writes,

But I have not ignored this alleged necessity. I have denied it. What is a fact must be possible. And it is a fact that people with disconnected hemispheres have two separate streams of consciousness - two series of thoughts and experiences, in having each of which they are unaware of having the other. Each of these two streams separately displays unity of consciousness. This may be a surprising fact. But we can understand it. We can come to believe that a person’s mental history need not be like a canal, with only one channel, but could be like a river, occasionally having separate streams. [p. 247, my emphasis]

The “river,” according to Parfit, is psychological continuity, which he claims (and on this point I agree) could “flow” in several different directions. Earlier, we were able to imagine how one person could be two different human beings at different times. This was one step toward
imagining how one person could be two different human beings at the same
time, which in turn is an important step towards imagining how we could
all be the same person in spite of such apparent excluders. Similarly,
*imagining how one person could have more than one stream of
consciousness at one time is a step toward imagining how a person could
be many different streams of consciousness at the same time, even all
streams of consciousness, and at all times.*

By making the claim for the Unity of Consciousness Dissolve, I claimed
that we could imagine a case in which there was more than one Self, yet in
which these two different Selves could be considered to be the same person,
one numerically identical subject simultaneously identified as both Selves.
Parfit argues that his Physics Exam could well be interpreted as a case in
which there was only one person with two different stretches of experience.
This of course is admittedly difficult to believe, he says, but not impossible,
and certainly not so difficult when we consider the alternatives.

Suppose you believe that the Physics Exam involves more than one
person. This would be akin to your having believed, in the Dream Analog,
that the other characters in your dream, if minded and if persons, would
therefore have been other persons. Suppose you think in the Physics Exam
there were three persons involved:

1) Parfit before and after the split,
2) the left-handed stream, and
3) the right-handed stream.

Where then do you suppose Parfit was during the split? Did he
momentarily die? Was he asleep? If he died, has he now come back to life
(resurrected? reincarnated?). If he was asleep, how is it that now, after the
split is over, he remembers everything? Each alternative is deeply counter-
intuitive.

Suppose, however, that you believe, as I do, that during the Physics Exam
only one person was involved and that this person was Parfit. This answer,
though clearly possible, also has its problems. The answer is clearly
possible because, as we saw in the Dream Analog,

\[(m) \text{ A is not aware of B's experiences}\]

is compatible with

\[(n) \text{ A and B are the same person.}\]

The idea that \(m\) and \(n\) are not compatible is, basically, the idea that the
Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border plus the Assumption of Mindedness
Border carry sufficient metaphysical and metapsychological significance to necessitate our having to conceive these borders as boundaries between persons. It is to suppose that psychological content-accessibility is necessary for personal identity. For instance, we saw that Swinburne, who claims that there is extreme difficulty of giving any sense to the supposition that a person P1 about to undergo fission will have in any degree the experiences of both of the two persons P2 and P2 who will in no way have shared each other’s experiences [Personal Identity, p. 21], also apparently believes that the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment must be of such metaphysical and metapsychological significance that it must be conceived to be a boundary between persons, which we have seen it does not.

In Parfit’s Physics Exam there is a divided subject of experience simultaneously experiencing two different streams of consciousness, or SOC’s, two exclusively conjoined psychological bundles within each of which there is identification with the other but not as the other. Let us call the left-handed stream of consciousness “left SOC” and the right-handed stream of consciousness of experience “right SOC”. (Humphrey and Dennett, for instance, would probably call each SOC a “self,” and though we could follow such usage and we may find it helpful to do so, we do not have to.) Now, since the left SOC is experiencing something different from the right SOC,

\[
\text{left SOC} \neq \text{right SOC}.
\]

This seems correct; how can they be identical SOCs if one is presently upset and angry at not being able to solve a physics problem say, using ordinary vectors while the other one is happily solving the problem using tensors? But are they in virtue of this border different persons? It seems that the best answer is that they are not different persons but are the same person, as in the MPD and Dream Analog cases. Parfit writes,

As I argued, we ought to admit as possible that a person could have a divided mind. If this is possible, each half of my divided mind might control its own body. But though this description of the case cannot be rejected as inconceivable, it involves a great distortion in our concept of a person. In my imagined Physics Exam I claimed that this case involved only one person. There were two features of the case that made this plausible. The divided mind was soon reunited, and there was only one body. If a mind was permanently divided, and its halves developed in different ways, it would become less plausible to claim that the case involves only one person. [Reasons and Persons, p. 256]
Parfit is willing to allow that the two separate SOCs are the same person for a while. But, having separated, by a bat of the eyebrow, his consciousness into “two separate streams,” there is then the possibility that they are never again connected. It is this that leads Parfit to suppose that, if they were split for good, they would (gradually, I presume) become different persons. For instance, suppose the left SOC, “located” in the left hemisphere, is transplanted into another body:

The case of complete division, where there are also two bodies, seems to be a long way over the borderline. After I have had this operation, the two “products” each have all of the features of a person. They could live at opposite ends of the Earth. Suppose that they have poor memories, and that their appearance changes in different ways. After many years, they might meet again, and fail even to recognize each other. We might have to claim of such a pair, innocently playing tennis: “What you see out there is a single person, playing tennis with himself. In each half of his mind he mistakenly believes that he is playing tennis with someone else.” If we are not yet Reductionists, we believe that there is one true answer to the question whether these two tennis-players are a single person. Given what we mean by ‘person,’ the answer must be No. It cannot be true that what I believe to be a stranger, standing there behind the net, is in fact another part of myself. [pp. 256 - 257]

But here Parfit, apparently taken in by the constraints of the individuation and separateness of persons assumption (the traditional Closed Individualist condition that there are definite boundaries separating one person from another), assumes that in an Open view such as ours if the Spatial Border if big enough is necessarily a definite and uncrossable boundary between persons—a condition which, as already pointed out, he is willing to relax and perhaps even drop provided it the gap is small enough. Why assume with Parfit that if the split were big, or permanent, the two separate SOCs become different persons? It seems extremely odd to suppose that the two SOCs are the same person for a while and then at some later point then become two persons. At what point do they become two different persons?

We tend to believe, as Bernard Williams writes, that

Since personal identity has great significance, whether identity holds cannot depend on a trivial fact. [Problems of the Self, p. 20]

But if we consider the point just before the two SOCs become different persons, and compare it to the very next point, when the two SOCs are now two different persons, what will be the difference between them? One additional (different) occurrent memory, perhaps?

Parfit of course denies what Williams claims is true of personal identity:
he denies that personal identity has the sort of significance as supposed by Williams (or by common sense). But even if he were right, he would be right for the wrong reasons. This is because Parfit supposes that the reason the two SOCs must become different persons at some point is that there is an ever-widening Psychological Border between them. But we have successfully performed the Psychological Dissolve; we can imagine a case in which there are not slight but drastic differences in psychological content between the two SOCs and yet about which we could still claim that only one person was involved.

Consider “My Ethics Exam.” Suppose that some years ago while in graduate school, having progressed from pigeon-massacring to capturing and torturing students, I had to take a comprehensive exam in ethics and political philosophy. Ethics, as it turns out, is to a torturer like me a subject so repulsive that no matter how important the exam will be for providing future cover for my nefarious activities, I cannot work on it without becoming even more psychopathic than I already am and collapsing into convulsions.

Luckily for me, however, I too happen to be able, with the bat of a Parfitian eyebrow, to disconnect the two perfectly identical hemispheres of my brain. I do this in advance of the exam and go to my friend and partner in child abuse, the Fantastic Hypnotist. While in my right-handed stream of consciousness (SOC) I am reading Hobbes’ Leviathan, in my left-SOC I am having all my memories wiped out by the Fantastic Hypnotist. In place of the old memories, my left-SOC gets new memories which make me (in my left-SOC) think that I am an ordinary philosopher. My left-SOC is of course convinced that these memories are not new but have always belonged not just to me, the left-SOC, but to the right-SOC as well. Then, once the left-hemisphere hypnosis is complete, while I am in my right-SOC reading Leviathan, in my left-SOC I read Kant’s *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

My two SOCs are kept separate until after the exam. What will be my experience upon uniting both streams? I can well imagine suddenly remembering having allowed myself to be duped - as in dreams I am often similarly duped - in this case into thinking that I was merely a philosopher and not also a child molester, into having a different personality, and so on. I would suddenly remember having both worked on ethics and on political philosophy. This sudden and surprising recall would not be unlike suddenly being reminded of some incident I had completely forgotten, an incident in which I had done things I at present regret having done, presently consider
distasteful, and would now no longer consider doing. I would not think, after the union, “Gee, I wonder who this other person was who had by hypnosis entered to take possession of my left hemisphere with different memories and a different personality, whose experiences I now recall having experienced as if they had been my own.”

Since we can conceive of my Ethics Exam as a case in which my personal identity was preserved across a Unity of Consciousness Border and also across a Psychological Continuity Border, we can conclude that the Unity of Consciousness Border and the Psychological Continuity Border, together, do not carry the metaphysical and metapsychological significance to necessitate drawing along them a boundary between persons: that we have, in effect, performed a Unity of Consciousness Dissolve.

What, though, in my Ethics Exam example, makes it possible to conceive of the different streams of consciousness as the experiences of the same person? The only possibilities left, it seems, is that it is either the eventual reunion of the two streams or the underlying Physiological Continuity that makes the difference. I suspect that, if in my Ethics Exam your intuitions agree with mine that personal identity has been preserved across the Unity of Consciousness and Psychological Continuity Borders, you probably assume that the reason your intuitions go the way they in this case do go is due to either the eventual reunion of the two SOCs or to the underlying Physiological Continuity having been preserved. But we have already successfully performed the Physiological Dissolve and can imagine performing one in the present example, as follows.

Suppose that, during my Ethics Exam, I get a painless strain of Neuraids. By the time the exam is over, not one of my neurons is identical to the previous neurons. This additional fact should not make me believe that during my Ethics Exam I died. The only difference between the Neuraids version of my Ethics Exam and the original version is that, whatever changes are going on in my head, the Neuraids virus carries out a seamless and unnoticeable switch of one identical neuron for another in such a way that whatever would have been happening to the original neuron had I not gotten Neuraids now happens to the replica neuron. Thus the left SOC would have been unconnected (for a while, at least) with my memories, would have occurred as a result of the workings of numerically distinct neurons, and would have been unconnected to my right SOC, etc.

What, then, about the “reuniting” of the two SOCs? Parfit supposes that the reason a brief split would not disrupt identity is that the psychological differences would be minimal (that is, the psychological borders would in
that case be metapsychologically insignificant). But since in my Ethics Exam we have just imagined great psychological differences between the two SOCs, we can conclude that Parfit is wrong in supposing that psychological borders per se are boundaries between persons. (In other words, we can claim that quantity of psychological border is not the important difference, on the grounds that quantity of psychological border does not necessarily signify a boundary between persons in the way that Parfit imagines.) Nor does it seem that, by itself, the briefness of the split - the length of the temporal interval considered by itself, without any changes - makes one person suddenly become, after say ten minutes, two persons; it must be some change that the interval produces. So perhaps though Parfit is wrong about it being the psychological differences produced by the interval of the split that necessarily makes two persons where before there was one, it is something else, such as that both SOCs are “located in” and controlling the same body.

But neither does this seem a plausible alternative. Recall, for instance, Dennett’s Brain example. Suppose that Dennett’s disembodied brain is divided into two SOCs, so that each SOC is controlling a different body. We are able to imagine, as Parfit does, that a brain split into two hemispheres, each of which has a separate stream of consciousness and each of which runs one half of the same body, is one person. Suppose now that the left SOC controls the right side of Parfit’s body but the right SOC controls (and is connected through transceivers to) the left side of your body. Is it at this point that we have two persons where before there was only one?

It seems odd that whether the transceivers are connected to your limbs or to Parfit’s limbs makes the difference between whether there are one or two persons inside Parfit’s head. Suppose, then, that instead of Parfit’s left SOC controlling the right side of your body via transceivers, the left hemisphere of Parfit’s brain is transplanted into your skull. To Parfit’s left SOC, there would be no change in experience between these two situations. Do we now have two persons where before there was only one?

But that seems arbitrary - why should it matter whether the control is done by direct neural connection or by transceivers? After all, neurons are not ever in direct contact with each other; there are tiny gaps between them, synapses in which there are not tiny neurons but chemicals—so why should we think that there must be some fundamental and essential difference whether the neurons are connected via chemical synapses or radio transceivers that are functionally equivalent to the synapses? Similarly, we
can go on to suppose that while the left hemisphere of Parfit’s brain is transplanted into your body, the right hemisphere of his brain ceases controlling the left side of his body and instead begins to control a different body via transceivers. And so on. At what point does the magic “creation” of the second person occur?

Suppose, even, as a last resort, that it is the length of the time interval itself—apart from any changes—that makes it plausible that there was only one person in the case when “the divided mind was soon reunited.” How could that be? Again, we can imagine all of the above changes transpiring within, say, ten seconds; we can imagine the operation being performed by extraterrestrial surgeons who can move (and think) at velocities approaching the speed of light. In that case, the two SOCs are reunited, after ten seconds, by a bat of an eyebrow. If there were two persons at any point in the operation, where is this other person now?

We can even combine Parfit’s and Dennett’s thought experiments and conceive of a case in which a brain is able to split itself into many different “minded” characters, as we imagined in the Dream Analog or as suggested by MPD, but in a way that, via computerized transceivers, each “minded dream character”—each Self—was hooked up to an actual body “out there” in the “real” world. If we had a way of predicting (or inducing) dreams, we could then do the following. Suppose we know in advance that tonight you will have the Mugging Nightmare. We then take four brain-dead but living bodies, hook them up via transceivers to your brain, and at the appropriate moment when the dream begins (a dream in which each one of your dream characters is “minded”) the transceivers are activated and the four bodies start moving around in an actual alley. Thus, instead of “walking around” in a dream world each “dream character” now walks around in the actual, physical world. Suppose, even, that this is in fact what is going on right now: you are actually a Martian with a huge and powerful brain, hidden in the center of the earth, dreaming that you are each one of the three billion-plus actual human beings on the planet’s surface, whose thoughts and actions are in actuality a separate stream of consciousness inside your brain.

Is this impossible to conceive of or in any way incoherent? It seems not. But if not, then, contrary to both traditional Closed Individualism and to what Parfit and other Empty Individualists would suppose,

(1) the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border
(2) the Alter Subject Identification Border
(3) the various types of Physiological Border
(4) the Spatial Border
(5) the various types of Psychological Border and
(6) the Unity of Consciousness Border
do not, either individually or collectively, necessarily signify boundaries
between persons. Open Individualism is possible in spite of these many
apparent excluders.
NOTES

1 In this chapter I draw on material from my “Finding Our Selves: Individuation, Identity and Multiple Personality,” Philosophical Psychology 6 (1993) 363-386, as well as material that Ray Martin and I developed for our Self and Identity (Macmillan). Other versions of this paper were read at the University of Connecticut, Storrs, where I am grateful to the comments especially from Susan Anderson, Diana Meyers, and Ruth Millikan, at the City College of New York, CUNY, where I am also grateful for comments especially from Charles Evans and Michael Levin, and also at the College of New Jersey, where I am grateful for comments especially from Rick Kamber, Alan Gotthelf, and Mort Winston.

2 You may recall that the minded version of the Dream Analog is not the only way to perform the requisite boundary dissolve for these sorts of excluders. I bring it up here merely for simplicity sake; as we saw in the first chapter, my thesis supports but does not require the multiple consciousness assumption.


4 Freud, The Origin of Psychoanalysis; Laing The Divided Self; Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle; Fromm, The Sane Society; Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality; Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being; Rogers, On Becoming a Person.

5 This in fact is quite in line with Jung’s actual thinking about such psychological structures. In his view, the persona (the “outer mask”) along with its inner counterparts (the anima in males and animus in females along with the “shadow” representing one’s own gender) as well as the self are understood to be archetypes. These archetypes reside in the collective unconscious until experience coagulates them into complexes which then emerge into, and become, conscious.

6 This therefore involves a variety of what I call “metaphysical self-deception,” in which the person is being deceived about the nature of personal identity, thereby enhancing the hold of such psychological complexes on consciousness through various identifications, discussed below. This is another aspect of the sense in which, as I explain later in the chapter, we are not just a psychology we are also a philosophy.

7 See, for instance, Kolak and Martin Self & Identity and my “Finding Our Selves: Individuation, Identification, and MPD.”

8 The reader should not confuse my use of “complex” with Freud’s and Jung’s usage of “psychological complex.” I use the term in the topological sense, to convey that a psychological complex is a psychological “space,” constructed
through identification, that includes, as the topological definition of complex does, a combinatorial structure that provides generative information regarding how that “space” is constructed. Thus, as in combinatorial topology, the same psychological space can in principle generate numerous different psychological complexes.

9 Who if we take him at his word is not “Borges,” or, perhaps more accurately, both is (what I call the is of identification) and isn’t (what I call the is of identity) “Borges.”

10 This still leaves open the possibility that non-dominant (alter) personalities appear to themselves linked via FEC to a body (and/or mind) image, except such that only one of the body images (that of the dominant personality) is “on line” during waking states (where the actual physical limbs move in response to or along with the movements of the body image). In other words, just as the body image to which “you” (the central dream character) are conjoined in a dream state moves but is “off line,” that is, your actual limbs don’t move, one can imagine that this is what it is like for “embodied” alters: they are like minded dream characters, except the rest of the body/mind is awake.

11 That is, from the dominant personality’s third or second-person point of view; there may exist, within the alter itself, a second first-person point of view. We’ll take up this possibility again.

12 As the subject of experience subject to that point of view: being subject to that perspective is to be locked into the experience via FEC.

13 This of course leaves open the psychologically subtle but logically blatant possibility that such non-dominant (alter) personalities appear to themselves linked via FEC to a body (and/or mind) imagine, except such that only one of the body images (that of the dominant personality) is “on line” during waking states (where the actual physical limbs move in response to or along with the movements of the body image). In other words, just as the body image to which “you” (the central dream character) are conjoined in a dream state moves but is “off line,” that is, your actual limbs don’t move, one can imagine that this is what it is like for “embodied” alters: they are like minded dream characters, except the rest of the body/mind is awake.

14 For instance in the Cartesian sense.

15 This still leaves open the possibility that non-dominant (alter) personalities appear to themselves linked via FEC to a body (and/or mind) imagine, except such that only one of the body images (that of the dominant personality) is “on line” during waking states (where the actual physical limbs move in response to or along
with the movements of the body image). In other words, just as the body image to which “you” (the central dream character) are conjoined in a dream state moves but is “off line,” that is, your actual limbs don’t move, one can imagine that this is what it is like for “embodied” alters: they are like minded dream characters, except the rest of the body/mind is awake.

16 See, for instance, his “What Is An Author?”


18 For a detailed argument of how we draw such borders, see my “Metaphysics and Metapsychology of Personal Identity.”

19 DiGiovanni has told me in fact that on more than one occasion when a work was being written (by Borges) in Spanish and simultaneously translated (by DiGiovanni) into English, Borges would subsequently insist that the affect upon him, the author, during the act of writing was such that he felt as if a composite entity had in some important sense “taken over” the writing; to a certain degree DiGiovanni felt similar sensations. Ray Martin and I, while jointly authoring our Wisdom Without Answers, likewise found that often we could not tell even in the act of writing which one of us had written what. Jaakko Hintikka has likewise told me how often he and Merrill Hintikka would attribute some particular passage that they had written together to the other, where each is attributing to the other what the other is attributing to them. Musicians, especially those adept at jazz improvisation, have expressed similar sorts of “composite composition” phenomena, where subsequently they are unsure as to who the “real” author is.

20 That I am addicted to such wordplay is Quine’s fault.

21 Again we must be careful to note that what is said here can only be said from the first person point of view of the dominant personality. That is, there may be no way to tell whether one’s alters are conscious or not the way one’s dominant personality (what one takes to be oneself) is — though I will in subsequent chapters offer arguments for the multiple personality thesis. See, also, my In Search of Myself: Life, Death and Personal Identity.

22 See the FEC discussion in Chapter 2.

23 The subject—the “I”—is then bound to that psychological object—that self—that by thus being the (psychological) object of (the subject’s) identification not only imparts “objective” or “real” structure (i.e., properties to the mind that are no longer subject to the direct and immediate conscious control by the subject) to what
is otherwise essentially subjective but, also, “becomes” conscious by as it were achieving a certain autonomy from all the rest of itself by, literally, possessing consciousness. It thus follows, as we shall see, that I have free will to the degree that I, the subject, am “liberated” from my “self” (see §6.6).

Notice what the “dominance” dominates: subjectivity is dominated by objectivity, that is, its objects dominate the subject, and subjectivity ultimately dominates itself. The subject-in-itself can be thought of as subjectivity subjectified within objectified subjectivity (a personified psychological complex, typically, a personality or self.) By the subject-in-itself, the I, becoming thus identified as a psychological object (persona, personality) the person qua subject is restrained or to a degree limited and controlled by the personality, a psychological complex that thereby helps create and sustain the phenomenological divide between (intentional) self and (intentional) other, by objectivity literally possessing subjectivity, the I. That is why, as I said above, it follows as we shall see that we have “free will” only in so far as we are “liberated” in (or, in extreme cases, from) our “selves.” Being liberated in our selves does not mean immediately getting rid or dissolving our selves (our psychological identifications) that are themselves one way to achieve proper human functioning. Indeed, as we shall see, part of the problem with the misnomer, “free will,” is that we fail to understand the important (but not necessary) role of identification with regard to proper functionality. That is why the full cessation of identification that leads to complete infusion of Open Individual Liberalism (OIL) into the socio-politico-economic machinery, is foreseen only as the final stage in the evolution of subjectivity. At our present stage of human evolution what I call the Subjectivity of Four Dimensions (four degrees of freedom) is required for the having of experience as we know it. In the first (“socialist”) stage the liberation of subjectivity is achieved through the designification of the metaphysical and metapsychological significance of our various psychological object-identifications through philosophical analysis. The misnomer “free will” (itself akin to the unhappy notion of morality in a pre-moral state of nature) is thus replaced in my view by the Open Individualist notion of liberated subjectivity, freedoms granted to the “I” within restraints required for proper functionality at this stage in the evolution of consciousness.

From the perspective of its own dream world.

Notice, once again, that calling the person “Borges” not only begs the question but, given our analysis (and his own comments), seems doubly inappropriate.

There is a continuous spectrum of psychological binding. Thus, for instance, if the professor’s close friend were to become also the professor’s student, and the student asked a personal favor of her friend, the professor might say, “Look, as
your friend I’d like to help, but as your professor, without your writing an ‘A’ paper I can’t just give you the ‘A.’” The professor is of course well aware that she could do so in the sense that she has the power to do so, but her role as “professor,” an academic professional entrusted with the rules of the academic integrity, etc., prevents her from acting on the impulse to help her friend. In more extreme cases there is not even the conscious awareness that one could (in principle, at least) do otherwise than one intends to do, such that the person then feels only the one impulse coming from the (dominant) “self.” Identification is thus roughly, in this particular sense, inversely proportional to “freedom,” i.e., a liberated will. This is because to act as a subject in the world without identification as a “self” is impossible, while that very same identification is what restricts the subject’s ability to act unrestrained by the particular psychological contours to which consciousness is thus at the same time bound and liberated.

28 See the appendix, “Logical Borders.”

29 Some actors apparently are able to do this; Oliver Sacks has suggested that Robert DeNiro, for instance, convinced him during the filming of Awakenings that he was indeed capable of such feats.

30 In ancient terms, here Averroës’s (Aristotle-inspired) distinction between the active and passive intellects comes to mind, where the personality functions as the passive intellect and the subject functions as the active intellect; this is especially apt in that in so far as Averroës argued for the numerical unity of all active intellects his was a distinctly Open Individualist philosophy. In more contemporary terms, the subject acts psychologically as an impulsive force while the personality acts as a compulsive force.

31 I use the words “net” and “filter” here quite intentionally to evoke the topological notions of nets and filters. Although I have here not the space (sic) to go into detail, I would merely ad to what I have already said about compactification, Stone spaces, Hausdorff separation, and singularities, that the mathematical concept of ultra-filters, especially random ultra-filters in combination with IF logic, are extremely fruitful tools of analysis of the subject, multiperspectivalism and open individualism (including the notion of open vs. closed worlds) in relation to quantum cosmology, the collapse of the wave function, and other related topics.

32 I might add: the mistaken notion that privation of “psychological essence” is sufficient for lack or denial of personal existence, i.e., that the amorphous ability to be identified as virtually anything is tantamount to being actually nothing (that e.g. “the I” is a fiction) is, to put it most bluntly, on the level of for instance inferring
from “I cannot say (or do not know) what right action is” to “there is no right action.” Which is not to say that there is no puzzle; if for instance one’s view is that to be is to the boundary of a variable, and the “I” is a variable that has no boundaries, we will have to find some middle ground explanation.

33 Consider by analogy the case of an actor in relation to a particular role, at once both the source of his limitations and his freedom: expression and action enabled through self-restraint.

34 This is in some ways analogous to what Brentano’s says about intentionality, the point being that we don’t see perceptions or ideas but objects.

35 By “object” here I mean of course perceptual objects. Anything I see and am conscious of as an object in my experience, presented visually and/or tactiley, is of course interpreted not as a perceptual object but a physical object. This of course is Kant’s transcendental illusion. But also there are “psychological objects” that present themselves to the subject as its own thoughts, ideas, feelings, and so on. The main point here is that identification, as a three-level relation between subject and object, functions upon both types of objects.

36 A phenomenological complex. See Chapter 10, especially §10.3.

37 In the topological, not psychological, sense of complex, with standard sort of combinatorial and algebraic topological properties; see §10.3.

38 To avoid possible confusion the reader should note that I am here changing the locutions of primary, secondary and tertiary identification from some of my earlier writings. See my Philosophical Psychology article “Finding Our Selves: Individuation, Identification, and Multiple Personality Disorder.”

39 What is here involved is what for instance Zeno Vendler calls inter-subjective transference, namely, the projection of subjectivity from one’s own self to another. My work with autistic children suggests that what is missing in autistic consciousness is not a “theory of mind” (for a broader discussion see my Principles of Cognitive Science) but precisely what I am here calling quartic identification.

40 See Daniel C. Dennett and Daniel Kolak, “Consciousness, Self and Reality.”

41 The εδθ manifold can of course also be thought of as the phenomenal world (see Chapters 8 and 10).

42 There are also cases, such as schizophrenia, where statues, chairs, even rocks speak to the individual. Jung’s stone, it seems, is an example approaching such a state. What is of course extremely revealing here is that the sorts of madness where the subject begins to see the objects in its experience as minds, as itself, and so on,
is the mind as it were moving away toward the sort of self-deception necessary for
the having of experience as we know it (e.g., the transcendental and transcendent
illusions). That such minds are thereby on the path towards dementia and a whole
slew of disorders that, unless treated, usually render the human mind dysfunctional,
suggests that at this stage of human evolution certain aspects of and types of
“madness” are themselves a sort of philosophical self-defense activated by the
received conceptual framework (“conceptual-psychological operating system”)
attempting (and thus far in our case succeeding) to remain dominant and in control,
by for instance being the sole psychological generator of “self”-archetypes. But of
course that’s just one sort of interpretation, and a relatively naturalistic one at that;
one can imagine a slew of religious and “exotic” metaphysical interpretations,
many of which have been the sum and substance of a variety of interesting
folklores, mythologies, and religions.

44 Hence the “power” of the personality over the subject of experience.
45 Meant here, again, in the topological sense of complex—which I realize may be
confusing given the Freudian and Jungian sense of psychological complexes.
46 This has anything but minor repercussions for human psychology. People rarely
think to ask, “By making me like and appreciate x, what are you (covertly or
inadvertently) getting me to not like?” This is ever so true in all walks of life, from
education to the arts and sciences. Educators, for instance, rarely stop to ask what
aspects of human reality various sorts of positive enforcement in the arts and
sciences exclude. This explains, I believe, the aversion many have to a personality
like that exhibited, say, by Wynton Marsalis; as many jazz aficionados resent and
denigrate his jazz abilities because of his classical abilities as classical music
aficionados denigrate his classical music abilities because of his jazz abilities. I
have myself done experiments along these lines, showing that not only verbal
qualitative value judgments but physiological responses as well vary with the
subject’s belief as to who the artist is. The same note played by the same musician
and heard by the same subject can be reported at one time to be “a phony effort”
and exhibit particular sorts of spikes in the subject indicative of emotional arousal
in the amygdala and yet at another time reported by the same subject as “singularly
exceptional” and exhibit spikes indicative of emotional indifference. Moreover,
some of my work with autistic individuals suggests that one of the things regarding
which their minds are particularly abnormal can be regarded as abnormalities of the
$\varepsilon/\delta$ manifold.
47 See my In Search of God: the Language and Logic of Belief.
Such identifications can be extremely powerful; Los Angeles subway officials seriously considered altering the “red” and “blue” lines of their new metro system to more “neutral” colors, fearing that the red and blue subway lines would become red and blue gang war zones.

In the supervising physician’s psychology I am identified as Kolak but that’s secondary and quartic, not primary, identification, consisting in that aspect of her psychology [objectified consciousness, i.e., superobjectification] presenting itself to itself not as (intentional) “self” but (intentional) “other” [i.e., transferred consciousness, or superdissociation], such that the “other” is not “object-other” but “subject-other.”

The ego as such in the literature has come to signify a representation of the subject, an image, a “self-image” that might better be called an “I image.” Thus I throughout this work distinguish the subject-in-itself, the I, from the ego. Part of what makes Open Individualism difficult to grasp from within received Closed Individualism is that although we are all the same I not only are we each a different personality, self, etc., we are each a different ego. The clearest way to see that the subject is not the ego is to get clear on my usage and then contrast it to Freud’s.

See Jaakko Hintikka’s “Cogito, Ergo Quis Est?” and the discussion of that article in my On Hintikka.

Since to say more would take us beyond the intended scope of the present work, suffice it to say the following. It is widely recognized in projective transformations of a projective space of n dimensions, S_n, that because changing a simplex of reference is equivalent to a linear transformation between coordinates involving a non-singular matrix, numerically one and the same point can have a number of different names in reference to whichever simplex of reference it is being referred. It is the one-to-one mappings under non-singular matrices allowing projective transformations of S_n into itself that are both one-to-one and onto that make possible changes of coordinate system. Well known also are the more “sophisticated” mappings expressible in terms of the product of projective transformations, called perspectivities, where a product of perspectivities is itself a projective transformation. But where the matrix is singular (of rank r < n-1) the perspectivities, called singular perspectivities, create points, i.e., “singularities,” that have no image and yet not only are they “there,” in that they satisfy the equations

\[ \sum_{0}^{n} a_k y_k = 0 \quad (i = 0, 1, \ldots, n), \]

they fill a subspace S_{n-r}, just as do the image points that do exist fill a space S_{r+1}. The subspace S_{n-r} of points is then called the null space. Moreover, the well known...
notion of the fixed point $P$ of a projective mapping onto itself, i.e., of a non-singular projectivity, arguably the starting “point” of Brouwer’s philosophical realizations, or should I say, understandings, of his symbolizations, is “allowed” under homogeneous coordinates to “reappear” as the product of an eigenvalue provided that our ground is the field of complex numbers, which is algebraically closed. The eigenvalue (characteristic root of the matrix which is singular) can then generate an infinity of fixed points each one of which belongs to a unique eigenvalue whose subspaces do not intersect each other. These subspaces are so important that in mathematical parlance they are rightly called *fundamental*. See, also, the Gödel Universe (§10.14), to which in my view such singular projectivities apply.

53 Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 37.

54 *Wesen*, German variably for being, essence, nature, etc., has been used to denote essential being, without which an individual has no reality, and is related to the Greek *Oousa*, which Aristotle used for constant being, as well as the medieval *essentia*. Kant used it most aptly to mean the principle of all of that which belongs to the possibility of a thing and which is unconditionally necessary in its concept independently of any external, causal, or temporal circumstances. See *On Hintikka*.

55 Max Scheler (1874-1928), a student of Rudolf Eucken who joined Husserl’s circle of phenomenologists at the University of Munich.

56 Weyl’s thoughts on this matter are worth quoting at length because his precision and rigor almost exonerates the formidable philosophical quagmire of trying to state the unstateable. According to Weyl, each and every step of a proof must be clearly perspicuous to the person $P$, recognized in $P$’s immediate insight at each and every moment of time $t$. Even more importantly, in “The Concept of Number & the Continuum” (*The Continuum*, Ch. 3), he goes on to say that

I only have experiences belonging to a given time-point; but among these experiences is a more or less clear memory whose intentional object is the experience that I had in a past time-point. . . . Thus if I have, say, a visual perception of brief duration, then, in a moment $A$, I have not only this perceptual experience, but simultaneously the memories “of” the perceptual experiences of all past moments which fall within this brief period. But not only this; for in this moment $A$, I remember not only the perceptual experience in the moment $B$ which occurred a short time earlier, but the entire experience of this moment $B$, and this in turn contains in itself, in addition to the perception, the memories of the experiences I had in all earlier moments. . . . Precisely what eludes us is the nature of the continuity, the flowing from point to point; in other words, the secret of how the continually enduring present can continually
slip away into the receding past. Each one of us, at every moment, directly experiences the true character of this temporal continuity. But, because of the genuine primitiveness of phenomenal time, we cannot put our experiences into words. . . Here we discover genuine reason which lays bare the “Logos” dwelling in reality (just as purely as is possible for this consciousness which cannot “leap over its own shadow”). . . Within this theory the concept “real number” is the abstract scheme of the continuum with its infinite embeddings of possible parts; the concept “function” is the scheme of the dependence of “overlapping” continua (a particular instance of which is given, e.g., by a moving point; i.e., the overlapping of a temporal continuum by a linear spatial one). . . The coordinate system is the unavoidable residue of the eradication of the ego in that geometrico-physical world which reason sifts from the given using “objectivity” as its standard – a final scanty token in this objective sphere that existence is only given and can only be given as the intentional content of the processes of consciousness of a pure, sense-giving ego. [The Continuum, pp. 91-94]

57 In the sense, for instance, of the phantom limb phenomenon; we consider, on several occasions and in due course, the possibility that the I am I is a sort of “phantom identity.” See especially §10.5.

58 Tom Nagel was onto this when he pointed out that there is nothing it is like to be a rock whereas there is something it is like to be me. See his View from Nowhere.

59 What I call “virtual” necessary conditions are ones that need not be actual at all times but are, at all times, possible.

60 Thus I believe machines can in principle think without being conscious in so far as they are without the subject; thinking is thus in my view neither sufficient nor necessary for consciousness.

61 Insofar as for instance thinking is active, perception passive.

62 Thus pathologies and disorders of the self should (as they often do) include distortions not just of the mind-image (i.e., the ego) but also of the body image, as for instance in the case of anorexia.

63 See §8.2.

64 Consider some of the propositions of superstring theory, relativity, and quantum mechanics that have had many more complexly radical twists added to them, such as are encountered in brane world scenarios, including (a) von Neumann’s application of his operation calculus in which he replaces the Boolean lattice logic of classical mechanics with an orthocomplemented modular lattice (where
distributivity is replaced by the weak modular identity, wherein the non-distributive modular lattice structure of subspaces represents relations of dependence and independence between measurement of different observables, showing that these measurements of different observables (witness individuals) are apt to interfere with each other, even though to disturb the concept of the distributive law of classical prepositional calculus seems to breach the correspondence principle; (b) the holographic type nonlocal effective action in two-brane Randall-Sundrum models, involving phase transitions between the local and nonlocal phases of the theory, along with the impossibility of consistent descriptions of massive Kaluza-Klein modes; (c) the nonminimal coupling of Einstein gravity to the Brans-Dicke type scalar describing the local distance between branes requiring “corrections” in terms of the squared Weyl tensor with locally independent, yet simultaneously scalar dependent coefficient; (d) a plethora of field theories based on non-commutative spacetimes exhibiting distinctive nonlocal effects that are acausal and inconsistent with conventional Hamiltonian evolution; (e) the Feynman integral path parallelism; (f) superstrings following the Einstein-Dirac equations; (g) Mackey’s axiomatic groups in Hilbert space; (h) Mittelstedt’s hidden variables; (i) Heyting logic; (j) Bohm’s notion of implicate order; (k) the Bell inequalities; (l) the Schrödinger quantisation as eigen values; (m) the Bohr complementarities; (n) the Born state vector; (o) the von Neumann operator calculus in Hilbert space and projection postulate, to mention but a few recent “openings” to an Open View.


67 For detailed clarification of mind-body image, see §8.2.

68 I have been recommending this technique to a number of psychiatrists to use as a method of philosophical therapy to be used in conjunction with traditional Freudian therapies. The results will be published in my forthcoming New Interpretation of Dreams.

69 Sophia, my five year old, loves playing the following philosophically subversive questioning game: she asks her friends, “If you’re pretending to pretend, are you really pretending?”

70 Again, see Dennett and Kolak, “Consciousness, Self and Reality: Who Are We?”

71 See my “Personal Identity and Causality: Becoming Unglued.”

72 That is, memories of events, contrasted with dispositional memories, such as your ability to read, speak, walk, ride a bicycle, brush your teeth, and so on.
I am grateful to Derek Parfit for pointing this out to me.

The reader may well intuit that my view allows for the possibility that the I is not a continuant. That is, just as we can imagine the Kolak personality being carried off by the virus, through teletransportation, etc., but we cannot imagine the I being thus carried off; the notion of you and I switching I's is tantamount to being meaningless. The I can thus be conceived as already there such that wherever the I is, the person is.

Based on my laboratory experiments with GSR’s (Galvanic Skin Response) and other related equipment it seems that there is something like a $\varepsilon/\delta$ function switch based on a phenomenological complex (the saliva taste sensation) having a visual representation, that is, consciousness being objectified. What I find fascinating about this aspect of my cognitive science research is that it seems within consciousness the switch between subjectified (1st order, primary identification as) and objectified (2nd, 3rd, and 4th order identification) consciousness is such that the subject not only draws a border around the body-mind image but insists on perceptual contiguity. Thus for instance in some of my experiments where a person’s own limb is seen by the person as disjoint (through a complex illusion using multiple digital cameras and multiple monitors) the alteration in $\varepsilon/\delta$ is extremely predictable and precise. Especially vivid is how FEC can rejoin or detach one’s own body-mind image, so much so that afterwards one’s body becomes, literally, confused about just where in the physical laboratory it is. I have performed a number of experiments along this line with lucid dreams wherein the subject switches its identifications among various body-mind image representations but in these cases I have not been yet been able to precisely measure the $\varepsilon/\delta$. For more details see my forthcoming New Interpretation of Dreams.

Parfit would claim that there is a whole range of borderline cases about which there would be no answer to the question of whether there are one or two persons present.
CAUSAL BORDERS

. . . there are no logically necessary connections between causes and effects as we know them, and Hume is clearly right about this.

J.L. Mackie, *The Cement of the Universe*

§7.1 APPARENT EXCLUDER (7): THE CAUSAL BORDER

One possibility, which we have not yet considered, is that what makes it possible for there to be personal identity across the various Boundary Dissolves we have thus far considered is causal continuity. That is, perhaps whatever changes I undergo, there is an underlying causal connection that makes them mine. This causal connection does not exist between you and me and this is why you and I are different persons. Thus, the Causal Border is another apparent excluder of Open Individualism.

Virtually all current leading contributors to the literature on personal identity would agree that the Causal Border is, necessarily, a boundary between persons. This list of contributors includes Williams, Nozick, Lewis, Perry, Shoemaker, Armstrong, and Wiggins; even Parfit, on who’s view causality matters less than other relations which more accurately reflect the facts on which judgments of personal identity depend, subscribes to an analog of the Causal Boundary. Whatever else these theorists disagree about (and often they seem to disagree about almost everything else), they agree on the Causal Boundary. A curious fact about this consensus is that nearly all the writers on this topic accept the Causal Boundary without argument, as if the Causal Border were self-evidently a Boundary between persons.

Using the Causal Boundary to distinguish between persons it would follow that, ordinarily, Daniel Kolak and Ann-Margret, in so far as they are causally disconnected, are different persons. They might still be the same person. But if they are, then to show how Open Individualism is possible in spite of this apparent excluder we would have to show how DK and Ann-Margret could be causally connected even though they do not appear to be.
What would have made it plausible, on this view, that in the Omni-Dissolve DK and Ann-Margret were the same person is that, unlike in ordinary life, in the Omni-Dissolve there is such a causal connection between them.

If, on the other hand, the Causal Border is not necessarily a boundary between persons, obviously DK and Ann-Margret might still be different persons for some other reasons besides being causally disconnected, such as that DK and Ann-Margret are qualitatively distinct. But if the Causal Border is, necessarily, a boundary between persons, then even if DK and Ann-Margret were qualitatively indistinguishable, as long as they were not causally connected they would not be the same person. It is this implication—“no causal connection, no personal identity even across qualitative indistinguishability”—that will help us weaken the metaphysical significance ordinarily ascribed to the causal condition and thereby help us perform the Causal Dissolve. We can perform the Causal Dissolve in two steps. The first is to consider whether what matters is that the causal connection between two person-stages be of the kind to which we are ordinarily accustomed. For instance, David Lewis writes:

[What matters in] survival is that my mental life should flow on. . . . My total present mental state should be but one momentary stage in a continuing succession of mental states. These successive states should be interconnected in two ways. First, by bonds of similarity. . . . Second, by bonds of lawful causal dependence. Such change as there is should conform, for the most part, to lawful regularities concerning the succession of mental states—regularities, moreover, that are exemplified in everyday cases of survival. [“Survival and Identity,” pp. 17-18]

We might wonder not only whether causal connection is crucial to personal identity but also, if it is, after all, only one among many ways of being connected, whether the “regularities” must really be ones “that are exemplified in everyday cases of survival.” Presumably, by “regularities exemplified in everyday cases of survival,” Lewis means regularities exemplified now in everyday cases of survival, as opposed, say, to regularities that will, or could be, exemplified in the distant future. In other words, Lewis not only cares that there be no causal connection, but also that there be causal connection of an appropriate kind, where “appropriate” is interpreted as “normal now.” But why this heavy attachment to the status quo?

The teletransporter example, which shows how it could be possible that compositional continuity is not necessary for personal identity, also shows how it could be possible that “normal” causal continuity is also not necessary. Our intuitions about the Teletransporter may or may not be
correct. But if they are wrong, then on what grounds are they wrong? Indeed, it is not at all clear in many such imaginary and actual cases where exactly we should (or even could) draw the boundary between the “appropriate” and “inappropriate” causes. Parfit, for instance, claims that we should move from a “normal,” or what he calls a “Narrow” cause view. He provides an analysis in terms of what he calls a “Widest” cause that is any cause. He explains why with a partial analogy:

Some people go blind because of damage to their eyes. Scientists are now developing artificial eyes. These involve a glass or plastic lens, and a micro-computer which sends through the optic nerve electrical patterns like those that are sent through this nerve by a natural eye. When such artificial eyes are more advanced, they might give to someone who has gone blind visual experiences just like those that he used to have. What he seems to see would correspond to what is in fact before him. And his visual experiences would be causally dependent, in this new but reliable way, on the light-waves coming from the objects that are before him. [Reasons and Persons, p. 208]

Second, if the causal process of the teletransporter transmits everything that ordinary causation transmits, then it seems as good as ordinary survival. It is for this reason that Parfit, for instance, accepts that using a teletransporter would be a way of traveling, not dying:

When I fear that, in Teletransportation, I shall not get to Mars, my fear is that the abnormal cause may fail to produce this further fact. As I have argued, there is no such fact. What I fear will not happen, never happens. I want the person on Mars to be me in a specially intimate way in which no future person will ever be me. My continued existence never involves this deep further fact. What I fear will be missing is always missing. Even a space-ship journey would not produce the further fact in which I am inclined to believe.

When I come to see that my continued existence does not involve this further fact, I lose my reason for preferring a space-ship journey. But, judged from the standpoint of my earlier belief, this is not because Teletransportation is about as good as ordinary survival. It is because ordinary survival is about as bad as, or little better than, Teletransportation. Ordinary survival is about as bad as being destroyed and having a Replica. [pp. 279-280]

The causal connections exemplified in the teletransporter example (which helped us perform the Physiological Continuity Dissolve) are not such as we ordinarily believe are exemplified now in everyday cases of survival. Should we say, then, that they are thereby inappropriate causal connections, and incapable of preserving personal identity? Lewis, as I understand his position, apparently would say this. But such an approach seems unduly conservative. It is one thing to say that technological innovations such as
those described in the teletransporter example fail to preserve personal identity because of the kind of innovations that they are, say, innovations which interrupt bodily continuity. It is quite another thing to say that such innovations fail to preserve personal identity merely because they are innovations. It would be akin to claiming that when you and I are talking across a great distance via video-hook up, where we are each facing a television screen and live camera, we are not really communicating with each other because the information is not transmitted to our eyes and ears via the ordinary cause. Communication does not require ordinary causal connection through direct physical contact—why should personal identity?

Accepting the teletransporter example as a means of traveling can weaken the metaphysical and metapsychological significance ordinarily accorded to the Causal Border. It does not, by itself, dissolve the Causal Boundary. In the BST-procedure and teletransporter examples, for instance, there is causal connection, but of an unusual sort. The importance of these examples, so far as the Causal Border is concerned, is that if one allows the situations described in the examples as possible cases of survival with identity, then one must be prepared to allow great latitude to what counts as an appropriate causal relation between and among various physiological-psychological bundles. But the greater the latitude one allows on the causal issue, the more weight one tends to put on the other factors constitutive of personal identity as the decisive considerations in determining whether personal identity is preserved, such as qualitative similarity between bundles in terms of bodily or psychological continuity. It is then but a short step to the Causal Dissolve. But can that short step be taken without absurdity?

§ 7.2 ONE SMALL STEP FOR PERSONKIND

It is ironic, given the seemingly universal contemporary acceptance of the Causal Boundary that one can fairly easily perform the Causal Dissolve. An example of two successive physiological- psychological bundles, neither of which causes the other, but both of which are plausibly identified as being the individuations of one and the same person, will suffice. Such examples are easy to imagine. Consider, first, the following example of Nozick’s:

As you die, a very improbable random event occurs elsewhere in the universe: the molecules come together precisely in the configuration of your brain and a very similar (but healthier) body, exhibiting complete psychological similarity to you. . . . This is not you; though it resembles you,
by hypothesis, it does not arise out of you. It is not any continuer of you. [Philosophical Explanations, p. 41]

It is interesting to notice how committed Nozick is to the Causal Boundary; for, by his own closest continuer theory, the “random replica” produced elsewhere in the universe would be (the apparent) closest continuer of the original person. But by Nozick’s intuitions the example would not be person-preserving—even though Nozick is willing to claim that what matters in survival (what the appropriate measure or criterion of closeness is) can depend on the preferences of the individual[s] concerned. But let us now suppose that instead of occurring elsewhere in the universe, this unlikely and random event occurs wherever you happen to be at the moment. Suppose, further, that it just happens to coincide with another highly improbable, random event: your instantaneous dematerialization. No observer, including the person, or persons, directly involved detects, nor in principle could detect, that anything unusual has happened. What do your intuitions say about this case? Suppose a Causal Breach—that is, the ending of one causal locus and the beginning of another—is about to happen within you, that it will in fact happen when you read the second word of the next paragraph.

Perhaps you believe that the person who just read the word “perhaps” at the beginning of this sentence, and the person who read the next word, “you,” are in this case not the same person. You might believe this due to the fact that it was a freak, random event that brought you into existence. Or perhaps you believe that due to the remarkable qualitative, but not causal, continuity between you right now and the person who read the word “perhaps,” you are that person. Or perhaps your intuitions say that in this case there is no clear answer to the question of whether the person reading these words right now and the person who began reading this paragraph are the same person—you believe the question is empty. Thus there are (at least) three possible answers to the question of whether, given that the causal breach occurred between your reading the first and second word of this paragraph, the person who read the word “perhaps” and the person who read the word “you” are the same person:

(A) they are not the same person
(B) they are the same person
(C) there is no answer to the question of whether they are the same person.

Suppose you believe (A), that the person who read the word “perhaps” and
the person who read the word “you” are not the same person. Your intuitions would then be like D.M. Armstrong’s. Armstrong asks us to imagine a case in which two gods, G₁ and G₂, decide independently of each other to do the following. G₁ decides at time t₁ to annihilate Richard Taylor at place p; G₂ decides at the same time, t₁, to create a person at place p who, by an incredible coincidence, turns out to have all the psychological and physiological characteristics of Richard Taylor:

The question is “Did Taylor survive,” “Is Taylor₂ identical with Taylor₁?” I hope that the reader will agree with my intuitions that he did not and is not. [“Identity Through Time,” p. 41]

(Note that Armstrong, unlike Parfit, evokes the survival and identity assumption, the traditional Closed Individualist condition that a person survives only as long as there exists an entity identical to that person.) There are both pragmatic and conceptual difficulties with Armstrong’s view. On pragmatic grounds, it would seem pointless and socially unacceptable to regard Taylor₂ as anything but Richard Taylor, the same person who was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rochester, author of Action and Purpose, and so on. What purposes would be served by deciding that Taylor₂ is not the same person as Taylor₁? Should we deny Taylor₂ his paycheck, his pension, in spite of (Taylor₁’s) tenure, even though he knows everything that Richard Taylor knows, teaches the same way, and has the same publication potential? Should we advise his family to ignore him, inform his wife that she is a widow?

Suppose Taylor₁ had just murdered D.M. Armstrong when suddenly the chance intervention of the gods replaced Taylor with the causally unrelated but qualitatively indistinguishable Replica. Would that make Taylor₂, who not only “remembers” performing the killing and suffers from the appropriate guilt, but has the same psychological inclinations, not guilty? Would we, ought we, not punish him? Note that to simply answer, “Taylor₂ should not be punished for Taylor₁’s crimes; he didn’t commit those crimes, he didn’t even exist when they were being committed, he is in no way responsible for the crimes, and so doesn’t deserve to be punished for them,” is not as obvious an answer as it may seem. Recall the case of the two Dennett brains; on the “ordinary cause view,” if the computer brain happened to have been controlling the body, while the biological brain, in sync, thought it was controlling the body while Dennett committed murder, then punishing the computer program would be appropriate punishment while punishing the biological brain would not - even though the biological brain is “counterfactually guilty.” Had the switch been thrown one way
rather than the other, everything would have happened exactly as it happened, the same murder in the same way, and now the computer brain would have thought it did it while it “really” had not, instead of the biological brain being in that position. (On the other hand, we could view both of Dennett’s brains as one and the same mind and, in that case, ascribe equal guilt on the grounds that there is only the one mind in two different places.)

Suppose that we did in fact decide to treat Taylor2 as an impostor who is not identical to Taylor1. He is now free to roam the streets, shunned by his colleagues and his family. Then, ten years later, after which Taylor3 has become a destitute street person, scientists apparently discover that whenever two gods make a wish at the same time of the sort under discussion, their wishes cancel out. Suddenly, Taylor2 is welcomed back by the philosophy community, his family accepts him again, and he (somewhat angrily) collects his back pension and royalties. Perhaps, if he had actually murdered Armstrong, we punish him. Things go on as they had before, but only for a few years, when scientists discover the gods’ “wish cancellation effect” does not apply during leap years . . .

One could reasonably respond to such pragmatic objections by saying that any physiological-psychological bundles that are as qualitatively similar as Taylor1 and Taylor2 ought to be regarded as stages of the same person for practical, legal, and social purposes, regardless of whether the stages are causally connected or not. For other purposes, such as metaphysical ones, someone could claim that Taylor1 and Taylor2 are not the same person — but that would require demarcating the metaphysical and metapsychological boundaries between them along one or the other boundaries that we have already dissolved, or to claim that the causal border is, necessarily, a boundary between persons. We now turn to the conceptual difficulty of such a position.

§ 7.3 THE CAUSAL DISSOLVE

Suppose someone believes that Nozick’s “randomly created perfect duplicate,” is not Nozick, and that Taylor2 is not the same person as Taylor1. If, in spite of the pragmatic difficulties, this is what someone believes, what will that person say about the following case?

Consider my Randomizer machine, which by a random manipulation of variables within its Supercomputer creates random Mathematical Object-Configurations in its Superbrain and then rapidly replaces them with other
randomly created mathematical object-configurations. A Mathematical Object-Configuration (MOC) of you, for instance, would contain, in the form of mathematical equations, accurate information about every cell in your body, including the states of every one of your neurons and their inter-relationships.

The Randomizer works as follows. We place an object, say Robert Nozick, in the “analyzer,” so that the Randomizer can then subsequently construct a MOC Nozick in its brain and keep updating it moment by moment so that at all times it contains a perfect mathematical representation of Nozick’s physiology and psychology. Then, the Randomizer begins randomly creating other MOCs in its immense brain, perhaps billions of MOCs at a time, and comparing them with the MOC Nozick. Some of these randomly created MOCs would be mathematical representations of rocks, blobs of matter, trees, typewriters, etc., and some would be mathematical representations of people, such as Churchill, Hitler, or others who do not resemble anyone who ever lived. If it so happens that after some time the randomly created MOC object just happens to be qualitatively indistinguishable from the MOC Nozick, what the Randomizer does is the following. It uses the randomly created MOC Nozick as a blueprint to create, out of new matter, a Replica Nozick as it simultaneously destroys the original Nozick and puts the Replica Nozick in his place.

It could be objected that causality has been sneaked in when the Randomizer compares the randomly created MOCs with the original (constantly updated) MOC Nozick. Two responses can be made to this. First, this is a move from a normal cause to a very different and extraordinary type of cause beyond what we imagined in the BST and teletransporter examples. For instance, as Nozick says about a randomly created duplicate of you:

This is not you; though it resembles you, by hypothesis, it does not arise out of you. It is not any continuier of you. [Philosophical Explanations, p. 41]

Nor is it the kind of cause, as Lewis calls for,

exemplified in everyday cases of survival. [“Survival and Identity,” p. 17]

Nor is it the kind called for by John Perry:

the explanation of the benign duplicate’s being like me, is that he was produced “from me” . . .

[“The Importance of Being Identical,” p. 83]

The duplicate which the Randomizer produced did not arise out of Nozick
nor was it produced from Nozick. Rather, the duplicate Nozick was created by pure chance, randomly, and then put in the original Nozick’s place. But, if this is not enough to sway us away from thinking that the Causal Border is necessarily a boundary between persons, we can do away with even this “sneaked in” cause, and we will do so shortly. Let us first consider exactly what happens in the Randomizer example.

The effect is this: Robert Nozick, call him Nozick₁, enters the Randomizer’s “analyzer” chamber and the machine begins working. If the Randomizer works fast enough, and we have enough time, sooner or later we see the following: the machine shuts off and what appears to be Robert Nozick walks out of the analyzer. Call him Nozick₂.

Is Nozick₂ the same person as Nozick₁? Barring some malfunction on the part of the Randomizer (such as it shutting off on its own), Nozick₂ is now originated from a randomly created, but qualitatively indistinguishable, version of Nozick₁. So far this is similar to the Taylor₁ and Taylor₂ example, in that if you believe that Taylor₂ ≠ Taylor₁ then you believe that Nozick₂ ≠ Nozick₁. If we interviewed Nozick₂ he himself might, since he has all of Nozick₁’s philosophical views, believe that he is not the same person as Nozick₁, even though he remembers everything that Robert Nozick did and, in all respects, feels as if he is Robert Nozick, author of *Philosophical Explanations*, father of Emily, etc. He could even go to Nozick₁’s home and finish the paper Nozick₁ had begun before going over to the Randomizer. In other words, whether or not there is tertiary (third order) psychological identification will in this case depend on what theory of personal identity one ascribes to. This, I think, in and of itself is an extremely important and telling result. (It may thus even be the case that subject identified as Nozick₂, at first psychologically identifies itself with Nozick₁, but this psychological identification, derived in part from the conceptual framework sustained in part by his theory of personal identity, upon further philosophical self-analysis overrides itself and so Nozick₂ concludes, intellectually, that his psychological identification with Nozick₁ is but an illusion. This is one explicit sense of what I meant, in the previous chapter, that to a certain degree we are not just psychology but, also, philosophy.)

When considering which way your intuitions go in this case, several things should be kept in mind. First, from one perspective, all that has happened is that all the atoms in Robert Nozick’s body have been replaced by qualitatively similar but numerically different atoms. Thus, if this in and of itself amounts to a destruction of Robert Nozick, then one must hold a
view of personal identity such that personal identity requires the numerical identity of the matter out of which a physiology is composed. But, as we saw in the various types of Physiological Dissolve, this is deeply counterintuitive and problematic. What, after all, is so special about a particular atom of carbon that if we replace it with another atom of carbon (and do so for all the other atoms of my body) I will have ceased being the person who I am? To claim that the difference is merely due to the fact that carbon atom A got into my body through an ordinary causal network and carbon atom B did not, begs the question. Consider, for instance, a suggestion made by Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld,

Could we not reject the concept of matter and build a pure field physics? What impresses our senses as matter is really a great concentration of energy into a comparatively small space. . . . A thrown stone is, from this point of view, a changing field. . . . there would be no place, in our new physics, for both field and matter, field being the only reality. [The Evolution of Physics, pp. 242-243]

Suppose indeed it turns out that physical reality can be better understood in terms of fields than matter. Then in the Randomizer example the replacement of certain energy concentrations with other equal concentrations of energies, which generate exactly the same fields as the original, does not amount to a “real” change, since the original field (in the present case, a field designated by ‘Robert Nozick’) has remained the same. The field itself has been preserved—it is, numerically, one and the same field on the grounds that in physics field identity is not fixed by, nor limited to, any underlying object identity. Further along the same vein, even physical structures without internal structure have similar properties; two electrons are for this reason in quantum mechanics considered absolutely identical, as are two photons:

The truth is that the entire material universe, with all its variety, is entirely made up out of quantum particles which are completely identical. . . . The fact that one electron is absolutely identical to the next has important physical consequences . . . [The Cosmic Code, p. 281]

The second thing to keep in mind about the Randomizer example is, as before, that this could turn out to be the actual situation in our universe. Suppose, for instance, that someday quantum physicists might discover that the entire universe flickers on and off every instant, and that some sort of cosmic randomizing device (such as, perhaps, quantum mechanics posits of the universe itself) creates an infinite number of sequences at every instant but then only those which correspond in a special way to the previous
instant are selected and conjoined with the others. In that case, any one instant would not have causally arisen out of the previous instant but would be brought in by some device after the fact of the first instant being destroyed and the second instant being generated without being caused by the previous one.

Suppose an objector responds as follows: if we discovered that the Randomizer was the actual state of the universe, then what we have discovered is that, despite appearances, nothing persists. This would be akin, for instance, to concluding on the basis of our discovery that the material of one’s body does not persist that we do not persist. Both conclusions would be consistent with the facts, the difference depending on what (metaphysical and/or metapsychological) significance one accords to the borders in question. The example thus far functions merely a “softening up” of our requirement for direct causal connection in the ordinary sense, somewhat in the way that Parfit moves from an “ordinary type” cause view to an “any type” cause view:

There are three versions of the Psychological Criterion. These differ over the question of what is the right kind of cause. On the Narrow version, this must be the normal cause. On the Wide version, the cause could be any cause. . . . I shall argue that the two Wide . . . Criteria are both better than the Narrow Criterion. [Reasons and Persons, p. 207]

Why, though, this holding on to the “any” cause (rather than no cause) view? Consider again Nozick’s example where, as you die, a perfect duplicate happens to pop into existence elsewhere in the universe. According to both Nozick and Parfit this would not be you, but it could have been you, on Parfit’s view, if there had been any cause that brought the duplicate into existence. Suppose, then, that your sudden death causes Zeus to sneeze, and the powerful gust of air from Zeus’s lungs happens (by pure chance) to arrange a bunch of atoms into exactly the configurations of your living body just before you died. Presumably, this would satisfy Parfit’s “any cause” view. But how can whether a human being pops into existence without any cause or whether a human being pops into existence due to Zeus sneezing make the crucial difference between whether you are that person or not?

We can move from the Widest to the “Minimal” Causal View, as follows. Thus far, we have imagined the Randomizer to work very rapidly—perhaps billions of times a second—in order that it generate enough random MOCs to make it a likely occurrence that sooner or later (but before too long) duplication would occur. Otherwise, poor Nozick; he would have to sit for
thousands, or perhaps millions, of years in the Analyzer chamber before a random MOC was produced that corresponded exactly to the MOC Nozick in the Analyzer’s brain. But now, let us suppose that Nozick is immortal. Then, we can posit the Randomizer to run much slower, and as follows. Each time the Randomizer creates a random MOC, it makes an actual, physical object from this MOC in chamber B. Only then does it compare the object in B with the original Nozick in chamber A. If there is a perfect match, it destroys Nozick in A and leaves the randomly created Nozick in chamber B. The effect, in this case, would be similar to that of the teleporter example.

What, though, do your intuitions say about the interval in which the randomly created object exists in B? In the original example, this interval was so short that it did not occur to us to worry about it. But suppose now, after a long time of Nozick’s sitting in chamber A of the Analyzer section of the Randomizer, a perfect duplicate of him pops in, randomly, in chamber B. So far, in this version of the example, no causality whatsoever between Nozick₁ and Nozick₂ has entered the system. Thus, those who believe in the Causal Boundary—whether the Narrow or one of the Wider Versions—would have to claim that so far this duplicate is not Robert Nozick. If, however, they claimed that in the original example the duplicate was Robert Nozick once the Randomizer checked the two and performed the switch, they would have to hold that now, when the Randomizer checks the duplicate’s quantum structure with the original and destroys the original Nozick, the duplicate then becomes Robert Nozick.

This, however, seems counter-intuitive. Certainly as counter-intuitive, if not more so, than to suppose that the randomly created Nozick is the same person as the original. For the object in A, the randomly created perfect duplicate, is there, awake and conscious, in those few seconds before the Randomizer checks to see if he is a perfect duplicate. During those few seconds, the duplicate lives, thinks, breathes, and nothing about him physically, psychologically, or personally, changes when the Randomizer checks his quantum structure and then destroys Nozick₁. How could what happens after that time interval determine (and change) who he is (and was)? Notice that if we went by some version of the closest continuer theory and said that Nozick₂ is the closest continuer of Nozick₁, and that is why Nozick₂ is Nozick₁, it would not be due to the causal connection between them (there is none) but merely because of the physical and psychological similarity. This, for instance, would be Hirsch’s view:

Suppose that it can now be shown that neither compositional continuity nor causal continuity (nor
their disjunction) is necessary for identity. It then would follow that the other two conditions, i.e.,
the SQ [spatiotemporal and qualitative continuity] conditions, suffice. [The Concept of Identity, p. 216]

Perhaps SQ is sufficient (but not necessary) for personal identity. In any
case, let us linger a while on the Causal Border just in case you think that,
in my example, causality has somehow been sneaked in.

Suppose that the Randomizer malfunctions. It blows a circuit and shuts
down, accidentally destroying Nozick\textsubscript{1} and leaving the object in B intact -
an object that just so happens to resemble in every way the original Nozick.
Has Nozick, by an incredible and lucky coincidence, survived, or not?

Now, if you believe that Nozick\textsubscript{2}—in either the “soft” or “hard” causal
breach examples—is not the same person as Nozick\textsubscript{1} because there is a
causal breach between them, suppose that the Randomizer can be set to
work across a whole spectrum of cases. At one end of the spectrum, the
near end, when the Randomizer shuts off, Nozick\textsubscript{2} is the original Nozick\textsubscript{1}
without any changes whatsoever having occurred. In the case closest to this
end of the spectrum, Nozick\textsubscript{2} has had only one of his cells replaced by a
randomly produced MOC cell, and so differs from Nozick\textsubscript{1} by only one
cell. At the other end of the spectrum, the far end, Nozick\textsubscript{2} is a qualitatively
indistinguishable replica of Nozick\textsubscript{1} who is completely causally
unconnected to Nozick\textsubscript{1}. In between is a whole range of cases. In the
middle, half the cells in Nozick\textsubscript{1}’s physiology are MOC-produced cells, and
half are the original cells. So, if you believe that at the far end of the
spectrum Nozick\textsubscript{2} is not the same person as Nozick\textsubscript{1} due to the causal
breach, what do you say about the adjoining case, where one of the cells in
Nozick\textsubscript{2}’s physiology is original, and all the others are MOC-produced?

Suppose you choose to draw the line between Nozick\textsubscript{1} having survived as
Nozick\textsubscript{2} in the middle of the Causal Spectrum. That particular number of
causally-connected cells, then, is the number required for Nozick\textsubscript{1} having
survived. But how can that be? How can the difference between Nozick\textsubscript{1}’s
life and death be due to one additional cell being replaced by a qualitatively
indistinguishable but causally unrelated cell? According to traditional
Closed Individualism, personal identity is important—according to the
survival and identity assumption, personal identity is a matter of life and
death. It would thus seem that personal identity couldn’t be the result of
trivial differences. Even if it turned out to be true that such a sharp
boundary existed, our accepting that the Causal Border is a Boundary
between persons would mean abandoning Closed Individualism.

But perhaps you think neither that Nozick₂ is the same person as Nozick₁, nor that they are different persons; rather, like Parfit, you would have in the previous section opted for option (C)—namely, you think the question is empty, that it does not have an answer—not in the sense that we cannot give it an answer but that, whatever answer we give, there is no significant difference thereby described. In that case, you believe that if it is you who steps into the Randomizer there may be no answer to the question of whether it will be you who comes out.

There are two problems with this response. First, at what point is there no answer? Surely you do not believe that if one fingernail is replaced with a causally unconnected but qualitatively similar fingernail, then there is no answer to whether this person is you or not! This leads to the same difficulties as before.

Second, if you believe that there is no answer to the question of whether the person who steps out of the Randomizer is the same person who goes in—that the question of personal identity is in such cases indeterminate—then you have again departed from traditional closed Individualism. The Empty Individualist moves of Parfit, Nozick, Shoemaker and others do of course in fact depart from traditional Closed Individualism in exactly this way. Open Individualism also departs from Closed Individualism, but not in this way. Both moves are at first glance (from the traditional Closed Individualist perspective) implausible. However, we can claim that Open Individualism is here no more implausible than Empty Individualism because it is no more implausible to suppose, as we have seen, that identity does matter and that identity is preserved in the fission cases because the original person survives in both branches and is identical to both subsequent human beings. According to Open Individualism, the person does not merely as good as survive. The person survives.

If, on the other hand, your intuitions are like mine, you believe that Nozick₂ and Nozick₁ are the same person. You should then also believe that if the Causal Breach occurred while you were reading this paragraph, the person who finished reading the paragraph and the person who started reading it are the same person. This is what my intuitions say. If I found out that such a Causal Breach had recently occurred to me, I would not, for instance, stop working on this book. Nor would I sink money into a cosmic insurance plan to compensate my loved ones in case such “Causal Breaches with qualitative indistinguishability” took place, or to prevent such breaches from taking place in the future. I would consider such an insurance plan
nothing more than a clever scam. The fact that I would not care whether a Causal Breach had occurred is a good indication to me that the sort of continuity preserved across the Causal Breach, even though it does not include causal continuity, preserves all that matters to me as far as the preservation of my personal identity goes. This is because we can take my caring in this case to be indicative of it being me, the person who exists before the breach, survives the breach. For unless I am conceiving myself as existing on both sides of the breach, what matters to me about me is in that case not preserved, since what matters to me regarding the preservation of me must, necessarily, be me.

Ordinarily, if someone says that what matters to her regarding her continued survival over time is, say, not the preservation of her but, rather, the preservation of her children, we should be deeply suspicious about her reports regarding what she says that, in caring about her continued survival, she really cares about. For it seems that in that case this person (perhaps without realizing it) is not really speaking about what matters to her about her but, rather, is speaking about what matters to her about the preservation of some other things besides her, namely, the preservation of her children, or her genes, etc.. She might really identify with her children or her genes in this way but unless she also believes, and has good reason for so doing, that what her personal identity consists in is such psychological identifications, then in caring about her children she is not really caring about herself. She would be caring about herself in this way only if she is her children. And that is what the case of realizing that what matters to me about my personal identity in the Causal Breach example indicates: it indicates that my identity has been preserved across the breach because otherwise I would not care as I do about that case. (We will later flesh out in much more detail how and why such carings can, generally, be indicative of personal identity.)

We might wonder why, if the Causal Boundary can be called into question, have so many philosophers accepted it without argument? One plausible reason is that theories about identity through time have, at least since Locke, been bifurcated into two views: the identity (or ‘substance’) view, and the relational view. The identity view, as is well known, has fallen on hard times. The fission example is the best known recent reason for rejecting it.

But we have see that one can explain the fission example by relying on an identity analysis and claiming that the same person can be at more than one place at a time. That is, by showing how one person can be identical to
more than one human being, even when the numerically distinct human
beings are separated by all the various apparent excluders of Open
Individualism that we have considered, we have seen how avoiding a
relational view can help us to see that neither the Causal Border nor any of
the other Borders we have considered are necessarily Boundaries between
persons.
In relying on an identity, rather than a relational, analysis, are we
therefore relying on a substance view? No. As we shall see in the next
chapter, Open Individualism does not commit us to a substance view.

2 One exception is Eli Hirsch’s Concept of Identity. See, especially, pp. 211-226.

3 The television screen provides an even more dramatic example: consider the comment by the physicist Paul Davies:

The image on a television screen is produced by myriads of light pulses emitted when electrons fired from a gun at the back of the set strike the fluorescent screen. The picture you perceive is reasonably sharp because the number of electrons involved is enormous, and by the law of averages, the cumulative effect of many electrons is predictable. However, any particular electron, with its inbuilt unpredictability, could go anywhere on the screen. The arrival of this electron at a place, and the fragment of picture that it produces, is uncertain. According to Bohr's philosophy bullets from an ordinary gun follow a precise path to their target, but electrons from an electron gun simply turn up at the target. And however good your aim, no bull's-eye is guaranteed. The even “electron a place x on the television screen” cannot be considered as caused by the gun, or anything else. For there is no known reason why the electron should go to point x rather than some other place. The picture fragment is an event without a cause, an astonishing claim to remember when you next watch your favorite program. (God and the New Physics, p. 103)

Davies’s failure to distinguish, as physicists today often seem to, the sufficient from necessary cause, in no way diminishes the as it were physical force of the example.

4 A description of such a state of affairs is of course conceptually problematical, but only in the accepted canons of philosophical discourse, not the accepted canons of contemporary physics discourse.

5 There could be a difference, depending on whether one adopted a “local” or “global” closest continuer view; see Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations, pp. 50-51.

6 One may wonder whether I am here involved in the Heap Paradox or the Bald Man Argument. Clearly there are some borderline cases between a man's having no hair on his head and his having a full head of hair where we would say that it is a matter of perhaps arbitrary stipulation whether he is bald or not. We might agree, for instance, that if he has fifty hairs he is not bald; if he has forty-nine hairs, he is
bald. But such arbitrary stipulation cannot be so easily applied to other areas, such as to the experience of color, nor do we tend to believe that our own existence is in this way arbitrary. See, for instance, Parfit’s *Reasons and Persons* p. 232, and especially Peter Unger’s “Why There Are No People” and “I Do Not Exist.”
The philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body, nor the human soul with which psychology deals. The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the boundary - nowhere in the world.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

We now turn briefly to the possible objection that our Border Dissolves would not work in real life in the way we have supposed because, in actuality, personal identity resides in some sort of metaphysical substance. Someone who subscribed to such a view could claim that the BST or teletransporter examples, for instance, would not really preserve personal identity because such devices would not make copies of, let us say, for instance, one’s “immaterial soul.”

§ 8.1 THE METAPHYSICAL SUBSTANCE BORDER

I suspect I have the same epistemological qualms about “soul” theories that most contemporary philosophers writing in the analytic tradition have. But it is important to notice that the traditional metaphysical difficulty with such theories—namely, that souls cannot be individuated (they cannot satisfy the individuation and separateness of persons assumption)—is not a problem for Open Individualism.

In various contexts, the idea that personal identity resides in a metaphysical substance might be expressed with words like “soul,” “atman,” “Cartesian Ego,” “mind,” “spirit,” “psyche,” and so forth. I do not think which word we use is important, so long as we keep in mind that what is basically at issue here is whether some Metaphysical Substance Border is, necessarily, an uncrossable boundary between persons.

One might easily assume, indeed often it is assumed, that soul theories are at the opposite end of the spectrum from material or physical substance views. This is incorrect. The view that my personal identity consists in physical substance identity and the view that it consists in metaphysical
substance identity are much closer to each other than to the (relational) view that personal identity is determined by psychological attributes such as memories, character, and so on. In any case, it could be said that in one version or another an immaterial substance identity theory—we are here using “theory” loosely to mean a general set of beliefs—can be traced back more than five thousand years and thus is probably the oldest, best known, and (globally) the most widely accepted theory of personal identity. For our purposes, we need not go into much detail about the supposed nature of what this immaterial substance is. The idea, roughly, is that you and I are each a different person because we are each, or we each possess, a numerically different soul. The Soul Boundary, then, is an apparent excluder of Open Individualism.

If we compare the Soul Boundary to the Physiological (substance) Boundary, we can immediately see the similarity: identity resides in some sort of substance. The difference is that what distinguishes me from you in the case of the Soul Boundary is an immaterial rather than a material substance. While in some ways the Physiological Boundary produces too sharp a boundary—it separates DK3 and DK42 into different persons—the Soul Boundary ends up working like a metaphysical Krazy Glue and bonding all of us into one same person.

Thus the traditional criticisms of the Soul Theory easily provide the means with which we can see how, if you are a soul and I am a soul, we could still be one and the same person. One way of putting the traditional difficulty is this. In the case of a material substance we understand what it means to say that two qualitatively identical things are numerically distinct. We can define the distinction ostensively. But we have great difficulty in understanding this in the case of immaterial substances.

Consider, as Locke does, your immaterial substance and my immaterial substance trading places, as follows. The contents of our psychologies—our occurrent and dispositional memories, our character traits, etc.—and all our physiological characteristics—how we look, walk, etc.—remain with our bodies, while we switch physiological-psychological bundles. What would happen? According to the Soul Boundary, we are who we are in virtue of any of our psychological attributes or physiological characteristics; instead, we are the persons we are in virtue of our metaphysical substance, the thing that owns or has or is the carrier of those psychological and physiological characteristics. That is, personal identity is on this view not essentially tied to any physiological or psychological attributes.
§ 8.2 THE SOUL DISSOLVE

We can thus perform “The Soul Dissolve,” as follows. When my metaphysical substance, my “soul” leaves my physiology and psychology behind, which includes all the memories, character traits, and so on, it enters your physiology and psychology, so that it now perceives the world through your physiology and psychology, experiencing your psychology and physiology. My soul does this at the same moment when your soul leaves your physiology and enters mine. What would this be like? Would I find myself there, in your body, with your memories, character traits, and so on, while you in turn found yourself here in my body, with my memories, character traits, etc.? If the Soul Border is a definite and uncrossable border between persons, we would in that case find ourselves as having switched bodies, memories, character traits, and so on. But what would that be like?

Let us return to one of the first (naive) Physiological Substance Dissolves for help. The corresponding “switch,” in terms of a physical rather than metaphysical substance, would be if the “stuff” of which your physiology is composed—your atoms—switched places with the “stuff” of which my physiology is composed—my atoms—but in such a way that your atoms are rearranged to look like me, to contain all my memories, character traits, and so on. We can imagine what that would probably be like: if it happened instantaneously, no perceptible change (neither inwardly nor outwardly perceptible) would occur. And our intuitions would more than likely say that I, the person who I am, am still here, even though I am now made up of atoms which a moment ago you were made up of. We would not say that now I am over there, that I have new memories, new character traits, etc.

Neither in a physical nor a metaphysical substance switch would we have any way of telling whether or not the switch had occurred. It could have just happened now and we would not know it, it could be happening once every second, and so on. If your intuitions are like mine, they say that in the physical switch no essential change (with regard to personal identity) has taken place.

Yet, in the metaphysical substance switch, we are told, an essential switch has been made, regardless of the fact that our deep intuitions say that the switch could never, even in principle, be observed. In other words, the Soul Boundary makes an apparent rift between persons and an actual rift between metaphysics and epistemology; it makes what is the case independent of what we do or even could know. This is because your
immaterial substance, ex hypothesi, is neither your physiology nor any part of your psychology such as memories or character traits but, rather, something that has them. Thus if another immaterial substance replaced your present material or immaterial substance by instantaneously taking over your physiology and your entire psychology including memories and character traits, etc., no one—not even “you”—would be able to tell the difference. But who is the “you” who would not be able to tell the difference? An impostor, a false person, a non-person?

The same is of course true in the case of the physical substance case. Suppose we just found out that Martians have invaded our planet. Here is how they did it. They came last night and while we were sleeping they dissolved their atoms into our bodies so that there was an instantaneous one-to-one switch with every one of our atoms (our atoms were themselves discarded), and in such a way that the form of our original physiologies and psychologies was perfectly preserved across the switch without any additional information being encoded onto them. So now you are made up of atoms that used to belong to a Martian. Are you now a Martian? We would probably say that you are not and that if this is indeed how the Martians invaded our planet then the Martians are incredibly stupid.

Why is this a problem for the Soul Boundary? Because, as with the case of the Physiological Substance Boundary, where the electrons out of which you are made are qualitatively indistinguishable from the electrons out of which I am made, so in the case of immaterial substance the raw metaphysical “stuff” out of which you are made is (ex hypothesi) qualitatively identical to the raw metaphysical “stuff” out of which I am made. So if we can imagine surviving the Martian invasion where the Martians replace our physical substance with theirs (preserving our physiological and psychological attributes in the process), we can imagine surviving the Martian invasion where the Martians replace our metaphysical substance with theirs (preserving our attributes in the process). This is because, on our best understanding, the Martian invasion preserves everything that matters to our continued survival as the persons we are; it preserves us, our personal identities.

Thus, it seems, the Soul Border is merely an apparent boundary between persons. Since I can imagine being the same person even if my soul has been changing every second during my entire life, your and my having each a different soul would not, by itself, necessarily make us different persons.

An even deeper problem (for Closed Individualism) is that it is not clear
whether we can even imagine the Soul Border satisfying the individuation and separateness of persons assumption—that is, it might even be logically incoherent to suppose that it could. According to Closed Individualism, qualitative identity is not numerical identity. Ordinarily, we understand the difference between qualitative identity and numerical identity in terms of spatial position. Since metaphysical substances, ex hypothesi, do not have spatial position, a believer in Closed Individualism could not make the distinction between the numerical and qualitative identity of persons in this way.

What, then, could possibly be the principle of individuation for souls, for contentless beings that are not located in space and time? When devoid of content, there seems to be no qualitative difference between my soul and your soul. There simply seems to be no way to distinguish between qualitatively indistinguishable metaphysical entities. Imagine, for instance, there being “meta-quarks.” Like Leibnitzian monads, meta-quarks are similar to ordinary quarks except they have neither spatial nor temporal position. Consider two meta-quarks, A and B. Ordinary quarks, in so far as they are distinguishable from one another, are distinguishable only by their relative spatio-temporal positions; other than that, they are all qualitatively indistinguishable. Now, what about meta-quark A and meta-quark B? Do we have here one or two meta-quarks? Well, one meta-quark is called “A” and the other is called “B,” so one might suppose that in virtue of having different names, meta-quark A and meta-quark B are indeed different meta-quarks. But “A” and “B” might be two different names for the same object, as is the case with “Morning Star” and “Evening Star.” Now if, like ordinary quarks, meta-quarks A and B are qualitatively identical, the supposition that they are two different meta-quarks must mean that they are numerically distinct. But “numerically distinct” means, as we ordinarily understand it, either “qualitatively dissimilar” (as is the case with Beethoven’s Ninth and Beethoven’s Seventh symphonies) or “separated by space” (as is the case with my Acme Model 119 desk and your qualitatively similar Acme Model 119 desk). Meta-quarks A and B are neither qualitatively dissimilar nor separated by space. Barring some other means of distinguishing between things, one would have to conclude, if one wished to remain rational, that meta-quarks A and B, if they exist at all, are one and the same quark.

That is why the Soul Border is not merely an apparent excluder of Open Individualism, it is an actual excluder of Closed Individualism because it
provides us with no way of distinguishing between numerical identity and non-identity of immaterial substances. The question, “How many qualitatively indistinguishable physical objects are there?” can be answered ostensively, by counting. The question, “How many qualitatively indistinguishable metaphysical objects are there?” cannot be answered in this way; in fact, without the means of distinguishing between qualitatively indistinguishable metaphysical objects, one could easily argue that there is only one such object.

Furthermore, not only can we imagine it to be the case that the same metaphysical subject is embedded in every physiological-psychological bundle, since the metaphysical substance of a person is itself, when stripped of particulars, qualitatively the same in all cases, it is, all else being equal, most reasonable (given this option) to think that they are the same. And if it is simply defined not to be so, this is not rational explanation but circular reasoning.

As has already been noted, much of the criticism of Soul Theories is based on the inadequacy of the Soul Theories to satisfy the individuation and separateness of persons assumption (the Traditional Separatist condition that there are definite boundaries separating one person from another). State-of-the-art Soul Theorists like Swinburne and Madell usually defend against such objections by trying to come up with elaborate ways of satisfying the individuation and separateness of persons assumption, not the least elaborate of which are transcendental-type arguments. Madell, for instance, claims not to be a Cartesian dualist because he thinks the self is not an object of any sort, neither material nor immaterial. Soul Theorists now have a second way of defending against the objection that whatever particular Soul Theory they ascribe to cannot satisfy the individuation and separateness of persons assumption: namely, that this assumption does not need to be satisfied because, since the Spatial Border (like the other apparent excluders of Open Individualism) is not necessarily a border between persons, this assumption is false. Such a response would of course lead one directly out of the comfort of Closed Individualism and into Open Individualism.

§ 8.3 METAPHYSICAL SUBJECTIVISM

Indeed, it should therefore not be entirely surprising to find the notion of
one Soul who is everyone being espoused at various times throughout history, from the Upanishads down to Josiah Royce. The positive thrust of our explanations has of course not relied on any such notion of a World Soul but, rather, on the analysis of the subject. Yet because from a metaphysical standpoint the notions may have something in common I want at this point, as promised earlier, to flesh out what I take to be the correct metaphysics regarding the subject.

Although I must admit with Schopenhauer that some version of transcendental idealism is the only coherent metaphysics, the reader should bear in mind that Open Individualism does not require or depend upon any such transcendental (critical) or representational idealisms and their function in some of the dream analogues, such as discussed below, is merely to further facilitate our analysis of how Open Individualism is possible in light of its many apparent excluders. That Open Individualism does not require this or any other such metaphysical or ontological commitment is in fact one of the considerations in favor of its being the best competing explanation of who we are. (On the other hand, the reader should also bear in mind that in considering this or any other sorts of metaphysical or metapsychological borders we must not let ourselves off the hook, as it were, by deferring in the back of our minds to some sort of physiological or psychological borders. These we have already dealt with via the requisite boundary dissolves.)

Let us proceed now with our metaphysical analysis of the subject by considering another sort of dream analog. As we do, let us also keep in mind the limited but important role of the various dream analogs within our overall explanation of how Open Individualism is possible. The purpose of the dream analogs is to help show in this and related sections that my existence as the subject

1) is what matters most to my existence as a person and
2) is independent of the very physiological and psychological borders that I am identified as (i.e., “bound” to or “bordered” in).

When I am asleep and not dreaming there is within this mind/body complex no consciousness that I (the subject) am aware of; I am then not consciously aware of anything, there is no experience as such. When a dream begins I, the subject, suddenly (it doesn’t feel like suddenly) emerge into consciousness along with the whole rest of the (dream) world as if from out of nowhere: I find myself, just as I do in my waking states, surrounded by all manner of objects that appear to exist “outside” me, that is, directly in
front of me, to which I, the subject, am related in my experience not as mind to mind but as self to other. Everything the subject sees in the dream appears to exist outside and independently of the subject: the objects in my dreams appear as things that are not me but part of the surrounding world external to me, from which I am separated by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment. In other words, in my experience the dream as such does not exist “inside me,” the subject, but on the contrary: in my experience I exist inside the dream world. This is a phenomenological fact (for a further discussion, see Chapter 10). To say that I, the subject, along with all the objects in my dream exist “inside me” is not only to move beyond experience to theory but into a very poor theory at that, requiring gross inattentiveness to one’s own actual phenomenology and the acceptance of grossly contradictory locutions; in short, it requires surrendering philosophy to folk metaphysics. For the “me” in “inside me” implies the subject, but clearly to say that the subject is inside the subject is nonsense from for instance a traditional naïve realist point of view, unless the secondary subject [the “me” inside which the I exists] is not a subject qua thinking subject of experience but a metaphysical subject, a brain, a “mind,” etc. And these items clearly are not what I am identified as. I, the subject, can as such only at most identify with my mind, with my brain, with my body, etc. This fundamental point seems to be poorly understood, if at all, but virtually all philosophers and psychologists today, even (perhaps especially) by cognitive scientists.

Here we must be extremely careful. So let me restate the point. I’m not saying merely that things in a dream look like they exist outside me and that “in reality” they exist inside me. For, once more, what would be the reference of “me” in such a statement? Me, the subject identified as a particular personality and body image in the dream? No, not that “me,” for that is merely the “dream” me (a mind-body image, a representation). Well, which me, then? Me the sleeping mind, or me the brain, me the body, etc.—but from the conscious first-person perspective of the subject none of those are me’s, that is, those entities as such are not thinking subjects of experience. They can appear at most (representationally) as objects before me, thrown forth in experience of which I am the subject. And here I want to avoid the old quagmires by insisting that what I mean by “me” is our subject-in-itself and that as far as conscious experience goes (i.e., in terms of my actual phenomenology) the subject qua our subject-in-itself is not something with an inside that is then filled with mental representations.
Which is not to say that there isn’t a clear sense in which (problematical though it is) we can say that a dream (or an idea, perception, or thought) exists inside a mind that itself exists inside a brain, and so on. This we shall flesh out more in subsequent chapters, especially Chapters 10 and 11. For now, let us instead make another important metaphysical distinction, with the caveat that it too shall be fleshed out in much greater detail later.

I explained above the sense in which a dream is not something that is “in” me but, rather, something that I am in, because what I mean by me is I, the subject. It is however equally essential that we already made this next point perfectly clear, for it is both simpler and more difficult than it looks. The subject, as such, is always embedded in “the world”—its “world.” (The Wittgensteinian “I am my world.”) Thus in both my dream and waking states I find myself situated at what seems to be the seat of consciousness, the head (or just inside the head) somewhere at or near the eyes, or thereabouts (some describe it as ‘just in front’ and others as ‘just behind’ the eyes), looking at what I see as the objective world outside me all around. According to common sense—the folk view of the typical layperson—all these objects that I am at this moment seeing exist outside (in front of) me, in the objective world of public experience, whereas the thoughts with which I am thinking about them exist inside (behind) me, in my mind. On the other hand, when I am dreaming—still according to the received view of common sense—the objects I see in my dream states exist inside me, in the mental world of the dream, they are but items that exist as such only inside my head. But surely as I have explained above these are not correct descriptions; certainly, at least, they are not literally true. Let me repeat and elaborate the reasons. First of all, upon reflection one comes to the conclusion that both in dream and waking states the subject and its objects exist inside the mind and/or brain, regardless whether these are dream or waking states (one key difference of course being that in the former there is no correlation between private and public “worlds” to the degree that there is in the latter)—the point being that we can relatively easily come to know that the subject does not exist outside the head, not ever. But one then proceeds, further, to believe that that “within” which the subject as such does exist—“the mind” or “the brain”—itself exists inside the subject. That’s how it feels. (Look at your experience right now.) But that’s an illusion. In dream and waking states alike the subject finds itself projected into a virtual (or, psychological) space, apparently located on the top of the shoulders where it feels as if that’s where the head is and that’s
where I exist, qua subject, somewhere inside there. But there is no “inside” there. The “inside” thus conceived is more appropriately referenced to the immediate (phenomenological) “outside,” which in relation to the subject is everywhere and all around. Where as here where I, the subject (consciousness), am is best described, from a philosophical (and, nowadays, even from a neurological) point of view as a headless “body-image.” What I am thus immediately and directly looking at from my first-person vantage point on my experience is not the objective “non-perspectival” world as it exists independently of me, the subject but, rather, the subjective perspectival world as it exists for me, the subject, within which I am myself situated and embedded (in ways that we already discussed in Chapters 2, 5 and 6 and shall still further explain below). In my immediate experience is not some publicly experienced objective world but the subjectively experienced phenomenal world (this too shall also be enhanced in Chapters 10 and 11). There’s no easy way around this, except to espouse some naïve form of so-called “realism.” To object that somehow this view, which I call metaphysical subjectivism, commits us to some sort of problematical idealism (which in any case it does not) is simply to miss the point entirely.

That is, as I come to understand that, dreaming or awake, what I am looking at is the subjective world existing as such in subjective, phenomenal space—that the space of consciousness is the space of subjective experience, the world in my immediate experience is my world—typically I continue, problematically, to believe that I the subject am the “container” of that which is being thus perceived, the body-mind entire. But the fact is that the perceived body with shoulders on top of which both in my dream and waking states I find myself situated and which functions as the locus of contact with my world, is not my physical body as such but my body image. Second, and even more problematically—for this is even more difficult to understand—none of this is occurring, from a phenomenological standpoint, inside me, the subject, but directly in front of me: and as the subject comes to understand that what looks like the outside can be understood, from a philosophical point of view, to exist only “inside” the mind, the subject takes itself to be that mind. In fact, we are now in a position to put this point as follows: the subject identifies with that mind but the subject is not identified as that mind. What the subject is, as a matter of phenomenological fact, identified as, is the phenomenal body-mind (also further discussed below). This is the point that I said has been either systematically missed or misunderstood by virtually all philosophers. The
most notable exception is also the most obvious: Schopenhauer, arguably the most systematically ignored philosopher in philosophy today. It is thus helpful for this stage of our philosophical explanation of Open Individualism to see the sense in which “the world,” as Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein each in their own way use the term to refer not to some sort of noumenal being-in itself or, to put it in the cloak of scientific respectability, some sort of physical spacetime manifold but, rather, the (categorical) manifold of subjective, phenomenal space and time immediately surrounding the subject in experience, the occurrent phenomenological manifold of subjectivity that as such exists only for the subject. This according to Schopenhauer is the “one thought” sought by philosophers since the beginning:

Everything that exists for knowledge, and hence the whole of this world, is only object in relation to the subject, perception of the perceiver, in a word, representation . . . this holds good of the present as well as the past and future, as what is remotest as well as what is nearest; for it holds good of time and space themselves, in which alone all these distinctions arise. [The World as Will and Representation, p. 3]

The world we see in our experience—the world as representation—is but “a phenomenon of the brain . . . the same brain function that conjures up during sleep a perfectly objective, perceptible, and indeed palpable world must have just as large a share in the presentation of the objective world of wakefulness.” (Vol. II, p. 4)

All this should help make progressively clearer the reference of I as we have been using it to refer to the subject, that it exists, and that so long as it exists the person exists. The word “I” has of course historically been notoriously ambiguous and very difficult to pin down. For “I” can be used to refer to just about any aspect of my existence—my brain, my body, my clothes—even my car. (“He hit me,” meaning that I have appropriated the car as part of my own personal borders—perhaps not only do I identify with my car but, to a certain degree, have become identified as my car, the way a hermit crab can come to appropriate a shell as part of its own personal boundary). But, clearly, when for instance I say “I was asleep” there is an important sense in which it wasn’t, strictly speaking, the subject who was asleep (except in the trivial sense of not being there, that is, being experientially and phenomenologically empty, i.e., “doing nothing at all”); rather, strictly speaking, it is the body/mind that was asleep. Only when the body/mind are awake is the subject there, localized in experience and
phenomenologically situated, the I projected into the subjective, phenomenal world at a particular location identified as a particular psychological complex. That I am that—the subject identified as a particular Self (primary identification, detailed in Chapter 6) embedded within my world—is by my lights an extremely important aspect of the life of a self-conscious being, a person; I would (and will) even go so far as to claim that without the possibility of the subject being thus identified as a self within its world, a world that it can, through philosophical analysis, come to identify with but which it is clearly and distinctly dissociated from, there is no “consciousness” (the subject, the I of personal identity), no “self-consciousness” (the intuition of personal identity) no perceiver, no thinker, no person. To be a person thus involves, and requires, what is an extremely elaborate yet apparently necessary self deception (the division of the person into self and other, including the Illusion of Other Persons).

In other words, metaphysical subjectivity involves the thesis that my conscious space is the space of experience. But as the subject in that space I am also a being that, under ordinary conditions, necessarily fails to recognize my subjective, phenomenal world as what it is—a subjective, phenomenal world; hence, the world experienced directly in my phenomenal space is characterized by a pervasive naïve realism (a user-friendly illusion that we could not function properly without). Again, no one should think Open Individualism requires some sort of idealism; moreover, these sorts of relations are by now rather straightforward, if altogether rarely understood, notions studied by researchers in cognitive science and cybernetics.

To be the subject in my world is an essential aspect of personhood. Am I a brain, a body, a mind, composed of material atoms, spiritual atoms, a function, a process, a ghost in a machine . . . ? It does not matter, so long as I am there for that is what matters to my existence as a person: what matters to my life as a conscious being is not the cause but the effect; whatever be the cause of the subject this essential effect is in what my existence as a conscious being consists.

That is why I claimed (esp. in Chapters 2 and 6) that the subject is no fiction, no chimera, but a fact, and a central one at that—indeed, a necessary condition—for the having of conscious experience. Regardless of whether the subject as such exists in a dream or waking state, the objects in its experience appear as elements of a world external to the subject. As we noted above, it is in that sense that the objects I see in a dream are external
to “me:” they appear in front of me, object and subject coexist within one and the same containing, subjective phenomenal space. (Remove the subject and its objects and cease to exist, as does its subjective, phenomenal world entire, just as Berkeley imagined. Which, once again, does not mean we need go as far as Berkeley’s idealism.) That at the present moment I seem in one sense to be peering into this containing space from the outside and yet, in another and more important sense, to be inside that space (in so far as I find myself identified as a body [image] in that space), makes it extremely difficult—almost impossible—to set things aright in terms of language. The philosophical upshot of metaphysical subjectivism is for us merely to take note of this. One must see that from a phenomenological point of view the subject is like a simple substance, unextended, though it is—paradoxically—conceived in language to be the container (i.e., “possessor” or “owner”) of all that is seen, which would require it to be extended (containment requires extension). The subject is, however—from the point of view of the phenomenal world—empty. Hence, I believe, part of the understandable mistake on the part of Empty Individualists to miss in varying degrees (Parfit comes closest to seeing it) the Open View. Likewise, one must see that from the phenomenological point of view the containing space of my world is a subjective, phenomenal space and, furthermore, that is what it is regardless of whether I am dreaming or awake. And the problem is that language is poorly suited for this sort of double effect, which is what makes it almost impossible to render metaphysical subjectivism properly except from a purely philosophical point of view.

Once we become clear about exactly what it is we are talking about when we talk about the subject, then nothing should be more clear than that I, the subject, can never find myself in anything other than a subjective, phenomenal space. To suppose otherwise would require the mind within which I exist as the subject to somehow push or project me outside itself through the eyes onto the surface of the face such that I, the subject, am protruding out into physical space. I cannot think of anything more absurd than that. I am therefore quite astonished to find some views, both philosophical and scientific, that require exactly some such absurd state of affairs and which have yet the audacity to call themselves “realistic” or “commonsensical,” or “pragmatic,” even as they imply that I am at this very moment peering out of my skull into the physical space of a world that exists externally to my brain/mind. To think in such ways is not just to
misuse language but to confuse the subject for the mind within which it exists identified as a particular personality, an unfortunately all-to-common state of affairs requiring more elaboration and further clarification, to which we must still tend before going on.

The subject is never a disembodied subject. Even in dreams I find myself not in a diffuse disembodied state floating about like some extended, conscious “sphere of attention” but, rather, just as I do in my waking states, identified as a particular body (image) existing inside the dream world as a locus of motion and intentionality at a specific location from which consciousness of objects, thoughts, feelings, etc., seems to emanate, separated from other such loci by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment. I say “objects” instead of “images” because neither in dream nor waking states do I see such mental events (psychological items of perception) as images. Although I may upon waking (or even during the dream, if it is a “lucid dream,”) be able properly to describe such items as “images,” what I see are not images but objects. (That is, although images the phenomena of my experience may be, neither in dream nor waking states do I experience phenomena as such; I dream not that I’m being chased by images but that objects, i.e., dogs, are chasing me—from images I simply would not run away.) Yet I can and often do infer (upon philosophical reflection) that what I see are, both in the case of dream and waking states, mental (phenomenal) images—i.e., representations that, in waking but not dream states, are ordinarily and to some requisite degree veridical to what we may, by convention, call the “objective” (i.e., multi-perspectival) or “physical” world. From the standpoint of metaphysical subjectivism let us thus refer to that what I see, when I see a table, a chair, a dog, etc., not as an object image but as a phenomenal object. So long as we remain consistent we can say therefore that what I am identified as in a dream is my phenomenal body, just as I am in my waking states. And, likewise, neither in dream nor waking states do I see my phenomenal body as an image but as a body. This fact helps create the requisite illusion that my phenomenal body is not a body image but a physical body situated in and surrounded by the “objective world” of “public experience” (sic) that, however, upon further philosophical reflection, reveals itself to be not what it seems—the objective (subjectless?) world—but what we should rather call my phenomenal world and to which apply all the same sorts of comments as above. For instance, in the dream the phenomenal world appears to be not my image of a world but my world. This is of course another absolutely
necessary illusion, in so far as it is exactly such proprioceptive awareness that is involved in my ability to move and control that within which I am situated as the subject (located, apparently, where that body’s “head” should be), namely, the physical body/brain/mind. Indeed, again there is much evidence from contemporary cognitive science and cybernetics that some such intimate relationship of the subject to the phenomenal body makes physical locomotion possible: the subject is intimately involved in the causal chain required to move the body, through directing conscious awareness to the appropriate aspect of the phenomenal body that then produces a response in the appropriate physical mechanisms.\(^\text{13}\)

This is illustrated most vividly in cases of the phantom limb phenomenon. Amputees can identify prosthetic limbs as their own bodies by appropriating them as part of their phenomenal body, such that they have the same proprioceptive awareness as we do of our own limbs. As Oliver Sacks notes, they can (and must, at some point, learn to) feel the limb from the first-person point of view:

All amputees, and all who work with them, know that a phantom limb is essential if an artificial limb is to be used. Dr. Michael Kremer writes: “Its value to the amputee is enormous. I am quite certain that no amputee with an artificial lower limb can walk on it satisfactorily until the body-image, in other words the phantom, is incorporated into it.” . . . One such patient, under my care, describes how he must “wake up” his phantom in the mornings: first he flexes the thigh-stump towards him, and then he slaps it sharply - “like a baby’s bottom” - several times. On the fifth or sixth slap the phantom suddenly shoots forth, rekindled, *fulgurated*, by the peripheral stimulus. Only then can he put on his prosthesis and walk. [*The Man Who Mistook His Wife For A Hat*, p. 67]

According to Sacks, “it is only by courtesy of proprioception, so to speak, that we feel our bodies as proper to us, as our ‘property,’ as our own [*The Man Who Mistook His Wife For His Hat*, p. 43].” very much along the lines considered in terms of the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment.

Furthermore, regardless of whether I am dreaming or awake, what I am identified as is not just a phenomenal body. There is also, in both cases, a complementary counterpart to the phenomenal body, namely, what I call the *phenomenal mind*. Here again metaphysical subjectivism allows us if we are careful to avoid falling into the old familiar quagmires. The phenomenal mind consists in large part precisely of the sorts of psychological bundles we identified in Chapter 6—namely, personas, personalities and selves—except that where as the phenomenal body and
phenomenal world seem both to be of the same sort of ilk—“physical stuff”—the phenomenal mind presents itself to the very subject that is identified as it in counterpoint to such “physical apparitions” as something completely different, i.e., as “mind stuff.” But of course phenomenal body, phenomenal world, and phenomenal mind can all be interpreted as aspects of one and the same person, within which the subject as such is the fulcrum of consciousness, the phenomenological nexus between the phenomenal world and the phenomenal mind, situated precisely at the interface of phenomenal mind and phenomenal body, conjoined to the latter but identified as squarely in the former. (It should also therefore not be surprising that “behind my eyes” where the mind seems to suggest its own presence is a phenomenological nothing, for the mind that I am in is all around me, not behind me; I, the subject, am in it. This is an elaboration of the fact that the subject is a simple substance and, as such, unextended—not a “set” or “sphere” but a “point,”—i.e., as I suggested above, “empty.”)

Metaphysical subjectivism allows us still to make some further clarifications and elaborations. Sustained philosophical reflection reveals for instance that my phenomenal world, my phenomenal objects, and my phenomenal mind (including thoughts, feelings, etc.) are conceived by me, the thinking subject of experience, to be all one and the same being, a person, and I am that being. But, again, from the point of view of the subject identified as a Self I don’t see all these aspects of myself as me (only the thoughts and feelings are more or less correctly interpreted as what they are and whose they are), which is just to say that I am not identified as my phenomenal world but only as a particular aspect of my phenomenal world—the phenomenal mind and the phenomenal body, i.e., the phenomenal Self.

In other words, there is what is interpreted as Self in my phenomenal world (see Chapter 10). The phenomenal Self is what the subject is identified as—this is what in §6.3 we defined in terms of tertiary identification—while thereby dissociating itself from all the rest of itself, which thereby becomes the phenomenal world—primary identification. The person is both. The person exists not beyond subjectivity but is, itself, subjectivity—all aspects of it (in that respect, the person is like a chameleon that can be anything or anyone). Consciousness, subjectivity, as such has a dual aspect in which personal existence consists: consciousness divides itself into—it becomes—the phenomenal Self within the phenomenal world.
Thus it is through the fourfold \( \varepsilon/\delta \) manifold relation (§6.3) that the subject does not see or understand its (phenomenal) objects as part of the same mind within which it conceives itself, the subject \textit{qua} subject (the subject-in-itself), to exist. This is part of the difficulty of comprehending metaphysical subjectivism clearly.\(^{14}\) Indeed, as I’ve already argued, there are lots of good reasons for thinking that, in fact, the subject \textit{can’t} properly see this state of affairs, not the least of which are precisely the sorts of reasons that Kant suggested accounted for the “transcendental illusion”—namely, that mistaking of phenomena for noumena (things in themselves) is itself a necessary condition for the having of experience (our “user friendly illusion” again.\(^{15}\) The fact is that the subject sees the items in its experience as external objects—existing, as such, in a world external to the subject, interpreted as “Other”—\textit{always}, regardless of whether the subject is involved in waking or dream states.

Second, the subject does not see \textit{itself} as a phenomenal mind, phenomenal world, etc. That is not how the subject presents itself to itself, i.e., as something capable of transforming itself into a phenomenal mind, phenomenal object, and phenomenal world, via its dual nature as (phenomenal) Self and (phenomenal) world. The subject presents itself to itself not as subject, object, world, etc., but only as that which \textit{sees} its objects and its world: that is, it presents itself to itself as the subject \textit{identified as} a phenomenal body-mind (i.e., phenomenal Self). In other words, I find myself identified \textit{as} my “phenomenal body-mind” within which I am situated where ordinarily I would imagine my head exists: what is situated there is “the subject.” The thus identified subject, then, is situated at a particular locus of conscious awareness in relation to the body-mind image “within” which it is identified \textit{as} a particular personality. This is the phenomenal Self (discussed again in Chapter 10). The phenomenal Self is not the subject \textit{qua} subject; it is how the subject presents itself to itself when identified \textit{as} a phenomenal mind (i.e., a particular personality) exclusively conjoined to a body image. The phenomenal Self, then, unlike the subject, is \textit{extended} in phenomenal space: superidentified consciousness contained within superobjectified consciousness. That is how all these aspects of the person come together in one organized unity that is not merely a single point of awareness on my subjective, phenomenal world but is me, the subject, consciousness, “spread out,” as it were, both via identification \textit{with} and identification \textit{as}, across the entire locus of intuition and intentionality that is the phenomenal Self (phenomenal body-mind).
Here we must try to make it yet again as clear as possible that, as above, the phenomenal body-mind (Self) does not present itself to the subject as a body-mind image but as the body-mind, the whole person. Thus in my own case at the present moment this phenomenal body-mind, this Self, is coextensive with what, ordinarily, I would call “Daniel Kolak.” What is in that sense true of me is also true of you. We each exist within ourselves—within superobjectified consciousness, our phenomenal world—as an identified subject situated in place of where we imagine the head is, inside the subjective, phenomenal world identified as a particular phenomenal body-mind (Self) to which we are each exclusively conjoined (FEC, etc.). What we therefore ordinarily think of as ourselves, the persons who we are, is in actuality neither the psychology nor physiology entire but, rather, consciousness, subjectivity, taking on the form of a particular psychology and physiology, a form which the subject doesn’t just manage to bring about like a thought or an idea but which it manages to turn itself into, through the process of primary, secondary, tertiary and quartic identification.

It is via the phenomenal body-mind (that, inclusive of the identified subject, we are calling the Self) that the distinction is made, in both dream and waking states, between Self and Other, an illusion achieved primarily through the sort of phenomenological divide that Kant called the transcendental illusion—essentially, for our purposes, a distinction within the conscious mind between that which the subject is identified as (i.e., the phenomenal body-mind, including the identified subject conjoined to and projected across this entire complex—the Self) and that which the subject is dissociated from (i.e., the Other, including the whole rest of the phenomenal world). It should therefore be clear that even what the subject is not identified as is still nevertheless an aspect of one and the same person, the same mind, one’s own mind, inside which and through which this phenomenological divide of superidentified and superobjectified consciousness exists. Superobjectified consciousness is, in that sense, the phenomenal world—Wittgenstein’s “The world is my world” is most apt—even though I, as identified subject, do not experience myself qua superobjectified consciousness—my phenomenal world—as what it is: my own mind. This is because I, the identified subject, am identified as only my phenomenal body-mind—my Self. I can, however, upon exactly the sort of philosophical analysis we have been engaging in come to identify with my world. The phenomenal Self can come, through philosophical analysis,
to understand itself as the phenomenal world. Whether I, the subject \textit{qua} subject can exist identified \textit{as} my phenomenal world entire is a fascinating question, one that is beyond the scope of the present work.

Being—or having—a Self—the phenomenal body-mind conjoined with the identified subject—is essential to the life of the person as we know it. That is why I claim this is a necessary condition for the sort of consciousness I most care about regarding my life as a person—i.e., self-consciousness as we know it. The problem with trying to understand this, as we have been observing above, stems from the commonsense view involved in Closed Individualism: when I think of the “external world” of the objects in my experience and the corresponding “internal world” in terms of my thoughts and the items in my language—tertiary identification—\textit{I construe myself, the subject, as existing at the interface between the internal and external world}—as if the whole question of my trying to understand myself and my world had only to do with my thinking or talking correctly about the items I see. It’s as if the phenomenal Self (the subject identified \textit{as} a particular phenomenal body-mind) forgets that its phenomenal objects and its phenomenal mind (e.g., personality), according to the very theories that allow it to even think about its thinking and look at its looking, exist squarely within the mind of the person within which the phenomenal Self itself exists—they are conjoined in experience not to the “noumenal world” as it exists “in itself” but to the phenomenal world. What I known of myself as such is not the whole of me—the person—but only an aspect of that person—my phenomenal Self. (The objects in my visual field are not inside the would-be “head” atop my shoulders where I, the subject, find myself situated, but rather the entire perceptual manifold itself is an event inside [or on the surface of] the brain, as am \textit{I}, the subject.)

This, I think, should make sufficiently clear for present purposes the metaphysics of what the subject \textit{is} (not the \textit{who} but the \textit{what}) and why it is legitimate to talk about the subject the way we have been doing. I should however add at this point—for those who may be considering a Humean type of objection to what I am claiming here (and which we shall consider again in more detail later)—that the subject does actually, as a matter of fact, \textit{perceive} itself, not because the subject is an object (an impossible state of affairs) but in virtue of the objects perceived (i.e., the phenomenal objects). When I see that objects are seen from a certain perspective I see myself without having to perform the impossible act of seeing the unseen seer. In other words, my phenomenal world is perspectival, it has a center;
subjectivity confers itself through the seen fact that the objects I see don’t exist for themselves in some absolute realm beyond the space and time of my experience but for me, the subject identified as such in the conscious act of seeing. Likewise, my “internal,” temporal “objects”—thoughts and feelings—are also perspectival, except directed not at me, the subject (as my objects are), but from me, that is, from the subject.

In a dream I move my phenomenal Self through the “subjective” (what is standardly believed to be uniperspectival) world. In waking states I move my phenomenal Self through the “objective” (what is standardly believed to be multiperspectival) world. The major difference is this. In the latter case my phenomenal Self can be regarded as “on line,” linked to the body, such that the phenomenal world to which it is linked and within which it subsists corresponds, to some requisite degree, to the multi-perspectival “physical environment” in which my “physical body” as such exists. At least this is one sensible way of putting it. There may be better ways but this tracks something correctly. Metaphysical subjectivism thus avails itself as a highly comprehensive worldview in which the philosophy of Open Individualism is possible, true, and the best explanation.


To claim, for instance that I am, essentially, a human being, would be to claim that the physiological, psychological and phenomenological borders of human beings bind my personal identity such that if I were transformed, say, into a silicon-based functionally equivalent computer replica, I would die. Seeing how it is possible that my being transformed into a silicon-based functionally equivalent computer replica would not necessarily signify my death shows how it is possible that personal identity is not bound by such borders or at least that survival is not so bound. Likewise, to claim that I am, essentially, this human being would be to claim that the physiological, psychological and phenomenological borders of this particular human animal bind my personal identity, such that if I were transformed into a numerically different human animal, I would die. In the course of our analysis, however, we have seen that we can justifiably claim that I am neither essentially bound to being human nor am I essentially
bound to being this human (this particular animal). And so on for our other borders.

As we’ve seen in previous chapters, there is not any substantial difference between my now imagining that I am the same person as Krishnamurti and my now imagining that I am the same person as Kolak age three. Yet I can imagine being Krishnamurti just as I do imagine being Kolak. What is this I, this Wittgensteinian “vessel of life” that, apparently, is able to identify itself as anyone—including itself, over time? It is by our analysis the subject—but what exactly is in such cases being imagined? Are we but fabricating in theory what is not there in experience—deceiving ourselves? Or are we extending the conceptual framework beyond our phenomenological borders so as to see through ourselves, beyond our borders—improving our understanding of person?

If our understanding of the world and ourselves were limited only to what we have direct phenomenological access, given the discrete nature of what I call quantum phenomenology and the nonlocality of consciousness (§10.3) we should forever be in the dark about nearly everything. That is why, over and above our percepts, we develop concepts with which we are then able to as it were see, theoretically, beyond the narrow borders of our phenomenologies. And it is our concept of personal identity—not our immediate experience, which is extremely (narrowly) bordered in space and (extremely) ephemeral in time—that allows us to view ourselves, theoretically, as one and the same person on many different sides of not only the Spatial Boundary but, also, the Temporal Boundary. Often our concepts are naive, confused, even grossly mistaken, our corresponding view of the world and ourselves severely limited. Fortunately, the history both of philosophy and of science is replete with improvements in our understanding of ourselves and the world via conceptual analysis. Experientially, the story of course is apt to remain the same. The philosophical analysis of the concept of personal identity is no exception. This should also not be surprising. We should be no more puzzled by why our experience is at it is, given the philosophy of Open Individualism, than the possibility of viewing the solar system in the way Copernicus viewed it should produce puzzlement as to why, if the Earth as Copernicus supposes is moving the Earth is nonetheless experienced by us as standing still. Is Copernicus denying the reality of our experience? Is he denying the validity of our concepts? Hardly. He is improving upon them. A mark of a good philosophical explanation grounded in the western
tradition—whether it concerns itself with the concept of motion amongst the elements of our solar systems or with the concept of personal identity amongst the elements of our lives—is that it does not simply deny or ignore what our experience presents to the subject but helps us to construct a conceptual framework with which to explain why experience is the way it is, i.e., to provide phenomenology with a conceptual account from which it can draw explanations. It is one thing to look up at the universe and throw one’s hands up in defeat and say, “motion is an illusion, change is an illusion, everything is an illusion,” etc., and quite another to show how, using an empirically-grounded concept of motion—imperfect though it may be—we can nonetheless construct a universal theory of gravity such that what we see in the heavens above and what we see here on the Earth below is explained by a new and better conceptual framework. Similarly, it is one thing to look within ourselves and throw one’s hands up in defeat and say, “consciousness is an illusion, the self is an illusion, personal identity is an illusion,” and quite another to show how, using a phenomenologically accountable concept personal identity we can nonetheless construct a universal theory of personal identity such that what we see within and amongst ourselves is explained by a new and better conceptual reference frame.

Clearly, one reason why the thesis that we are all the same person strikes us as wildly implausible prima facie is that for many thousands of years of recorded history most of us have believed that we are each separately existing persons, numerically identical to ourselves over time and numerically distinct from each other. Moreover, that we are all the same person seems directly contradicted by experience. If Open Individualism is true, our experience must involve a deep amount of illusion. Indeed, what I call The Illusion of Other Persons can (but does not need to) be understood as a philosophical analog of two other, well-known philosophical illusions:

1) the Transcendent Illusion, interpreting the appearance of otherness (phenomenal representations) as the direct unmediated apprehension of things in themselves (noumena), and

2) the Transcendental Illusion: interpreting the appearance of self (the phenomenal Self) as the direct, unmediated apprehension of the person in itself.

My arguably Kantian rendering of (1) and (2) is meant to facilitate the reader’s understanding of the sense in which I take the Illusion of Other
Persons to be an illusion, not to impart to my view any particular ontological commitment or limit my arguments to a particular philosophy. As I have been endeavoring to show, Open Individualism is the best possible explanation of who we are under any (standard or nonstandard) interpretation or model (e.g., is independent of ontological and metaphysical commitments, as our analyses of various—physical, psychological, metaphysical, etc.—borders shows. My point here, rather, is that just as Kant’s “Transcendent Illusion” and what I call the “Transcendental Illusion” are (arguably) necessary conditions for the having of experience, so too the Illusion of Other Persons can (but does not have to) be understood as a necessary condition for the having of experience as we know it.

Consider the related Geocentric Illusion. For thousands of years nearly everyone believed that the Earth goes around the sun. That’s what they saw and that’s what they were taught. Now why, if all the planets revolve around the sun, did nearly everyone until very recently believe that the Earth is at the center of the universe? Indeed, to even think otherwise was but an exercise of a purely speculative philosophical imagination, one that when the likes of Copernicus and Galileo began to practice it as a superior alternative to the ensconced reality, was expressly and vehemently forbidden under threat of death. And yet, nevertheless, that’s not why people believed the sun went around the Earth. They believed it because that’s what they saw. It’s what we see too but we have been taught to believe what only a few centuries ago was unthinkable and heretical, namely, that ours is not a uniquely privileged position in the universe. That the Earth seems to be at the center around which everything revolves is, we have been taught to believe, due to an illusion that applies equally well to any and all observers in whatever reference frame they are looking out at the universe from. Today we are taught that the Geocentric Illusion is a necessary consequence of the relationship between geometry, mechanics and phenomena that makes whatever planet one is on seem as if it is the unique center around which everything else revolves.

Likewise, nearly all of us today believe that we are each a numerically distinct person because that’s what we see. It’s what I see too even though I believe what may seem on the face of it unthinkable and heretical, namely, that there exists but one person who is everyone. Now why, both in the Copernican case and in ours, did the church conspire with common sense against reason’s attempt to see beyond the appearances? This is merely a
historical but nevertheless a rather interesting aside. The standard answer dished out in the Copernican case is that Heliocentric theory contradicts Scripture and thereby undermines church authority. I do think authority is the issue but the church’s intentions were far more deeply sinister, having to do with not only the preservation of the Illusion of Other Persons as conscripted under traditional Christian doctrine of distinct souls (necessary for its system of authority) but also the preservation of something like the Transcendent Illusion conscripted under the common belief that experience is the direct and immediate apprehension of physical objects in the external world, i.e., that appearance is reality. For if one accepts the Copernican model it means first and foremost that what we see are not facts but interpretations—that the phenomena we call seeing and sensing are but a variety of phenomenological (re)presentations. This seriously undermines the orthodox Christian doctrine of a one-one physical resurrection (as opposed, say, to various gnostic alternatives that are one-many) necessary for its top-down hierarchical system of absolute authority. Indeed, I believe the great (albeit unwitting) conspiracy of modern science has been to neuter this truly philosophical revolutionary aspect of Copernican thinking so that the Galilean rape of the senses leaves intact that philosophical hymen known as the illusion of naïve realism necessary for the standard practice of science. So much for the Copernican revolution—what about the personal identity case? Ultimately the intention behind both suppressions is in my view the same, namely, the preservation of the Illusion of Absolute Authority: in the first case, the authority of the absolute other—God, i.e., the official view of the church—and, in the second case, the authority of the immediate other—experience, i.e., the official view of science. They both have the same function: the suppression in consciousness through interpretation of the subversive fact of our common existence.

Imagine now what might have happened had the church successfully put down the Copernican revolution. What would have been the result? One could suppose, plausibly, that science might never have come into its own, just as in one important sense philosophy still hasn’t. Suppose, then, that a modern day Copernicus after so many centuries of Ptolemaic thinking put forth the thesis that only a handful of centuries ago seemed so outlandish that even its author presented it as hyperbole. The result, I suspect, would not have been unlike the case with I Am You. When appearance and authority conspire to such a degree any view to the contrary will seem as
bizarre and ludicrous as it once was to propose the existence of irrational numbers, to argue on behalf of non-Euclidean geometries, or to assert that space and time are relative to an observer’s reference frame.

Incredulous readers who think that here I too resort to hyperbole may be shocked to learn that for the past thousand years throughout Christendom there has been a philosophical prohibition against the Open Individualist thesis, no less systematic than the church’s efforts squelch the Copernican revolution. Indeed, the church may have lost the cosmological battle over the solar system but on the metaphysical battlefield of personal identity, the internal struggle for consciousness and subjectivity, it won the war. The opening salvo was Thomas Aquinas’ *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* (On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists) levied against a metaphysical uprising of sorts fueled by the teachings of the Islamic philosopher and theologian Averroës (Ibn Rushd). In his influential series of commentaries on Aristotle, Averroës claimed to have discovered irrefutable arguments revealing the numerical identity of the intellect in all conscious beings. This view became the foundation for an entire school of philosophers known as the Latin Averroists or “Integral Aristotelians.” Represented first by the Faculty of Arts at Paris, they disseminated the teachings of their avatar throughout medieval Europe. Aquinas, no philosophical slouch, was not blind to the power of their arguments. To make the church’s defense he himself ended up relying on the Averroist notion that there are two sorts of truth, one based on reason and the other based on revelation and only through revelation could the truth about personal identity be known; leave reason to the infidels. The church, not content with thus only God on their side, resorted to more reliable means and declared the Averroist view a heresy and put it on its infamous list of Forbidden Propositions—a condemnation that seems downright ominous, when one imagines what the church as an institution represents from, say, a Freudian perspective. To teach or even utter the notion that we the many all are one was punishable by death. Thus centuries later when Giordano Bruno was given the chance to recant his version of our view he refused and was burned at the stake; this year marks the fourth centennial of his death.

That what on the face of it appears an absurd view had adherents spanning from contemporary quantum physicists to theologians and philosophers in both the Islamic and Judeo-Christian worlds, that in the east it has been expressed in the *Upanishads* as well as among a variety of mystics
separated by gulfs of space, time and culture, and that in the thirteenth century a philosophical war was fought over it, should I hope give incredulous readers sufficient pause. Here after all is a view that, regardless of anything else, had in its infancy crossed racial, national, and religious borders—a philosophy without boundaries—only to be stopped dead in its tracks. And why? Not because the view was unbelievable, surely! To forbid under threat of death belief in the unbelievable—what would be the point? On the contrary. Theologians at the time worried that such thinking would undermine the traditional Christian doctrine of distinct souls required for their hierarchical system of authority. You were forbidden from thinking that the neighbor across the designated border is you because such thinking obviates the racial, religious, and national boundaries that make possible all manner of authority. That it also obviates the motives for all manner of war and immorality, well, let that be the price of power. Hence the philosophical prohibition, lasting to this day; even after having now officially forgiven Galileo for his cosmic heresies on the personal front the church stands unwavering: the dreaded proposition linking us to each other, to God, and to anyone else who may happen to exist in the past, present and future remains steadfastly forbidden.

Open Individualism radically opposes this entire religious-scientific metaphysics. Open Individualism, however, cannot be believed by us to be the truth about us except in theory on the one hand and, on the other, a sort of Cartesian rational insight (broadly construed) or mystical revelation, unless (identified) as Phenomenal Selves we are willing to subversively undermine all interpretations and all Views from which we can derive the absolutely austere fact of the existence of the subject. Open Individualism therefore neither dispels nor denies the appearances as they occur in one’s Phenomenal World but takes account of and transcends them.

Both Closed Individualism and Open Individualism can account more or less equally well for the appearances. Closed Individualism, however, at least initially, is more closely aligned with the appearances conscripted under the Transcendent Illusion, that is, experience understood naively as the direct apprehension of things in themselves (noumena). Closed Individualism is in that sense a folk philosophy predicated on Naïve Realism broadly construed as the folk belief that the items (phenomena) in our immediate experience are things in themselves (noumena). Where as Open Individualism, on the other hand, can (but, again, does not have to) be understood as a philosophical upgrade of Transcendental (or Critical)
Idealism. Understanding how a person must be bordered from (within) itself so as to make experience as we know it possible is one way of showing how it is possible that for me to be conscious of all aspects of myself from the first person point of view—the subject seeing itself directly as the whole of subjectivity (the \( \varepsilon/\delta \) manifold) and not just (identified) as a Phenomenal Self in a Phenomenal World—is itself impossible. Thus the fact that I—the subject identified as this Phenomenal Self—don’t experience you—the subject identified as that Phenomenal Self—as myself is hardly preclusive of Open Individualism, since to be identified as a Self in any conceivable world already requires the Phenomenal Self to be bordered exactly the way I already am (and must be) from the rest of my own Phenomenal World, dissociated from all the rest of the being within which I subsist identified as a particular Phenomenal Self, an exclusively conjoined locus of awareness and control. In other words, as we shall see, it shouldn’t be surprising that I don’t experience you as myself once I understand that I don’t experience myself (e.g., my own phenomena) as myself, either.

In understanding how it is possible that without the Illusion of Other Persons, the Transcendent Illusion, and the Transcendental Illusion consciousness as we know it (i.e., experience in space and time) would be impossible, we create the possibility of moving beyond the limitations of our present view to a new and better one showing us that we necessarily fail to see the truth about ourselves (i.e., in the sense that the Transcendent Illusion, the Transcendental Illusion, and the Illusion of Other Persons can be understood as necessary conditions for the having of experience) in ways that sometimes lead us to limit ourselves unnecessarily. And moral harm will turn out to be one such form of unnecessary self-limitation. Although we cannot (as yet) do anything about the necessary metaphysical limitations imposed upon the having of experience, we can with the right philosophy transcend our unnecessary moral limitations. The problem is that we have been living the wrong philosophy.

To be ignorant both of the “Transcendent Illusion” and the “Transcendental Illusion” is to take appearances as what they appear to be, to live in the commonsense, pre-philosophical world of Naïve Realism. To become aware of the Transcendent and Transcendental Illusions as such is to take the first small step (Kant’s self-proclaimed Second Copernican Revolution) toward Open Individualism. To understand Closed Individualism—the commonsense view of ourselves as each being a
separately existing person—as a natural consequence of Naïve Realism, a naïve philosophy operating under the same variety of illusion as the Transcendent and Transcendental Illusion, is to make the second, giant leap (our self-proclaimed Third Copernican Revolution) toward Open Individualism.

Understanding such necessary, “user friendly” illusions cannot alter our experience, at least not by much (but perhaps by enough). Just as the Galilean-Copernican theory does not make us feel the Earth move nor show the Earth, moon and planets to be moving around the sun, at least not literally and in any case not by very much, so likewise Open Individualism philosophy should not be expected to make us feel we are all the same person nor make us see ourselves as such, at least not literally and in any case not by very much (but perhaps by enough). The Illusion of Other Persons can only be understood through a theory requiring a Galilean-like transformation of our present metaphysical coordinate system, a philosophical rape of the senses that dislodges the Self from its privileged position and places instead the central fact of our existence, the subject, at the center. And although knowing that we are all the same person does not dispel the Illusion of Other Persons any more than believing the Heliocentric Theory dispels the Geocentric Illusion, it can help alter our lives, perhaps for the better. That, ultimately, is the goal of this book.
NOTES

1 See footnote 1, Chapter One.

2 Though most contemporary philosophers working in the western analytic tradition have discarded the Soul Theory, Madell 1981 and Swinburne 1984 are two examples of recent writers who still hold a version of such a view. It should also be noted that—remarkably enough—Karl Popper and John Eccles (The Self and Its Brain) have come out with what appears to be a “soul” view; for instance, Popper writes not only that “I think that the self in a sense plays on the brain, as a pianist plays on a piano or as a driver plays on the controls of a car,” (p. 495), but, even, “I believe in the ghost in the machine,” (p. 464).

3 I suppose one could try to do it, as the Scholastics tried, by tying the individuality of souls to the relations they had with particular bodies. But, given contemporary difficulties with the physical criteria of personal identity, I doubt this could be made coherent. One wonders, especially, what the Scholastics would have made of the “fission” and “fusion” examples—it seems that they would either have dropped the doctrine of indivisibility or the doctrine of individuation.

4 See our discussion in the Preface.

5 Conscripted, by my lights, in the language of logic, mathematics, and science.


7 Errant rogues may wish to begin with S. Jack Odell’s superb On Schopenhauer.

8 See Dennett and Kolak, “Consciousness, Self and Reality.”


10 As Wittgenstein clearly noted - see my Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.

11 In a dream, for instance, language demands that one say, “this dream exists inside my head,” even while acknowledging that the reference of “my head” is not the space atop my shoulders where I find myself in a dream but, rather, something within which the entire scene, including the subject (located where the “dream head” is imagined to be), exists. So one could, in a dream, refer to one’s head ostensively by pointing everywhere and all around and saying “there’s my head,” except what one is then pointing at is not a head but a (dream) world containing all
manner of objects. Polish the linguistic mirror as you will, you simply cannot speak unproblematically about yourself in dream nor waking state, the problems are exactly the same, they are only more easily referred to in the case of the dream.

12 Thus, looking at a picture on a television screen, a photograph, etc., I see the image as an image. Whereas when I look at a “picture” through a virtual reality simulation, I am much closer to seeing the images not as images but as objects. What happens in the virtual reality situation is extremely informative with regards to identifying the nature and role of the subject; indeed, the subject must be put into or projected into a world (a representational world) so that items can be viewed by it as “objects.”

13 If my analysis here is roughly viable, it would suggest that the subject, which I would claim is a sufficient condition for consciousness, is a necessary condition for an organism’s ability to respond to its environment, such that even the lower animals are conscious in ways far more similar to the way we are than one might otherwise think. Indeed, one might use such considerations in making an argument for vegetarianism.

14 Thus Garrett Thomson’s comment to me that metaphysical subjectivism requires “twisting oneself” into an “intellectual yoga position—uncomfortable,” is apt, “comfortable” and “uncomfortable” being, however, flexible interpretations.

15 Again, see Dennett and Kolak, “Consciousness, Self and Reality: Who Are We?”

16 This interpretation of course is not something the Self does but, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, something that happens to the Self. Whether this interpretation function is—to now borrow for a moment for analogical purposes from Freud’s topographic model—part of system Pcs. or Ucs. I leave, for now, as an open question.

17 Discussed in Chapter 6.

18 It is somewhat unfortunate that Kant often used the word “transcendental” when he meant “transcendent,” the latter by which he meant mistaking phenomena for things in themselves and the former by which he sometimes meant that but at other times used in the non-pejorative sense of reaching beyond the phenomena not to things in themselves but the categories of the mind. Only when he uses “transcendental” in the pejorative sense is it synonymous with “transcendent.” Thus what I am calling the transcendent illusion is what Kant explicitly (and unfortunately) calls the “transcendental illusion” [Prolegomena, First Part of the Transcendental Problem, Remark III] when what he means is the “transcendent illusion,” and what I am calling the “transcendental illusion” is exactly what he
would have called it had he been perfectly consistent in his usage (thought I think it is always clear, in context, which usage he means).

19 In the naïve sense; the more sophisticated phenomenalistic and representational theories of perception are not part of peoples’ common beliefs.

20 As a Jesuit friend once remarked: “Too many Christs spoil the brethren.”

21 For a detailed account see my “The Copernican Revolution: Prelude to Modern Philosophy” in my Lovers of Wisdom.

22 That may be a somewhat melodramatic way of putting it. What I mean is that what Kant called the Second Copernican Revolution has yet to be integrated into general consciousness in the way that the first one has.


24 Among them were David of Dinant, Amalric Bène, Siger of Brabant, Boece of Dacie and Bernier of Nivelles.

25 See my In Search of Myself: Life, Death and Personal Identity and In Search of God: the Language and Logic of Belief.

26 Thus far in Western Philosophy no one has been willing, not even Descartes who in the first few pages of his Meditations proved that he was able.

27 Transcends in Kant’s transcendent, not transcendent, sense. The latter may be possible, if at all, only in some formal language such as mathematics and logic. See, for instance, Hintikka’s “The Paradox of Transcendental Knowledge,” “Surface Information and Depth Information,” “Kant’s Transcendental Method and his Theory of Mathematics,” and “Kant on the Mathematical Method.”

28 That is, transcendental idealism revised, or perhaps I should say upgraded, into a contemporary logico-mathematical-linguistic-cognitive perspective that amounts in effect to a Kant redivivus still very much in progress and to which I hope to be able to contribute substantially in the near future. See, again, Hintikka’s “The Paradox of Transcendental Knowledge.”

29 Under the known canons.
See Sect. 12.3

See Daniel Dennett and Daniel Kolak, “Consciousness, Self and Reality.”

Except in certain limited ways regarding various aspects of our thought identifications, as explained in Chapter 13.

Hanson famously claimed the experience of the astronomer could be significantly different, though I myself have never quite managed to make it seem, while watching a sunset, that the ball on the horizon was fixed and that it is the earth and I that are spinning away from it.

In terms of our sensations.

Again, there are some remarkable exceptions, which I discuss later in the book.
Thus far we have seen that (1) the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border, (2) the Alter Subject Identification Border, (3) the various types of Physiological Border, (4) the Spatial Border, (5) the various types of Psychological Border (6) the Unity of Consciousness Border (7) the Causal Border and (8) the Metaphysical Substance (e.g. Soul) Border, are not necessarily boundaries between persons—they are merely apparent excluders of Open Individualism, both individually and collectively. Therefore the existence of these borders is not adequate to show that Open Individualism is false: the borders that have traditionally been used to separate people from people are not, necessarily, Boundaries between persons. And it is this that we set out to show—namely, how Open Individualism could be possible in light of its apparent excluders. Moreover, Closed Individualism as we are about to see again is false and, furthermore, there are at least two reasons for thinking that Open Individualism is superior to Empty Individualism:

1) what matters in survival is identity  
2) my survival without identity doesn’t make sense.

Throughout, we have been exploring two closely related questions:

A) What matters primarily in personal survival? 
and

B) What are the boundaries of a person?

Concerning the first question, we have seen various answers, ranging most plausibly from physiological continuity to psychological continuity and in such a way that, on Empty Individualism, identity is not what matters primarily in survival: what matters primarily is the underlying continuity relations (such as, on Parfit’s psychological view, Relation R).

Personal identity theorists who hold that what matters primarily in
personal survival is physiological continuity argue persuasively against the Psychological Boundary by presenting cases where physiological continuity without psychological continuity either preserves personal identity or else at least matters more in survival than does psychological continuity. Theorists who hold that what matters primarily in survival is psychological continuity argue persuasively against the Physiological Boundary by presenting cases where psychological continuity without physiological continuity either preserves personal identity or else at least matters more in survival than does physiological continuity. Each type of theory relies upon, and achieves much of its persuasiveness by, criticizing the other. Typically, this persuasiveness is achieved through the presentation of counter-examples in which one’s deep intuitions side against the view being criticized with a more or less tacit disregard for the fact that the preferred view seems more plausible only on the rebound, that is, only as long as one does not attack the preferred view with the same critical force. Doing so usually makes one’s intuitions “flip-flop.” Why?

Typically, you, the subject, are asked to project yourself into the examples by imagining yourself identified as one or the other of the various physiological-psychological bundles (survivors). How you then further identify yourself (in your imagination) as one or the other of the survivors is influenced, or guided, by the philosopher’s presentation. For instance, you are given a fission thought experiment in which you imagine yourself identified as the one continuer (along, say, psychological relata at the exclusion of physiological relata). Then, presented with the same experiment but from the other continuer’s first-person point of view, you imagine yourself identified as the other continuer (along, say, physiological relata at the exclusion of the psychological relata). Then, presented by the example yet again your intuitions tend to go back the other way, and so on, back and forth, without any mutually agreed upon, persuasive or permanent resolution. How you respond to an example (such as fission) thus changes dramatically depending upon how the example is presented, that is, shifts with the “first person point of view” as the subject projects itself in an imaginary experience, into and among the various physiological-psychological bundles under consideration. Imaginatively identifying yourself as the one bundle or the other, there seems nothing factually wrong with each side’s negative argument and yet each side’s positive argument seems demolished by the other side’s valid negative position.

Parfit, Nozick, and other Empty Individualists are well aware of this
problem of differing responses. Even Williams, who seems committed to the view that physiological continuity is what matters primarily in survival, sets up his by now classic 1970 puzzle by showing that how one responds to personal identity thought experiments varies importantly depending on how the examples are presented. Some have taken this to signify the irrelevance of thought experiments to the analysis of personal identity in general and to questions (A) and (B) in particular. Others, most notably Nozick, have, as we have seen, taken the phenomenon of differing responses to signify that personal identity does not consist just in the intrinsic relationships between an individual at one time and an individual at some later time but is also importantly affected by the presence or absence of other persons, such as individuals who could plausibly be regarded as “continuers” of the original person. So the question of what matters in survival is answered by Nozick with a theory which allows the survival relations, such as physical and/or psychological continuity, up to and including identity, being in part a function of what the survivor deems most important. Others, most notably Parfit, have, as we have seen, taken the puzzle of differing responses to signify not only that personal identity is an extrinsic relation, hence relative, but, furthermore, that personal identity is not determinate: even if we know everything there is to know about ourselves, there is not always a Yes or No answer to whether personal identity holds across some particular border; there would be a Yes or No answer, on Parfit’s view, only if Empty Individualism were false and a person were not reducible to the physiological and/or psychological elements in which he consists. Since there is no simple Yes or No answer that works, personal identity is, on Parfit’s view, not what matters primarily in survival; what matters primarily is some element of the persisting physiological-psychological bundle to which a person is reducible - on Parfit’s view, psychology. The underlying assumption of course is that the only plausible choices for what identity could consist in are physiological and/or psychological relata and that since these relata are not one-one (i.e., physiologies and psychologies can fission), there is no real personal identity among the various exclusively conjoined physiological and/or psychological bundles within and among which the lives of human beings qua persons consist. Personal identity, on the Empty Individualist View, is thus not what matters primarily in survival. What matters primarily according to them is physiological and/or psychological continuity—both positions which we have dismissed time and again with our various physiological and physiological boundary dissolves. Indeed, Open
Individualism *explains* the puzzle of differing responses in terms of the nature of the subject, primary identification (identification *as* of the inverse fourfold consciousness relation), and so on.

What of the second question? If identity is not what matters primarily on the Empty Individualist Views, what implications does this have for the boundaries between persons? According to Empty Individualism, the Identity Border—although it is, necessarily, a boundary between persons—is not, necessarily, a boundary that precludes *survival*: the Identity Boundary is not, necessarily, a boundary between *survivors*. That is, in supposing that identity is not what matters primarily in survival, the Empty Individualist View gives up the survival and identity assumption (the Closed Individualism condition that a person, \( p \), survives only as long as there exists an entity identical to \( p \)). This does not dissolve the metaphysical significance of the boundaries between us as does Open Individualism. But, paradoxically, Empty Individualism does bring us closer to each other by, in effect, *lessening the metaphysical significance of the inner unity of our connections to ourselves* (hence the appropriateness of the title, “Empty Individualism”). None of the dissolves we have encountered, however, are as drastic as this one taken by Empty Individualism—the Personal Identity Dissolve. (Which, as we shall see, in an important sense dissolves *us*.)

As already mentioned, in his 1971 article Parfit explicitly considers the possibility that, in cases of fission, the result is one person with two bodies and a divided mind. “We cannot now call this absurd,” he writes, though he goes on to reject this answer as “unsatisfactory.” At the end of the article he comes even closer to being a closet Open Individualist:

> “Will I survive?” seems, I said, equivalent to, “Will there be some person alive who is the same person as me?” If we treat these questions as equivalent, then the least unsatisfactory description of Wiggins’s case is, I think, that I survive with two bodies and a divided mind. [“Personal Identity,” p. 26]

I, unlike Parfit, Shoemaker, and other Empty Individualists, do take

Q1  Will I survive?

And

Q2  Will there be some person alive who is the same person as me?

as equivalent. Thus, on my view, the best description of the tie case dissolves the Spatial Boundary. The various cases of temporal overlap we have considered I take to be Boundary Dissolves. Whether Open
Individualism is (at least) as good a view as Empty Individualism or perhaps even better now hinges on whether Q1 and Q2 are equivalent. We now turn to this issue, which is best be approached from several different angles.

§ 9.1 THE IDENTITY DISSOLVE, OR, IS CESSION OF IDENTITY DEATH?

We have seen that if we can imagine person X undergoing a BST-procedure or teletransportation and remaining the same person, then we can imagine that X and Y being composed of different physical material, per se, does not necessarily make X and Y different persons. Or, if we deny this, and imagine (with Parfit’s latest formulation of his view\(^1\)) that this procedure is as good as survival (even though it does not preserve identity), then we have dramatically lessened the metaphysical and metapsychological significance of the Spatial Border. Similarly, we have seen that if we can imagine two synchronously running but numerically distinct brains separated by space as being the same person, we can accept as coherent the idea not only that our Physiological Borders (including the Brain Border) are not necessarily boundaries between persons, but also that the Spatial Border is not necessarily a boundary between persons. And so on. And, all else for the moment being equal, if the Physiological Border and the Spatial Border are not necessarily boundaries between persons, we can imagine as coherent the idea that two qualitatively identical, contemporaneously existing individuals—Y and Z—are the same person, personally identical to each other and identical to the original person—X—from whom they were produced.

We have, however, the Nozick-Parfit-Shoemaker alternative—variations of Empty Individualism—that answers the relevant puzzles without explicitly and fully dissolving the (metaphysical and metapsychological significance of) the Spatial Boundary between us. Their solution, however, denies the survival and identity assumption, according to which survival is possible only as long as there exists a person identical to the original person (i.e., that Q1 and Q2, above, are equivalent). But this on the face of it seems incoherent. If there is no identity between the person who I am now and some future person and I die while the other person goes on living, then I have not survived as that other person (i.e., identity is what matters primarily in survival). But as we have seen, Parfit, Shoemaker, and others, claim that Y can “in some sense” survive as Z without being identical to Z,
while Nozick suggests that whether a particular case of survival is a) survival with identity or b) survival without identity is, in part, up to the survivor! This is because Parfit, Shoemaker, and others believe identity is not what matters primarily while Nozick believes identity is (in part) synthesized by the person, with (or without) identity. And—what is brought out in Parfit’s version of Empty Individualism—what the types of cases we have been considering show is not only that identity is not what matters in these cases: what the cases show is that, even in ordinary cases of survival, identity is not what matters. On Parfit’s view,

my relation to my Replica contains what fundamentally matters. This relation is about as good as ordinary survival. Judged from the stand-point of the Non-Reductionist View, ordinary survival is, on my view, little better than—or about as bad as—being destroyed and Replicated. [Reasons and Persons, p. 285]

By Nozick’s understanding, identity itself (not just our boundaries) is an unfixed concept: what personal identity is depends in part on how we view it. The incoherencies involved in both of these sorts of moves is the result of Parfit, Nozick and the others not having sufficiently analyzed the subject; their views are confused, I have claimed, because they are fundamentally confused about what a person is. The reason for their confusion is that they have been unwilling or unable to look beyond their own psychologies and physiologies. Their fundamental error can and should be avoided entirely, I have argued, by accepting one of the fundamental principles of Open Individualism—not even as an axiom but as a theorem supported by various of arguments and explanations—namely, that identity is just what makes survival possible with identity at more than one place at a time; this principle is true, I have argued, because there is some sort of survival (all the views on this point agree) and in the sort of survival there is what matters primarily is identity. For Parfit and Shoemaker, on the other hand, for whom identity is not what matters, there is survival without identity at more than one place at a time because in the sort of survival there is, according to their view, identity is not what matters.

But now let us ask point blank: In ordinary survival is there identity? Or is ordinary survival, as Parfit supposes, death with replacement? How can we find out? The question now is about what actually matters in survival. There had better be, if Empty Individualism is right, something else, besides identity, that matters in ordinary survival or else, on the view that identity is not what matters, there is no survival possible, period. Death
with replacement is just \textit{death} with replacement, and if anyone finds a clever verbal way around this by calling such a state “survival,” this is hardly better than being told at your mother’s funeral that so long as her memory is alive within you, she lives; there should be no place for such verbal trickery in philosophy. So I claim, as Parfit is willing to entertain (but denies that it matters all that much to him), that accepting the Empty Individualist View means, ultimately, accepting without any real consolation whatsoever the unsettling Humean view that persons are not really continuants. (No one has yet been explicit about what such “real” consolation might consist in; we will in Chapter 10 provide an analysis of what this real consolation consists in.) This is because I claim that what according to Empty Individualism matters in survival (something other than identity, such as Parfit’s Relation $R$) is not actually what matters (what matters is, in my view, identity). Hence, personal identity, if we choose the Empty Individualist View—since the relations they claim really do not, on the Open Individualism view, really matter—is an illusion. \textit{You} are an illusion.

Nagel notes similar qualms with the kind of condolences offered by Parfit’s analysis:

I can’t take the kind of metaphysical consolation offered by Parfit (who observes that his view has parallels with Buddhism). By breaking down the metaphysical boundaries between himself and other persons, and loosening the metaphysical bonds that connect him now with his future self, he claims to have become less depressed about his own death, among other things. His death will be the termination of a certain connected sequence of activities and experiences, but not the annihilation of a unique underlying self. ‘Instead of saying, “I shall be dead”, I should say, “there will be no future experiences that will be related, in certain ways, to these present experiences.”’ Because it reminds me what this fact involves, this redescription makes this fact less depressing [Parfit 1984, p. 281].

As I’ve said . . . I can’t accept the metaphysical revision, but I’m not sure that if I did, I’d find the conclusion less depressing. I actually find Parfit’s picture of survival depressing - but that of course is by comparison with what I take survival to be. By comparison with Parfitian survival, Parfitian death may not seem so depressing; but that may owe as much to the deficiencies of the former as to the advantages of the latter. [View From Nowhere, p. 224]

Nagel’s lament, as I understand it, is that if Parfit’s analysis is correct, then there is no “non-depressing” survival. Parfitian death according to Nagel is no more depressing than ordinary survival only because Parfitian survival is not “real” survival—survival with identity—and hence is depressing. It would be a bit like being depressed about finding out that your spouse does
not love you and then being offered, as consolation, the insight that your spouse has *never* loved you! There are only certain other sorts of relations, such as relation $S$, between spouses. This it seems would be more, not less, depressing.

In other words, if there is to be any meaningful (i.e., non-depressing) survival, there must, according to Nagel, be personal identity. That is why according to Nagel what matters primarily in survival is personal identity. Any analysis, such as Parfit’s, which dispenses with the survival and identity assumption or claims that personal identity is not what matters primarily in survival strikes Nagel, and many others, the wrong way. Indeed, it strikes me the wrong way, too. But it strikes me as wrong in an importantly different way that it does Nagel.

Parfit, as I understand him, is claiming to describe the truth about us. This truth is that given the sorts of beings we are, there is no continuous personal identity over time. When Parfit says, “Identity is not what matters,” he is not saying that identity is not what people (like Nagel) care about. Rather, what Parfit is saying about identity is, there isn’t any, there never was, there never will be, and so it need not be missed: “What is missing is always missing.” People like Nagel, according to Parfit, are in principle missing what in fact they never have. Where as Nagel, on the other hand, is talking about what matters to him—that is, what Nagel “cares about”—and the sort of survival relations Nagel cares about—what matters to Nagel, such as the continuity of his brain—are on Parfit’s view (as on mine) not what personal identity consists in. So it is not like the case of discovering not only that your spouse does not love but that your spouse has never loved you—it is more like discovering that there is no such thing as love and so what you are missing is always missing because among human beings indeed there are only at best certain sort of good relations, i.e., the intimate sharing of each other’s experience, terrific sex, mutual caring, enjoying each other’s company, and so on. Someone might find such a revelation depressing—but only if the person was deluded with beliefs in an idealization that in reality does not exist. Specifically, Nagel claims,

one of the conditions that the self should meet if possible is that it be something in which the flow of consciousness and the beliefs, desires, intentions, and character traits that I have all take place - something beneath the contents of consciousness, which might even survive a radical break in the continuity of consciousness. If there were no such thing, then the idea of personal identity would be an illusion, but we are not in that situation. Even if nothing can be found to fill this role which satisfies the condition of the Simple View, the brain with its problematic conditions of identity in
certain cases is still better than nothing. And it is a possible hypothesis that I am my brain, since it is not ruled out by the apparent subjective conceivability of my moving to a different brain. That seems conceivable, to the extent that it does, only so far as what my incomplete concept of myself tells me; and that isn’t a reliable basis for deciding what is possible. If a dual aspect theory is correct, then it is not possible for my mental life to go on in a different brain. [p. 45]

The phrase, “the conditions that the self should meet if possible,” however, should be followed, on Parfit’s view as well as on mine, by several caveats. First of all, our various Boundary Dissolves, including the Brain Dissolve, suggest that neither physiological continuity nor psychological continuity are the sorts of things in which personal identity consists. So, in our love metaphor, Nagel’s way out would be akin to someone’s arguing, say, that even though there is no such thing as “real” love there is, nonetheless, the human heart and so it is the human heart that is the receptacle of love. That, ultimately, is the level of Nagel’s move and should be rejected.

Second, the Brain Border, contra Nagel, does not matter in the way he thinks it does. I may care about my brain in the same way that I care about the tape on which one of my musical compositions is recorded (and the degree to which I care about the tape may vary inversely with the number of copies available) but I cannot conclude on the basis of this caring that I am my brain nor that the one and only tape on which my song is recorded is my song. If for instance fissioning (duplicating) the song preserves everything that matters to the identity of the song across the Spatial Boundary, the Physical Boundary, etc., then, arguably, one and the same song exists in two different places at the same time. That someone would consider song duplication as a way of destroying a song may tell us something about his values but it certainly would not tell us anything about the real nature of song identity.

Let us for a moment look at it this way. Suppose that some Christian cared about is “the presence of Jesus in one’s heart” continuing because, he thinks, that is what his personal identity consists in. Well, if we can plausibly imagine this person continuing to exist as the same person even without this special “presence of Jesus in one’s heart”—via a variety of actual and imaginary Jesus Dissolves—then his belief that “unless the presence of Christ in my heart continues I am dead as a person” is mistaken. The degree of metaphysical importance which he accords to the Jesus Border (as it was in fact accorded for many years by a great many people as signifying a boundary between someone with a soul and someone without a soul) can—and perhaps should—be dissolved.

Suppose a Christian actually believed this. What we would likely say to
the Christian is that when the “presence of Christ in your heart” (whatever that may be) ceases you are not really dead—it is just a matter of speech, a way of talking and thereby what you are expressing is the strength of your psychological identification with the character of Christ, not the truth about the nature of your personal identity—your existence as a person. We might perhaps choose to respect the Christian’s belief but even then we would not thereby as philosophers be likely to say that the Christian’s belief matters to him in the way the Christian thinks it does. What we would more than likely say is that the Christian’s view of personal identity in seriously misguided, a cognitive error—not because personal identity is not what matters nor because “the presence of Jesus” does not matter to him but, rather, because personal identity does not in fact consist in “the presence of Christ in one’s heart.” (Moreover, no amount of Christian-inspired apologetics about how the special feeling in question does in fact matter in all sorts of important ways to the person, etc., should give any serious philosopher cause to try and extract from any such purely psychological values any significant metaphysical conclusions about life, death, and personal identity; to do so would is about as absurd as trying to derive from an analysis of “personal values” truths about the nature of persons—a lamentable direction in which Nozick and others sometimes seem to tread.)

Parfit—and this I take it is the philosophical power of Parfit’s analysis—is not just talking about how we talk about ourselves nor even of how we care about ourselves. He is (when he is careful) talking about what he takes to be the truth about us. We can agree with this admirable aspect of Parfit’s analysis, namely, that his heart is in the right place: he is after truth; the problem is that it eludes him. We can also claim, with Nagel, that identity is what matters in survival—but not for the reasons Nagel thinks it does. This is because we need not think that as a matter of fact physiological continuity nor psychological continuity are what matter primarily in survival—they are not what personal identity consists in because, in our view, a person is not reducible to physiological and/or psychological bundles (as Parfit and other “Reductionists” in the various Empty Individualist camps believe), and the various Boundary Dissolves we can take to be evidence for this non-Reductionism. That is why Open Individualism points us in a new direction away from Separatism by presenting an alternative to both the identity-type analyses of Nagel and Williams and to the relational-type analyses of Parfit and Nozick.

Bernard Williams, too, like Nagel, objects to the Reductionist version of
Parfit’s Empty Individualism on the grounds that it dispenses with the survival and identity assumption. Williams claims that this sort of Empty Individualism violates two fundamental concepts of what a person is:

Requirement (1): Whether a future person will be me must depend only on the intrinsic features of the relation between us. It cannot depend on what happens to other people.

Requirement (2): Since personal identity has great significance, whether identity holds cannot depend on a trivial facts. [Problems of the Self, p.20]

Parfit’s “Relation R” and Nozick’s Closest Continuer Theory take both of these Requirements to be false. In a section entitled “Why There Is No Criterion Of Identity That Can Meet Two Plausible Requirements,” Parfit writes:

If we assume that identity is what matters, we cannot meet these requirements. [Reasons and Persons, p. 272]

But we can. We have done so. To me, as to many others, identity is what matters primarily in survival, meaning that if there is to be any survival of a person there had better be identity. Identity does not matter to Parfit because he does not think that continuous identity is the truth about us. His reason is that neither physiological continuity nor psychological continuity, which (given the fission puzzles), are one-one, where as identity must be one-one and so he does not see how it is possible to reconcile these facts.

We can however reconcile them (for instance by giving up the metaphysical significance ordinarily accorded to the Spatial Border).

In using the phrase, “what matters,” Parfit and Nagel are thus talking not to each other but at each other—they disagree, for instance, on whether requirements (1) and (2) can be met. I claim that identity does matter in that I—contra Parfit—think it is the truth about us. On an Empty Individualist View such as Parfit’s, Nozick’s, and Shoemaker’s Reductionisms, identity is not the truth about us, i.e., identity is not what matters primarily, even in ordinary cases of survival. I believe it is as plausible to accept the survival and identity assumption and that identity is what matters primarily in survival—that it is the truth about us—than to believe that identity is not what matters primarily—i.e., is not the truth about us. We can take this line not by denying any of the Boundary Dissolves, as Nagel apparently does. Rather, by dissolving the Spatial Boundary, etc., and supposing that whatever is left by the method of via negativa (e.g., the subject) is the essence of personal identity, we can both claim that identity is what matters primarily (is the truth about us) and account for all the “variegated
multitude of apparently unsolvable cases,” which the Empty Individualist theories can also do but which Williams’s view and Nagel’s views cannot. Yet Open Individualism also satisfies Williams’s two Requirements and satisfies Nagel’s deep intuitions about identity, which Parfit’s Empty Individualist View does not. If we choose Open Individualism, it is the metaphysical and metapsychological boundaries between us that are the illusion, not us. These, I claim—some version of Empty Individualism or else Open Individualism—are the only philosophically plausible choices. It is a nasty dilemma: nobody or everybody, with nothing in-between.

§9.2 IS REDUCTIONISM TRUE?

Parfit’s central argument for his Reductionist version of Empty Individualism is a sort of “Omni-Dissolve,” which he calls “The Combined Spectrum.” If personal identity is relative such that a person is reducible to physiology or psychology or to some element thereof—or, indeed, reducible to anything else of which there are more than one of, then—it seems—Open Individualism is false and Empty Individualism is true. So let us look more closely at Parfit’s Combined Spectrum.

Parfit asks us to imagine a case at one end of which is Derek Parfit and at the other end of which is Greta Garbo. Along the Spectrum there is a range of cases where both the Psychological and Physiological Boundaries between two human beings dissolve. Parfit uses this argument, surprisingly, not to make the case against the view that personal identity boundaries consist in physiological and/or psychological connectedness and/or continuity, but for it, and for the view that such boundaries are not sharp.

At one end of the “Combined Spectrum” is Derek Parfit just as he is right now; at the other end is Greta Garbo as she was at age thirty, when, we are asked to suppose, scientists made a perfect record of every cell in her body and brain. Between these two ends of the Combined Spectrum lies a whole range of cases, starting with Derek Parfit with one of the cells of either his brain or body replaced with one corresponding cell from Greta Garbo’s body. These cases, Parfit says,

involve all of the possible variations in the degrees of both physical and psychological connectedness. . . . In the first case in this spectrum, at the near end, nothing would be done. In the second case, a few of the cells in my brain and body would be replaced. The new cells would not be exact duplicates. As a result, there would be somewhat less psychological connectedness between me and the person who wakes up. This person would not have all of my memories, and
his character would be in one way unlike mine. He would have some apparent memories of Greta Garbo’s life, and have one of Garbo’s characteristics. Unlike me, he would enjoy acting. His body would also be in one way less like mine, and more like Garbo’s. His eyes would be more like Garbo’s eyes. Further along the spectrum, a larger percentage of my cells would be replaced, again with dissimilar cells. The resulting person would be in fewer ways psychologically connected with Garbo, as she was at the age of 30. And there would be similar changes in this person’s body. Near the far end, most of my cells would be replaced with dissimilar cells. The person who wakes up would have only a few of the cells in my original brain and body, and between her and me there would be only a few psychological connections. She would have a few apparent memories that fit my past, and a few of my habits and desires. But in every other way she would be, both physically and psychologically, just like Greta Garbo. [Reasons and Persons, pp. 236–237]

If I am a holist (non-Reductionist) about persons, Parfit claims I must believe that personal identity is all-or-nothing - that you cannot take bundles out of one person and combine them with the bundles of another person. I must therefore believe either that at some specific point in the Combined Spectrum, somewhere between the all-Parfit and all-Garbo endpoints, Derek Parfit ceases to exist and Greta Garbo begins to exist, or else I must believe that Derek Parfit continues to exist through all the changes. But either alternative seems utterly absurd, claims Parfit, for the following reason. How could anyone possibly believe that Derek Parfit continues to exist in all cases of the Combined Spectrum, when at the extreme end of the Spectrum Derek Parfit’s physiology is destroyed and a completely different physiology, that of Greta Garbo, appears in place of it? Parfit writes,

There would be no connection, of any kind, between me and this resulting person. It could not be clearer that, in this case, the resulting person would not be me. [p. 238]

But if we do not believe that Parfit continues to exist in all cases of the Combined Spectrum, and we believe that personal identity must be all or nothing, then we must accept the other alternative, namely that at some specific point in the Combined Spectrum Parfit ceases to exist and Greta Garbo begins to exist. But how could that be? How could the exchange of one additional cell turn someone into a completely different person? That is, if we believe that personal identity is all-or-nothing we must believe that:

Somewhere in this Spectrum, there is a sharp borderline. There must be some critical set of the cells replaced, and some critical degree of psychological change, which would make all the difference. If the surgeons replace slightly fewer than these cells, and produce one fewer
psychological change, it will be me who wakes up. If they replace the few extra cells, and produce
one more psychological change, I shall cease to exist, and the person waking up would be
someone else. There must be such a pair of cases somewhere in this Spectrum, even though there
could never be any evidence where these cases are. [pp. 238-239]

Both alternatives, Parfit claims, are hard to believe:

I believe that they are even more implausible than the only other possible conclusion, which is the
Reductionist view. We should therefore now conclude that the Reductionist view is true. On this
view, in the central cases of the Combined spectrum, it would be an empty question whether the
resulting person would be me. This spectrum provides, as I claimed, a strong argument for this
view. [p. 239]

Parfit thus claims that given the Combined Spectrum we must accept one of
three conclusions, which taken together he claims are mutually exhaustive:

1) Derek Parfit continues to exist throughout the entire Spectrum,
2) Derek Parfit ceases to exist at a specific point in the Spectrum and Greta Garbo begins to exist,
3) Derek Parfit exists at one end of the Spectrum, Greta Garbo exists at the other, and in the central cases of the Spectrum the
question of whether the person is Derek Parfit or Greta Garbo is empty.

Once again, by “empty” questions, in this context, Parfit means:

they have no answers. We could decide to give these questions answers. But it might be true that
any possible answer would be arbitrary. If this is so, it would be pointless and might be
misleading to give such an answer. This would be true in the central cases in the Combined
Spectrum. [p. 260]

If the three choices Parfit offers, (1), (2), and (3), are mutually exhaustive, we must indeed choose one of them. If we are Reductionists, according to
Parfit we must choose (3), that Derek Parfit exists at one end of the
Spectrum, Greta Garbo at the other, and in the middle cases there is no
answer to who the person is. If we are non-Reductionists, according to
Parfit, we must choose either (1), that Derek Parfit exists throughout the
entire Spectrum, or (2), that Derek Parfit ceases to exist at a specific point
in the Spectrum.

Now (3), Parfit admits, is extremely hard to believe. How, he asks, could
the question of whether he survives a change be empty? If he is about to
undergo an operation in the middle of a Spectrum and the person who
wakes up will be in terrible pain, doesn’t it seem obvious that this person either will be or will not be Derek Parfit? But (1) and (2), says Parfit, are even harder to believe. If we believe (1), we believe that the dematerialization of Derek Parfit and the materialization of Greta Garbo is a way for Derek Parfit to survive, which seems absurd: “it could not be clearer that, in this case, the resulting person would not be me [p. 238].” If, on the other hand, we believe (2), we believe that one cell makes the difference between Derek Parfit and Greta Garbo, which also seems absurd:

We are inclined to believe that there is always a difference between some future person’s being me, and his being someone else. And we are inclined to believe that this is a deep difference. But between neighboring cases in this Spectrum the differences are trivial. It is therefore hard to believe that, in one of these cases, the resulting person would quite straightforwardly be me, and that, in the next case, he would quite straightforwardly be someone else. [Parfit 1984, p. 239]

We can agree that it is harder to believe (2)—the person who Parfit is ceases to exist at a specific point—than it is to believe (3)—one person, Parfit, exists at one end, another person—Garbo—exists at the other, and in the central cases the question is empty. But we can also believe that (3) is harder to believe than (1), that the person who Parfit is exists throughout the entire Spectrum.

That is, we might find it harder to believe that one person—Parfit—exists at one end, another person—Garbo—at the other, and in the central cases the question is empty, than to believe that one and the same person continues to exist throughout the entire spectrum. This itself—such a belief, that is—might be very hard to believe. After all, it sounds preposterous to suppose that accepting Parfit’s dematerialization and Garbo’s subsequent materialization is an example of the continued existence of a person. How could such an alternative be easier to believe than Parfit’s (Reductionist) alternative?

Parfit, in formulating the Combined Spectrum, assumes without argument that Parfit and Garbo are two different persons. That is, he assumes that the Problem of Other Persons does not exist as we have formulated it (in Chapter 2) because he assumes that there are some borders which have the (metaphysical and/or metapsychological) significance that necessarily individuate the boundaries of persons. Such an assumption might be justified if the Closed Individualism were a sound view—but as Parfit himself has so well demonstrated, Closed Individualism is deeply problematic and ultimately unsound. Parfit then derives his conclusion from this unquestioned assumption. But his assumption can be questioned. Recall
how we imagined such a Spectrum in my Omni-Dissolve, where we took the entire range of cases as being demonstrative (or, at least suggestive) of survival with identity. We can believe that when we run through the Omni-Dissolve each change is, plausibly, a change that does not kill me, the subject undergoing those experiences, but merely changes a variety of my identifications as a particular personality, etc., up to the point where I am identified as a completely different phenomenal body-mind (Self)—such that I, the subject, have been transformed from phenomenal Self$_1$ to phenomenal Self$_2$, to phenomenal Self$_3$, and then back to phenomenal Self$_1$.

Why does Parfit not take the plausibility of his surviving the whole range of cases as evidence that Parfit at least survives as Garbo, even if the relationship is not, on his view, one of identity? Obviously it is because Parfit, like other Empty Individualists, assumes that an Identity Boundary separates Derek Parfit and Greta Garbo: that they are two different persons. But this is exactly the view we have been questioning—whether X and Y separated by various borders, such as being two different exclusively conjoined physiological-psychological bundles, necessarily entails that X and Y are two different persons. We can believe that Greta Garbo and Derek Parfit each have a different body, a different stream of consciousness, a different psychology, including different memories, different personalities, and so on—that what we have here are two very different physiologies and psychologies—up to and including two numerically different Selves. But we can also believe that, as the Omni Dissolve suggests, two numerically different physiologies and psychologies can be one and the same numerically identical person, that two numerically different Selves can be one and the same numerically identical person, and we can believe these things on the basis of the same arguments that allow Parfit and other Empty Individualists to accept that survival is possible without persistence of the same human being or the same Self. That we can believe this has been demonstrated, for instance, by our various Physiological and Psychological Boundary Dissolves.

Parfit, however, assumes that because we have, in his example, two completely different physiologies and physiologies that therefore Parfit and Garbo are different persons. He does this, presumably, because he does not distinguish between personal boundaries and physiological-psychological borders: he takes the latter to be metaphysically significant inter-personal boundaries. Thus, the reason it seems clear to Parfit that the person “Derek Parfit” ceases to exist at the far end of the Spectrum is that a particular
physiology has at the far end been replaced by a different physiology. Likewise for the psychological borders. It is clear that these changes have taken place. We could thus agree that, in so far as when Parfit says “Derek Parfit” and “Greta Garbo” he is referring to the physiologies and psychologies, Derek Parfit ≠ Greta Garbo. Or, similarly, if (and this is even more important for his psychological view of persons) “Derek Parfit” and “Greta Garbo” are taken as names of particular Selves, Derek Parfit ≠ Greta Garbo. But, unless we already accept the Reductionist version of Parfitian Empty Individualism—unless one already accepts that a person’s boundaries are necessarily delineated by physiological-psychological borders—we do not have to accept that either physiological and/or psychological borders have the (metaphysical) significance that necessitates viewing them as metaphysical boundaries. Indeed, we have seen evidence that personal boundaries are in fact not in this way delineated.

Parfit would disagree with my claim that Parfit and Garbo are the same person—he rejects (1), without argument. But, as we have been arguing, not only is (1) plausible, (3) is ultimately preposterous. And since Parfit and I both reject (2), that leaves us with (1). Thus, for instance, suppose we respond to Parfit’s initial rejection of (1) with what, initially and pre-analytically, may seem like a silly question: by which borders? But then, post-analytically, we find there is no simple answer to this question that works. Are Derek Parfit and Greta different persons because they are separated by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border? But the FEC Border is not necessarily a boundary between persons. Perhaps it is by the FEC Border plus the Assumption of Mindedness Border that Parfit and Garbo are different persons. But that, too, as we have seen, is not sufficient for there being other persons. Perhaps it is by FEC, plus the AM Border, plus physiological disconnectedness and/or discontinuity that Parfit and Garbo are different persons. That is, since Derek Parfit and Greta Garbo are different physiological-psychological bundles, they are different persons. But how could that be, when we have successfully performed the Physiological Boundary Dissolve? Perhaps it is that the sorts of identifications we considered in Chapter 6, in our discussion of the Self, that make them different persons. But identification as Self₁ and identification as Self₂ is not necessary a boundary between persons. And so on for all the other borders.
§ 9.3 WHAT PARFIT’S COMBINED SPECTRUM ARGUMENT REALLY SHOWS

An Open Individualist would believe that Derek Parfit and Greta Garbo are the same person. This would not require the Open Individualist to hold the absurd position that Parfit, a male philosopher, and Garbo, a female actress, are the same exclusively conjoined physiological-psychological bundle. Nor does it require the Open Individualist to believe, say, that they are the same animal. Nor does it require the Open Individualist to believe that they are the same Self.

But, if when we are thinking through the Spectrum we are concerned with the person who is Derek Parfit and the person who is Greta Garbo, then we can indeed believe without absurdity that Parfit and Garbo were the same person before the Combined Spectrum, during the Combined Spectrum, and after the Combined Spectrum. We are therefore not forced to choose Parfit’s Empty Individualist version of (3)—that the person Derek Parfit exists at one end of the Spectrum, the person Greta Garbo at the other, and that in the middle cases the question is empty. We can and should choose version (1), namely that the person who at one end of the Spectrum is identified as Derek Parfit is one and the same person who at the other end is identified as a different Self, Greta Garbo, and that this person exists throughout the entire spectrum.

Parfit claims that if his brain and body are destroyed and then, out of new matter, a replica of Greta Garbo is created,

It could not be clearer that, in this case, the resulting person would not be me. [p. 238]

But since we need not accept either Parfit’s reductionism of personal identity to physiological and/or psychological continuity, nor his assumption that the boundaries of persons consist in physiological and/or psychological borders, Parfit’s claim here is anything but clear. These two different persons, according to Parfit, defined as the persons they are by physiological-psychological borders, start getting their physiologies and their psychologies mixed up. This mixes up the physiological-psychological bundles. As an Open Individualist I can agree. According to Parfit’s version of Empty Individualism, however, this mixes up personhood in the way that mixing progressively larger amounts of blue paint in with yellow paint would make the yellow gradually become green, then blue, and in the areas in-between there might be no clear answer whether the color is green or yellow or blue. But we need not and should
not believe that one can mix persons the way one can mix paint. We can
and should believe instead that what the various puzzles show is that the
borders of a person are, in one sense - provided that the analogy is not
pushed too far - more like the borders of water than of paint, and that
different physiologies and psychologies are like different-shaped
“containers.” (Water always takes on the shape of the container, and by
exchanging the parts of a container one might get containers about which it
is not clear whether they are round or square, but we could not on this basis
infer non-identity. And water is not a count noun but a mass noun; so too,
with the noun, “person.”) Parfit could say there is no evidence for such a
holistic view of personal identity as Open Individualism espouses, in
response to which I would say that there is no evidence for a reductionistic
view of personal identity espoused by his Empty Individualism because
drawing his Combined Spectrum, Parfit has drawn himself a circle: he has
assumed what he is trying to prove. When he says,

S: “It could not be clearer that, in this case, the resulting person
would not be me,”

he is drawing a conclusion from the previous sentence, which is

R: “There would be no connection, of any kind, between me and
this resulting person.”

And why would there be no connection, of any kind, between him and the
resulting person? R is drawn from the previous sentence:

Q: “... the scientists destroy my brain and body, and then make,
out of new matter, a Replica of Greta Garbo.”

The idea is that Q implies R, R implies S, and that therefore by transitivity
Q implies S.

First, does Q imply R? No. Q—Parfit’s brain and body being destroyed
and replaced with a Replica of Garbo—would imply R - that there is a
boundary between Parfit and Garbo—only if the Physiological and/or
Psychological Border were a boundary between persons. Such
Reductionism might be true. But Parfit is here trying to derive
Reductionism by assuming Reductionism. Reductionism might not be true.
The evidence that it might not be true is that we can interpret the Combined
Spectrum completely differently, as we have done in our Omni-Dissolve, in
which case it might instead be true that, as the Physiological Dissolve and
the Psychological Dissolve would in this case suggest, that neither
physiological nor psychological disconnectedness and/or discontinuity are of sufficient metaphysical significance to necessitate our viewing these borders as boundaries between persons.

Does R—that there is a Physiological and/or Psychological Border between Parfit and Garbo—imply S—that Garbo is not the same person as Parfit? Again, no. S would follow from R only if Physiological and/or Psychological borders are, necessarily, boundaries between persons. For reasons already discussed, we need not believe that Physiological and/or Psychological Borders carry the metaphysical and/or metapsychological significance of inter-personal boundaries, the difference between life and death, the delineating boundaries where one persons ends and there begins another; in fact, we have seen reasons for thinking that Physiological and/or Psychological Borders are not boundaries between persons. Things like persisting physiological-psychological bundles or even the persisting of the same physiology or the same neurology might be important to me in some sense in which they are important to Nagel but they are not, by themselves, as Nagel believes, a matter of my life and my death. I do not just believe this without reason. The reasons, already provided, are the various Physiological and Psychological Dissolves.

Persons, if Parfit is correct in his analysis of the individuation of persons, are in certain ways like tables and chairs and heaps of sand, their parts interchangeable, their identities in some cases indeterminate. We need not and should not believe that this is what personal identity is like. However, we can and should believe that this is what our physiologies and psychologies are like. That is, we too can believe, as Parfit does, that psychologies and physiologies can be interchanged, either in whole or in part. There would be no problem with supposing this to be the case and we have seen some good reasons—the various dissolves—to think that this in fact is the case.

Parfit presupposes, once again without argument, the individuation and separateness of persons assumption. In his Spectrum Argument, he destroys the metaphysical connection between Derek Parfit and Greta Garbo by an all-or-nothing set-up: Parfit is one person, Garbo another. Since it cannot be shown where the change would occur between Parfit ceasing to be Parfit and becoming Garbo by the addition of just one cell, and yet it is observed that change does occur, Parfit presupposes that a change in personhood had occurred. But such a set-up, and the description of it, presupposes the individuation and separateness of persons assumption, just as the traditional
Soul theorists presuppose it, as an ad hoc assumption without any argument. Consider the following analogy. Let us give the name “Jack” to the experience of watching a sunset and the name “Susan” to the experience of playing a violin with eyes closed. Jack ≠ Susan. Suppose we lived in a society where names were used in this fashion. Just as calling a river the same river does not make it the same river (except in some trivial, merely verbal sense), so calling a river a different river at every instant, giving it different names at every moment, does not make it a different river (again, except in some trivial, merely verbal, sense). Let us also suppose that, in the society just imagined, we encounter someone staring at a sunset and we ask, “Who are you?” The response: “I am Jack.” Later, as we encounter this person (that is, what we would take to be this same person) playing the violin for us with eyes closed, and we ask: “Who are you?” This time the response is: “I am Susan.”

We now suggest to this person that the names “Jack” and “Susan,” while being the names of numerically different experiences, are not the names of different persons; they are two different names of one and the same person because both experiences are the experiences of one and the same, numerically identical, person. “Jack or Susan?” he asks. We could answer, without absurdity, that, in an important sense, “Both.” We could say, “Jack = Susan.” We could claim that his confusion is due to his viewing the borders described by the content of experience as boundaries between persons. We could explain what we mean by pointing out that there is a continuous spectrum between Jack and Susan—for instance by asking him what would happen if he begin playing the violin and then slowly opening his eyes while watching the sunset, etc. We then ask: “At what point does Jack cease and Susan begin?” “When the watching of the sunset stops,” he answers, “that is when Jack dies.” “But suppose the violin is picked up while the sunset is still being watched,” we say, and “then gradually the violin is begun to be played while, also gradually, the eyes close to the sunset. At what point, then, did Jack die and Susan begin?” “Ah, what that shows,” he responds, “is that parts of Jack can be mixed with parts of Susan, not that Jack is Susan. What you have shown is that Jack and Susan are both reducible to non-Jack and non-Susan parts, so that really there is no Jack or Susan. There is just the experience of watching a sunset and the experience of playing a violin.”

Parfit’s reduction (mis-identification?) of personal identity with the psychological and/or physiological elements in which a person consists, can
in an important sense be viewed as analogous to our above reduction (mis-
identification) of the person with the experiential elements in which the set
Parfit has missed, to put it in the most colloquial terms possible, is the
special “insideness” to these experience, namely, that there exists in fact,
necessarily, the unnamed (in the example) subject who has those mis-
named (e.g., “Jack,” “Susan”) experiences.

Philosophers who have wished to conserve identity have been disturbed
by the Empty Individualist conclusions of Parfit, Nozick, Shoemaker and
others. These philosophers might be pleased to see that Separatism is not
the only way to go (though it too weakens the boundaries between us): we
can move away from Closed Individualism by dropping either (i) the single
continuous entity, the survival and identity, and the intrinsic features
assumptions or (ii) the individuation and separateness of persons
assumption. Parfit, Nozick, Shoemaker, and others, drop (i), with bizarre
results. If the conservative’s choice is to preserve identity then one must
give up something else; Open Individualism does so: it carries the
conservative thesis to its end and drops (ii)—with coherent and
revolutionary results. Moreover, once we have removed some of the
remaining obstacles, the idea that Derek Parfit and Greta Garbo—in spite of
their being different persisting body-character-memory bundles, different
Selves, etc.—are the same person, Open Individualism is the soundest
alternative. And would it not be a nice existential irony if, in the end, Open
Individualism turned out to be the more conservative choice?

§ 9.4 IDENTITY, SURVIVAL AND WHAT REALLY
MATTERS

As we have seen, Parfit argues that the question, “Will some future person
be me?” is in some cases empty—not in the sense that the question has no
answer but that the question has an answer and, in asking it, we are not
asking for different possibilities (P or not P), each of which might be true,
and one of which might be true; rather, the answers we give to the (empty)
question give us different descriptions (P & ~P) of the same outcome. If we
choose either P or not P (and have some reason for so doing), then one of
the descriptions is better than the other. Parfit, as we saw, chooses in the
case of fission to answer the question, “Which one of the two resulting
persons is me?” with the answer, “Neither,” and I choose “Both”—not
because Parfit and I disagree only about whether what matters is what really matters but, rather, because Parfit and I disagree both about what really matters and about the nature of the valuing that affects (or does not affect) the nature of personal identity.

According to Parfit the identity of a person is like the identity of a club. Whether the Chicago Bears are the same football club this year as they were seven years ago is in a sense empty; we can know everything there is to know about the club without knowing the answer to the identity question. We have to decide, on the basis of what matters in club identity, and in turn on the basis of what really matters—not just on what we might (falsely) think matters. For instance, if a Chicago Bears fan thinks that what matters in football club identity is the wearing of football uniforms of a particular color so that if we give the players new, differently colored, uniforms the fan believes that they are no longer the same football club, then that fan is seriously mistaken—not about what really matters to him but about what really matters to the identity of football teams. He should have someone explain to him what really matters. In other words, what matters to him is what really matters to him, but what really matters to him is not what really matters to the identity of the Bears! The situation is the same regardless of whether he is a fan (an involved spectator) or a member of the team.

It is precisely at this point that Parfit’s analogy between the borders of clubs and the borders of persons breaks down in important ways. All there is to football team identity is extrinsically determined and personal identity is (at least in part) intrinsically determined. That is, as already mentioned, I believe, with many philosophers, that personal identity is an essentially intrinsic, not an extrinsic, relation. The proponents of Empty Individualism disagree. But my point here is that, concerning the question of what matters, it is in this sense that our beliefs about ourselves matter: they should be beliefs of the proper sort. Our ordinary beliefs in the example above are beliefs of the proper sort.

What in my view differentiates the personal identity question from the club identity question is that we must ask: What matters to whom? In personal identity, there is not just some exclusively conjoined physiological-psychological complex—there is, in addition, someone, a person “inside” that physiological-psychological bundle: the subject. On the Empty Individualist View in general and on Parfit’s Reductionist version in particular it is implied that the person reduces to some psychological and/or physiological elements. Since identity does not strictly hold as a relation across the (ever changing) psychological and/or physiological relata, on the
Empty Individualist View it should not be personal identity that matters to us when we contemplate our continued survival over time. What should matter, instead, are the continuity of the (non-identical) relations themselves. In my view, however, these same facts are more plausibly interpreted as showing that a person is not reducible to psychological and/or physiological elements. Indeed, the examples only help bring the subject’s attention to itself, to the subject’s experience of the subject. Hence, the issue of what should matter if the Reductionistic version of Empty Individualism were true (a question best settled by criteria of prudence and rationality) must in reality take a back seat to what actually matters—not to the survival of the relationship between some psychological and/or physiological relata but, rather, what actually matters to the continued identity of the person qua thinking subject of experience.

In other words, a person, unlike a club or a team, is not just identified with some exclusively conjoined physiological-psychological bundle. A person is identified as an aspect of that bundle—i.e., the subject identified as a particular phenomenal body-mind, what we have dubbed “the (phenomenal) Self.” Identification as a particular phenomenal Self has a special “insideness” to it. It is not just a personification. It is a personification from the first person point of view within which resides the subject. This “insideness” which people have is very different from the sense in which you are “inside” a club by being a member of a club (and the way a particular psychological or physiological element might be a member via psychological identification with the “physiological/psychological club,” or “bundle,” in which a human being consists). The subject is something people have and football teams do not. Although team members, i.e., persons, can psychologically identify with the team, or psychologically identify themselves as members of the team, they do not psychologically identify themselves as the team from a first person point of view: they do not project themselves into the bundle of football players and experience the game from the first-person point of view of that complex; a complex such as a team—unless some bizarre version of a functionalist thesis is true—does not as a matter of psychological fact (as far as we know) have any such consciousness from a first-person point of view; there is, as far as we know, no “group thinking subject of experience,” no “collective subject.” And we need not make any far-fetched and speculate claims about the nature of consciousness or to explain what the subject in and of itself is or how it comes about (though we shall provide a rather detailed analysis in
 IDENTIT Y BORDERS

Chapter 10) to make such a claim.

What, then, is wrong with Empty Individualist’s belief that identity is not primarily what matters? It is this. If either physiological continuity mattered—if bodily continuity, [BC], mattered—or if psychological continuity, [PC], mattered, then—in so far as [BC] and/or [PC] continued, plus if the possibility of fission showed that identity, [I], did not—we should accept, as the best interpretation of the fission cases, that identity does not matter. But, as we have seen, and as Parfit and others have argued, [BC] is not primarily what matters. And, as we saw in Chapter 6, and as Williams, Unger, and others have argued, [PC] is not primarily what matters. We can accept both negative theses—neither [BC] nor [PC] are what matter primarily in survival. If neither [BC] nor [PC] matter, then either we must give up the idea of there being any significant sort of survival of persons, or we must accept that personal identity is bound neither by [BC] nor by [PC]. Open Individualism allows us to make the latter, better, choice.
NOTES

1 As Peter Unger has pointed out to me, Parfit has made various important changes in subsequent printings of his 1984 Reasons and Persons, as noted in the 1985 and subsequent, paperback printings, most notably: “Thus I have withdrawn my support for the Wide Psychological Criterion of personal identity (p. 208 and elsewhere in the recent editions), since this conflicts with my view that we should not try to decide between the different criteria. . . .” p. x of the 1989 paperback printing.

2 Indeed, this is one reason why in his defense against the Averroists of the church position on resurrection and survival of bodily death conscripted under the separateness of persons assumption, Aquinas in the end claims not only that arguments one way or the other do not settle the issue but, moreover, that this is as it should be because arguments are not the litmus test of truth which—surprise, surprise—can only be known through the grace of God, by revelation.

3 Identity, Consciousness and Value.
PHENOMENOLOGICAL BORDERS

Here we see that solipsism thoroughly thought out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality coordinated with it. Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can speak about the self in a nonpsychological way. The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the “world is my world.”

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

Showing how the borders that people have traditionally used to separate people from people are not necessarily boundaries between persons, our philosophical explanation of how it is possible that we are all the same person—how Open Individualism can be true in spite of its many apparent excluders—lessens the significance of the various borders between us while enhancing the significance of what we all have in common, within us: the I of personal identity, our ubiquitous fulcrum of consciousness.

Moreover, by extending the intuition of the subject-in-itself—the intuition of personal identity, i.e., “self-consciousness,” the “I am I”—beyond the literally Self-imposed psychological limitations of our commonsense (folk) beliefs, our analysis via negativa spans the dual razor’s edge between analytic (and “western”) philosophy and phenomenology (and “eastern” philosophy) to liberate us from our Selves with a live option (in William James’s sense) against the dissolution and death of personal identity, thereby making possible the intuition of the subject-in-the-not-itself—“moral consciousness”—simultaneously denoted and expressed by “I am you.”

Thus far we’ve seen that

1) Closed Individualism is an incoherent view
2) reasons standing in the way of Opan Individualism are not good reasons
3) our ordinary experience of ourselves (e.g., the individuation and identification of phenomena from the first person point of view in relation to the subject, etc., the intuition of the subject-in-itself,
etc.) is consistent both with Empty Individualism and Open Individualism (but not traditional Closed Individualism)

4) Open Individualism preserves our deep intuitions (e.g., the *I am I*, the intuition of personal identity)

5) Open Individualism is more coherent than Empty Individualism.

The idea that *I who am one am many*—that for instance the subject-in-itself is numerically one in all human beings—is therefore a viable alternative we can choose rationally to accept as the truth about us provided we are willing and able, from within the confines of the received conceptual framework—what I call a *conceptual reference frame*, or *View*—to think actively beyond the passive and literally Self-imposed limitations of our commonsense (folk) beliefs and let go of our Selves, that is, let go of the Closed Individualism that—identified as Selves—has us, literally, in its grips.

This philosophical inverse of the “lifting oneself up by one’s bootstraps” paradox is a conceptual upgrade of the sort of Catch-22 we already encountered and responded to back in §2.5, where I made a promissory note that we would encounter the issue again in more detail later. The objection there was that perhaps the way we have proceeded in our analysis is, ultimately, self-defeating on grounds that in making our case against the Received View of Persons we are relying on deep intuitions derived from our ordinary concept of person—intuitions that, if we succeed in making our case against the Received View, ought not to be relied upon because they are false. (Chief among these, for instance, is the intuition of personal identity upon which the physiological and psychological bundles in the various examples are identified as unity, individuated into plurality, and by which judgments are made about whether personal identity has been preserved across various changes.) If the common sense framework is flawed, how can we use intuitions derived from it to show that the common sense framework is flawed? Wouldn’t that be a bit like lawyer X arguing before a jury that they ought not to listen to the arguments of lawyer Y on the grounds that the arguments presented by lawyers to juries are but clever deceptions and ought not to be trusted?

The supposed problem, in other words, is that our procedure is viciously circular in that we began by assuming the validity of intuitions that if our reasoning is sound in the end are invalid. If our intuitions are not to be trusted, then neither is any conclusion based on them—up to and including the conclusion that our intuitions are not to be trusted! Instead of denying that intuitions matter we meet such objections head on by showing how our
procedure could be circular (but not viciously) if all intuitions derived
solely from the Views within which the Selves we are identified as are
phenomenologically embedded and cognitively structured. For as we have
seen (by our Kantian rendering), and shall see again in more detail,
because certain intuitions (e.g., the intuition of personal identity, including
some of our non-inferential beliefs) are not derivatives but integrals of
(necessary conditions for the existence of) any Self or View, we can,
through philosophical analysis, transcend sufficiently the conceptual and
cognitive limitations of the Received View(s) imposed upon us by the
necessary duality of our phenomenologies (in which we are embedded and
within whose cognitive borders our Views, as well as our Selves, unfold) to
see the necessity of the existence and identity of the subject in space and
time and thereby know the sense in which it is possible that I, the subject-
in-itself (consciousness), am numerically one in all human beings—that we
are all the same person—to know ourselves whole. The clearest way to
introduce this transformational aspect of our metaphysical (transcendental)
subjectivist philosophy—a philosophical revolution in step with the third
Copernican Revolution (Kant’s being the second)—is by considering the
following Cartesian, Kant-inspired, Wittgensteinian variation on the
Megarian Paradox, which I call, “The Paradox of the Dreaming Thinker.”

§10.1 THE LUCID DREAM ANALOG, THE
INTUITION OF UNDERSTANDING, AND THE
PARADOX OF THE DREAMING THINKER

When I was a graduate student at the University of Maryland in College
Park, working on my doctoral dissertation, I lived in an apartment building
on Route 1. I wrote well into the night, often until sunrise, and my
nocturnal activity was made easier by a 24-hr convenience store, a “7-
Eleven,” just outside the building. It was in the early hours that, having run
out of coffee, I found myself going down to the 7-Eleven. When I walked
into the store I was astounded by what I saw: there was no coffee and the
store was full only of ski equipment!

This bothered me tremendously. I stood there wondering why a store that
ordinarily sold dairy products and overpriced junk food now sold only ski
equipment. The more I thought about this, the stranger I felt until, suddenly,
I realized that Rt. 1 is on the way to the ski resort and so that must be why
this 7-Eleven, unlike most other 7-Elevens, sells only ski equipment. This
“realization” seemed like any other realization I have ever had about

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anything, replete with the experience of remembering propositions like “Rt. 1 is on the way to the ski resort.” My worries then ceased and, amazed by my momentary forgetfulness of the seemingly obvious fact that Rt. 1 is on the way to the ski resort, I walked out, satisfied but still craving coffee. Outside I walked toward another convenience store, the “Highs” (a different franchise) across the street.

Anyone who knows the College Park area, however, also knows that, from where I stood, Rt. 1 leads to Baltimore and there are no ski resorts between College Park and Baltimore. Furthermore, 7-Eleven stores, (even those located at ski resorts) do not sell only ski equipment. However, walking toward the Highs, I was unaware of these inconsistencies. Indeed, with every step I took there came another nagging worry that I was overlooking something important until suddenly I “realized” what it was: there really is no Highs near my apartment building! Yet there the store was, straight ahead, and there I was, walking towards it! In a sudden flash of insight I concluded that, therefore, what I was experiencing had to be a dream.

As I stood there on (an imaginary) Rt. 1, amazed at the vividness of the detail (I remember seeing the numbers on the license plates of the passing traffic), thinking, “I’m having a lucid dream?”, I thought what fun it would be to jump out into the traffic just to see what would happen. As I was about to step off the curb in front of a speeding truck whose driver, wearing an elaborate Mayan headpiece, was smiling strangely at me it dawned on me suddenly that jumping into the traffic would be very reckless. For how could I really be sure that I was dreaming? My reasoning went as follows.

I find myself in a 7-Eleven that carries only ski equipment. This is inconsistent with what I know about 7-Elevens. I feel the urgent need to resolve the inconsistency. So I sift through my mind until I come up with what I (think I) know about Rt. 1: namely, Rt. 1 leads to a ski resort. This resolves my feeling of puzzlement until, on my way to the Highs, I remember that there is no Highs there. This memory is inconsistent with what I see: I see Highs where I know no Highs exists. The sense of puzzlement returns, more heightened, and I feel the urgent need to resolve these inconsistencies. So I sift through my memories until I come up with what I believe about such inconsistencies: namely, that when you find yourself reasoning the way that I am reasoning, you are dreaming. So this must be a dream. However, how do I, in my dream body, standing in the middle of my dream on a dream street looking at the dream scene, now know that this is, in fact, a dream? I know it, if I
do know it, because I believe that there is something wrong with my reasoning and that this sort of erroneous reasoning is typical of dreams. But if there is something wrong with my reasoning, then any conclusions I draw on the basis of my reasoning must also be suspect. Therefore I do not know whether I am now dreaming! And yet—even though I know that there is something wrong with my reasoning—don’t I know, based on this very realization that something is wrong with my reasoning that I am dreaming?

What the Paradox of the Dreaming Thinker illustrates is, first, that there can be inconsistencies in experience or among our thoughts or judgments without our sensing that there are, and, second, that this sensing is itself neither logical nor psychological but, rather, phenomenological. Moreover, what we might describe in the most general terms possible as, “the sensation that an experience, thought or judgment is correct or makes sense”—what I call the intuition of understanding—and “the sensation that an experience, thought or judgment is incorrect or does not make sense”—what I call the intuition of non-understanding—can, and often (perhaps always) do, function independently of the actual logical, epistemological, or psychological status of the experience, thought or judgment in question.

The basic notion seems to have been understood for instance by Wittgenstein. In his *Philosophical Investigations* where he gives the following famous “private language” argument against any idea theory of meaning or even the notion of an individual speaker’s meaning he writes:

Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. - I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. - But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition. - How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation - and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. - But what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition surely seems to establish the meaning of a sign. - Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation. But “I impress it on myself” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means here that we can’t talk about ‘right.’ (pt. I, sect. 258)

There are of course several known ways to interpret this argument and its significance. I bring it up here only to help get across the idea that the
intuition of understanding is itself not a judgment I arrive at, say by comparing my present thought with some past thought; the intuition of understanding arrives along with (is contiguous to) the content of the thought in which it occurs—say, as the sensation that a thought “makes sense,” is “correct,” is “coherent,” and so on. Typically, this intuition is “phenomenologically borderless” (think “objectless,” as in “objectless dread”). By this I mean the following. Unlike the intuition, say, that there is a cup on my desk, which is bordered along the contours of the seen and felt cup (it has an object), the intuition of there being nothing anomalous about there being a cup on my desk (for instance, I am not ordinarily shocked or puzzled by this experience) is not itself bordered along the contours of the seen and felt cup (it has in that sense no object). Rather, it is diffuse, non-localized, “free floating” (i.e., “objectless”). (Notice that the “object-less” intuition is automatically associated to—i.e., predicated of—the subject, which thereby becomes, as it were, the bearer of the phenomenological property such that the experience is subsequently dubbed “subjective;” thus we say, “I am not puzzled,” “I see nothing puzzling here,” “I understand,” etc.) There is of course a continuous spectrum between phenomenologically “bordered” and phenomenologically “borderless” intuitions of understanding but the difference between the two ends is an important one, perhaps even one of type. Indeed, “thought \( t \) makes sense,” experientially, consists in part in \( t \) occurring without the intuition of non-understanding; that is, in there being no “phenomenological red flags” in or among \( t \). Often when presented with an explanation, for instance, what happens, experientially, is that we “wait to see” if any such red flags occur and make them more likely to occur by trying, as it were, “to hold up to consciousness” various different thoughts and “checking” whether the intuition of non-understanding, or some such cognitive dissonance, occurs.

To use an analogy, consider what happens when one writes something one thinks is terrific, “makes a lot of sense,” and so on—say, involving for instance something as apparently cursory as an introductory level philosophical explanation of perception—only to discover, a week or a few days later, that the same sequence of words now seems horribly wrong-headed, terrible, “sheer nonsense” not even worthy of rewriting, etc. (This can also happen in reverse, of course). What this “Semantic Necker-cube” phenomenon vividly reminds us of is that from a phenomenological point of view the intuition of understanding is not something we actively derive using logic and reason from within the content say of particular thoughts but, rather, the intuition of understanding impresses itself upon particular
thoughts from beyond thought, arriving into consciousness (epi)phenomenally, contiguous with (but not directly caused by) the content of our particular thoughts. And the fact that this is the case with thoughts we write down should, by analogy, sober us to what is the case with the thoughts we don’t write down.

We might put it this way: thoughts do not so much make sense as bring, or arrive with, sense. (By “sense” I mean here the phenomenological sensation of sense, i.e., an intuition.) Thoughts are vehicles by which the intuitions of understanding and non-understanding arrive in ones psychology. In my dream, for instance, the thought, “Rt. 1 is on the way to the ski resort” occurred already sensed as “correct.” That this intuition of understanding was not a judgment I arrived at by checking the contents of my experience in which the intuition occurred but, rather, that the intuition arrived along with the content of experience from beyond the content of the experience is shown by the fact that “Rt. 1 is on the way to the ski resort,” is, in fact, false. Simply put, if I arrived at the intuition of understanding directly by checking the content of my experience such that the phenomenological elements themselves thus being checked were, due to their object relations, the immediate and uninterpreted cause of the subsequent phenomenological sensation, a false proposition could not be the vehicle of its arrival. (We might even put it this way: the phenomenological sense of veridicality and its phenomenological counterpart are, as sensations, purely intentional “objects,” i.e., “pure” intuitions.)

The intuition of understanding is thus “epiphenomenal” with cognitive, semantic, and emotive content. It is this intuition of understanding that made the inconsistent, incoherent and false thoughts (i.e., false propositions) in my 7-Eleven dream seem consistent, coherent and true. That is what I mean when I say that from a phenomenological point of view the intuition of understanding is not something I arrive at say by making rational judgments about the contents of my thoughts (nor is there enough psychological time, ordinarily, even to make the attempt) but, rather, is something that arrives a priori along with the content; the intuition of veridicality as such is phenomenologically contiguous with, not derived from, experience. Moreover, “veridical” intuition of understanding and “non-veridical” intuition of understanding are, as sensations, phenomenologically indistinguishable; there is in either case only the intuition of understanding: whether any intuition of understanding is itself “veridical” is in fact not determined phenomenologically, say, based on the
character or strength of the intuition. “Veridical” intuition of understanding must ultimately, if at all, be determined, or established, extrinsically to, and independently of, its “phenomenal vividness.” Ordinarily, one might suppose that “checking” whether the intuition itself coheres with the overall conceptual reference frame within which the intuition occurs guarantees this. But what then is the vehicle of this coherency check? The intuition of understanding!

We might think to try and get phenomenologically around the epistemological problem by holding up in our consciousness as best we can and as large a set as we can of propositions contiguous with each of which there is the intuition of understanding and then checking to see whether the intuition of understanding or of non-understanding follows. Say I find myself flying naked with a friend over the rooftops of Manhattan. Surprised, I ask her how it is that we are flying and, with an ever so slightly worried expression on her face that ever so slightly inhibits me from staying focused on my question, she says, “What? But Dan! Are you forgetting? Don’t you recall how earlier we smeared the flying cucumber juice over our skins?” This remark—which now as I write this I recognize as nonsense but which is a perfect example of how “nonsensical” a proposition can in a dream be and still be the vehicle of the intuition of understanding—is followed, while we are flying, by my seeming to remember our having, indeed, smeared cucumber juice on our skins and so as we continue flying I am no longer puzzled about how it is that I am able to fly. But were I to hold up, together, the fact that I am having the experience of flying and that I am understanding how this is possible in virtue of having smeared flying cucumber juice on my skin, and then asking further questions, etc., as a matter of psychological fact what happens, typically (though not necessarily), is that the intuition of understanding gives way to the intuition of non-understanding until, eventually (unless that dream ends and I wake up or shift into another) I become aware that I am dreaming—that is, the dream becomes a lucid dream.

So we now ask: although I knew by the intuition of non-understanding that there was something wrong with my reasoning did I know, based on this realization that something was wrong, that I was dreaming? It seems I did until I remind myself that the intuition of understanding and the intuition of non-understanding are themselves neither dependent upon, nor derived from, the content of particular thoughts. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me! How do I ever know that I am not being fooled—that the intuition of understanding or non-understanding is
“veridical?” How to distinguish the veridical from the non-veridical intuition of understanding, if my only “template” is the intuition of understanding and all thought occurs already tainted either with the intuition of understanding or with the intuition of non-understanding?

The question here isn’t whether in a so-called “lucid dream” I can have the thought, “I am dreaming.” I can and often I do. The question is whether I can in the process know it to be true and, if so, how. Interestingly enough, my own dream research has shown consistently that when you ask lucid dreamers (people who have such states regularly, whether through natural ability or through training) whether they know in their dreams that they are dreaming their response to such a question is adamant: Yes. And, clearly, as I can myself and probably you too can attest, occasional lucid dreams are an empirical fact of human psychology (over 60% of people report having had such dreams). But the fact that “lucid dreams” are defined by dream researchers and their subjects as “a dream in which one knows that one is dreaming” does not itself settle the issue whether, in fact, this is the case. This problem can be rather difficult to state clearly. Indeed, that is why as I say lucid dreamers—even sophisticated ones, such as professional psychologists and psychiatrists trained in lucid dreaming—are apt to deny that there is any question as to whether or not they know in their dreams that they are dreaming with the same adamant certainty that people in waking states will tend to deny that there is any question as to whether or not they know, at that moment, whether they are awake or sleeping. By and large, lucid dreamers tend to take the question of whether they know in a lucid dream that they are dreaming as an unfriendly assault on their intellectual honesty, as a skeptical assault on their “advanced” psychological ability to have such dreams, or as a naïve assault on the empirical evidence from their own psychology. Very few lucid dreamers (without some considerable philosophical prodding) understand the semantic/conceptual twist to this sort of phenomenological upgrade of the traditional epistemological problem that so troubled for instance Wittgenstein that it led him even to deny that one could know, in a dream, that one is dreaming. Wittgenstein for instance thus did not deny the existence of lucid dreams; he denied, rather, that the dreamer in the dream knows what the dreamer in the dream says he/she knows. Thus Wittgenstein denies that one can know, in a dream, that one is dreaming. What Wittgenstein claims, hardly surprisingly but I think extremely significantly, is itself a conceptual upgrade of the Cartesian dictum that one could as a matter of phenomenological fact never know that one is...
dreaming:

I perceive so clearly that there exist no certain marks by which the state of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep, that I feel greatly astonished; and in amazement I almost persuade myself that I am now dreaming. (*Meditations*, I para. 5)

Wittgenstein then philosophically escalates Descartes’ claim that dream and waking states are *phenomenologically indistinguishable* to thereby further delineate what is according to Wittgenstein not just *phenomenologically impossible* but *conceptually forbidden*:

Ich kann nich im Ernst annehmen, ich träume jetzt. Wer Träumend sagt “ich träume,” auch wenn er dabei hörbar redete, hat sowenig recht, wie wenn er im Traum sagt “Es regnet,” während es tatsächlich regnet. Auch wenn sein Traum wirklich mit dem Geräusch des Regens zusammenhängt. [I cannot honestly believe that I am now dreaming. A dreamer who says, “I am dreaming,” even if out loud, is no more right than a dreamer who says “it is raining” while it is in fact raining. Not even if the dream were connected with the noise of the rain pounding in the background. DK]

One way of putting our refinement of the problem is that by checking whether a particular intuition of understanding coheres with my overarching conceptual reference frame (a typical response) I can only *apparently* judge whether that intuition of understanding is veridical to that framework. I might however still ultimately be wrong, as Descartes so vividly showed. I may thus draw the distinction *relatively*, based on whether any particular occurrence or set of occurrences of the intuition of understanding coheres with the larger conceptual reference frame from within which it arrives into experience (not as a logical derivation but a contiguous phenomenological occurrence). But there is then the next, further and still deeper problem of whether the intuition of understanding *actually* coheres with the overarching conceptual reference frame since this too, in turn, is not itself derived from any actual checking among the contents of my experience against the overarching conceptual reference frame but, once again, is something that arrives into experience contiguous with the content. This *might* yet again allow me to distinguish the intuition of understanding that is (seems to be) incoherent with the overarching conceptual reference frame and the intuition of understanding that is (seems to be) coherent with the overall conceptual reference frame. (Thus, for instance, in my dream, the 7-Eleven was not on the wrong side of the street, nor upside down, etc.; there was an inconsistency only between what was in the 7-Eleven—ski equipment—and what I knew should be in it—junk food
and coffee—not with the overall map of the neighborhood where the 7-Eleven is located, and so on.) But still the problem nevertheless remains. Checking whether there is a yet larger (overarching) conceptual reference frame into which the intuition of understanding coheres relies still further upon subsequent occurrences of the intuition of understanding, as in the case of the 7-Eleven dream that can seem either coherent or incoherent. (In the 7-Eleven dream, the first occurrence of the intuition of understanding did, in fact, seem incoherent with the immediate conceptual reference frame. Indeed, there followed a larger, more coherent, conceptual reference frame against which the original intuition of understanding disappeared and was replaced by the intuition of non-understanding that—unlike the former [phenomenologically equally vivid but conceptually incoherent] intuition of understanding—could be placed into a larger, more coherent conceptual reference frame.) But the verification of that, too, is but a matter of the intuition of understanding!

What I am nevertheless here suggesting is that the claim that I qua the thinking subject cannot come to see, or know, the flaws of conceptual reference frame C using intuitions \( i_1, i_2 \ldots \) in that are themselves derived from C, is analogous to the claim that I cannot know in a dream that I am dreaming. But one can know within a dream that one is dreaming and, similarly, one can come to “see,” so to speak, or know, the flaws of the conceptual reference frame in which one’s experience is embedded (interpreted or complied). Perhaps surprisingly, my position here is more complementary to Wittgenstein and to Descartes than one might at first glance think. Indeed, a far better way to put what I believe the good Ludwig like the good René were (or should have been) trying to say is quite close to what they actually did say, in the case of Wittgenstein on one occasion even quite explicitly:

So ist es so: Wir schlafen. (Ich habe das schon einmal . . . und es ist wahr.) Unser Leben ist wie ein Traum. In den besseren Stunden aber wachen wir so weit auf daß wir erkennen daß wir träumen. Meistens sind wir aber im Tiefschlaf. Ich kann mich nicht selber aufwecken! Ich behüte mich, mein Traumleib macht Bewegungen, aber mein wirklicher rührt sich nicht. So ist es leider! [it is so: We’re asleep. (I’ve said this before . . . and it’s true.) Our life is a dream. In our better moments we awaken just barely enough to know we are dreaming. But most of the time we are deep in the dream. I can’t wake myself up! I try as hard as I can, my dream body moves, but my actual body does not move. That’s how it is, unfortunately.]

The idea, in other words, as I would now put it, is that never can we say that we are not dreaming because even when awake experience is a type of
dream, not in the sense that experience is never real but in the sense that experience is \textit{a post-subject phenomenon}, e.g., that without the perceiving subject there can be no objects perceived. (The philosophical insight underlying this aspect of our analysis is one that seems to have eluded a number of contemporary re-takes on the classic ‘Brain in a Vat’ problem, e.g. Hilary Putnam \textsuperscript{13} who seem not to realize the sense in which we are, necessarily, \textit{like} brains in vats, i.e., that our skulls are vats and our eyes are anything but windows.) Once we are mindful of this aspect of the metaphysical subjectivist thesis we \textit{can} in fact quite clearly and significantly \textit{distinguish} waking dreams from sleeping dreams (an analytic problem that I think because in one way or another it has been swept under a \textit{synthetic} rug haunts philosophy still) such that without necessarily destroying the phenomenological and conceptual limitations necessary for the having of experience as we know it we \textit{can} know within a dream that we are dreaming, just as we can likewise from within a View without necessarily destroying the phenomenological and conceptual limitations necessary for the having of Views come to know the flaws and limitations of that View making thereby possible a better View. For us the significance is that by explaining how it is possible that lucid dreams allow us from within our dreams without destroying the dreaming process to learn to dream better dreams, is the right analog to seeing how the lucid philosophy of Open Individualism can allow us from within our Received View without destroying unless we are mystics our much needed conceptual reference frames to conceive and actualize a better View.

As an illustration, let us return to my 7-Eleven dream. As in most of my dreams, there I was apparently located in a minded body, separated from other bodies and all the rest of my surroundings by borders consisting in the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, etc. I was not the Chinese fellow behind the counter. I was the Caucasian fellow in front of the counter from whose first-person point of view the counter, the fellow behind the counter, etc., were being experienced. Within this apparent (phenomenal) locus of movement and intentionality from whose first-person point of view the (apparent) events were being observed, I find myself identified as that particular Self in a limited (bordered, phenomenal) world—since, for instance, within the occurrent psychology drawn in those borders there is not present the immediate realization that “in reality” I am lying in bed, having a dream, and so on—experiencing the (phenomenal) events. Among the content of my experience (apparently from nowhere), there occur the following “realizations”:
Realization 1: I find myself in a 7-Eleven store seeing only ski equipment. I know that 7-Elevens don’t sell only ski equipment. So there is an inconsistency between what I see and what I know. I conclude that there is something wrong either with what I see or with what I know.

Realization 2: Rt. 1 is on the way to the ski resort and that must be why I see ski equipment in this 7-Eleven. I had forgotten this, and that is why I was troubled. But now that I remember this I realize what I am seeing is not inconsistent with what I know, so I conclude now that nothing is really wrong.

Realization 3: Rt. 1 is not on the way to the ski resort, yet I just seemed to remember that it is, and so I conclude that the intention of the (false, seeming, confabulatory) memory, “Rt. is on the way to the ski resort” was to resolve, i.e., literally dissolve, my puzzlement at finding myself in a 7-Eleven that sells only ski equipment. So the inconsistency is not just between what I see (my seeing) and what I think I know (my seeming knowledge), but also between my seeming knowledge at one moment and my seeming knowledge at another moment. I conclude, therefore, that there is something wrong with my reasoning.

Realization 4: Since I am seeing things that I know cannot be there and seeming to know at one moment what in the next moment is contradicted by what I am seeming to know in that next moment, my seeing, my seeming knowing, and my reasoning must all be hallucinations of sorts. Since I am having hallucinations while reasoning in ways typical of dreams I conclude that, therefore, I must be dreaming.

Realization 5: But wait—if my reasoning was in error a moment ago, then whatever is causing me to see what I am now seeing (the 7-Eleven store, the ski equipment, etc.) and to reason as I am now reasoning (i.e., that there are the various inconsistencies) has the (profoundly disturbing) power to make me see things that are not there, to make me believe with certainty that I know what I don’t know, and to reason badly without realizing that I am doing so. But since I can’t trust my senses and I can’t trust my reasoning and since it is by my senses and by my reasoning that I just concluded that I am now dreaming, I do not really know that I am dreaming!

Such lucid dreams, an empirical fact of human psychology, provide a convenient real life philosophical upgrade of our Dream Analog explaining
how it is possible to know the flaws of and see beyond the conceptual reference frame in which experience is embedded (interpreted or compiled).

In that dream, Realization$_4$—that I was dreaming—transcended the phenomenal borders derived from and sustained by the conceptual reference frame through and within which identification as that Self was cognitively conscripted. That is, the “philosophical analysis” (within the dream) reached beyond the phenomena of the occurrent psychology present within the borders of the Self while the events of the dream were being experienced from the inside (by the subject, I, in relation to which objects in the dream, up to and including the [dream] Self that the dream subject is identified as, i.e., the [dream] phenomenal body-mind, are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., “observed”). By contrast, Realization$_2$—“Rt. 1 is on the way to the ski resort”—did not. Thus if we ask what during the dream generated Realization$_2$—“Rt. 1 is on the way to the ski resort,” we realize that the thought was purely confabulatory. The intention was to keep myself—i.e., the Self that in the dream I was identified as—from unraveling, literally, the situation that I was in, i.e., to keep the subject (consciousness) phenomenologically bound to the dream, i.e., to keep myself dreaming. The confabulation was the result, that is, of an elaborate self-deception through which the subject, “the Dreamer,” in becoming identified as one part of itself—the (phenomenal, dream) Self—while at the same time having suppressed the intuition of the subject-in-itself, namely, self-consciousness, in its active mode (see, e.g. §6.6.2), was phenomenologically bound to the dream.

In other words, at one intentional level Realization$_3$ was the result of me, the subject, trying to solve the intellectual puzzle (resolve the apparent contradictions), while at another (deeper, or higher) intentional level it was the result of me trying to preserve my phenomenology apparent, i.e., to keep myself dreaming. If we thus ask how Realization$_3$—that my reasoning was in error—came about, what is extremely revealing is that while the intention of the confabulation resulting in Realization$_2$ was to preserve the phenomenology (identification as Phenomenal Self), the intention of the puzzlement, or sense of paradox leading to Realization$_3$ was to illuminate and thereby defeat the self-deceiving intentions that bound me psychologically (through identification as) to the Self in that dream.

Thus, at the intellectual, or rational, intentional level, the realization occurred in part through the intuition that something was wrong with my reasoning (i.e., contiguous with that experience there occurred the intuition
of non-understanding). At another, deeper (or higher) intentional level, the realization occurred in part through the insight that I was dreaming and this “explained” the apparent contradiction (i.e., contiguous with that experience there occurred the intuition of understanding). The ensuing struggle, or tension, or psychological dissonance is the result of an intuition in which the Self—i.e., the tertiary identification of the subject—experiences its own unreality and death, that is, in which the identified subject-in-itself, the I, experiences the illusory component of its (false or pseudo) existence qua psychological object of its own identifications. What is going on in such transitory phenomenological states of enlightenment is a sort of distortion, or disruption, of the phenomenal mind by the phenomenological presence of more than can be sustained by mere appearance, the received conceptual reference frame, or both.\(^\text{15}\)

In the dream I, the subject identified as a (phenomenal) Self, the exclusively conjoined locus of motion and intentionality, etc., saw “through” my Self thereby transcending my dual-aspect phenomenology necessary for the having of experience as we know it (whether dreaming or waking). In this, the Lucid Dream Analog, I, the subject, am the “Dreamer” dreaming the dream and then projecting myself as it were into myself, thereby phenomenologically binding consciousness into one of its own deceivable deceptions. Now, if the question is how identified as an appearance I can affect the appearances, the answer is that I do not; if the question is how I, the projector of the appearances and of the Self through which the appearances are perceived as divided, both conceptually and experientially, into Self and Other, become perceivable to myself as myself, the answer too, is that by actual psychological and phenomenological content I do not (there is only the experiential fact of my active psychological identification as this Self in which at the present moment I consist). In the act the Self becomes both metapsychological mask and metaphysical mirror without ceasing to be either. (One reason therefore why in most cases our psychologies are invulnerable to our philosophies may be precisely because the intuition of understanding and the intuition of non-understanding, instead of being derived from our thoughts, themselves occur contiguous with the cognitions in which our philosophies in fact consist as being understood by us. Like our psychologies, the intuition of understanding is not checked for “real” understanding against the conceptual reference frame: any such checking, via a sequence of thoughts, itself already contains the “checkmarks” which, supposedly, are being derived at each step. Where as when an insight is generated from what is
beyond [transcendental to] the conceptual reference frame we not only have intuitions about the way we might apparently be; we have insights about the way we apparently are [in part because consciousness, the I, returns from the effects of the phenomenal world to their source]. It is here that we begin to see the possibility within our philosophy of personal identity for a paradigm shift from self-deception to self-creation.)

In the Paradox of the Dreaming Thinker, to accept Realization 4—"I am dreaming"—is to accept (or preserve) within the dream the deep intuition that logic works even and especially when identified as a Self I, the subject-in-itself (consciousness), cannot comprehend what my own mind is telling me. There is neither the Self-sustaining intuition of understanding nor the equally Self-sustaining intuition of non-understanding—both of which help secure and sustain the Self—but a plunge into the philosophical maelstrom of perpetual paradox peppered in irresolvable inconsistency. The historical irony here is that the legendary Cartesian beacon of clear and distinct ideas illuminates the Self only to mask consciousness, the I of personal identity, from itself. It should thus come as no philosophical surprise that what the Open Individualist revolution here calls for is a return to a quintessentially primordial (and primitive, in Nietzsche’s sense) Socratic quest (that may have some affinity to Zen) in which we must be willing and able to be guided in our philosophizing by paradoxes (e.g., "Philosophical Koans") designed to disrupt the psychological comfort and security afforded by the intuition of understanding and the intuition of non-understanding.

In this way our philosophical upgrade of the Dream Analog—the Lucid Dream Analog—is analogous to a means of transcending without dissolving the dual aspect phenomenology (a necessary condition for the having of experience as we know it) with the metaphysical subjectivist philosophy in which the Self that the subject is identified as within its (phenomenal) world ceases to signify necessarily a metaphysical boundary between Self and Other and can more appropriately be viewed as the borders within one numerically identical person, me. In the metaphysical subjectivist philosophy of Open Individualism the intuition of personal identity, i.e., self-consciousness, denoted and expressed simultaneously by I am I, sufficiently transcends the necessary phenomenological divide of identification-dissociation.

Now, but: because these are necessary conditions for the having of experience without the Transcendental Illusion and Illusion of Other Persons the (phenomenal) Self and (phenomenal) world both end,
experience ends; in the dreaming case the dream is over, you wake up; the dream may be over but the Transcendental Illusion is back because experience is back and without it there wouldn’t be any. One might think thus the Lucid Dream Analog is here disanalogous to the waking case because in the latter there is, arguably, nothing to wake up to. But there is. The Conceptual Analog to the Lucid Dream Analog is the “lucid philosophy” that in spite of our philosophical transgressions owes as much to Descartes as to Kant, what in Chapter 8 we called metaphysical (i.e., “transcendental”) subjectivism: the subject becomes (identified as) not the “transcendental subject” (the subject [sic] of our next chapter) but, alas, as the next best thing: an Open Individualist, i.e., a metaphysical subjectivist. Thus instead of being blind to the necessity of the (border-bound) limitations of our experience and seeking some sort of mystical transformation beyond all Views and Selves in which the phenomenologically divided subject has a “mystical experience” of its own transcendental identity, of the transcendental identity of the subject, the metaphysically transcendental subjectivist philosophy of Open Individualism provides for consciousness—the I of personal identity—a View with room enough to conceive with the possibility of the necessity not of the transcendental subject but, rather, of the necessity of the transcendental identity of the subject, making thus room for the nonlocality of the subject-in-itself; such that personal identity is not closed under any known borders individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view in relation to that very subject that I, myself, am, across all my many—up to and including, especially, phenomenological—borders.

§ 10.2 FROM A PHENOMENOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

The question, then, is how we can at this stage of game as it were see beyond, in a limited way, the conceptual and phenomenological limits of the Selves that we are identified as and within which our cognitions are structured. Here, roughly, is the method. Knowing for instance that tertiary identification—identification as—gives rise to the same sort of identification (defined in §6.3) on the basis of which I, the subject, become a Self, can lessen the metaphysical and metapsychological significance of my physiological and psychological attachments and thereby liberate me not from my tertiary identification as Self (a necessary condition for the
having of experience without which there wouldn’t be any) but from my secondary identification with Self, i.e., it can liberate me from attachment to my Self (recall, for instance, the Kolak/Scott example of Chapter 6). Likewise, knowing that all Views (conceptual reference frames) give rise to the same intuition of understanding (toward themselves) and, in varying degrees proportional to their conceptual differences, the same intuition of non-understanding (toward other Views), can lessen the cognitive significance of the phenomenological sensation of the intuition of understanding attaching me to my particular View and keeping me, as it were, alienated from other Selves similarly embedded in other, antithetical, Views. Knowing this can to a limited but sufficient degree liberate me from my View. This doesn’t mean that I no longer believe what I believe or think as I do but, rather, that the psychological attachment to my View (tertiary identification) is sufficiently lessened so that I can

1) think and reason more “objectively” (i.e., multi-perspectivally)
2) “step back” from my View and evaluate it critically and, most importantly for our present purposes,
3) decrease or defeat my Self-identification as that View.

(To put it colloquially, and perhaps somewhat paradoxically but in a way that may well have been already understood a long time ago by the Jesuits, we might even say: believing phenomenally less is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for transcendentally knowing more.) And, likewise, knowing that the intuition of understanding (along with the corresponding reciprocal intuition of non-understanding) are necessary for the having of experience as we know it, such that regardless of the ontological or metaphysical status of my experience (e.g., whether [sleeping] dream or waking [dream] states) those very same phenomenological sensations will be structuring (and helping to automatically interpret) my experience for me, can lessen the metaphysical significance of the perceived border between Self and Other and thereby lessen significantly the hold on me, the unidentified subject in intuition, of the Transcendental Illusion within which I exist identified as a Self.

What we are seeing here, in a nutshell, is that to the degree that I can lessen the (metaphysical, metapsychological, cognitive, etc.) significance, and thereby the metaphilosophical hold, of these various sorts of borders I can achieve a broader, more inclusive, “transcendental knowledge” of the nature and function of Views and Selves in relation to myself as the subject whose intuition of itself—the intuition of the subject-in-itself, i.e., the
intuition of personal identity, what ordinarily we call “self-consciousness” can thus with the right philosophy transcend all such psychological, phenomenological and cognitive identifications. Indeed, such “transcendental knowledge” integrates extremely well with our overall method via negativa. Just as Descartes through the method of radical and extreme doubt found his path to knowledge and discovered as it were the certainty of his own existence in the concerted effort to doubt his own existence, it is precisely by seeking, or going in the direction of, my “no-one-ness”—turning away from my various primary, secondary, tertiary and quartic identifications—that the phenomenologically divided (by the fourfold ε/δ manifold relation) subject-in-itself can come to know itself as a projection (via identification/dissociation) of the subject qua subject into the Phenomenal World (the ε/δ manifold) and thereby realize the open possibility of its “everyone-ness.”

Once we come to know various such “open” intuitions as integrals of any View, any Self, we come to see that without them there would be no Views, no Selves; like the Transcendental Illusion and the Illusion of Other Persons (§8.4), such intuitions are necessary for the having of experience as we know it. It is by precisely noting (rather than confabulating or rationalizing away) the phenomenological ubiquity of these open (i.e., “integral,” “invariant,” etc.) intuitions that consciousness, the subject-in-itself, can escape the necessary phenomenological and conceptual limitations inherent in any View, to as it were turn away from its Self to “see” (intellectually) beyond the psychological, conceptual and phenomenological limitations imposed upon Phenomenal Selves (defined in §10.3) by conditions necessary for the existence of consciousness and in whose cognitive domain the subject, identified as that Self, is (phenomenologically, psychologically, etc., i.e., qualitatively) bordered (but not personally, i.e., numerically bound). That is how from within the psychological, metapsychological, physical, metaphysical, conceptual, epistemological, and phenomenological constraints necessary for the having of experience as we know it—dream and waking states are in that regard parallel—identified as Phenomenal Selves we can transcend our phenomenological and conceptual limitations and thereby come to think beyond the limits of our necessarily dual aspect phenomenology and thereby know ourselves from, as it were, “above” our borders.

What I am claiming, in other words, is that I can be still further liberated (“unbound”) from my Self to the degree that I can realize the phenomenological function of the View that I am in (whether in addition to,
or opposed to, its epistemological function). And what is that phenomenological function? In a nutshell: Self-preservation, that is, the preservation of the Self in which I, the subject, live my life, identified as that Self. That is the phenomenological function of any View: to preserve the Self, including the dual aspect phenomenology in which the subject—in-itself (consciousness) is identified as a particular Self and which together are the necessary conditions for the having of experience as we know it.

A View, in other words, doesn’t require just a viewer (consciousness), the I in relation to which objects are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed. A View requires, also, a Self; that is, it requires the subject in relation to which, etc., to be identified as a particular personality, etc., embedded in a conceptual reference frame structuring the View (whether particular to some scientific, philosophical, or religious domain, or overarching View Domain) to which the subject, I, via the Self is attached through the process of psychological identification. But I don’t merely identify with a View; I, as we already saw in Chapter 6, to a certain degree become identified as that View (e.g., not just “I believe in Christianity,” “I practice Buddhism,” “I study physics,” “I do philosophy,” etc., but “I am a Christian,” “I am a Buddhist,” “I am a physicist,” “I am a philosopher, [and, further on down the line, I am a logical positivist, eliminative materialist, idealist,” etc.]). That is why, typically, we don’t just have Views, to a certain extent and in varying degrees we are our Views (the is of identification, not of identity). Identified as Selves, we thus identify with the particular View within which in part the cognitive contours of that Self are formed; we become even more deeply attached if and when we become identified as that View. Ultimately, that is the phenomenological function of any View, literally, the preservation of the identification of the subject as a particular Self: Self-creation through self-deception.

This dynamic relation between one’s Self and one’s View structures from a phenomenological point of view all cognitions equally. Suppose, for instance, that I am a physicist who at the end of a long hard day of inquiry become suddenly very puzzled at how it is possible that anything at all exists—why isn’t there just nothing? Perhaps I started out that day thinking about the evolution of space, time and matter, the big bang, quantum electrodynamics, de Sitter spaces, Lie groups, the Schrödinger equation, quantum tunneling, the big bang, and so on, until eventually at some point—when I manage to hold up in my awareness, as best I can, as large a set as I can of such cognitions—what happens, as a matter of
psychological fact, is that, typically (but not necessarily) my intuitive sense of understanding that until that moment was like an invisible backdrop that I did not even notice suddenly is as if vanished, followed by a backdrop of non-understanding. I am then, however briefly, before my thoughts are deflected (or deflated), cut off from the psychologically securing (and, also literally, “Self-preserving”) intuition of understanding and its counterpart provided by the conceptual reference frame (View) within which I, the subject in the active self-conscious mode identified as that particular Self, subsist. This in may ways is analogous to the lucid dream experience; both are analogous to the realization that the world in experience is not some monotonic and univocal subject-independent reality but a mutually independent subject-dependent phenomenological (re)presentation of reality: you realize, perhaps not without substantial psychological discomfort, that what consciousness grasps even in its most lucid moments are not “cosmic truths” but, at best, cosmological theories; what I, consciousness, the subject, am situated within is not the whole of me but a self-representation structured by, and myself a part of, the View within which my experience, including my cognitions, unfolds.

If, on the other hand, the Self I am identified as and phenomenologically situated in is not a physicist but, say, a fundamentalist Christian who believes not even in species evolution, much less cosmic evolution, the particulars by which the intuition of understanding and the intuition of non-understanding run through my psychology will be different but the phenomenological function will be the same; and that, of course, is something that when the Selves we are thus identified as are philosophers we ought to find mightily depressing, if not downright disturbing. (Different cultures at different times will have radically different propositions that function as the vehicles of the intuition of understanding: a Christian theologian, a Jewish Theologian, a Newtonian physicist, an Einsteinian Relativist physicist, a Copenhagen interpretation quantum physicist, a quantumelectrodynamist statistical interpretation quantum physicist, a Theravada Buddhist, a Mahayana Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu, etc., will each within his or her conceptual reference frame have propositions that make vivid sense to them, i.e., have the intuition of understanding attached to that proposition, but not to any of the others, and so on.)

Am I saying that all conceptual reference frames are the same? As far as their phenomenological functions go—i.e., the preservation of the Self (and the necessary, user-friendly Illusion of Self and Other within a
phenomenology)—yes. (Does it therefore follow that a significant change in one’s View—such as, say, what we might think of as a paradigmatic “View Domain Shift,” say—produces a change in one’s Self? Yes, indeed, as I already argued in Chapter 6 when I said that we are not just a psychology, we are also a philosophy.) Moreover, as I claimed above, psychological attachment through primary, secondary, tertiary and quartic identification to (or even as) a particular View or some such intersection thereof is part and parcel of, literally, “Self preservation.” In other words, to oversimplify somewhat: no Self, no View. No View, no Self.

This, as we saw in the previous section, is much easier to witness in our Lucid Dream Analog. If we think of the intuition of understanding as a sort of phenomenological glue and the intuition of non-understanding as a sort of phenomenological solvent, we can explain this, if somewhat melodramatically, as the idea that by putting questions to myself that move me beyond the intuition of understanding and the intuition of non-understanding that are themselves necessary for the Self that I am identified as I can lessen the conceptual, cognitive and phenomenological hold of the View sustaining me as such to as it were philosophically “transcend” a particular received View.

§10.3 THE PHENOMENAL SELF, THE PHENOMENAL WORLD AND THE NOUMENAL SUBJECT: THE UNSPEAKABLE MODE OF BEING OR, SILENT NO MORE

Presently I am identified as, and situated in, this particular phenomenal body-mind dissociated from the rest of my phenomenology by borders consisting in the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, etc. This e.g. phenomenal locus of movement and intentionality from whose first-person point of view these occurrent events are being observed by me, the subject—I—is the Self (defined in Chapters 6 and 8) whose borders do not signify the boundaries of my personal identity in so far I can explain how it is possible that personal (numerical) identity resides not in the psychological objects of my (qualitative) identifications but in me, the subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity, consciousness situated in what the (identified) subject is identified as, namely, this particular phenomenal body-mind, etc. Indeed, given our various Boundary Dissolves, there is not just one way such an explanation can be attained; thus although metaphysical subjectivism is from our Open Individualist View the metaphysics of choice (literally), our
thesis is ontologically neutral in so far as the various philosophical explanations of how it is possible that we are all one and the same person function across all manner of borders (physical, psychological, neurological, metaphysical, etc.) Thus, on our metaphysical subjectivist (§8.2) construal the phenomenal body and mind, themselves both (re)presentational (re)constructions (synthesized, we have reason to believe, through the brain), are not necessarily the limiting boundaries of me, of my personal identity—even though I identify myself with (take myself to be) and am identified as (experience myself to be) this Self—i.e., this exclusively conjoined (phenomenal body-mind) locus of motion and intentionality (phenomenal body = fingers, limbs, etc.—and phenomenal mind = emotions, thoughts, persona, etc.), individuated from the rest of what is phenomenologically present by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border, etc. In other words, presently (as in my dreams) both I, qua the subject-in-itself (consciousness) and the (phenomenal) world in which I find myself situated are all but aspects of one and the same (numerically identical) being whose identity transcends its phenomenological borders.

Now, but who—what—is this phenomenologically divided yet transcendentally identical being? I am, yes, but, as we have stumbled here before: I, who? I, this Self? No. This Self is a phenomenologically border-bound psychological bundle that I am identified as and in which I qua the subject-in-itself, consciousness, the I in relation to which said phenomena (e.g. objects) are individuated and identified (localized) in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, am in turn thereby reciprocally localized, i.e., situated in relation to said objects. So, as we have indeed seen before and are coming around to see yet again in more precise detail: whereas the psychological (qualitative) identity (i.e., identification) of the Self is, necessarily, phenomenologically border-bound, the personal (numerical) identity of the subject-in-itself is not phenomenologically border-bound. The philosophical problem here from a purely phenomenological point of view is how to now integrate our concept of the subject-in-itself with what from a phenomenological, conceptual, and even semantic point of view appears not as subject but (a manifold of) objects—i.e., the fourfold ε/δ manifold—that presents itself (to itself) in experience not as a me but as a world, the phenomenal world, within which the subject-in-itself, consciousness, the I of personal identity, is projected and situated through identification as a particular phenomenal self, by both of which I mean the following:

Phenomenal World: the totality of the perceptual manifold that ordinarily
I call “my world” or “my experience of the world,” in which I find myself located as an observer (without a directly observable head), apparently watching and experiencing the unfolding events from the perspective afforded through identification as a Phenomenal Self (the phenomenal body-mind—the “[phenomenal] physiology,” and “[phenomenal’] psychology”) individuated from the perceptual events I see by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, etc.

Phenomenal Self: the exclusively conjoined locus of motion and intentionality, within a Phenomenal World, whose experiential and conceptual borders are drawn along the phenomenal body-mind (along physiological and psychological perceptibles [perceptibles = visibles + tangibles]) that the subject is identified as and individuated from (the rest of the Phenomenal World) by the FEC Border, the ASI Border, etc., and from whose first-person point of view I (the subject-in-itself) experience my Phenomenal World.

Now in what sense am I, the subject-in-itself, both my Phenomenal Self and my Phenomenal World? Well, clearly, the sense in which I am both the Phenomenal Self and the Phenomenal World is not the is of identification but the is of identity. For, as we have seen, the subject is, in experience, not in any phenomenological sense identified as anything other than a Phenomenal Self. But we have also gone to great pains to explain how it is possible that “I am what I am not,” i.e., that “I am (my identity extends to) what I am not identified as” and from which I am separated by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, etc. This as a matter of fact is strictly speaking from a logical (formal) point of view not only possible but necessary, for (Kantian) reasons already given, having to do with the conditions necessary for the having of experience, and so on: if it were not possible for me to be anything but what I am identified as, then strictly speaking from our point of view not only would I not exist, experience itself (in the conscious sense, given our definition of consciousness in terms of the subject-in-itself) would be impossible. Without the subject there would be no objects, period. This is not idealism. This is Kant 101.

The point is that I am not just the subject in relation to which phenomena (e.g. objects) are individuated and identified (localized) from the first-person point of view (i.e., observed), I am, also, all the corresponding phenomena, up to and including everything in my experience, in so far as the subject and its (phenomenal) objects are the necessarily dual aspects of one and the same numerically identical being, and that being is me. So
when we factor into our analysis—as we did in Chapter 6 and then again in Chapter 8, and as Wittgenstein shows in the *Tractatus*, “I am my world,”19—that my Phenomenal World—everything in my experience, what I (consciousness, the subject-in-itself) am dissociated from—and the Phenomenal Self, what I (consciousness, the subject-in-itself) am identified as, are the dual phenomenological aspects of one numerically identical being, it follows that this being is both the Phenomenal World (εδ manifold) and the subject-in-itself (the I). This means I am both the phenomenologically divided subject identified as this Phenomenal Self within this Phenomenal World and the Phenomenal World. So if and when (e.g. now) we want to speak about the nature of personal identity in what I call the unspeakable mode of being (modulo *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) let us use the locution *Noumenal Subject* to signify thereby “personal identity beyond my dual-aspect phenomenology,” keeping in mind (remaining consciously aware) that no such transcendental identity of the (noumenal, unidentified) subject appears (i.e., is identified) anywhere in experience but that, also, nor could it appear thus even though we are no longer by any compression of the imagination forbidden from explaining how it is possible that I am the whole of my experience, that the whole of my experience is “me,” and other such philosophical prerequisites for our Phenomenological Boundary Dissolve.

Wittgenstein amplifies (to the point of distortion) this same sort of point (albeit in a rather distorted fashion, because of his indiscreet use of “subject,” “metaphysical subject,” “I,” “Philosophical I” and “Philosophical Self” apparently interchangeably) when he says,

The subject does not belong to the world but is the boundary of the world. . . . Where in the world could a metaphysical subject be? . . . Here we see that solipsism thoroughly thought out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality coordinated with it. Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can speak about the self in a nonpsychological way. The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the “world is my world.” The philosophical I is not the human being, nor the human body, nor the human soul with which psychology deals. The philosophical self is the metaphysical subject, the boundary - nowhere in the world. [Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*, pp. 38-39]

Wittgenstein’s use of “subject,” “metaphysical subject,” “I,” “Philosophical I” and “Philosophical Self” as coextensive is confusing yet understandable and in a certain aspects perhaps even desirable, given that these Tractarian denotations refer ultimately to the same being—the person—in various modes.20 For our present purposes, however, we are choosing when we
wish in addition to speaking of ourselves in our phenomenologically partitioned dual mode—the subject identified as a Self within a Phenomenal World—to speak in the “unspeakable mode,” use *Noumenal Subject* to mean the (non-phenomenological, e.g., non-empirical) sense in which the numerical *identity* of the subject-in-itself, the *I*, necessarily transcends the *phenomenological* borders between (phenomenal) Self and (phenomenal) Other in which the subject’s experience and cognition consist (regardless, even, of the question of *how far*, though by now we know full well our Open answer: *as far as you choose to explain*). Thus we can say: the *Noumenal Subject* is *transcendently identical* to the Phenomenal World within and into which it projects itself through identification as a particular Phenomenal Self.

Let us note, too, that the *identity* of the Noumenal Subject is thus itself, quite necessarily, *nonlocal*, i.e., “transcendental,” which is *not* to claim that the Noumenal Subject is itself, necessarily, the transcendental subject. That will be the subject (sic) of our next chapter. The *nonlocality*, i.e., *transcendental identity*, of the Noumenal Subject is as a matter of fact strictly *mundane*, in that nonlocality is required from a phenomenological point of view even under Closed Individualism (otherwise, as we have shown and shall see again in this chapter in excruciating but hopefully painless detail, there just is no personal identity, i.e., personal identity is not what matters). To keep this clear let us therefore also allow ourselves the locution, when we wish to remind ourselves of what is as surprisingly difficult to demonstrate as it is unsurprisingly, perhaps even revealingly, easy to forget, namely, the necessity of the *nonlocality*, i.e., *transcendental identity*, of the *Noumenal Subject*.

In the interest of better defining this terminology, let us now assume that your Phenomenal World is to some relatively high degree veridical to the “public” (i.e., multiperspectival, multiphenic, etc.) “objective,” “empirical,” etc., *world* of “physical” “publicly (i.e., e.g. multiperspectivally, etc.) verifiable” objects as ordinarily conceived by the man on the street (who hopefully hasn’t been run over yet) that there is a relatively high degree of isomorphism among our Phenomenal Worlds. Thus we may say that through each brain there is synthesized a Phenomenal World structurally isomorphic with other such representations into each of which, through identification as (and conjoinment onto) that Phenomenal Self, the Noumenal Subject is projected (localized) *into* each Phenomenal World. As we have shown, we can say that what is being thus experienced through our Phenomenal Selves can be thought of as a type of “public
dream” or “group hallucination” (what Dennett and I have called commensurate dreamworlds; see §11.4)—not in the sense that what is being experienced does not in any way correspond to what exists “outside our heads” within which it is represented in order to be perceived but, rather, that the perceptions occur in some sense “inside” each head—specifically, around the calcarine fissures in the brain—but that the perceptions are then projected via the imaginative faculty of the brain into its (re)presentation of the objective world (i.e., the Phenomenal World) and automatically interpreted (compiled) through each Phenomenal Self as a direct perception of objects external to the Self, up to and including “other persons.” Thus we could also say that the difference between, say, “psychotic hallucinations” and, let us say, “normal hallucinations,” is not that the former occur “only in the head” and the latter occur “outside the head;” obviously, since perceptions never occur outside the head (which does not imply they occur inside the head, either), the crucial difference that our psychiatric colleagues would be interested in is whether the perceptions are veridical to the required degree as verified in the public forum of language, communication, and accepted canons of so-called “objectivity” (though “objectivity” itself translates into metaphysical subjectivism as “multiperspectivalism;” see below). And that we may ordinarily assume that the “subjective perceptions” in normal, healthy individuals are to a relatively high degree veridical to some aspect of the “public world” makes it all the more remarkable that we can more or less veridically “group hallucinate” in the way described.

Clearly, if you were here in the room with me there would be two Phenomenal Selves present each in its own Phenomenal World experienced from a particular point of view. But experienced by whom? It would be extremely odd to suppose that the Phenomenal World is being experienced by the Phenomenal World; the Phenomenal World is, after all, but the (reconstructed, representational) experience of the “physical world”—to whom does it belong? Perhaps to no one—but how can we take that route, without leaving ourselves—persons—out of the universe altogether?

There is a way. If we thus wish to preserve our concept of a person we can make a conceptual leap to the Noumenal Subject as follows:

Just as we are reasonably justified conceptually in making a transcendent leap from the subjective, “mono-perspectival,” “private,” Phenomenal World to the metaphysical “external,” “multi-perspectival,” “public” world, thereby accepting that even though we do not have direct access to any such external, multi-perspectival, public world but
only to our various, often conflicting subjective conceptions interpreted as such by us we are nonetheless warranted in believing in a multi-perspectival, “public world” of physical reality, so too we are warranted conceptually in making a transcendental leap from the subject-in-itself identified as a Phenomenal (i.e., immanent, physical) Self to the Noumenal (i.e., transcendental) Subject, thereby accepting that even though we do not have direct, phenomenological access to our own metaphysical inner workings but only to our various, often conflicting conceptions of ourselves interpreted as such by us we are nonetheless warranted in speaking of ourselves as one Noumenal Subject.

It is our warranted ability to speak in the unspeakable mode that allows us to say (not only show) from a philosophical point of view that the Noumenal Subject creates (e.g. in Brouwer’s sense), generates, structures, individuates and identifies varieties of borders and boundaries within itself to create the Phenomenal World and Phenomenal Self through which it subjects itself to itself and thereby experiences, interprets and conceives itself and its world as such.

There may be no such entity. Lest anyone think that we are here engaged in sheer speculation, however, let us note that many practicing cognitive scientists do in fact claim to have actually discovered the existence of such an entity—one that indeed meets at least all the above conditions: namely, the human brain. Thus the Noumenal Subject, as here naively (i.e., scientifically) conceived, may well just be the brain and that is how we can, for now, think of it. (The problem with that conception, of course, is that it equates the person with the brain, a la Nagel who asserts, explicitly, “I am my brain.” This, in my view, is not the correct analysis for reasons already discussed and which in the next chapter we shall discuss further—but it is a possible view and for now if it helps the reader to think of the Noumenal Subject in such neurophysiological terms, then it can serve as a useful heuristic.)

On the other hand, one might instead be included to think of the Noumenal Subject in (metatheological) terms of God. Or, the Noumenal Subject is the Subject of the Universe, “the World Soul.” And so on. (It is probably no small accident that one can read, say, a work of Augustine’s and by replacing “God” with “brain,” or “Universe,” or “World Soul,” and get not an altogether incoherent reading.) In that regard, it may help the reader at this point if our concept of the Noumenal Subject as what in some pretty good literature has gone under the rubric of “the transcendental subject” (which we shall consider, along with the notion of transcendent
identity and the requisite Transcendental Dissolve, in much more detail in the next chapter). However, we would here be explicitly (and, perhaps unfortunately, necessarily) ready to part with a Roycean (or any other similar) type of God-like conception of omniscience and omnipotence of the Noumenal Subject. The “God” of Open Individualism is not just fallible and a (self)deceiver but, what should not be surprising given that we are after all speaking about a person, necessarily so.

Thus even if the Noumenal Subject just is the brain, such that this what I am now seeing is a brain looking at (mental representations within) itself, what is being seen, or represented, does not look, for instance, like a calcarine fissure but like a room with a window facing a garden at sunset. We have only to remind ourselves yet again of the sense in which the human being is blind—that the human brain lives in darkness—that eyes are not open windows through which actual sunlight enters the brain and that in the brain there is no actual sunlight whatsoever. (Indeed, it would be fair to say, from the standpoint of physics, that light is not bright, that is, that “bright qualia” or the “visual phenomenon of brightness” are not properties of lightwaves per se nor of photons—another point that seems to go universally unheeded by virtually all philosophers and physicists today).

That is, if this what is now being seen by me is but a neural occurrence in, say, the calcarine fissure of a brain, we shall not be making a great leap of faith if we assert that this is not merely what a neural occurrence in the calcarine fissure of the brain looks like but, at best, is a representation of neural firings identified not as neural firings but as—I now raise a phenomenal representation of an arm toward a phenomenal representation of a window—the sunlit garden of my backyard. Otherwise, I should be utterly shocked and think myself crazy to find myself pointing at trees and saying anything but, “I see neurons firing, aren’t these neural firings beautiful?” and so on.

What is true in a (sleeping) dream from a purely phenomenological point of view is true of your waking (dream) experience as well. Sleeping or awake, from a purely phenomenological point of view there is no (perceptible) difference between the one (sleeping) dream experience and the other waking (dream) experience. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere (Kolak 1999A) and will do so again later for the Cartesian thesis, already quoted earlier, that (sleeping) dream and waking (dream) states are phenomenologically indistinguishable:

I perceive so clearly that there exist no certain marks by which the state of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep, that I feel greatly astonished; and in amazement I almost persuade
myself that I am now dreaming. (Meditations, I para. 5)

Thus right now I, identified as this Phenomenal Self, have the experience of sitting at a desk writing a book on personal identity. I, the subject, am thus experiencing my own phenomenology; that is, unless direct experience of the external, multi-perspectival world is possible, all experience—whether “dreamed” or “waking”—must be experienced by the subject through a simulated experiencer, the Phenomenal Self. And what makes the Phenomenal Self to a certain limited degree phenomenologically “active” (not the fully active mode of self-consciousness discussed earlier) is that some of the experiences available to me among my occurrent psychological individuations are “experientially glued together,” as it were, through psychological identification as, while some are “experientially bound apart” via FEC and psychological dissociation. In other words, an exclusively conjoined locus of motion and intentionality is constructed (e.g. Brouwer’s intuitionistic creative subject) and projected (i.e., localization of the subject-in-itself modulo localization of said objects) into a Phenomenal World as bodily phenomena through which, identified as a Phenomenal Self, I, the subject-in-itself identified as that Self, manage to experience both my self-representations and my world-(re)presentations by identifying certain borders within myself (my phenomenology) as Self and certain borders within myself as Other. It is by experiencing my phenomenology (my representational self-constructions) that I am thus able, to the degree that I am able, to function in an environment “external” (i.e., non-identical) to myself. That is, I am presently experiencing one part of myself—the self-representation that is this Phenomenal Self—as Self, while experiencing another part of myself—the phenomenal re-presentation of the external environment that is my surrounding Phenomenal World within which I am situated perspectivally from the first-person point of view—as Other; both of these sets of representations are but phenomenological aspects of my own experience in which the Phenomenal Self appears as a locus of motion and intentionality (the phenomenal body-mind) individuated from the rest of its Phenomenal World via the FEC Border, etc. (Along with the reversal of FEC when the interpreting is turned inward toward what is transcendentally behind [“above” or “within”] the “internal-world” of one’s own psychological individuations.) To show or to think or to conceive how all this can be numerically one and the same identical person, me, is to acknowledge, assert, or assent to the possibility of personal (numerical) identity necessarily transcending all such phenomenological borders, i.e., the possibility of the metaphysical necessity of the transcendental identity
It is through this rather complex (and, let us assume, more or less veridical) representational self-construction and representational world reconstruction into an ordered locus of phenomena (a set of mental representations within which the subject becomes identified as a particular Phenomenal Self and the Physical World is modeled as a Phenomenal World, i.e., the ε/δ phenomenal spacetime manifold) that correctly (we have sufficient reason to believe) tracks—at least with some requisite degree of isomorphism—both mental and physical reality. (So even if the sky is not “really” blue and not “really” up, we can and do believe that the sensations of “blue” and of “up” are, at least on most realist interpretations and at least to some degree isomorphic with something “out there.”) It is by the projection of ourselves into our (experienced from different points of view) Phenomenal Worlds within which we are identified as Phenomenal Selves that “we” manage to interact both with each other and with the world and on the basis of which are formed our conceptions about how things really are.

Put more carefully, along these same lines we can say: I, the Noumenal Subject identified as the Phenomenal Self—through whose experiential and conceptual borders I apparently (mis)identify myself (within the totality of the Phenomenal World) across various exclusively conjoined apparent psychological individuations as “Self,” while (falsely) identifying the rest of the Phenomenal World as “Other”—consist in borders that do not constitute my personal boundaries. It is this (mis)identifying of myself as one part of what I, qua identifying (and reciprocally identified as this Phenomenal Self, DK) subject-in-itself, am while managing, through psychological (mis)identification, to identify another part of what I am (the rest of my Phenomenal World) as what I am not (“the external world”), a feat achieved by drawing phenomenologically rigid (“objective”) borders within myself, that the illusion within the illusion is sustained, thereby drawing a picture of reality that encourages and sustains the Closed Individual View of Personal Identity. In other words: there is far more to us nonapparently than can apparently be dreamt of in our (received) philosophy.

That I can be numerically identical to more than one exclusively conjoined locus of (psychologically and/or physiologically individuated) motion and intentionality, e.g., more than one Self—as we saw in the Dream Analog, the Psychological Dissolves, the Physiological Dissolves, etc.—and yet, also, at the same time, numerically identical within and
across phenomenological borders, shows how our concept of personal identity is as a matter of philosophical explanation in no way border bound, i.e., that the Noumenal Subject is conceptually and experientially orthogonal “beyond all that is my subjective, conscious experience of Self.” And while (identified as) the Phenomenal Self I am bound to exist dimensionally “beneath” or “within” (an effect of) my conceptual reference frame (i.e., the psychological [qualitative] identity of the Phenomenal Self, unlike the personal [numerical] identity of the subject-in-itself therein identified, is border-bound), my personal identity is not thus border-bound, that is, the personal (numerical) identity of the subject-in-itself extends what is “beyond” it, that is, beyond its known borders of individuation and identification. The Noumenal Subject is, in that sense, at once both immanent and transcendent (and thus to add to the subject-in-itself the adjective noumenal is in that sense redundant).

Which, of course, is not to claim that the Noumenal Subject does not consist in any borders; for instance, if ultimately the Noumenal Subject just is the brain it is clear where these borders are but the point is that if our analysis is thus far correct then the conditions of personal identity for the living brain (if we were to allow ourselves to speak in this way) are such that what matters with regard to continued personal existence (survival with identity) over time is not bound by the neurophysiological borders of a brain, as was already suggested in our various Brain Dissolves. (The problem with that conception, again, is that it equates the person with the brain, a la Nagel who asserts, explicitly, “I am my brain.” This, in my View, is not the correct analysis for reasons already discussed and which in the next chapter we shall discuss further—but it is a possible View and for now if it helps the reader to explain the possibility of the transcendental identity of the subject in such terms, then it can serve as a useful heuristic.)

The situation, then, is this. My identification as a Phenomenal Self in the Phenomenal World creates a phenomenological border (within me [not me the subject but me] the person who I am) between Self and Other, which is for us itself not a boundary between persons but, rather, a border within one and the same numerically identical person, the Noumenal Subject whose identity is, as such, at least locally transcendental. (Again, this transcendental “I [Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical I’"] am my world” aspect of Open Individualism presupposes neither idealism nor phenomenalism but can, quite to the contrary, be stated in squarely positivistic terms.) According to Open Individualism, the person who I am is both
(Phenomenal) Self and (Phenomenal) Other: the Noumenal Subject that presents itself to itself (identified) as the Phenomenal Self within (and dissociated from) the Phenomenal World of its objects. The person who I am thus exists with metaphysically transcendental identity on all sides of that border, both as (Phenomenal) Self and (Phenomenal) Other. Unlike in Kant’s construal of the Phenomenal/Noumenal Self distinction, which is arguably from a metaphysical point of view conceivable as one-one, Open Individualism construes the Noumenal Subject as being not beyond experience, as Kant thought, but as itself being experience—all aspects of it; and since the subject is in that respect a phenomenological chameleon; it can be—in experience it is—anything or anyone and hence is conceivable as one-many. (Which is not to say that this is all that the Noumenal Subject is. Rather, it is how the Noumenal Subject projects itself into phenomenological space and time: how it lives. Also, in that respect, the Open Individualist conception of a person can thus be construed in terms of Leibnizian Monads; I would even go so far as to say it squares nicely with Leibniz’s concept of a complete individual notion.)

The world in my experience is a phenomenal world. The Phenomenal World as such consists not of dead matter but is best conceived, itself, as the Noumenal Subject self-transformed (created) into a world, an aspect of the living person who I am. I am that person. I am the Noumenal Subject whose acts constitute the world, who then lets the world manifest itself without restricting its own creativity; as Brouwer, who himself saw as clearly as anyone the falseness of the conception of what he called “plurality of mind,” puts it well when he says:

. . . although the intuitionistic creating subject can in advance pose restrictions (or forbid restrictions) on a given growing mathematical entity that is its creation, it cannot do so on its own possibilities to create.

Now, but who am I? Well, when I say, “I am Kolak,” I am (mistakenly) ascribing my identity to that which I am within my own Phenomenal World identified as—the Phenomenal Self. (This is the same a language-driven error that in our dreams, for instance, makes us appear to ourselves not as each and every aspect of the dream but as being only that which in the dream we are identified as—a particular dream character from whose first-person point of view the dream is experienced as such.) The problem with doing so is that I the person am not just that. To echo Wittgenstein once more: I am also my World. Now, the Phenomenal World I am in is, in that this limited sense, “Kolak’s World.” I am Kolak, yes; but also I am, also,
Kolak’s World. I am (identified as) Kolak, I know myself and experience myself as that Phenomenal Self, etc., but I am not just that Self. I, the person considered not from within my dual aspect phenomenology divided into Self and Other but in toto, as the subject, the person—am Self and World. This is not inconceivable, nor incomprehensible, nor ineffable. Nor is it any more mystical than when in the case of the (sleeping) dream I say that I am both that which language must in the dream make me say that I am—the dream character—and that which language in the dream forbids me from stating clearly and distinctly that I am—each and every object in the dream. What I could do in the dream (Phenomenal) world is what I can do in the waking (Phenomenal) world case, namely, to say that what the dream (Phenomenal) world is not me the subject identified as the Phenomenal Self but is me, the (mis)identified objectified (e.g. “alienated, dissociated, etc.) Noumenal Subject. The extension of the term “subject” is in both cases neither nonexistent nor nonsensical but certainly does require the second order cognitive activity of philosophy (i.e., Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical I”). When I thus say that the person who I am is the Noumenal Subject whose identity is, at the very least case in the dream locally transcendental; I thus use the word “transcendental” here quite appropriately to mean “phenomenologically” transcendental to thereby remind ourselves that this is in fact not how I experience myself in (phenomenological) space and time. In my phenomenology I am presented to myself not as a Phenomenal World but identified as a Phenomenal Self separated from the Phenomenal World by FEC, etc., whereas the rest of me that in my phenomenology I am not identified as is not Self but Other. Therefore the proper locution here certainly is from a purely phenomenological point of view transcendental, as Kant and so many others have clearly recognized, such that only the most unphilosophical and unscientific “minds” (Selves) could possibly object to it.

We might at this point also make the following distinction. Since the Phenomenal World I am now a experiencing (what the man on the street calls, simply, “the world I see”) can be conceived in terms of the result of interpreting the pressure light waves make upon the rods and cones on the back of my eye, the pressure sound waves make upon my inner ear, and so on, why is it that I cannot, simply by an act of will, reinterpret the apparent scene into whatever I choose? The reason is that, identified as a Phenomenal Self, the Noumenal Subject is thereby causally barred by the same phenomenological borders that it is identified as, its seeming causal powers limited via the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment by the same
phenomenological borders within which and as which it is identified. That is, as a Phenomenal Self in the Phenomenal World, I can by an act of will, or at least with some effort, make the chair I am sitting on look pretty or ugly, feel comfortable or uncomfortable, and so on. Prettiness and ugliness, comfortableness and uncomfortableness, I can be brought to believe are not fixed properties of the physical thing existing independently of me, the subject, but (somewhat) flexible interpretations to which I, identified as the Phenomenal Self sitting right now in the perceived chair (also a phenomenal conglomerate of physical and psychological perceptibles) contribute to my experience of the chair. Whereas I cannot, by a mere act of will, make the chair appear a different color. Why is it that I cannot do this, if the phenomenal color I am experiencing is itself an interpretation created by (some part of) me? Is it because phenomenal color exists, necessarily, independently of the mind? No. The reason why I cannot, by a mere act of will, make the chair appear a different color, is that although as a philosopher I can come to know the sense in which the phenomenal color I am experiencing is itself an interpretation created by (some part of) me, identified as a Phenomenal Self I cannot be brought to believe in any but a purely intellectual and detached sense that this phenomenal color that I am now seeing exists, necessarily, only in virtue of being so perceived by me, the subject.

In other words, it is because some of the interpretations in my Phenomenal World are what we might call flexible interpretations, while others are what we might call inflexible interpretations, that the subject identified as a Phenomenal Self can interact with all the rest of itself (e.g., the Phenomenal World) to the degree that it can. The experience of the Noumenal Subject as a Phenomenal Self, in other words, is necessarily conscripted under the Transcendental Illusion—it is, as Kant aptly noted, one of the necessary conditions for the having of experience (further analyzed from a phenomenological point of view throughout the rest of this chapter). Prettiness, ugliness, comfortableness, uncomfortableness, and so on, are “flexible interpretations,” whereas the experience of color, solidity, etc., are “inflexible interpretations,” etc., the Phenomenal Self exists precisely at the right and necessary balance for proper functionality and the having of experience as we know it. (More precisely, in the chair example, there is the phenomenal occurrence of seeming will with regard to, say, comfortableness, followed by the phenomenal occurrence of seeming comfortableness, and so on—the events can always be re-described consistently with Hume’s insights regarding the nature of experience and
even more precisely from a phenomenological point of view by what in §10. 5 I call quantum phenomenology. The point is that, as a matter of phenomenological fact, there just never is the phenomenal occurrence of seeming will to, say, flip my Phenomenal World upside down followed by the phenomenal occurrence of my Phenomenal World suddenly flipping itself upside down. That is, just as I have some control over my television set—the contrast, color, etc. would correspond, by analogy, to what I am calling “flexible interpretations”—I have no control over what is going on in the T.V. show I am watching. What is happening in the show would correspond, by analogy, to what I am calling “inflexible interpretations.” It is at the (meta-conceptual) level of the interpretations of these interpretations that we tend to draw a common assumption, the logic of which I have already alluded to with the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment explored in Chapter 2 and which, more broadly, can as we saw be stated as follows:

What I seem to control by direct acts of will is automatically interpreted (by me) as me; what I cannot thus control is automatically interpreted (by me) as not-me.

That is, to a large extent the conceptual boundaries between Self and Other are drawn on the phenomenologically-based assumption, roughly, that what apparently I can control directly in my experience is me, and what apparently I cannot directly in my experience is not me. And as we have seen in our discussion of the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, this assumption, at face value, is obviously false; I cannot control directly some of my physical body—some of my organs, the flow of my blood, my digestion—and some of my psychology—say, for instance, bouts of passion or of anxiety—and yet I can and do believe that these are all physical and psychological elements in which I consist.

But it is along the FEC Border that a subtle yet far-reaching effect occurs regarding my phenomenal sense of who I am, in so far as I not only identify with but also am identified as this Phenomenal Self within this Phenomenal World. That is, I tend to forget that the fingers I see and feel down there typing away at the keyboard are themselves representational (phenomenal) constructions, as is the seen and felt keyboard, the seen and felt desk, the seen and felt computer, the seen and felt wall in my present Phenomenal World, and so on: but the motion of my fingers are instantly (and without any conscious effort on my part) identified as me, while the motion of the keys are not. Yet both the fingers and the keys I see and feel are
representational (phenomenal) constructions being interpreted by whatever it is (e.g., through the brain) that is constructing the scene that I am right now seeing and experiencing, replete with a Phenomenal Self that I am (again, without any conscious effort on my part) identified as.

Among my present phenomena the phenomenal fingers are flexible interpretations, whereas the phenomenal keyboard is not. This shows the sense in which the Phenomenal Self—that part of me that I the subject am identified as—is itself a limited part of me that thus identified I am allowed immediate and flexible access to (which I can, apparently, control directly). The rest of “me” consists in inflexible interpretations.

The Phenomenal Self, then, is that “open-to-the-immediate awareness” part of me that I, the Noumenal Subject identified as that Self, interpret based on the flexible/inflexible distinction itself conscripted under and a derivative of the fourfold identification/identification relation within the Phenomenal World (the ε/δ manifold) that is the sum and substance of my phenomenology. But I, the Noumenal Subject identified as a Phenomenal Self, exist within a perceptual (phenomenal) space that is itself the product of a “not-open-to-the(Phenomenal Self’s)-awareness” beyond appearance that “structures the phenomena” (through the brain, or perhaps it is the brain). In other words, presently I am identified as a Phenomenal Self individuated by various border controls from other parts of myself; I seem to be part cause (within my locus of control) and seem to be part effect (within the larger creative sphere of the unfolding situations in which I constitute, interpret, and re-interpret myself).

If we are thus willing and able to consider, now as part of this, our Open View, the Noumenal Subject that through identification/dissociation transforms itself into a Phenomenal World into which it projects itself through identification as a particular Phenomenal Self, we can understand how the Phenomenal Self isn’t even just a psychological bundle personified from the first person point of view, etc., nor does it merely have a View in which the phenomenologically identified subject’s cognitions are structured—it also to a certain extent and in varying degrees is that View (this too is the is of identification, not identity). This means, as we already saw in the previous section, that I, the Noumenal Subject identified as a Phenomenal Self am not merely phenomenologically locked into a personality: I’m also phenomenologically locked into a philosophy (whether of the “folk” or “professional” variety). What we need, then, is a philosophy for unlocking the philosophy in which I, the subject identified as a Phenomenal Self in a Phenomenal World, am locked. Metaphysical
Subjectivism is that philosophy.

§ 10.4 SINN BEYOND BORDERS

Using the distinction between the Phenomenal Self and the Noumenal Subject we can disambiguate the following confusion. Part of the problem in trying to imagine, for instance, how you and I could be the same person, is that we are apt to read this view as implying, among other things, that a particular Phenomenal Self, constituted, in part, in the experience of being a blond-haired philosopher presently writing this book, of having memories of growing up as a boy in Zagreb, etc., must be conceived of as being identical to a completely different Phenomenal Self constituted in part, for instance, in the experience you are now having of reading a book the writing of which you have no recollection, etc. But, clearly, this Phenomenal Self (“DK”) cannot be identical to that Phenomenal Self, just as the experience of $x$ (writing) cannot be identical to the experience of $y$ (reading). If personal identity cannot extend beyond our Phenomenal Selves, it is impossible, in so far as the only possible extension of names such as “Daniel Kolak” is to Phenomenal Selves, for me to be the same person as you. But we have seen time and again how it is indeed possible that personal identity is not necessarily bound by the borders of one Phenomenal Self but, rather, is better construed as the non-border bound identity, that is, from a purely phenomenological point of view metaphysically transcendental, i.e., nonlocal, identity, of that which experiences the phenomenologically, psychologically and physiologically bordered identities and is itself identified as them—the Noumenal Subject.

I realize that the distinction between the phenomenologically border-bound identity of this Phenomenal Self, ordinarily referred to as “DK,” and the metaphysically transcendental, i.e., “non-border bound” or nonlocal, identity of the Noumenal Subject, like the distinction we drew earlier between the physical-border-bound identity of this human being, ordinarily referred to as “Daniel Kolak,” and the non-physical-border bound identity of myself, may strike some readers as unintuitive. For it may seem that the sentence “I am writing this sentence,” and the sentence, “this Phenomenal Self is writing this sentence,” simply and straightforwardly express the very same proposition, and that therefore the extension of “I,” as expressed and uttered in my mouth, is identical to the extension of “this Phenomenal Self,” likewise expressed via DK. But I do not think this is the best way to view the situation, for the following reasons, all of which will be fleshed
out in detail throughout the rest of this chapter.

First, I believe that if I lose many of my familiar personal characteristics, as in the Omni Dissolve, I cease to be this particular Phenomenal Self, this particular body, and so on, but I do not believe that thereby necessarily I cease to be me—I do not, thereby, necessarily cease to exist. To some, this will seem to be equivalent to the sort of view Kripke argued against; according to Kripke, “Kolak” is a rigid designator, and the properties by which we recognize or single out Kolak need not be essential to him. If one agrees with Kripke, there is less resistance to the idea that, in my mouth, “this Self, DK” and “I” have the same extension. But this truth is not a priori—as has already been shown with examples of severe amnesia and the various Psychological Dissolves—although it may be a necessary truth nonetheless; I have argued, however, that it is not. (I believe, in a nutshell, that one cannot realistically erect rigid boundaries upon what in reality is not rigid—one cannot fix what is by its very nature, essentially uncemented. To speak one of my favorite philosophical colloquialisms: “You cannot freeze a flowing river by pointing to it and making a noise.”)

Second, and more importantly, I do not believe that “I am the author of this sentence,” and, for instance, “this Phenomenal Self is the author of this sentence,” express the very same proposition; the extension of “I” in my mouth, is not equivalent to the extension of “my Phenomenal Self” (in one mathematical manner of speaking, we could say that it extends beyond the extension). On the other hand, I do believe that I am the author of this book. Now, since by my “Phenomenal Self” I mean the apparent entity, both public and private, that you can come to know and that I can come to know via physiological and/or psychological perceptibles (“external” appearances for you [the way I look, behave, etc.], “internal” appearances for me [the way I appear to myself, which includes the phenomenal body and phenomenal mind that through the first-person perspective of my present exclusively conjoined locus of motion and intentionality apparent I am privy to)—in short, the phenomenal body and phenomenal mind—the Phenomenal Self is what, ordinarily, we would refer to as “Daniel Kolak.”

Right now, for instance, as I am writing, I can observe the words coming up on the screen, the fingers typing, and I can hear the auditory images, softly, in my mind, which corresponds, semantically, to the words being written. These phenomena emerge forth into the Phenomenal World from somewhere beyond the borders of the Phenomenal Self, beyond (or behind) the appearances (from beyond the Phenomenal World). Thus although from my limited and, necessarily, phenomenologically bound present perspective
identified as this Phenomenal Self it seems to me that the extension of “I” is limited to the Phenomenal Self as much as the Phenomenal Self seems to be in control of these words that are pouring forth, a more careful phenomenological analysis reveals that the Phenomenal Self is as much being composed as are these words. This was Hume’s revelation, I believe. It is this sort of insight too that I believe Wittgenstein meant to express when he said, “Thinking, by contrast with willing, is something which happens to one, not something one does.”33 (Again, I might be tempted to write, “I am as much being composed as are these words,” but that is apt to be confusing, and I believe this too was part of the confusion Hume lamented about in his appendix to his Personal Identity section [which we discuss in §10.6]. It is the Phenomenal Self (or this persona personified from a first-person point of view, the phenomenal mind of this Phenomenal Self) who is merely an effect, not the “philosophical I”—the Noumenal Subject—and it is in part due to the ambiguities of our language that such apparent extensional ambiguity is produced.

By as it were extending the extension of “person” from the Phenomenal Self to the Noumenal Subject—which in another universe of discourse is studied under the Lonergenian “return of the subject to the subject”—although it goes both against (phenomenologically unexamined) appearances and the intuition of understanding, is actually and remarkably closer to the ordinary meaning of what a person is, since by the ordinary meaning we intend to refer not to a chimera but to an agent who as such is both self-conscious and creative. Unlike Closed or Empty Individualism, Open Individualism thus not only preservers the intent of our original extensions but with our return of the subject to the subject (instead of moving beyond the subject into various objectifications, be they reductionistic, e.g. mechanistic, or holistic, e.g. theological) augments them by putting active self-consciousness at the center, and the departure from common sense (like the departure from the Ptolemaic universe) only makes our usage more consistent with what we have come to know about ourselves since the pioneering work of Hume and Kant.

It is fairly easy, through a phenomenological analysis of one’s actual experience as it unfolds, to conceive how and why among the psychological individuations and identifications in which the Phenomenal Self consists there is the misperception of the Phenomenal Self as full (instead of, at most, partial) causal agent. One observes that much of the time there is, in fact, co-variation between the intuition of intent and the intuition of action. This co-variation is mistakenly taken, as it so often is in other areas of
inquiry, for causality.

For instance, I get up from my desk. Why? Ordinarily we would say it is because I wanted to, that is, ordinarily it seems that the intuition of intent to get up preceded the intuition of the perception of getting up. This is in fact false—not because I didn’t want to get up but, rather, because the intuition of the intention did not in fact precede the intuition of the action. The intuition of the intention to get up was contiguous with either the perception of getting up or with the arrival, beforehand, of some (usually non-verbal) auditory image, such as, “I am hungry.” (Or, if I now “will” myself to get up, without yet getting up, and then a moment later I get up, close attention to experience reveals that the “intuition of will” occurred in the Phenomenal World, then there occurred the intuition of motion, and so on.)

The intuition of intention is but part of a rationalization, within the psychological individuations in which the Phenomenal Self that I am identified as consists, that the intuition of action of getting up was caused by the psychological individuations in which the Phenomenal Self consists: where as the perception of the action was merely contiguous with the other psychological individuations in which the Phenomenal Self consists. So if “I wanted to get up, and then did,” expresses a truth, there must be more to me than what is available to me via appearances, since both the intuition of action and the intuition of intention—like the rest of the psychological individuations in which the Phenomenal Self consists—are psychological effects of which the Phenomenal Self is not the cause (since it, too, consists in exactly those and other such exclusively conjoined psychological bundles) but the effect.

This phenomenon—the misperception of the intuition of psychological co-variation as the intuition of psychological causality—is more easily seen when the psychological individuations in which the Phenomenal Self consists are not wanted, i.e., when contiguous with the personified psychological bundle in which the phenomenal mind of the Phenomenal Self consists there is the intuition of non-intending towards those individuations. There are many obvious examples from our normal psychologies: anger, jealousy, and a slew of negative emotions (toward which, from the perspective of the exclusively conjoined psychological complex in which the Phenomenal Self consists, there is no intuition of psychological intending and some intuition of psychological non-intending). It is during these and other such conscious states very apparent that the Phenomenal Self is a psychological effect, not a psychological cause. At such moments, identified as the Phenomenal Self one might say
to oneself, “If I am the causal agent of my (present, intuition of) psychological states, then let me construct, or bring about, for myself, right now, different psychological states.” Typically, one cannot do this. When one points this out to oneself there comes the response, typically, that “Well, right now I’m not in control but, at other times, I am.” But what is the crucial difference, one wonders, between now and those other times? The difference is that now (when, ordinarily, we might say, “the person is ‘upset’”) the conscious psychological states do not co-vary with the intuition of intentions contiguous with those very psychological states in which that Phenomenal Self consists. Where as those other times (when, ordinarily, we might say, “the person is ‘in control,’” or, “is himself,”) the psychological states do co-vary with the intuition of intentions contiguous with those psychological states in which that Phenomenal Self consists. If the Phenomenal Self were the cause of the psychological states in which it consists, rather than merely contiguous and covariant with them, there would always be a perceived consistency between the intuition of intent and psychological states. We—identified as Phenomenal Selves—would, in that case, never be victims of our psychological states. We would as overtly compose our psychological states as the psychological states of characters in novels are composed when the author is in the act of writing them. But Phenomenal Selves are not their own authors. They are, at best, our created characters whose psychological states often co-vary with our intuitions of psychological intentions such that these states seem, from the first-person perspective from which they are experienced as such, to be creating themselves. The relationship between the Phenomenal Self and the subject can thus be conceived as in some ways analogous to the relationship between an imaginary character and the author of that character; the major difference, of course—and this is where the author/character analogy breaks down in an important way—is that the imaginary life of imaginary characters are not lived by the actual lives of their authors, where as the imaginary lives of the Phenomenal Self are lived, in actuality, by the Noumenal Subject.

In other words, we can conceive of the Phenomenal Self as being like an imaginary character, but it is a real imaginary character. If this is correct, then a slew of abnormal psychologies, such as severe depression and other mood disorders, are painfully vivid illustrations of the phenomenological observation that the Phenomenal Self is not a causal agent (though, under ordinary circumstances, it nevertheless seems to be). In the Dream Analog we saw how the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border between
exclusively conjoined psychological complexes as they occur in dream states (when I am dreaming, more or less non-veridically, with my physical eyes closed) makes possible nightmares in which I (identified as the Phenomenal Self within the dream) am forced to experience what apparently I do not wish to experience. So, too, we can see how the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border between exclusively conjoined psychological bundles as they occur in waking life (when I am “dreaming,” more or less veridically, with my eyes open) makes possible waking nightmares in which I (identified as the Phenomenal Self within the Phenomenal World we ordinarily call, “our experience of the external world,”) experience what (apparently) I do not wish to experience.

Given these sorts of considerations, then, we can conceive the extension of person to transcend the “Phenomenal Self,” yet in a way that preserves what ordinarily we should wish to talk about when we talk about a person. Were I to use “Kolak” to refer to myself as the person who I am (rather than to use this name to refer to the Phenomenal Self, the phenomenal mind-body, or some part of the fluctuating body-character-memory complex, that I am identified as) is to identify certain characteristics as being that which my personal identity consists in (i.e., is border-bound by); but, as we have seen, my personal identity does not consist in these characteristics. I, too, when I am in an ordinary “frame of mind” (identified as this Phenomenal Self), identify with such apparent characteristics, somewhat in the way an actor identifies with a role. (One important difference is that the subject, I the person who is [identified as] Kolak, am both actor and author of this Phenomenal Self). In this sense, then, it is as if the Phenomenal Self is a one way mirror: I, the subject—consciousness—can see out through my mask, the Phenomenal Self, but identified as the Phenomenal Self I—the subject-in-itself, consciousness—cannot see back in.

Thus, we could say: “I see my Phenomenal Self but my Phenomenal Self does not see me.” In looking out into the Phenomenal World (a phenomenal “model” of the physical world) through my Phenomenal Self, I, who here and now call myself, “Kolak,” see myself as this particular Phenomenal Self, bound by these borders, even though my Phenomenal Self cannot see in through itself at what lies behind the mirrored mask. That is the sense in which the subject is phenomenologically bound to looking at itself through its Phenomenal Self, a mask.

Thus, while “I am Kolak” is true and “Kolak is this Phenomenal Self” is true, a better way to put this, in our terms, would be to say that the borders of my Phenomenal Self do not bind me. That is to say, I, a person, have an
identity that is not delineated, or bound, by the borders of a particular phenomenal body-mind, nor by any of the underlying physiological and or psychological fluctuating individuations, or elements, for the reasons we have seen such as in the various Physiological and Psychological Dissolves. That is the sense in which the psychological (qualitative) identity of my Phenomenal Self and my personal (numerical) identity are not co-extensive; the former is a subset of the latter.

To put it slightly differently: though I, a person, am a particular Phenomenal Self (indeed, am on my view many such Phenomenal Selves), the psychological (qualitative) identity of this Phenomenal Self (pointing to myself) and the psychological (qualitative) identity of that Phenomenal Self (pointing to you) are not co-extensive—even though you and I are one and the same, numerically identical person. This is apparent in that the phenomenological elements in which the Phenomenal Self consists are in a state of flux (as we shall see in much more detail in the next section) and so, in that sense, it is not possible for the Phenomenal Self to be identical even to itself over any significant length of time—where as it is possible that I am numerically identical to myself over time. (In other words, while I am this Phenomenal Self, this Phenomenal Self is not the whole of me—that is roughly the point of the one-way mirror metaphor.) Conceiving how my Phenomenal Self and my personal identity are not co-extensive can help us to see why, as I have been suggesting, neither Closed nor Empty Individualism express the truth about personal identity.

Thus, we can write,

\[(1) \ I = \text{Phenomenal Self}_1 \ \& \ \text{You} = \text{Phenomenal Self}_2.\]

If Open Individualism is true, then it is true that

\[(2) \ I = \text{You},\]

which does not imply that

\[(3) \ \text{Phenomenal Self}_1 = \text{Phenomenal Self}_2.\]

The same relationship holds in the narrower sense of persona (e.g., §6.2). We could say that your persona belongs to a person, you, but the person, you, does not belong to the persona. The person, the subject, exists unowned. The relation between person and persona, then, like the relation between what we are calling the Phenomenal Self and the subject, is, like psychological identification, a non-transitive relation. And it is not impossible to conceive, through the phenomenological analysis of our
experience, how it is indeed possible that there is more to us then meet’s the mind’s I—more to us than what the subject (consciousness) identified as a Phenomenal Self, can see.

Consider again my 7-Eleven dream, our Dream Analog III above (the Paradox of the Dreaming Thinker). Identified as that particular (Phenomenal) Self, a limited (bordered) Phenomenal World (since, for instance, within the occurrent psychology drawn in those borders there is not present the immediate realization that “in reality” I am lying in bed, having a dream, and so on) experiencing the (phenomenal) events, I had a number of realizations among which, we pointed out, Realization 4—that I was dreaming—altered my awareness substantially. How? The “philosophical analysis” altered the intuition of understanding and non-understanding within the occurrent psychology present within the borders of the Self while the events of the dream were being experienced (from the inside, from the first-person point of view of the character in search of coffee. That is, the realization was followed by an alteration in the occurrent psychology present within the Phenomenal Self. Whereas, Realization 2—“Rt. 1 is on the way to the ski resort”—was not (except by the removal of the intuition of non-understanding). Both changes followed the having of intuitions. We can thus further distinguish intellectual intuitions (Wittgensteinian “sayings”) from phenomenological insights (Wittgensteinian “showings”) as follows: the latter (at least apparently) have the power to alter substantially the character of the Phenomenal World that includes the experiences had through the Phenomenal Self. The former do not. We could thus say that I, identified as the Phenomenal Self through whose experiential and conceptual borders the Noumenal Subject apparently (mis)identifies itself (within the totality of the Phenomenal World) across various exclusively conjoined apparent psychological individuations as “Self,” while (falsely) identifying the rest of the Phenomenal World as “Other,” am a phenomenologically embodied projection of the Noumenal Subject into the Phenomenal World.

That is, I, identified as a Phenomenal Self, the exclusively conjoined locus of motion and intentionality, generated with limited access of awareness within a Phenomenal World itself created and generated (and made possible by) the Noumenal Subject in which both the experiences and the experiencer consist, was myself an integral element in the self-deceiving mechanism through which the experiences were being created. Both I, the conscious extent of the inwardly illuminated (apparent) experiencer of the experiences, and the experiences themselves, were being
generated by the Noumenal Subject (against what created the Phenomenal Self and bound it to the dream).

But while the Phenomenal Self and the Noumenal Subject both are one and the same being through which “intuitions” are constituted as such, the intuitions “thrown upwardly” by the subject-in-itself through (toward) the Phenomenal Self are merely intellectual; the intuitions “thrown downwardly” (inwardly, i.e., toward the subject) by the Noumenal Subject, are phenomenological. (This would perhaps be akin to the sense in which both me and my shadow are one and the same "mover;" the analogy would be more apt if I were somehow able to hypnotize myself into being identified as my shadow.35) The reason is that the Phenomenal Self is not itself the cause of any of the elements of the Phenomenal World within which experience occurs; it is only the effect, a phenomenal locus of motion within the Phenomenal World: among these phenomena are what Hume called the perceptions, such as anger, heat and cold, fear, and so on. Where as the cause of the Phenomenal World is the Noumenal Subject, and so any insights generated in that mode will affect not only the phenomenological character of experience, but, also, the actual occurrent psychology of the Phenomenal Self, up to and including how psychological identification and dissociation, up to and including the intuition of understanding and non-understanding, are distributed within that (occurrent) psychology. The “dreamer”—the Noumenal Subject—is in direct contact with me and with every aspect of the dream, having projected itself, through identification as this limited part of the Phenomenal World—the Phenomenal Self that in the dream appears as the “me”—and so that is the important sense in which the Phenomenal Self is not the dreamer but the dreamed, through which the person—the dreamer, the Noumenal Subject—knowingly experiences and creates himself, unknowingly, as such.

I might also at this point add that Realization3 never actually happened in my dream. That is, this realization was never really generated in my dream but in reconstructing my dream for the purpose of illustrating all these rather complicated distinctions in as simple manner as possible I realize that it could have been generated and so a part of me is granting me this insight, intellectually, without granting me the deeper, phenomenological, insight. Intellectual intuition can, it seems, be intuited into the psychology of the Phenomenal Self; that is, intellectual insights can be generated (contiguously) within the cognitive structure of the body-mind image from whose first person perspective of the thus identified subject-in-itself the
PHENOMENOLOGICAL BORDERS

dream unfolds, where as phenomenological insights cannot: experiential insights must be granted to the Phenomenal Self by the Noumenal Subject, granted to “me” by that transcendent but immanent part of me that is not apparent within the borders of the awareness of the Phenomenal Self but is pulling the causal strings—the Noumenal Subject.

In the case of the 7-Eleven dream, the Noumenal Subject is the “Dreamer” running the dream and then projecting itself into it, binding itself into one its own deceivable deceptions. In the case of my present experience, the Noumenal Subject is the me behind the scenes (perhaps just the brain) that runs the present Phenomenal World (which includes “me,” the present Phenomenal Self). If I, the Phenomenal Self, want to gain deep phenomenological insights into my true nature, it will not be through the (identified) subject-in-itself qua Phenomenal Self fighting with the (unidentified) Noumenal Subject (I will always lose) but by granted them, as it were, to myself, somehow. (This “fighting” is a misnomer, in that as we explained above the Phenomenal Self does not, in reality, have the requisite sort of causal powers; rather, what is going on in such cases is what above we called a distortion of the Phenomenal World by the presence within the Phenomenal World of more than can be sustained by mere appearance, the received conceptual framework, or both. Thus parallels with the philosophy of Augustine, especially those parts that had most influence on Descartes and, especially, Kant, in terms of the relationship between “man” [i.e., the Phenomenal Self] and “God” [i.e., the Noumenal Subject], though if this is not the God of Abraham and of Averroës, I don’t know who is.).

Or consider, in a somewhat lighter vein, once more, the acting analog. You watch “Hamlet” with a friend who knows little about actors and asks, “Who is Hamlet?” You answer: “Laurence Olivier is Hamlet.” Then, you watch Richard III. He asks, “Who is Richard III?” You answer: “Laurence Olivier is Richard III.” Thus,

(A) Laurence Olivier = Hamlet
(B) Laurence Olivier = Richard III
but (C) Hamlet ≠ Richard III.

Similarly,

(D) Olivier = Hamlet
but (E) Hamlet ≠ Olivier!

Thus the relation between the Noumenal Subject and the Phenomenal
Self is thus in some ways like the relationship between the actor and the characters played by the actor: it is not reflexive. That is, the relationship between the subject and the Phenomenal Self that under ordinary circumstances, we might call “Daniel Kolak,” can be conceived as being like the relationship between Olivier and the characters he plays (provided, once again, that this limited and grossly oversimplified analogy is not pushed too far). In this way, I would say,

(i) I = this Phenomenal Self

is true and, also

(ii) this Phenomenal Self \(\neq\) I,

is true, which may appear logically strange unless we remember that “I” and “Phenomenal Self,” even though I am (identified as) this Phenomenal Self, are not co-extensive.

The fact that we use the name, “Daniel Kolak” ambiguously, to refer either to the person or to some particular predicate is a major source of confusion. It has led some to posit either that the various things to which “I” and “Daniel Kolak” refer have vague borders or that personal identity is itself a vague concept—that is, that my identity is vague, a view one version of which is developed in a new and fruitful way by Brian Garrett. 36

Our analysis shows how we can have further reasons for avoiding making such moves by carefully distinguishing between psychological (qualitative) identification as a Phenomenal Self and the (numerical) personal identity of the subject.

For instance, in Open Individualism I am Daniel Kolak and I am Derek Parfit; Derek Parfit is me and thus Derek Parfit and I are the same person; but—at the same time—the Parfit (Phenomenal) Self and the Kolak (Phenomenal) Self are not identical, any more than any two qualitatively different experiences are identical. Yet he, the person (the subject identified as that Phenomenal Self) “over there,” and I, the person (the subject identified as this Phenomenal Self) “over here,” are numerically one and the same consciousness, the same I, the same person. Whereas this Phenomenal Self is not identical to that Phenomenal Self, just as the exclusively conjoined physiological-psychological individuations in which DK’s present experience consists is not identical to any other physiological-psychological individuations in which your present experience consists—and this is true even if you are Kolak on June 30, 2001; yet DK and you are, in Open Individualism, one and the same person, because there are no
PHENOMENOLOGICAL BORDERS

(metaphysically) significant borders between us.

In other words, part of the initial strangeness of Open Individualism is due to the ambiguous extension of a particular name and also of the term “person.” But we can distinguish “person”—the being who one is—from “Phenomenal Self”—the particular phenomenal mind-body, including the persona, or personality, that the subject (consciousness) wears like a mask. Often this distinction is simply glossed over, as we saw in the case of multiple personality disorder (Chapter 6); for instance, we speak of many persons when what we should be speaking of is, in that case, many Phenomenal Selves.

Thus if we use proper names, like “Daniel Kolak” and “Derek Parfit,” properly to refer not to particular personas or personalities or Selves—Phenomenal Selves—but to the person, then we can conceive how it is possible that I, a person, can be more than one Phenomenal Self: Kolak and Parfit can be the same person in the same way that an actor can be more than one character; the person exists through a Phenomenal Self the way an actor exists through a mask; some of us in ordinary cases do this more easily than others, some of us even (apparently) against our will, as in cases of multiple personality disorder. In saying this what we cannot be saying is that a particular Phenomenal Self can change Phenomenal Selves, any more than a particular persona can change personas. Rather, what we are saying is that we can conceive how it is possible that the subject-in-itself, the consciousness behind the mask, the simultaneously immanent and transcendental element in the personal identity equation (itself neither transitive nor reflexive) is at present doomed to exist, in actuality, as we now do: the higher, bound by the lower.

§ 10.5 QUANTUM PHENOMENOLOGY, QUANTUM CONSCIOUSNESS, AND PHANTOM IDENTITY

David Hume claimed famously that there is no self to be found anywhere in experience. He was wrong. The Phenomenal Self is a self and it is found in experience.

What we could thus say to Hume is that he could have found one aspect of what he was looking for by holding up his hand (as G.E. Moore in a somewhat different context would one day unwittingly do) in front of his eyes and wiggling his fingers. The “simple mirror” (i.e., a phenomenal mirror-representation) by which Hume shaved afforded him an excellent opportunity to view what he claimed he could not find in his experience.
Hume only would have had to properly integrate into his conceptual reference frame the philosophical sense in which human beings are blind—not merely that the human brain lives in darkness but that from a philosophical point of view the whole universe is dark, in the sense that physical light is not “visually bright,” that “visual brightness” as such exists only within the phenomenal/representational “mental” realm—to stumble upon his blindingly apparent Phenomenal Self. Unless Hume’s brain was different from other brains, such that his eyes were open windows through which physical sunlight entered the calcarine fissure, etc. (the place where supposedly the “seeing of sunlight” occurs but in which there is no actual sunlight whatsoever) Hume could not ever, not even for a moment, escape from the presence of what supposedly he could not find and according to him was not there. Indeed, the Phenomenal Self makes what we call “seeing”—conscious seeing—possible (i.e., phenomenal representation from a particular first-person point of view, what in Chapter 2 we defined in terms of the individuation and identification of objects from the first person point of view in relation to the subject-in-itself). The philosophicalunnecessity (but not irrelevance—we are not here denying the possible relevance of underlying physical mechanisms to causal theories of perception) of the eye with regard to the existence of visual phenomena is made clear by dreams as well as a number of cognitive science experiments about perception.

Now, unlike mere phenomenal or psychological bundles and complexes (i.e., object-representations)—e.g., pebbles, clouds, trees, rivers, etc. (which are experienced from the third-person point of view and which I do not identify with) and human bodies such as strangers, members of my family, my friends, even of my reflection in the mirror, etc. (which are experienced from the third-person point of view but which in varying degrees I do identify with)—the Phenomenal Self is a psycho-phenomenological matrix that is experienced from the first-person point of view, what I the subject am identified as (i.e., my phenomenal body-mind, my “mind-body image”). Moreover, rather than merely being generated into an identification phenomenology (the Phenomenal World, i.e., the εδ manifold) among other such object-representations, because the Phenomenal Self is a psycho-phenomenological matrix (in the mathematical/topological sense) it in part helps generate recurring self-similar (possibly even qualitatively identical) psychological complexes into the phenomenological flux, making thereby possible through its psycho-dynamic process of phenomenological reconstruction the persistence of self-similar psychological complexes over
PHENOMENOLOGICAL BORDERS

In my occurrent psychology I am, as a matter of phenomenological fact, exclusively conjoined to this (phenomenal presentation of a) hand (part of my phenomenal body) and to this (phenomenal presentation of a) thought, (part of my phenomenal mind) etc., (via identification as that p drawn along the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment Border, etc.) rather than to that (phenomenal presentation of a) cloud, that (phenomenal presentation of a) hand (yours), and so on; and just as consciousness—the I, the subject-in-itself—cannot reidentify its objects (phenomenological bundles) before it at will by, say, turning a chair into a lion, individual consciousness cannot reidentify itself as a different personality at will. Thus while not a perceiver proper, neither is the Phenomenal Self merely a bundle of perceptions: it is a psycho-phenomenological matrix exclusively conjoined (bordered unity-at-a-time) which the perceiver—the subject-in-itself, I—identifies with and in varying degrees is identified as. (Thus as we saw in the previous sections the problem of agency does not prohibit me from referring to myself as an “exclusively conjoined locus of motion and intentionality” on grounds that I can hear myself think, for instance, “I will now move,” and then see my body image move. The heard [phenomenal] intention is [in my Phenomenal World] identified with what I call “me” and is [in part] what I am identified as, the phenomenal body-mind, the “body-mind image.”)

However, even if the Phenomenal Self were a substance (or a self-subsistent continuant), or if we were to speak of it as having an identity, as psychologists are wont to do, it would at most be the sort of identity that objects have, i.e., psychological objects that can be construed as psychologically enduring (though not necessarily continuously persisting in phenomenological time) in the same sense as habits, predispositions, (Freudian) psychological complexes, etc., which are not constitutive of personal identity but, rather, of (primary) psychological identification. Thus although Hume was wrong both with regard to there being nothing in experience that could be called a “self” and there being no (metaphysically) significant persistence of such psychological identifications as are involved in Phenomenal Selves (although Phenomenal Selves do not persist throughout entire “human lifetimes,” they nevertheless as psycho-
Chapter 10

Phenomenological matrices give rise to repeating patterns of qualitatively similar [and evolving as well as deteriorating] psychological structures over time that the subject is identified as), he was right to point out to the degree that he did that such psychological and phenomenological objects in experience are not constitutive of personal identity. (It should however be noted that even if they were, this would not be a problem for us in so far as the challenge then would be merely to show how it is possible that a person can be more than one of them, which we already have done in Chapter 6, where we showed how it is possible for one and the same numerically identical person to be more than one, psychologically non-identical, Phenomenal Self, both over time and at a time.)

Hume was also wrong about there being among the perceptions no perceiver. Consciousness—I, the subject-in-itself—is the perceiver, the “mind’s I” that acts like a “phenomenological eye.” However, because the subject is both the perceiver and the perceived, such that, for reasons already given, the subject-in-itself is not and cannot be phenomenologically identified as the whole of what it is (the εδ manifold); “perception” would in that case be impossible for there would be no phenomenological “distance” between the “perceiver” (primary identification of the subject) and the perceived (quartic identification of the subject). This means that what there is of the subject in experience from a purely phenomenological point of view identified as such is not the (transcendentally identical) subject in toto but, rather, the residual (from the act of identification/[mis]identification, numinous, unidentified) subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity that constitutes consciousness as we know it, up to and including the I am I, the intuition of personal identity, what ordinarily we simply and naively (pre-theoretically) call “self-consciousness.” Having de-emphasized the standard interpretation of the “self” component of that locution—“self-consciousness”—we know what we mean, clearly not the Phenomenal Self being conscious of itself but, rather, I, the subject-in-itself—consciousness—having the intuition of my own personal identity. And yet because this aspect of our analysis provides more positive (in both senses of the word) content and verification to what can up to that point be expressed in primarily negative terms (our method via negativa), it behooves us to ask to what degree our analysis of the subject-in-itself—I, consciousness—would appease Hume, or a neo-Humean type skeptic. For even if he agreed with us regarding all our above points, a thoroughly neo-Humean empiricist or phenomenologist might still offer the rejoinder that our personal discovery of the subject-in-itself is, literally, from a purely
phenomenological or strictly empirical point of view, too short-lived to be worthy of personal celebration. After all, is not consciousness, the subject-in-itself, as revealed to itself in the intuition of personal identity—\textit{I am I}—from an empirical or purely phenomenological point of view, vulnerable ultimately to the same temporal constraints—durational limitation—as the phenomenological elements in which the Phenomenal Self consists?

In other words, suppose our neo-Humean skeptic grants that the subject-in-itself, consciousness, is aware not just of the Phenomenal World and Phenomenal Self but also, as our philosophical analysis has shown, of itself as \textit{being} that (the \textit{is} of [transcendental] identity, not \textit{identification}) of which it is thereby aware, namely, the Phenomenal World and Phenomenal Self, allowing furthermore (through identification \textit{as} that Phenomenal Self) the subject’s intuition of its own existence and identity in space and time (the “phenomenological eye” that accounts for the fact of phenomenological perspectivality). What then would our skeptic say about this intuition of its own existence and identity in space and time that the subject is aware of—the intuition of personal identity, simultaneously denoted and expressed, i.e., communicated, by “\textit{I am I}?” For here then is the rejoinder of our up to that point agreeable neo-Humean skeptic: if I grant you the \textit{I} of personal identity, what reasons have I for thinking that the intuition of personal identity—the \textit{I am I}—is in fact veridical?

The subject-in-itself, the \textit{I} of personal identity, and the intuition of personal identity, the \textit{I am I}, clearly and distinctly are there; we can (and should) all agree on that. And so if we now ask, as the good David did: on what impression can our concept of personal identity possibly be based? Our answer is: on that actual one, the \textit{I}. That, we could all well agree, is the \textit{why} of why I believe that I-\textit{now} am one and the same numerically identical consciousness, the \textit{same I}, as I-\textit{now}, or why it seems to me from a phenomenological point of view that I-\textit{now} am numerically identical to the consciousness, the \textit{I}, of any other time besides \textit{this} present moment in which \textit{this} Phenomenal World, \textit{this} Phenomenal Self, \textit{this} I, exist. Well, but how is \textit{this} consciousness, \textit{this} subject-in-itself, \textit{this} I, one and the same numerically identical \textit{I} as at any other time, regardless of how \textit{qualitatively} similar from a phenomenological point of view, in so far as \textit{this} state of consciousness had from a purely phenomenological point of view a different beginning in time than \textit{that} state of consciousness? How can \textit{this} occurrence of consciousness, this \textit{I}, be one and the same numerically identical occurrence as \textit{that} one? That was \textit{then}, this is \textit{now}. There is the phenomenological \textit{fact} of the intuition of personal identity, the \textit{I am I},
making it seem that it is so. But insofar as all the phenomenological elements in which any experience as such consists are in constant flux, a neo-Humean type skeptic could thus argue that our ubiquitous intuition of personal identity ends up, in the final analysis, in the phenomenological graveyard, being just what Hume claimed personal identity itself was, namely, an illusion. Parfit could well agree. Recall Parfit’s understanding of what a person is:

. . . to be a person, a being must be self-conscious, aware of its identity and its continued existence over time. [Reasons and Persons, p 202]

This, to be more precise, in our analysis translates into the subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity, and the intuition of the existence and identity of the subject in space and time, the I am I. The problem now is that among the phenomenological elements in which experience qua experience consists, up to and including the I and the I am I, there simply is no continued existence of consciousness with numerical identity over time. That is why for Parfit and, arguably Hume, there is only death with replacement:

Ordinary survival is about as bad as being destroyed and having a Replica. [Reasons and Persons, p. 280, italics his]

The reason why Parfitian survival is no better than death with replacement is that the “being”—consciousness, the subject, the I—who is “self-conscious, aware of its identity and its continued existence over time” has, from a purely phenomenological point of view, direct experiential access, at best, only to what is there at that very moment among the phenomenological elements in which that occurrent experience consists. And so even if our analysis of the I helps from a phenomenological point of view to locate in experience the subject now it does not thereby establish the numerical identity of the subject now with the subject then or at any other time, even when we note that accompanying each I, there is, as a matter of phenomenological fact, the intuition of personal identity, I am I. So if a thoroughly phenomenological analysis of experience fails to locate in experience anything in which personal identity necessarily consists—either an underlying (physical or metaphysical) substance extending us over time to the required degree, as Descartes thought, or an overarching (psychological or metapsychological) transcendental unity, as Kant thought—then without some such underlying or overarching unity to extend us over time to the required degree, in terms of our actual experience, a
person’s life is not just poor, nasty, brutish and short; experientially, it is a life too short to be called the life of a person. And that is just one of the many reasons why Reductionistic versions of Empty Individualism, such as Parfit’s, as well as Hume’s, conclude that personal identity is an illusion. You are an illusion.

One obvious reply would be to refer our neo-Humean phenomenologists or Parfitian Reductionists of the *conditional* variant of our thesis: *either* personal identity matters, there is personal identity, etc., *or* there are no persons. We could thus say that *unless* the subject *now* (the *I* in the present act of writing Chapter 10 of this book)—reflecting upon and reflected by the intuition of its own existence and identity in space and time, the *I am I*—*am* one and the same numerically identical *I then* in the remembered act of writing Chapter 1—then Empty Individualism is true, such that there is no significant sense of “person”—i.e., Closed Individualism is false. Thus the above sort of neo-Humean rejoinder would not defeat our philosophical explanation of how it is possible that we are all the same person, since the other component of such a stance would be that, as we have readily shown, either there is no personal identity and no significant survival of persons, i.e., no one is anyone in the appropriate way as required for the existence of persons, or *if* as we have supposed it is none other than the *I* that provides identity *then* we are all numerically one and the same person (because in part there are no metaphysically significant borders among the *I* here now writing this book and the *I* there reading it, etc.). But nor would such a philosophical explanation, having defeated Closed Individualism many times over on such fronts (in that regard, we can up to such a point be readily allied with the Empty Individualists), suffice to offer Open Individualism as the *best* explanation, unless we also explain, as I promised we would, that our view is preferable on *all* fronts because of its unique philosophical invariance. In other words, because Open Individualism, unlike Empty Individualism, is possible regardless of the “philosophy” one is in—even, as we are about to see, in the radically empirical or experiential philosophy of Hume—we are in fact able to go one phenomenological step up against the above rejoinder and defeat Empty Individualism on its own philosophical turf. In other words, we can go *phenomenologically beyond* Non-Individualism by providing an argument establishing the possibility of personal identity here where Humean or Buddhist inspired experiential phenomenology in general and Empty Individualism in particular asserts that as a matter of phenomenological fact it is impossible: *in experience*. That we are now in a position to do this is but another remarkable and
perhaps even startling aspect of our view.

What we must do, then, is to show how it is possible that the intuition of personal identity, simultaneously denoted and expressed by “I am I,” is an immediate and direct intuition in which the subject, the I, consciousness, is having a veridical experience of its own personal identity over time, when from a phenomenological point of view experience itself—up to and including the intuition of personal identity, like the subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity—occurs only at-a-time. The phenomenological time interval over which any experience itself “continues” as that very experience is, at best, a tiny Buddha-instant. Direct and immediate phenomenal access by consciousness—to the content of its own states of consciousness implied by descriptive naming as e.g. “self-consciousness,” “awareness of one’s identity,” and so on, is bound by the borders of the temporal interval in which any particular state of consciousness itself occurs. Which is, in each and every instance, very, very brief.

Which is why I say that neo-Humeans, philosophical Buddhists, empirical phenomenologists, or Empty Individualists could thus reasonably assert that direct and immediate phenomenal access by consciousness—the subject-in-itself, the I—to any states of consciousness, up to and including the contents of consciousness, in which personal subjectivity—the subject-in-itself, the I—is the intended “object” (subject) of consciousness (e.g., the intuition of personal identity, the I am I) extends itself not over a phenomenological continuum but consists only in phenomenal quanta. That is, any occurrent (now) subject-in-itself, I, does not extend in phenomenal time beyond the phenomenal quanta, \( \psi \), in which that occurrence of consciousness, that I, consists. (This would almost seem to be tautological, in which case there would be no need for a denial of a permanent self in experience, such as Hume’s; personal identity over time would, in such purely experiential terms, be a necessarily false proposition.) This simply means that no I at time \( t \), where

\[
I_t = \int \psi_1, + \psi_2, + \psi_3, + \ldots, + \psi_n,
\]

contains any other I, such that the I consists as a matter of phenomenal fact in a temporally bound, individual, discreet, phenomenal quanta (rather than an extended phenomenal continuum). Moreover, that the entire temporal series of I’s,

\[
I_1, I_2, I_3, \ldots, I_n, \ldots,
\]
what, ordinarily, we might call “quantum states of consciousness,” such as
the subject’s intuition of its own existence and identity in space and over
time, consists not in a phenomenological continuum but only in individual,
non-continuous, discreet phenomenological quanta within each of which
there is direct and immediate access to that phenomenological quantum and
to no other: consciousness consists from a phenomenological point of view
in phenomenological singletons of quanta. There is no significantly
continuous consciousness over time—no consciousness continuum—there
are only phenomenological quanta—discrete phenomenological quanta of
individual consciousness. These are the claims, respectively, that I call
quantum phenomenology and quantum consciousness.

Is either claim—quantum phenomenology or consciousness—true?
Well, is say quantum physics true rather, than, say, relativity physics? In the
case of physics, both relativity and quantum mechanics are possible
descriptions and one is, arguably, better; and one of the major reasons why
one of them is a better explanation, by my lights anyway, is that it can
explain or account for the phenomena and interpretation of the other but not
the other way around. In a similar sense many of our examples and puzzle
cases have been stated and solved within what could be regarded as
“relativistic consciousness,” stated broadly in terms of the continuity of
time and space, subject-local reference frames connected via differential
equations, etc., and now crossing over the quantum phenomenology and
quantum consciousness threshold we are willing to suppose (given our
claim of philosophical invariance) that this too is a possible description
except that our view unlike the competing view holds in either description
and, moreover, can explain the other.

We are thus now supposing that subject-in-itself, the \( I \), is a quantized state
of consciousness existing, as such, within a quantized phenomenology, in
other words: what at the macroscopic phenomenological level appears as a
lagado consists, at the microscopic phenomenological level, in a very rapid
staccato. Even at the “macroscopic” phenomenological level of ordinary
day to day experience the effects of quantum consciousness and quantum
phenomenology can be observed in the fact that, for instance, I am not
simultaneously aware of what my name is, where I’m from, where I work,
what my mother’s maiden name is, who my co-author of “Is Hintikka’s
Logic First Order?” is, what sentence I wrote prior to this one nor even
what the first item on this list is, and so on. In each case I have, in one way
or another, to “go and look.” Although in most cases the looking does not
take very long, neither is it instantaneous nor does any particular instance in
which the conscious act of “looking” occurs expand the borders of that particular occurrence of that direct and immediate experience beyond the phenomenological time interval in which it occurs. Nor, during the conscious act of looking, am I looking at anything but that which is at that moment being looked at; not even that which was being looked at in the moment when the search was initiated is co-present in the moment when the search is completed. The “looking” is merely a “shifting” of individual consciousness, the I, from one set of “phenomenological quanta,” $\int_\psi$, to another which are not simultaneously present in the act of looking; the I—the quintessential and ubiquitous “phenomenological eye” of consciousness—is in that respect less like a computer screen and more like the cursor on the computer screen. When I am looking, say, for the first item on the list above I have to search the right line out and when I find “what my name is” I am not looking at these words that I am here now typing. My looking is at any particular moment in which it is occurring, like the cursor on the screen, only there where it is and nowhere else.

Thus, our neo-Humean rejoinder: from a purely phenomenological point of view, if the intuition of personal identity extends the existence of the subject in space and time, the I am I, beyond the temporal interval of the specious present in which the phenomenological quanta, $\psi$, occur and in which from such a purely phenomenological point of view the I consists, is not an awareness of anything real; the intuition of personal identity is but an illusion. It is like an amputee’s avowal that he experiences his right leg as three feet long when in fact we have measured the stump and know it to be a mere three inches. His experience is real but it is an experience not of a real limb but of a phantom limb. So when people claim, for instance, that they are e.g. self-conscious, aware of their identity and continued existence over a long span of time (e.g., the Tolstoy quote on page 15), as the intuition of personal identity itself suggests in no uncertain terms, they are deeply mistaken. Those who have measured the actual duration of experience, such as empirical psychologists, Buddhist meditators, experimental phenomenologists, and so on, know that such avowals regarding the phenomenological extension of any experience—for under discussion here is not personal identity qua concept of an experiencer but qua intuition of the subject in space and time, the “experiencer in experience”—as a matter of phenomenological fact, are false. The I—consciousness, the subject-in-itself—as a phenomenological continuant in experience, is, as seen in the light of our quantum-consciousness upgrade of a strictly empiricist or purely experiential neo-Humean View, like the
amputee’s awareness of his leg extending over space. What the amputee is aware of is not his actual limb but a phantom limb. What I am aware of via the intuition of personal identity is not my personal identity proper but, rather, my “Phantom Identity.”

In this way the question comes down, then, to whether the intuition of personal identity (6.3), I am I, is a real experience of something real or a real experience of something that is not real. Notice that at issue here is not whether we can locate in our experience a perceiver; we can, Hume and Buddha were on this point wrong: it is the subject-in-itself in relation to which e.g. objects are individuated and identified (localized) in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed. The question, rather, is whether and how from a strict neo-Humean, Buddhist or quantum phenomenological point of view any such experience could possibly establish, in experience, or through experience, that any I (indexed in space and time modulo quantum consciousness) is numerically identical to any other. The issue here is not whether we can locate in our experience anything more than the I. We want, given our claim to philosophical (metaphysical) invariance under our present (quantum consciousness) constraints to go that far (or, more accurately, that short) with Hume, Buddha and Parfit by agreeing, for the sake of argument that we cannot.

For if we are going to dissolve the Phenomenological Boundary on its own philosophical turf we cannot dodge the existential bullet by shifting the issue off the phenomenal or empirical plane back to conceptual or forward to transcendental borders. Part of our promise, again, has been that Open Individualism can work in any philosophy, that it has the merit of philosophical (and metaphysical) invariance. We must therefore remain phenomenologically steadfast and ask: just as my conscious mental states are connected to my physical limbs, at best, via the Phenomenal World in which I find myself identified as a Phenomenal Self, is the intuition of personal identity—the I am I—an intuition of anything real? But here it seems we must, given all that we have said above, be in for, literally, a lost cause. For how could it be?

Except to be fair here it must also be noted by all sides that even from a purely quantum phenomenological point of view to consider an experience of something an experience of something real, we cannot require more of experience than the true phenomenological nature of experience allows, any more than to consider a description of an event a real description requires more of the description than the true nature of any description allows. (That is to say, unless we are going to be complete skeptics at best or nihilists at
worst about everything, we cannot require of your description, say, of John, to include what no description of anything could ever include before we count it as a true description of John rather than a false one. Your true description of John and your false description of John can, and are, in such cases distinguished on the basis of whether you are fabricating or not, trying to deceive or not, consciously leaving anything out or not, etc. True descriptions can thus be distinguished from false ones, in part, relative to the abilities of the describer: we can distinguish the child’s representation of his father as a bear from his representation of his father as a stick figure that resembles his father only remotely. Thus what is and what is not a true description can to a certain extent vary, depending on the abilities of the describer.) To justifiably believe that the \textit{I am I} is an experience of something real, then, does not require of the experience more than what any experience at most is. Indeed, given the claims of quantum consciousness and quantum phenomenology, the \textit{I am I} cannot, from a purely phenomenological point of view, that is, experientially, be more than that. Rather, the intuition of my own existence and identity in space and time must to a certain degree be veridical to some actual (and limited) aspect of my existence and personal identity (which is itself, as Hume correctly notes, nowhere present in experience).

Clearly, it is the experiential \textit{fact} of the intuition of personal identity, that makes it seem, for instance, that there are never any \textit{gaps} in our experience. Not just in our thought experiments involving various Boundary Dissolves and actual cases involving various psychological and neurophysiological dissociative phenomena, what unexamined day-to-day experience itself suggests to each and every one of us is that we exist without gaps throughout the course of our lives. We fall asleep, we get up, and we experience various changes throughout the minutes and hours but without loss of existence and identity. For consciousness, the subject, at each phenomenological moment there is no transition from \(I_{n-1}\) to \(I_n\) to \(I_{n+1}\), each “transition” is for the subject \textit{phenomenologically instantaneous}. There may have been a seven-hour gap between the moment at which I fell asleep—i.e., consciousness, the subject, the \textit{I}, “disappeared”—and the moment when I woke up—i.e., consciousness, the subject, the \textit{I}, “appeared”—but for the \textit{I} at each temporal endpoint there is nevertheless the \textit{intuition of personal identity, of having always been present}, simultaneously denoted and expressed, i.e., communicated, by \textit{I am I}. There is no “phenomenological gap,” no “phenomenological nothing.” That is, regardless of the nature or duration of the gap between
there is just the \( I_n \) and the \( I_{n+1} \), without any "...". How can any such discontinuous (discrete) states of quantum consciousness contain the intuition of continuous personal identity, the \( I \text{ am I} \)? Which is why, as I said above, we seem to be begging for the ultimate negative, skeptical neo-Humean rejoinder: how could the intuition of personal identity even possibly be an experience of anything real? But notice now that such a response cuts both ways. For the fact also is that the \( I \) occurs in the moment, not in the “gap between” moments, over moments, or in any continuum (i.e., not just quantum consciousness but also quantum phenomenology). The \( I \text{ am I} \) should thus, in fact, from a purely phenomenological standpoint, given that the intuition of personal identity as we are now considering is a quantized state of consciousness existing, as such, in a quantum phenomenology, in which each expression \( I \text{ am I} \) is reducible purely to the phenomenological quanta, be impossible. So if we are puzzled from a phenomenological point of view as to how the \( I \) should even possibly be an experience of anything real, we should be no less puzzled by the fact of its existence, which given quantum consciousness and quantum phenomenology should itself be impossible. This crucial point is one to which we shall in due course return; before we do, let us first take care of a few other related matters.

§ 10.6 The Phenomenology of Survival and Identity: Empathy vs. Identity

As Parfit notes, Hume’s contemplation of the problem of personal identity threw Hume into “the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness” [Hume in Parfit 1984, p. 260]. Indeed, one can imagine Hume’s discovery to be in some ways analogous to suddenly waking up in a hospital room after an accident only to discover that during the night your limbs have been amputated. (Indeed, perhaps the Humean dismemberment of the mind in general and consciousness in particular is the more gruesome scenario in the sense that, for many, losing parts of your mind is worse than losing parts of your body. Nor would it be much consolation to be told that when it comes to your individual consciousness time is a Painless Surgeon.) Though how deep and dark could Hume’s dread really have been, I have always wondered, if Hume cured it by dining and playing backgammon with his friends? Some angst his must have been!
Hume’s response is in that respect actually quite revealing: dissociation from one’s own, i.e., phenomenologically first-person immediate (Phenomenal) Self—i.e., Self-alienation—may lead consciousness, the subject-in-itself, the I, into association with “others” (i.e., phenomenologically first-person non-immediate, Phenomenal Selves), and therefore may have an evolutionary social function. Closed Individualism may thus offer an evolutionary benefit: by making the subject-in-itself, the I, feel insecure and alienated from all the rest of itself (its Phenomenal Self and its Phenomenal World) it may help bring about the need to be with “others” in social contexts. At the same time, and also quite tellingly, Parfit writes that Hume’s arguments supported total skepticism. That is why they brought darkness and utter loneliness. The arguments for Reductionism have on me the opposite effect. Thinking hard about these arguments removes the glass wall between me and others. And, as I have said, I care less about my death. This is merely the fact that, after a certain time, none of the experiences that will occur will be related, in certain ways to my present experiences. Can this matter all that much? [Reasons and Persons, p. 282]

Parfit’s emotional and phenomenological response, if we are to believe his testimony here (and I do), may be explained on the same grounds that Open Individualism affects me: namely, what Parfit is seeing is that, as Walt Whitman saw, we are far more, not far less, then what we believe ourselves to be: “I am large,” wrote Whitman in his great ode to identity, Song of Myself, “I contain multitudes.” That is, I believe Parfit’s view implies more than his analysis explicitly shows. The reason he does not allow in his analysis for the possibility of Open Individualism—the identity of the subject identified as self and as other—but only for empathy (the sort of psychological feeling he describes above) by the subject towards other Selves, i.e., toward Selves that it is not from its own immediate phenomenological standpoint identified as, is that Parfit does not fully see how it is possible to dissolve the Spatial Boundary so as to make identity fit the logic of fission (up to and including simultaneous personal identity across a variety of contemporaneous physiological, psychological and phenomenological borders). We have seen, however, that such a dissolve is in fact possible. For instance, proceeding via negativa in exploring what a person is not, we have seen that none of the Boundary Dissolves are like death. Since being identified as a completely different physiology or psychology is not the same as death, the borders of this exclusively conjoined physiological-psychological complex are therefore not of
sufficient (metaphysical and metapsychological) significance to necessitate
drawing along them the boundaries of personal identity. Nor, as we have
seen, am I essentially my phenomenology: the borders of this Phenomenal
Self are not sufficiently significant to require our drawing along them the
boundaries of the person. This should not be very surprising, given that
personal identity is neither a physiologically-bound nor psychologically-
bound relation, since the borders of the Phenomenal Self consist, after all,
in the phenomenal body-mind (the body-mind “image”). That is, once it is
understood that the borders of my physiology (body) and my psychology
(mind) are not the delineating boundaries of my personal identity, it should
not be very surprising to find that neither are the borders of my
phenomenology, i.e., my \textit{phenomenal} body-mind, the boundaries of my
personal identity. And so on for the other apparent excluders of Open
Individualism, up to and including, especially, as we have already seen, the
Spatial Boundary.

Likewise, as we already saw in previous sections, and shall consider again
in more detail in the next chapter, neither do Transcendental Borders
signify metaphysical boundaries between persons: even if what you and I
are, essentially, is the non-local “Transcendental” subject beyond
experience and beyond space and time (as opposed, or I should say over
and above, the \textit{locally} transcendentally identical subject as required for the
having of experience as we know it), it is nonetheless possible that we are
one and the same numerically identical person simultaneously identified as
numerically different contemporaneously existing Phenomenal Selves. The
concept of a \textit{non-local}, “Transcendental” subject—although not essential to
our philosophical explanation of how Open Individualism is possible in
light of its apparent excluders—like the concept of a soul, will as we shall
see turn out to fit perfectly into the what Quine has (I take it with some
critical tongue in cheek) called my “vast ontology.” We could of course
further speculate about what the non-local, “Transcendental” subject might
actually be, such as a five-dimensional entity in whose mind this four-
dimensional universe is but a virtual reality, a Universal Mind which has
split itself up into a plurality of divided identifications in what would be but
a more elaborate version of the minded version of our Dream Analog, such
that the (Transcendental) subject exists in its own Cosmic Arcade,
“playing” the universe from each and every first-person point of view, one
of which is you and one of which is me . . . . and so on. But although such
imaginative speculations are for our purposes neither necessary nor
functional (though they fit particularly well with recent “Brane World”
scenarios in quantum cosmology), we should note that the fact we can show how even such an imaginary scenario is possible within the boundaries of what we now know and think—within the boundaries of our conceptual reference frame—such imaginative speculations should no longer be considered science fantasies but science fictions. Which is already a good deal more than we might have previously believed possible. Or, if one’s speculations bend not toward science fiction but toward mystical philosophy or even religion, the (Transcendental) subject is the God of Averroes, or the Hindu Brahman, personally identical with each and every one of us who are each the Atman. There are other fascinating religious and mythological schemas, metaphorical and otherwise, that could accommodate a transcendental version of Open Individualism. If one had to choose, the secular Cosmic Arcade scenario is philosophically perhaps the more interesting; if religious imagery were called for, however, then better perhaps to borrow from Plato: the brain is the cave, the Phenomenal World is the flickering on the back wall of the cave, Phenomenal Selves are shadows, the subject is the light from outside the cave, the Transcendental subject is the Sun. Or, perhaps best of all if philosophical mysticism were called for one could hardly do better than to say that the Open (Transcendental) Subject is the Plotinian All-Soul, the One who is numerically identical with all individual souls (e.g., “Are All Souls One,” Enneads IV. 9).

We have already considered Boundary Dissolves such as the Omni Dissolve—in which it is at least as plausible to suppose that the transformation from Kolak to Ann-Margret does not disrupt personal identity as it is to suppose that it does not disrupt survival—across which no particular physiological, psychological, or phenomenological element survives (i.e., continues) but, at least to the extent that I survive ordinary, day-to-day transformations (the Ordinary Life Dissolve), I survive. According to Open Individualism, such transformations do not necessarily disrupt personal identity. In Parfit’s Empty Individualist View, such transformations do not necessarily disrupt survival. On a view that such transformations do necessarily disrupt both personal identity and survival (such as in traditional Closed Individualism [in which there is not even a distinction made between personal identity and survival]) ordinary life turns out to be an endless series of deaths.

Given our analysis, we could thus say the following. In Open Individualism, we should treat others as we should wish to treat ourselves because we are them. (This will be a cornerstone of our global ethics, as we
shall discuss at length in Chapter 13.) In Parfit’s Empty Individualist View, given our analysis, we should treat others as we should wish to treat ourselves because the bonds that connect each one of us to our future replicas are no stronger than the bonds that connect each of us to each other in the present. In traditional Closed Individualism, given our analysis, it follows that from a purely phenomenological point of view treating anyone in any way whatsoever—including ourselves—is as irrational as worrying about and caring for fictional entities that do not exist.

The differences between Empty Individualism and Closed Individualism thus mask an underlying phenomenological convergence which we shall make full use subsequently: on one or the other view I can plausibly believe that personal identity and/or survival are not bound by the physiological, psychological, and phenomenological borders limiting and defining the boundaries that on traditional Closed Individualism we would take to be the boundaries of Kolak. This, in turn, gives rise to a moral convergence between Empty and Open Individualism.

§ 10.7 SEEING THROUGH OURSELVES:
CONCEPTUALLY EXTENDING THE BORDERS OF EXPERIENCE

Open Individualism does not deny experience. Rather, it affirms that experience of the person is bordered while the concept of personal identity is not thereby bound. The concept of ourselves as a bordered but boundless, Open Individual, one numerically identical person who is everyone, can be used to construct a theory by which we can explain how personal identity is possible in spite of the plethora of borders within and amongst us. Part of this explanation is that (in Closed Individualism) we only assume that personal identity is bound along the borders of experience because identification as a Phenomenal Self consists, experientially, in an experience that is border-bound. Experiencing ourselves through the borders of our Phenomenal Selves we thus naturally come to the traditional Closed Individualist View that personal identity is border-bound (a view that may have some evolutionary advantage, as suggested above and considered again below). We should have never, unless we engaged in philosophical analysis (or had some sort of “mystical revelation”) come to have anything but the traditional Closed Individualist View of ourselves any more than the ancients whose experience told them that the Earth did not move could have been expected to come to have, without analysis or
revelation, any other but their Geocentric world view. Seeing how it is possible that in spite of the fact that experience says the Earth is not moving the Earth could nonetheless be moving, along with an understanding how it is possible that this experience of stillness would be had by any creature regardless of what planet it is looking out into the cosmos from, can help us to shift from a Geocentric world view toward a larger cosmological perspective in which there are no such privileged positions. Seeing how it is possible that in spite of the fact that experience says you exist only at your present location you could nonetheless simultaneously exist at other locations, simultaneously identified as more than one Phenomenal Self, and understanding how it is possible that the experience of being identified as only one Phenomenal Self at a time would be experienced by anyone regardless of what borders one is looking at its Phenomenal World from, can help us to shift from an Egocentric world view toward a larger cosmological perspective in which there are no such privileged positions. And just as shifting from a Ptolemaic to a Copernican view of the solar system leaves our experience Earth-bound, so too we should not be surprised that a shift from traditional Closed to Open Individualism leaves our experience border-bound.

In other words, if I am everyone why then do I not at this very moment consciously experience myself as being everyone everywhere, with co-consciousness across the borders? Well, first, the Unity of Consciousness Dissolve, the Personality Dissolve, and other such Conceptual Boundary Dissolves help explain this and the Illusion of Other Persons. Second, the fact is that not only do I identify with this Phenomenal Self; I am also identified as this Phenomenal Self, consisting, experientially, in this Phenomenal Self within this Phenomenal World. This simply means that, just as within a dream (an “off-line” Phenomenal World) I am identified as a particular (conscious) dream-character at the exclusion of any and all others, within waking experience (an “on-line” Phenomenal World) I am identified as this Phenomenal Self: separated from the rest of my Phenomenal World by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, etc., I experience my (phenomenal) body and the rest of my Phenomenal World as well as my (phenomenal) mind from the first-person point of view of this Phenomenal Self at the exclusion of any and all others. (We could say: just as the experience of reading a novel or hearing a symphony is made possible by limiting consciousness [the subject] to one bordered section of the work of art at a time, so too consciousness, personal subjectivity, is made possible by the limiting of consciousness [i.e., the compactification of
the subject] through identification of the subject as one bordered section of the Phenomenal World at a time.) Third, the idea that I am essentially bound by the borders of this Phenomenal Self is based, in part, on occurrent memories; however, we have successfully seen how it is possible that even when these occurrent memories, along with this entire psychology, are no longer there it is possible that the same person is still there. If these psychological borders essentially bound personal identity I could not imagine being some other psychology. I even have access to experiences, such as in the Fishing Village Dream, in which all these occurrent memories are in fact different, replete with a different mind-image (a different “apparent” [dream] physiology and a different “apparent” [dream] psychology [i.e., a different Phenomenal Self within the Phenomenal World of the dream]), consisting in part in a different personality, etc., yet which it is nonetheless possible to view as the experiences of the same person even though the entire contents of the experience are different, and so on. Fourth, if we choose not to view such borders in this way then it turns out that the truth about us is that the entities we each are do not exist for very long, if at all (i.e., we end up with Empty Individualism).

Once we have seen how it is possible that something which apparently seems not to be the case can in fact be the truth about us, we may then be able to accept Open Individualism not merely intellectually but, on a deep, emotional and experiential level, we might feel it to be the truth about us. Open Individualism could, in other words, affect a change in our phenomenology. This would of course be limited to what can be seen, understood, and felt from the limited and limiting perspective of any Phenomenal Self. For in order for there to be experience as we know it—up to and including the experience of philosophical understanding, what Brouwer calls “wisdom”—it has, as far as we know, to occur in phenomenological space and time, that is, it must be bordered in ways that Phenomenal Selves are bordered. That is why explaining how Open Individualism is possible in light of its many apparent excluders does not require co-conscious identification as more than one Phenomenal Self at the same time, nor simultaneously extending via the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment into the borders of psycho-phenomenological matrices other than the one which you are at present exclusively conjoined to nor knowing everything, and so on, any more than having a lucid dream in which you understand how it is possible that you are every aspect of that dream (even though judging by the appearances it would still not seem to be the case that
CHAPTER 10

you are) requires that you co-consciously experience every aspect of the dream from a co-conscious first-person point of view at the same time, all under one FEC, by simultaneously and with co-consciousness finding yourself identified as every aspect of that dream. Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine what such an “unbordered experience” would be like, phenomenologically, since in all likelihood (barring the possibility of some such “mystical” experience) a necessary condition for the having of experience as we know it, (i.e., in phenomenological space and time) is that it is bordered in exactly the way Phenomenal Selves are bordered. Thus, the only experiential shift required for Open Individualism is the demonstration of the possibility of identification with more than one Phenomenal Self at a time, not the having of any “mystical,” “cosmic,” “unbordered experiences,” in which, say, I suddenly find myself looking out at the world from the eyes of every Phenomenal Self and yet without any individuating distinctions whatsoever (an “ineffable” experience that, incoherent as it may seem, many mystics and some philosophers [e.g., William James], present author included [e.g., my doctoral dissertation] actually do claim to have had; see §10.8).

Thus Open Individualism—unlike traditional Closed Individualism—does not deny or ignore any aspect of our actual experience but helps us to explain even from a purely phenomenological point of view every possible aspect of it. Furthermore, in saying that the person who you are is bordered but not bound, Open Individualism is not offering empty, unverifiable or purely theoretical speculations. Attending closely to our experience, perhaps more closely than we are accustomed reveals that this is in fact, from a purely phenomenological point of view, what our experience is like. Considering one apparent excluder of Open Individualism after another, we do not come across any sufficiently significant Borders that necessitate our drawing along them the metaphysical Boundaries between one numerically identical person and another in such a way that includes the having of personal identity but excludes the possibility that we are all one and the same, numerically identical, individual consciousness, the same I—the same person. Our Conceptual Boundary Dissolves show us time and again that following our negative path leads us not only to the conditional thesis, if I am the same person over time then I am everyone, but also beyond it to a view that accounts, better than any other view, for our actual phenomenologies.

That is, let met reiterate that, unlike traditional Closed Individualists, we are able to agree fully with what Parfit’s and the other Empty Individualists
The neo-Humean view implies about us: namely, the full and unrelenting disintegration within us of all psychological and phenomenological content and of the physiological realizers of that content: nothing within us persists, in the sense that we can agree, as I interpret Hume and Buddha as having claimed, that none of the elements of the psychologies, physiologies, and phenomenologies in which I consist actually continue through time, that is, persist with identity. Hence, if the only way I can exist as numerically one and the same person over time is, as Parfit and other Empty Individualists assume, by sustaining the same psychological, physiological, or phenomenological borders, then in this disintegrating universe I do not exist for very long. There is only death with replacement.

Here, however, is the rub of the rub: as Closed Individualists, Empty Individualists and Open Individualists would all agree, there is some sort of survival going on. Nobody has ever claimed, at least not persuasively, that we are nothing and that nothing is here going on; even Heraclitus failed to explain how, if there is only chaos, it is possible that there is in spite of the chaos a seeming permanence, just as Zeno failed to explain how, if there is no motion, it is possible that in a universe without motion there is the illusion of motion, and even Buddha (even extreme Theravada Buddhists) leaves us to wonder albeit with some strange notion of Karma why there is from a purely phenomenological point of view what there seems to be. (One is reminded of the skeptic Cratylus’s refusal to speak or do anything but wag his finger to signal the occurrence of sensations but that hardly amounts to a claim, much less to an explanation.) In our view, seeing how the various Boundary Dissolves are not like death—i.e., that survival with identity is possible in spite of such borders—implies that physiological, psychological and phenomenological borders do not bind consciousness, the subject-in-itself—they do not bind the I of personal identity, that is, personal identity is not closed under those known individuating and identifying borders. On the Empty Individualist View, it is survival, not personal identity that is not bound by such borders. That such borders do not bind either personal identity nor survival is not itself a radical claim. (Indeed, in this universe from a purely phenomenological point of view it is the traditional Closed Individualist View that is making the radical claim!) Given the actual borders within and amongst ourselves it must be part of any empirically grounded, phenomenologically astute, and conceptually sound view. In doing so, Open Individualist presents a picture of one person at many different places at the same time while the Empty Individualist Views present ultimately a picture of no persons, that is, of a universe
containing no persons who are identical to themselves except, at best, as a strict phenomenological analysis of such empirically grounded views reveals, tiny Buddha-instants. Both pictures strain the conceptual reference frame (but not our experience) and so on strict experiential or purely empirical grounds, that is, from a purely phenomenological point of view, it is difficult—but not impossible—to accept them as plausible. Traditional Closed Individualism, on the other hand, simply ignores the truth about us (it denies the phenomenology of actual experience, i.e., quantum consciousness) and so on empirical grounds it is not possible to accept it as a plausible view. Everyone or no one: in this universe, those are our only two plausible choices.

Thus, in the end, the disagreement between Empty Individualism and Open Individualism is neither about what the truth about us is from a phenomenological point of view nor about whether there is survival across our borders but, rather, how far the type of survival across our borders that there actually is allows us to extend beyond—to be not bound by—our borders. In other words, for us the germane question is not whether survival extends beyond—is not bound by—the actual borders within and amongst us but, rather, how far the sort of survival that there actually is makes it possible for personal identity to extend beyond—to not be bound by—our borders.

For Parfit and other Empty Individualists, as for Hume and for Buddha, the answer is, of course, not very far. The reason is that in their views personal identity reaches only as far as phenomenological consciousness reaches—which if we actually look at our experience from a purely phenomenological point of view is not very far at all. That is why they forego the concept of personal identity in favor of other sorts of relations. Instead of conceptually dissolving the boundaries between us, as Open Individualism does, Empty Individualism dissolves us.

But not completely! “Not very far” is hardly the same as 0. We have already noted a philosophical convergence between Open Individualism and the Empty Individualist View with regard to how we should treat each other: Parfitian empathy is in one moral aspect very close to the moral consciousness of Open Individualism. Might we in this additional, phenomenological-moral convergence, slight though it is, between Empty Individualism and Open Individualism help us find some way of erecting a philosophical bridge between our two apparently antithetical views—a bridge that connects all of us to each other?
§ 10.8 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL BOUNDARY

I matter. Consciousness—the subject—matters. And it matters a lot. We have seen the ways in which our physiologies, our psychologies, and our phenomenologies do not matter. They may be important but—unlike consciousness, the I of personal identity, which is, for us, a matter of life and death—they are not, for us, a matter of life and death. If they were, we could not imagine surviving any of our various Boundary Dissolves, up to and including the Ordinary Life Dissolve. But we can and, as in the Ordinary Life Dissolve, we do.

For instance, if I knew that starting tomorrow the universe would obliterate the having of consciousness forever but in such a way as to leave our bodies perfectly intact and without any physical disintegration, making it safe for this physiology to eternally walk the earth but without an internal mental life, I would not look forward to it. I would not consider this the eternal life of a person but, at best, on par with the eternal life of, say, a walking plant. I might care, for instance, that my wife’s body be allowed to remain with my body but this would be for sentimental reasons only. For anyone to point to my so caring as evidence that Wendy and I will be “spending eternity together” would be no less ludicrous than someone pointing to a couple of corpses buried together and claiming that on the basis of their once wanting to be in the same grave there is some reason to believe that the worm-infested entities pushing up the daisies are a case of two persons now spending eternity together. There is no one down there spending any amount of time doing anything, much less spending all of eternity and together. The number of living persons in the grave is zero.

Clearly, unless the mental lives of worms are much different than we are now justified in believing, the number of beings in that grave who are self-conscious, aware of their identity and their continued existence over time, is, indeed, zero. When Wendy and I are at home in bed sound asleep and not dreaming, however, the number of beings in that bed who are self-conscious, aware of their identity and their continued existence over time is also zero. So, on a strict phenomenological interpretation of for instance Parfit’s minimal criterion of what it is to be a person, the number of persons in that bed is also zero. We could of course equivocate by counting them as two sleeping persons and we could similarly equivocate by pointing to the grave and counting two dead persons. Obviously, of course there is a difference in that the two living bodies in bed will (probably) wake up tomorrow when our children wake up where as no amount of noise will
wake up the two corpses. And there is the obvious sense in which the two persons there, in bed, will no longer be there when they are dead and buried in a grave. But there is also the obvious sense in which it makes little difference whether you have been lecturing to a room full of students who are asleep or to a room full of students who are dead since, in either case, we could say that there was nobody there but you: the only one who heard your lecture was you. Likewise, it will make little difference to you whether you die in your sleep at 6:00 a.m. or at 1:00 a.m. (assuming, for simplification, that you had your last dream at 12:30 a.m.), and it should make little difference whether you die right after a coma from which you never regain any sort of consciousness or ten years later, and so on.

In other words, for consciousness, i.e., the subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity, there is an important sense in which sleep presents us with the same sort of Boundary as does death. But no occurrent state of consciousness lasts the day, not even an hour, not even a whole minute. Just as the life of individual perceptions, as Hume notes, “interruption of their existence is contrary to their perfect identity” [A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 275]

and, in Locke’s analysis,

“that which had a different beginning it time . . . is not the same, but diverse” [an Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 275],

so too, ultimately, from a purely phenomenological point of view, for us to view ourselves through the naked lens of consciousness, unclouded by any theory, is to make out of each tick of the clock a death toll.

In other words, if the impermanence of our physiologies, psychologies and phenomenologies dismembers personal identity, how can we show the possibility of personal identity in light of the phenomenological fact that—even by the grossest standards of continuity—the subject, consciousness, seems to be the least permanent aspect of our already ephemeral existences?

Consciousness, the I, the subject in relation to which phenomena are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, is as far as we know something a person essentially has that rocks essentially do not (if consciousness ceases forever in a body that body ceases to be a person, where as if consciousness turned out to occur in rocks and a rock ceased to have it, the rock would not cease to be a rock). From a purely phenomenological point of view
PHENOMENOLOGICAL BORDERS

consciousness—the subject-in-itself, the I—consists as we have upgraded the empirical or Humean, experiential claim, in phenomenological quanta,

\[ I \cdot \int \psi_1 + \psi_2 + \psi_3 + \ldots + \psi_n \]

of which the entire fourfold \( \varepsilon/\delta \) manifold of experience—the Phenomenal Self, the Phenomenal World, and the subject identified as the former but dissociated from the latter—consists. The thesis of the (local) transcendental identity of the subject is that the subject is both Phenomenal Self and Phenomenal World, albeit identified as the former but dissociated from the latter. The I of personal identity—consciousness, the subject-in-itself—is (locally, transcendentally identical to) everything in its experience. Now, it is the intuition of personal identity, the I am I, that provides consciousness, the I, with the intuition that consciousness now, this I, is numerically one and the same I that has existed before at some earlier time, and will exist in the next and subsequent moments. This is a necessary condition for the having of experience as we know it. But, at the same time, it is this same intuition that helps simultaneously foster the illusion that personal identity resides not in the subject as a whole, nor in the subject-in-itself—the I—but in that in which the subject is identified as, namely, the Phenomenal Self, and not in that which the subject-in-itself is dissociated from, the Phenomenal World. But now if the subject-in-itself, the I, consists in phenomenological quanta, \( \psi \), and both the Phenomenal World and Phenomenal Self consist in \( \psi \), why then not say that the subject-in-itself, the I itself, consists just in \( \psi \)? For when we ask how far in time any particular \( \psi \) actually reaches—what the extension in phenomenological time is of any phenomenological quantum, \( \psi \)—we need not be Buddhist meditators to realize that someone who stipulates the phenomenological boundary of any \( \psi \) is well under a minute is well within the margin of error. If years are the appropriate units with which to mark significant changes in our physiologies, days or hours our psychologies (such as typical mood swings, etc.), to demarcate the borders of consciousness in phenomenological time the units will be, at best, seconds.

In Hume’s deep dark labyrinth time is not just a thief, it is a Cosmic Jack-the-Ripper with a sharp, quick scalpel and it knows your every move and it never stops cutting. Time dismembers consciousness and we talk about remembering ourselves in the future but unless there is more to identity than the dismembered mind’s I that emerges completely scathed from out of Hume’s labyrinth, there is in terms of consciousness no real remembering of ourselves. There is only a seeming remembering, the past
but now non-existent I’s reflecting in the intuition of personal identity, the eternal recurrence of the I not of personal but of merely Phantom Identity. We are, at best, but ghosts.

§ 10.9 THE GHOST IN HUME’S LABYRINTH AND THE CONTINUOUS PHENOMENOLOGICAL DISSOLVE

The argument we shall now consider is that consciousness—the subject-in-itself, the I—is itself also ephemeral because the “phenomenological contents” of consciousness, the ψ, are ephemeral. The underlying presupposition of such a claim, in a nutshell, is that consciousness, the I of personal identity, itself consists just in phenomena. This is the claim of Reductionism.

We have seen that the I is a necessary condition for the having of experience. Objects in my world don’t just appear from some objective third-person point of view but are viewed from a particular location in space and time, the situated locus of consciousness accompanying each and every perception from the first person point of view, the I of personal identity. I don’t think Hume nor anyone else could, given our explanations thus far, coherently deny this aspect of our analysis. Rather, what can be denied coherently is that which is designated by the same indexical, “I,” over time, is not one and the same, numerically identical, subject-in-itself over time but is, at each instant in which it occurs, a numerically different subject.

Hume and Parfit could thus both claim, in effect, that the traditional Closed Individualist belief captured by the single continuous entity assumption (§1.1) is false. Certainly from a phenomenological point of view there is something correct in this sort of deconstructive analysis. Going in and out of existence, individual perceptions occur in perpetual flux. They have no unity among their content except whatever unity arises as a consequence of external relations among them. Due to constant qualitative changes, perceptions have no identity over time, except perhaps for very short Buddha instants. Yet how is it that “we” (mis)perceive this flux of passive, discrete elements? If there is only the perpetually changing flux of individual perceptions, why is there (apparently) consistent misperception? Even if the subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity—consciousness—and the intuition of personal identity, the I am I—self-consciousness—are but illusions, why these illusions? And why does the I
am I, the intuition of personal identity, accompany each occurrence of the I, the subject-in-itself? What accounts for the illusion? Hume writes:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. [A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 252]

Ironically, as every smart student of Hume is fond of pointing out, Hume uses the word “I” at the beginning of a sentence in which he seems explicitly to be denying the existence of such an “I.” What then does he mean? What is it that can never catch itself? Obviously it cannot be some particular perception (i.e., no ψ) or other (i.e., “heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred,”) since he, David Hume, the subject of that perception, never perceives himself as a particular perception. To what, then, or to whom, does this “non-referential I” refer? If to nothing, why then does the “I” occur as the subject of the very sentence in which the existence of the subject is denied?

On one level, Hume might be interpreted as saying, in effect, as (the old) Peter Unger used (!) to claim, “I don’t exist,” or perhaps “I, the subject of my (?) experiences, do not exist.” This, for reasons we have already outlined in some detail, is not a coherent view and goes against what is as a matter of phenomenological fact, by our analysis, given in experience: the (if need be geometrically expressible and axiomatically proven) fact of the individuation and identification of phenomena in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view in relation to the subject. More plausibly, it could amount to the claim, as suggested above, that the subject in relation to which e.g. objects are thus individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed—the I of personal identity, “consciousness”—consists itself just in phenomena, such that the intuition of personal identity, the I am I, is but a false intuition, a misperception, etc., in short, an elaborate hallucination or illusion. That would again be the claim of Reductionism: the I—the subject-in-itself in relation to which, etc.—is a sort of (upward causality) emergent property of the phenomenological elements themselves, a “mis”phenomenon tossed forth upwardly from the ever-churning phenomenological sea. On another level, however, Hume might be interpreted as saying “I, the subject of this experience, have no principle(s) by which to understand my nature as a subject.” However one wishes to interpret Hume’s famous denial, it seems clear, even to Hume, that he is on
this matter quite contradictory. In Book I of his *Treatise*, he writes,

There are some philosophers who imagine that we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF. . . . Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self . . ..” [p. 251]

But then in Book II of the same *Treatise* he writes as if he himself were one of the philosophers whom in the passage above he had scorned:

‘Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that ‘tis not possible to imagine, that anything can in this particular go beyond it. [p. 317]

That Hume was himself well aware of the problem is evidenced by his insertion in the Appendix of the Treatise:

But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involv’d in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. [p. 633]

Roderick Chisolm writes:

How can he [Hume] say that he doesn’t find himself—if he is correct in saying that he finds himself to be stumbling and, more fully, that he finds himself to be stumbling on to certain things and not to be stumbling on to certain other things? [Persons and Objects, p. 40]

Chisolm attributes Hume’s difficulties to a possible inconsistency:

The difficulty is that Hume appeals to certain evidence to show that there are only impressions or perceptions, and that when he tells us what this evidence is, he implies not only (i) that there is, as he puts it in his example, heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, but also (ii) that there is someone who finds heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, and moreover (iii) that the one who finds heat or cold is the same as the one who finds love or hatred and the same as the one who finds light or shade, and finally (iv) that this one does not in fact stumble upon anything but perceptions. It is not unreasonable to ask, therefore, whether Hume’s report of his fourth finding is consistent with his report of the second and third. If Hume finds what he says he finds, that is to say, if he finds not only perceptions, but also that he finds them and hence that there is someone who finds them, how can his premises be used to establish the conclusion that he never observes anything but perceptions? [p. 40]

Indeed, as our analysis has shown, even from a strictly empirical point of view, the subject does as a matter of phenomenological fact perceive both (1) the (geometrical) properties of the manifold of experience in relation to which phenomena are individuated and identified in space and time from the first person point of view and (2) the intuition of its own existence and
identity in space and time, namely, the \textit{I am I}, self-consciousness, the intuition of personal identity. The apparent excluder of Open Individualism we are now considering, however, is not Hume’s argument against the existence of the \textit{I} in experience; the apparent excluder is our actual experience (which Hume’s analysis merely directs our attention to). In a sense, we could say that to appease a Humean-Parfitian-Buddhist type of Empty Individualist it will not be enough merely to construct an argument for ourselves, we must deconstruct ourselves down to our actual experience and \textit{find} ourselves. What we need here is not a Conceptual Boundary Dissolve but an Experiential (i.e., Phenomenological) Boundary Dissolve. After all, ordinary life is already a Conceptual Boundary Dissolve of the Phenomenological (Experiential) Boundary. For one thing, the fact that we have a concept of personal identity (even within traditional Closed Individualism) shows that it is possible for us to view ourselves as the same person over time in spite of the plethora of phenomenological borders that would apparently exclude our ability to so view ourselves. Indeed, it seems that viewing ourselves as separate persons—the Illusion of Other Persons—is as necessary an illusion as the Transcendental Illusion, in the sense that no amount of philosophizing will alter its phenomenological hold over consciousness, the subject-in-itself, the \textit{I} of personal identity.

There is of course also the further fact of my Phenomenal World as such and, within it, my Phenomenal Self, replete with the \textit{I} and the \textit{I am I}; all of these are, in a sense, like drawings in the brain or, more precisely, like drawings within a drawing. What can be drawn can be conceived. In other words, it is one thing to debate the question of whether a (properly functioning, living) human brain can imagine itself being, say, a computer. To answer the question we must examine our concepts, since this imagining occurs only at the conceptual level. It is quite another to debate the question of whether the human brain can imagine itself being a person. For this imagining already occurs both at the conceptual and at the experiential level: we have the phenomenological facts of consciousness, the \textit{I}, and the intuition of personal identity, the \textit{I am I}, along with the concept of personal identity. To answer the latter question, a further philosophical analysis is needed not only of our concepts but also of our phenomenology, that is, of our experience from a purely phenomenological point of view. This would be in some ways analogous to a world in which everyone has always assumed that it is impossible for there to exist anything more than a ten sided figure and someone suddenly drawing one! Experience is, in an important sense, like the brain drawing. The Phenomenal Self, the \textit{I}, and the
I am I are, in that respect, like a drawing. The question of whether X, which can be drawn, can be conceived is here moot: what can be drawn can be conceived. The Phenomenal Self, the I, and the I am I are like drawings in the brain. But for any drawing to be meaningful it must be interpreted and so any meaningful drawing is like a visual story. According to the Phenomenological Boundary the Phenomenal Self is, in that respect, like a visual story we keep telling ourselves in each and every instant as we die. But who is telling it? For unless the subject-in-itself, the I doing the narratizing, is numerically the same someone over time (and space)—a being with personal identity—it is but a brief tale told by a series of brief, disintegrating idiots, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.

§10.10 DRAWING OURSELVES PHENOMENOLOGICALLY: THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIMSELF FOR THE WORLD

I have argued that the subject is a necessary condition for the having of experience as we know it. No subject, no experience. We can imagine automatons such as robots (e.g. Cog, discussed below) or computers without the subject but they would be literally dark inside, that is, they would not have an “inside” in the sense discussed in Chapter 6; without a Phenomenal World and a Phenomenal Self that the subject is identified as theirs would not be the life of a person. Could we tell the difference? Well, I can easily imagine how for instance Cog could for instance pass the Turing Test, or some appropriate philosophical upgrade of such a test. So I think there would in some cases be for us no ordinary way to tell. (On the other hand, I can also well imagine that there would be a way to tell, provided not so much by that the inquisition were led by a philosopher or philosophers, as that the being in question spontaneously or of its own accord engaged or began to engage in the second order activity of philosophy, that is, asking the right sorts of questions that involved thinking about thinking, looking at seeing, wondering about wondering, and so on.)

Dan Dennett and I, when we discussed exactly this sort of situation with regard to Cog in our “Consciousness, Self, and Reality,” ended up expressing the puzzle this way:

KOLAK: I find myself situated at what seems to be a location at the surface of my eyes, or thereabouts (some describe it as just in front and others as just behind the eyes), looking at what I see as the world outside me all around. Let’s call this location “the subject.” Let’s call the
immediate items I see “objects.” . . . The “I” in all these cases is “the subject.” . . . The problem is that when I think of the “external world” as containing the objects in my experience and the corresponding “internal world” as containing my thoughts and the items in my language, I construe myself, the subject, as existing at the interface between the internal and external world—as if the whole question of my trying to understand myself and my world has only to do with my thinking or talking correctly about the items I see—as if true knowledge of reality were only a question of building a bridge between perception and the intellect! I conveniently forget that both perception and the intellect, according to the very theories that allow me even to think about my thinking and look at my looking, exist squarely within the mind within which I, the subject, myself exist. In this way the mind plays a sort of trick on itself, a philosophical bait and switch, in which the issue (as it is presented to the subject) becomes that of relating perception and the intellect, rather than of how to relate percept and concept not just to each other but also to reality. The realization that the reality in question is not directly apparent (at least not clearly and distinctly) is conveniently swept under the rug. But that’s weird and strange! Why? Because the perceiving, thinking self does not exist outside the head, not ever! I, the subject, am at best a sort of projection of the brain or mind into its own virtual (or psychological) space . . . And when one puts it this way, the whole issue of reductionism of any kind—reducing mind states to brain states or brain states to mind states, or reducing the whole of reality to a physical process, or a cosmic mind, and so on—seems to rest on a conceptual mistake (the sleight of hand, the bait and switch) but not of the purely intellectual type so easily dispensed with in the way Quine and Ryle do it. If I (the subject) am just a cog in a wheel within the whole system within which I subsist, as I believe I am (I think you do too), don’t the philosophical and scientific quests for knowledge about ourselves and the world in terms of both the manifest and scientific image involve an elaborate metaphysical self deception that fundamentally and perhaps irrevocably taints the proceedings, in so far as they occur within what Kant called the transcendental illusion? That, of course, is an unfortunate term . . .

DENNETT: Whenever I confront these slippery bafflers about what/where/why I am, and what the relation is between that entity and the rest of the things I take seriously, I move resolutely outside, and take the third-person point of view about somebody else. In particular, I ask myself what I would have to do to make a self. Cog, for instance, the humanoid robot we’re building at MIT, does not yet have a self, is not yet conscious, but I like to think about just what more we have to add before I will be confident that there’s as real a self there as there is “in” me . . . . I ask myself what Cog would have to be able to do (my “behaviorism” is front and center here, and its denial simply swallows in mystery) to win my acceptance as another conscious being. Cog would have to be indefinitely sensitive to its own reactions (to its own reactions to its own reactions . . .) and capable of recalling, reviewing, evaluating, but also concealing, trying to distort, lying about, refusing to discuss these internal states . . . And now I can begin to imagine what it is like to be Cog, confident that there is like something to be Cog . . . . You note that what Kant called the “transcendental illusion” is an unfortunate term, and indeed it is—or was, since I think we are
beginning to emerge into the light by which we can see that there are benign illusions, benign in
every way that matters: user illusions . . . . Whenever such a phenomenon exists, there is a point of
view. Some are pretty minimal and uninteresting; others are, well, Us, and what could be more
interesting that us? [Kolak and Dennett 2000]

I have thus argued there and elsewhere that the subject is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the having of what ordinarily we call
“consciousness,” and that the subject’s intuition of its own existence and
identity in space and time—the intuition of personal identity—is necessary
and sufficient for the having of what ordinarily we call “self-conscious”
experience.

There could however be subjectless (Phenomenal) Selves, but they would
have in their Phenomenal Worlds the dimmed mental lives of animals at
best and be semi-conscious at worst. It’s not that the subject isn’t there, it is
(the Phenomenal World and Phenomenal Self are the subject); but there
would be no individual (i.e., reflexive) consciousness, no (compactified,
residual) subject-in-itself, no I, and certainly no intuition of the existence
and identity of the subject in space and time, the I am I, what ordinarily we
simply and naively call “self-consciousness.”

In the same vein we can likewise easily imagine that what it would be like
for the subject-in-itself, the I, to exist without the intuition of personal
identity: it would be very similar, if not equivalent, to what it is like to be a
Korsakoff patient: because there is in that case conscious experience
(Phenomenal Self and Phenomenal World) the subject is there and because
there is with the Korsakoff patient the subject-in-itself, the I, there is
consciousness but without the intuition of personal identity, the I am I, the
Korsakoff experience is that of ceaselessly coming out of a trance, of
waking up, such that the ordinarily hidden (at the macroscopic
phenomenological level) effects of quantum consciousness manifest
themselves in gross experience. (The problem with the Korsakoff, in other
words, is not with lack of memory per se but with consciousness, the
subject-in-itself, lacking the requisite intuition of personal identity that self-
consciousness is. Memories without consciousness and self-consciousness
are at best dispositional, not occurrent.)

We have also seen that what makes our ordinary, moment-to-moment
consciousness possible are the sorts of “user friendly” illusions Dennett and
I discussed above, inclusive of the Transcendental Illusion and Phantom
Identity. The latter results from the conscription of the subject-in-itself, the
I of personal identity, and the intuition of personal identity, the I am I,
under Reductionism, i.e., what Dennett calls “upward-causality,” rather
than Holism, i.e., “downward-causality:” the I (the subject-in-itself, “consciousness”) and the I am I (the intuition of the existence and identity of the subject in space and time, “self consciousness”) are interpreted automatically as emergent properties belonging to the Phenomenal Self (the I—consciousness—and the I am I—self-consciousness—are “owned” by the Self). This in turn makes possible the phenomenological fact that the intensional duration of the subject-in-itself, the I, across the temporal phenomenalological borders (because the I am I, the intuition of personal identity, i.e., “self-consciousness,” is appropriated or [falsely] “owned” by the Phenomenal Self) in which it exists overexceeds the intensional duration (in phenomenological time) of the I (hence Hume’s famous comment about the missing “Self,” i.e., permanent or continuously existing Self in experience; see §10.5).

Within the \epsilon/\delta manifold the I is singularly unique (in fact a singularity) in that it not only is the subject (the is of identity, as is the rest of the \epsilon/\delta manifold) but not the subject (primarily) identified as a non-subject, e.g. the Phenomenal Self or some aspect thereof, e.g. the phenomenal representation of a hand, etc., nor the subject (secondarily, tertially, or quartically) identified as a non-subject e.g. a (phenomenal representation of, say, a tree or a rock): the I is the subject presenting itself to itself not as what it isn’t but as what it is, namely, the subject (hence our locution, “subject-in-itself”); in other words, the I is not, strictly speaking, a representation and does not involve the (user-friendly) mis-identification involved in the construction of the Phenomenal World and Phenomenal Self. That is why I say that the I of personal identity is in fact the only aspect of experience (considered now in terms of the entire \epsilon/\delta manifold) that is thus, strictly speaking from a phenomenological point of view, not a representation.

Whereas the Transcendental Illusion makes possible the further phenomenalological fact that the intensional extension of the subject-in-itself, the I, across spatial phenomenalological borders (because the I is appropriated by the Phenomenal Self) intensionally underextends the actual extension of the I “in” the phenomenalological space within which the subject subsists identified as a Phenomenal Self (dissociated from the rest of its phenomenology, e.g. the Phenomenal World). Within phenomenalological space the experience of the subject is thus limited to that which the subject is identified as, namely, the Phenomenal Self “in” the Phenomenal World. And the intuition of personal identity, then, is itself a relation between I and I, that is, the relata of the intuition of personal
identity relations are themselves I. This is how the I (consciousness) and the I am I (self-consciousness) impose reciprocal phenomenological limits upon the subject’s primary identifications: by overextending the identity of the I in phenomenal time the I underextends the identity of the I in phenomenal space, thereby limiting (or phenomenologically focusing) the subject-in-itself, the I, to that which the subject is identified as, namely, the Phenomenal Self “in” the Phenomenal World.

We can illustrate this aspect of our phenomenological analysis of identification and identity most vividly with a closer look at the example of memory. Remembering myself dismembers me, it divides the person who I am into Self (the Phenomenal Self) and Other (the Phenomenal World), into subject and object, thereby divorcing me from all the rest of myself—i.e., divorcing the Phenomenal Self from the Phenomenal World. Seeing myself ‘there’ in the ‘past’ obscures me from being myself in the present, it keeps me from seeing myself whole. Identification as a Phenomenal Self alienates me from all the rest of my Phenomenal World; it phenomenologically fragments my existence (our user-friendly illusion in so far as this phenomenological bifurcation is itself a necessary condition for the having of experience, i.e., consciousness, as we know it).

At each moment identification dissociates the subject from its objects (i.e., the “object-images”) within the fourfold ε/δ manifold, thereby creating a Phenomenal World within and into which the I of personal identity (consciousness) is projected and phenomenologically bound through identification as, at the present moment, Daniel Kolak, a memory-bound, ‘objectified subject:’ the illusion of phenomenologically border-bound personal identity over time achieved through the illusion of non-identity with objects at a time (the Transcendental Illusion).

The subject is thus phenomenologically dissociated—projected, or phenomenologically transformed, as it were—from the totality of its existence and the actuality of the present moment into time, spread out backwards and forwards until it is aware of itself only as the Psychological Ego (a representation, an image, unlike the I) within the Phenomenal Self, the mind within the mind, divorced from its objects (object-images) in (phenomenal) space through self-identification in time. That is how association of phenomenological states of consciousness over time with each other—the Phenomenal Self, Daniel Kolak—dissociates consciousness—me, the person qua subject-in-itself—from all the rest of myself, strengthening further the (user-friendly) illusion that the world in my experience is not my own, a Phenomenal World as the Phenomenal Self
is, but an external thing, the Absolute Other. The feeling of my own existence as a Phenomenal Self—the subject-in-itself, the I, “consciousness”—and the intuition of personal identity, the I am I, are (mis)appropriated, or “owned” by my psychological identification, a phenomenological feat achieved through the feeling of my nonexistence as the surrounding objects in the (phenomenal) space of my experience through identification (primary, secondary, etc.). We could say: the fact of (personal) identity is revealed in the hidden interpretation of my (psychological) identification. This truth, obscured through identification as a Phenomenal Self, reveals the Phenomenal World in my experience to be external only to the Phenomenal Self, not to the (locally) transcendentally identical subject of which the subject-in-itself is but a projection via identification as.

In other words, we could from the phenomenological point of view say that I—the person who I am—literally mistake myself for a world. This helps foster a psychological predisposition toward Closed Individualism, paralleling the illusion upon which was built the pre-Copernican model of the solar system. It is, again from a purely phenomenological point of view, a false personology of appearances, in which everything revolves around the Phenomenal Self. A clever series of philosophical epicycles, involving a slew of fictions not the least of which is “naïve realism,” can make things more or less work out for such a view, should one want it or need it for practical navigation. Open Individualism on the other hand conscripts not the Phenomenal Self at the center of the World but, rather, conscripts the Phenomenal Self along with the Phenomenal World entire within the (logical) scope of the identity of the subject that, through identification as, exists as consciousness, the subject-in-itself, the I at the center. Taking thus the third step of Copernican Revolution (Kant’s was the second), Open Individualism makes personal identity not a derivative (external, relative, reductionist) relation of the Phenomenal Self over time but an integral (internal, invariant, holistic) relation of the subject. Our analysis can thus appease even the most radical neo-Humean, Parfitian Reductionist, or even a quantum-phenomenologist.

We now have, starting in Chapter 6, explained the subject-in-itself, the I—consciousness—and the intuition of personal identity, the I am I—self-consciousness—in terms of experiences that, as a matter of psychological fact, we do have. Indeed, as we said above, were it not for the subject (I) and the intuition of personal identity (I am I), we would experience a ceaseless awakening as if out of a trance, of coming to be, of emerging into
existence apparently out of nowhere, from nothing. The brute phenomenological fact of the matter is that there is not that experience. This is so even when there is no continuity as is ordinarily supposed necessary for such a state of affairs, as evidenced by Korsakoff patients (further discussed below). Rather, it is via the intuition of personal identity (I am I) that, from the limited perspective of this or any other Phenomenal Self, it seems, experientially, that I exist with identity in and over phenomenological time as presupposed by (and not revealed in) experience, as is ordinarily assumed, on the basis of various psychological and/or physiological relations.

Like the grasping hand that can let go of everything but not of itself, the intuition of personal identity is a non-representational relation of the subject-in-itself, via negativa, within the borders of each Phenomenal Self in which it occurs, that thus makes the various Boundary Dissolves, including the Ordinary Life Dissolve, seem not like death. We might even say, with intended contradiction: the intuition of personal identity (I am I), because it is a relation in intuition among relata each of which is itself not a representation but the subject-in-itself, the I (“consciousness”) is the “something” non-apparent behind the appearances making it seem at each moment that someone is there, that I, this consciousness, I am that someone and, moreover, I, this consciousness, have existed in moments prior and will exist in moments subsequent: I am I, the same consciousness, the same subject, the same person over time both in real life and across the various Boundary Dissolves, up to and including the Omni-Dissolve.

To speak in this way is not to posit a res cogitans—a substance that thinks, a Cartesian Ego—nor to posit some unobservable Kantian “unity of apperception” (known at best, as we saw in the previous chapter, only by its effects), or to deny James’ denial of the existence of consciousness (e.g. our discussion of Wittgenstein’s I in §2.1.3). It is but to note that both in our moment to moment lives and throughout the various Boundary Dissolves in which physiological, psychological and phenomenological identifications cease and are replaced by different psychologically identified bundles and complexes (up to and including psycho-phenomenological matrices), there nonetheless occurs within both sets of borders the identification of the subject as a Phenomenal Self, thereby producing the conscious experience of

a) someoneness
b) of being that someone
c) of existing
d) of personal identity
e) of continued existence over the specious present,

such that the various “masks” through which we interpret ourselves and the world—i.e., the Phenomenal Self—makes it possible for us both to experience numerically distinct Phenomenal Selves over time (falsely connected by psychological borders, e.g. memory) as being numerically identical while (automatically) (mis)-interpreting numerically distinct Phenomenal Selves at a time (falsely disconnected by phenomenological borders, e.g. lack of co-consciousness) as numerically distinct subjects.

So we have now from a purely phenomenological point of view in direct experience the verification of what makes experience as we know it possible, explaining why an impossible Closed Individual View of Personal Identity emerged as the only possible Received View while the Open Individual View of Personal Identity is the best View possible: our ubiquitous subject-in-itself, the \( I \), related, in intuition, by the intuition of personal identity, the \( I am I \), thereby making possible the feeling that \( I \), consciousness, am that and only that which I am identified as.

The reason Hume, Parfit and the other Empty Individual View Theorists may have not concerned themselves with attending more closely to the \( I \) and the intuition of personal identity, the \( I am I \), is because they are looking for a rational judgment that \( I am p \), i.e., they are looking for a criterion on the basis of which I can conclude that I am the same person over time. (Even not finding one in their experience nor in any of the underlying realizers of their experience is, in my View of their View, a missed possibility of seeing even in their View that the experience of a person is bordered but personal identity is not bound—that is the point of all the Boundary Dissolves.)

Clearly, the \( I am I \), our ubiquitous intuition of personal identity, is not a rational judgment that I am the same person over time (in which case, as an experience qua experience, given the fact of non-continuity of physiology, psychology, and phenomenology it would be a false experience). It is the direct and immediate intuition that someone, \( I \), a person, exists, that \( I am \) that someone, and that I am that same someone, the same person, over the specious present (which means that if we so limit our usage, it is from a purely phenomenological point of view a true experience, as shall be further explained below).

If (analytic) push came to (experiential) shove, however, we could say that the \( I am I \) is inclusive of an a priori and usually anoetic cognition of
reognition, not that some other, past experience is one’s own but that the very experience with which the subject-in-itself is itself experientially contiguous is one’s own.

The I am I is thus what the man on the street probably means to name when he describes (falsely) what he means when he says that he is “self-conscious, aware of his existence and identity over time.” Using our locutions, we would say that he is talking about psychological identification as that (ephemeral) Phenomenal Self, an identification consisting, experientially, in the experience that, at any moment, makes it seem both that someone exists, that he exists because he is that someone at that moment and that he continues to exist at other moments to which he does not, at that moment, have conscious access. (Again, a helpful phenomenological note: to see what I am saying simply contrapose the over-time phenomenology of your present View with the at-a-time phenomenology of your present View and you will see the possibility from a phenomenological point of my View. Or, think of them as mirror-Views where the reversal is not left-to-right but time-to-space, that is, in the orthogonal direction; or, you can think of the relationship between our Views in terms of their phenomenological cross-product.)

The point is that by itself the experience the man on the street is naming with his (false) description neither shows that he is the same person over time nor how it is possible that he is. But neither can we conclude—as the Empty Individualists are too quick to do—that because the poor man on the street has falsely described his experience, that the experience described is philosophically and metaphysically insignificant (described with more phenomenological precision it might be, and in our View is, more significant, not only experientially but also metaphysically) nor that the man does not have the personal identity he thinks he has on the basis of that experience which, as described by him, he does not in fact have. To do so would be on par with concluding, on the basis of (what we know to be) Jones’s false description of his own happy mental states (a description he thinks accurate), that therefore Jones is not really happy or, even worse, that Jones is therefore probably depressed. If psychological analysis of experience can help us to help Jones discover his true feelings, might not a phenomenological analysis of experience help us to help Jones discover his true personal identity (or lack thereof)?

Before proceeding still further along these lines let us distinguish carefully yet again, one more time, the intuition of personal identity, the I am I—the relation—from the subject-in-itself, the I—the relata of the
As we said above, consciousness—the subject-in-itself—could exist as a Phenomenal Self in a Phenomenal World but without identification as that Phenomenal Self, such that there would be no subject-in-itself, no consciousness, no “I.” The experience of animals, for instance, is arguably like that; I believe (and my experiments with autistic children strongly suggest) some (e.g. autistic) humans are like that. We could think of it as “consciousness (the subject-in-itself) without self-consciousness,” that is, the I of personal identity without the intuition of personal identity, the I am I.

As we thus already noted above, consciousness—the subject-in-itself, the I of personal identity—could in that sense exist, with identity, but without the intuition of personal identity, the I without the I am I. It would be consciousness without self-consciousness. We might, as Dennett and I theorized above, create an android aware of its environment not just in the sense that plants are aware of sunlight—without a Phenomenal World, without a Phenomenal Self—but also of itself in that environment, that is, with a Phenomenal Self in a Phenomenal World, which necessarily as we have argued would give rise to what could be called experience, even conscious experience, but without the intuition of personal identity it would not be a “self-conscious” experience, it would be consciousness without self-consciousness.

Clearly, when the plant turns toward the sun it is not because the sun is through the plant’s stem represented as a Phenomenal Sun in a Phenomenal World within which the plant is itself represented, through itself and to itself, as a Phenomenal (Plant) Self, etc. (In that respect, when the sleeping body not in REM sleep moves away from the blowing air-conditioner and toward the warm body next to it, it is moving more like a plant moving toward the sun than like a person moving toward another person.) That is why above we said that this sort of state of affairs could, in principle, be realized in an automaton, a “zombie.” The next level would be a case in which there was consciousness—the subject identified as a Phenomenal Self in a Phenomenal World—but without the intuition of personal identity, the I without the I am I. Such a state of affairs would best be described as a conscious automaton without self-consciousness, i.e., a conscious automaton that was not “self-conscious,” lacking the degree of personal freedom (in the orthogonal direction) that self-consciousness affords. Or, we might create the next version of Cog within whose Phenomenal Self that the subject is identified as there is, also, in addition to the subject-in-
itself—the I, consciousness, the locus of perspectivality within Cog’s Phenomenal World—replete with the intuition of personal identity; in that case Cog would be as “self-conscious” as we are. In this way we can logically explain without necessarily explaining away the unnecessary fuzzyness of terms like “consciousness” and “self-consciousness.”

In speaking thus of the I of personal identity (the subject-in-itself), and the I am I (the intuition of personal identity), we are demystifying consciousness, subjectivity, self-consciousness, and so on, not by “reducing” or “eliminating” but by deconstructing such concepts down to the phenomenological level of sensations, albeit a special sort of sensation. (The mystery of there being any sensations at all, of course, is not thereby demystified. But the I and the I am I, consciousness and self-consciousness, respectively, as we are explaining them, are to be understood as a special case of ordinary sensation, generatable, in principle, into any bordered psycho-phenomenological matrix such as, for instance, might be realized someday by Cog. If this is correct, then being a person, i.e., consciousness with the intuition of personal identity, is philosophically a much more simple a phenomenon than we might ordinarily suppose. The fuzzy question, “Is X self-conscious?” becomes, for us, the question: “Does X have a Phenomenal World with the subject identified as a Phenomenal Self, the I, along with the intuition of personal identity, the I am I?”) Note, again, that the I am I is not any particular bordered cognition, \( c_1 \), recognized within some other bordered cognition, \( c_2 \), as one and the same (i.e., as we shall see in more detail below, it is not a memory); it is the cognition of the (however brief) presence of the very cognition identifying the contiguous cognition(s) as one’s own, not over time but only over the specious present. That, in part, is what is meant in saying this thought I am now having is going on now and not some other. And when I am in fact able to conceive of myself as still being there while I am getting new experiences, new memories, a new body, a new brain, and so on, I do so, it seems, not because there is a comparison between past thoughts and present thoughts, nor because anything is continuing from one moment to the next, passing through the borders, etc., but because at each subsequent moment there is, as a matter of psychological fact, the subject-in-itself and the intuition of personal identity—denoted and expressed by I and I am I, respectively.

Thus the question to which we have been leading up: How is it possible that there is the intuition of personal identity, the I am I, when everything in the subject’s experience, up to and including the subject-in-itself in relation to which phenomena (e.g. the objects of perception) are individuated and
identified (localized) from the first person point of view, i.e., observed—the I of personal identity—if the subject-in-itself is itself from a purely phenomenological point of view a (phenomenological) non-continuant? This is our correlate to a revamped refinement of Hume’s original question, How is it possible that there is the feeling (mis-perception?) of a “permanent self”—i.e., a continuously existing consciousness, the I—in phenomenological time, when in fact there is no such phenomenologically permanent, i.e., phenomenologically continuous individual consciousness in experience? Hume never explains this. Nobody does. But we do.

Without the I and the I am I, as already noted, within each perception—in so far as there is the subject transformed into a Phenomenal World and Phenomenal Self without being “located,” or “projected” there via psychological identification—there would be either no conscious experience at all (leaving the possibility of non-conscious or unconscious experience) or else the sensation of being startled to find oneself existing: there could be in the latter case the subject-in-itself, simultaneously denoted and expressed by the first person indexical, I, without the intuition of personal identity, simultaneously denoted and expressed by I am I.

The fact that Hume is not at each moment exclaiming surprise indicates that there is within his psychological individuations both the subject identified as those individuations—a Phenomenal Self—and the intuition of personal identity contiguous with the borders of each new psychological individuation. Hume thus leaves us to wonder not only how it is possible that there is the illusion of a “permanent self”—i.e., the intuition of a self-identical continuously existing personal identity over time—if there really is none but, also, why is there not some other “illusion”? Why don’t we, for instance, experience ourselves as Buddha or Parfit-type series-persons? For the fact is that we do not. (c.f., §10.16, “Why Was Hume Not a Korsakoff?”)

Had Hume answered that question in terms of our subject-in-itself, the I, and the intuition of personal identity, the I am I, and thought through the various Boundary Dissolves through which, via negativa, there emerges on the basis of this bordered phenomenology the necessary conditions for the having of individual consciousness, as we have done and shall do in still more detail, he would perhaps have found a way out of his labyrinth—a way out that, as we shall see, leads into every other experiencing labyrinth. (Hume’s problem, in other words, is that he—the subject identified as that Phenomenal Self—was operating within the impossible from a logical point of view constraints of Closed Individualism, the View that personal identity
is closed under known individuating and identifying borders.)

The *I am I*, then—our ubiquitous intuition of personal identity—is but a (non descriptive) name of an experience that we have described inclusive of the subject’s intuition of its own existence and identity in space and time, that is, putting it now more precisely and ostensively, indeed, indexically (or communicatively), *over the specious present*, achieved in part along with the intuition of non-identity towards one’s own Phenomenal World (the Transcendental Illusion). Borrowing now from Nagel and relying on our earlier distinctions, we could thus say that what it is like to be a person is to be the subject identified as a Phenomenal Self such that from the subject’s first-person point of view on that Phenomenal Self there is the *I* of personal identity (what altogether we shall call, in §10.17, an *incarnation*, of the subject) and the intuition of personal identity, the *I am I*.

Just as we could give a non-descriptive name, “the sunco diz,” to the experience of “what it is like to be watching a sunrise, aware of the sun’s identity and continued existence over time,” independently of whether there is a real watcher, independently of whether the sun really has an identity and a continued existence over time, etc., so also giving the name, “the *I am I*” i.e., the intuition of personal identity, to an experience of what we might think of as subject depth-phenomenology, does not imply that the experience is of something real but merely that it is a real experience. We could easily distinguish both the sunco diz and the *I am I* from, say, the *zwa bongo*, the experience of what it is like to be a square triangle. Even though the former might not be experiences of anything real, clearly they are real experiences in a way that the latter is not.

Suppose, then, that as we are in fact supposing that someone nonetheless claims there is in actuality no such experience as the *I am I* or that, even if there is such an experience, it is in some important sense an illusion. (Even if this person was mistaken there would of course still be the question of how, even if there is such an experience and it is veridical, an empirically-based phenomenologically sound concept of personal identity could be established in virtue of this or any other experience.) What could we say to such an objector? (We could of course, only half-jokingly, answer with another question: *who* wants to know?) We might ask, first, what the having of any experience—real or illusory—could possibly consist in and, secondly, what the having of a “real” experience of personal identity could possibly ever, even in principle, consist in. For suppose someone is having an experience of a frog and this experience turns out to be imaginary—that is, there is no physical frog present. We can understand this. The experience
of a hallucinated frog is not a type of frog. But of course it is a type of experience. We can perfectly well distinguish our dead person in the grave who is not having any experience whatsoever from the drunk person who is having the experience of a frog when there is no actual frog present. The drunk is having an experience and the dead fellow is not. In neither case is there an actual frog there. But in the latter case there is an actual experience there.

If the intuition of personal identity, simultaneously denoted and expressed by I am I, is thus, merely, something like a “hallucinated experience of personal identity”—if it is a sort of “psychological hallucination”—then we might still value it on the same grounds that we value other such experiences which, arguably, do not exist independently of the conscious mind, such as, for instance, ordinary colors. That is, if in pointing to our intuition of personal identity someone objects that this is but a psychological image within the mind-image that has no reality independently of the mind, then the sense in which my existence does not consist in the having of any such “real” experience is merely the sense in which the existence of the Mona Lisa does not consist in the having of any “real” colors. This would be, at best, a philosophically underwhelming objection.

But how far, if anywhere—even as a real experience—can the I am I take us?

Readers who may have been anticipating the overall let us say independence friendly torque of our argument sets, should not be surprised that if it is the intuition of personal identity that succeeds in providing personal identity, even within the local case phenomenological-psychological bundles we call individual human beings, it will fail to discriminate between any human beings whatsoever, past, future or present. But of course if one View’s failure is another View’s success, then Open Individualism wins, not by default nor by accident, but by choice. Provided, of course, that the subject is willing.

§ 10.11 DRAWING OURSELVES (TEMPORALLY) IN PHENOMENAL TIME: BEING IN THE SPECIOUS PRESENT

The I am I is a real experience. Like the I of consciousness, the subject-in-itself, from a purely phenomenological point of view the intuition of personal identity lasts as a phenomenological continuant a bit (in fact, one
or maybe two bits) longer than the I itself (the subject-in-itself reciprocally individuated and identified as such, i.e., localized, in relation to its objects in space and time) but still not very long. (But of course we should not diminish this! It takes not much competence with Turing machines to realize that one goes as it were immediately from the starting problem to the halting problem!)

As with most experiences, the fact of there being a simultaneous interpretation of that experience (the I am I) according to (typically, transparent) background theory, unless one stops as best one can all thinking—verbal theorizing—and attends very closely to the borders of the experience, borders which are from a purely phenomenological point of view experientially discreet, will in the shadow of the background theory (through automatic interpretation) seem to be experientially seamless such that it will (falsely, as in the Phantom Limb case) give the duration of that very experience as longer than it actually is.

In other words, the intuition of personal identity may from a purely phenomenological point of view falsely make the subject-in-itself, the I, seem to extend in phenomenological depth and over phenomenological time beyond the actual depth and duration of consciousness itself, of the I, which, as we have seen, can itself be construed from a purely phenomenological point of view as a quantized state of consciousness localized as such within an overall quantized phenomenology. And so to avoid that the experience named by I am I is from a phenomenological point of view deeper or longer than that or any other experience actually is or lasts—which would in a sense be like naming the experience of a square triangle (in which case I am I would not be the name of a real experience but, at best, the name of a delusion)—we must (perhaps over) cautiously limit the depth and extent of the subject’s intuition of its own existence and identity in space and over time, respectively” to the specious present, defined for instance by Anthony Flew as follows:

*specious present:* The least temporal interval such that two modifications of experience, separated by that interval, may nevertheless seem to the subject to be co-present in his consciousness. [Dictionary of Philosophy, p.333]

This means that although we could speak for instance of past, present and future occurrences of consciousness, there is always one and only one actual I that is the privileged “present” occurrence and we shall limit, ostensibly, our reference to it. And by “specious present” we shall mean the specious present that can always, and only, from now a purely
phenomenological point of view, be defined ostensively. Although the borders will not be absolutely precise we can make them as precise as we like and there will thus always be a clear boundary for us to make our requisite distinction with regard to contemporaneous simultaneous unity in experience.

For instance, when I say “here, now” I might be looking at things far away and seeing things as they were some time in the past. Up to a certain distance, however, there will, in this universe, be a unity in the observer’s experience between light signals and sound signals and, beyond that distance, there will be perceived a disunity. Lightning that strikes close will be within this border; lightning that strikes far away will not. Stars will not. And so on. If we have to, we can always use the finite speed limit of light signals to stipulate the experiential borders of the indexical space-time-identity triple, “here, now, I.” It will be in terms of what is perceived simultaneity by the subject and is analogous to our Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment: phenomenologically speaking, up to a certain distance, within our experience, light and sound are exclusively conjoined and past that certain distance they are not. The flashing red light on top of the tower that I am now seeing would thus reside, when I say, “this moment right now,” from the point of view of my specious present, as within the borders of this “now;” the rising of the sun tomorrow morning would not.

Thus, experientially, any of us can at any moment in which we exist ostensively refer to ourselves from a purely phenomenological point of view as I, the subject who at this moment has this intuition of my own existence and identity in space an time, simultaneously denoted and expressed, i.e., communicated by I am I, itself (the communication, that is) occurring at that moment then and there, where and when the actual reference is being made and no other. Like Russell’s infamous chalk-mark on the blackboard, the I am I, the intuition of personal identity, is as an intuition a small enough phenomenological depth and extension of experience that even a momentary empiricist, or even a logical positivist, could well enough allow himself to refer to it without having to as it were go out on a phenomenological limb—provided of course—to paraphrase Russell—that he spoke very, very fast.

Sketching thus from a phenomenological point of view the borders of my experience, I can clearly enough say that from my present point of view I exist in the specious present not on page one of the first chapter this book but, rather, on chapter 10, page 467, line 38, column 55, etc. And although when I typed the last “5” on the keyboard the column marker changed to
“6,” we are here in the (tiny enough) ballpark with regard to my present temporal location. (The fact is that although I can type in the line number so that the number on the screen corresponds to the line marker at the top of the screen, I can never, on this computer, type in the correct column number such that the number typed on the screen and the number typed on the line marker correspond since the act of typing moves the cursor over to the next column.)

I just stopped writing, took a sip of water, and am now writing again. It doesn’t seem to me at this moment that I do not exist. It seems to me that I do exist. What makes it so? From a purely phenomenological view now this does: the individuation and identification of phenomena in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view in relation to subject, denoted and expressed simultaneously by \( I \). Moreover, it seems to me that I existed before the drink of water, during the drink of water, and now such that I will continue to exist for the next several moments at least. What makes it so? From a purely phenomenological point of view now this does: the intuition of my own existence and identity in space and time, respectively, denoted and expressed simultaneously by \( I \; am\; I \).

Now, whether or not I actually do exist in some absolute sense there is a clear now purely phenomenological sense in which from my present (purely phenomenological) point of view I do as a matter of fact experience myself as existing in the specious present of typing these words somewhere within the 10:48 p.m. minute mark on January 11, 2004, on page 468, etc., at least in a way that I can say that I do not, as a matter of fact, speaking from my present and occurrent phenomenological point of view experience myself as existing in the specious present typing the words on line one of page one of Chapter 1 in whatever year it was of the previous century when I began writing this book that if memory serves always seems to the author (if identity serves) to be either too long or not long enough. But I do not have to strain my imagination so far. Here I am now typing on page 468, line 30. Do I, this very subject-here-now, bordered (by definition but also by experience) in the specious present when “line 30” was typed, extend in phenomenological space and across phenomenological time to the subject-there-then bordered in the specious present when the title of Chapter 1, “Borders,” was being typed for the first time? From a purely phenomenological point of view, both by definition and by experience, we must answer: \( no, \; I \; do \; not \). From a purely phenomenological point of view, is that \( I\)-then-and-there and this \( I\)-here-and-now the same \( I \)? Well?

One may answer \( yes \). Or, one may answer \( no \). Which answer is correct?
Well, as I have been going to great lengths to try to show, to that answer there is no answer independently of theory. That “Yes” is a philosophically possible answer has taken some doing on our part, but it is possible—albeit, only, at best, in theory. Likewise, “No” too is a philosophically possible answer that is possible, at best, only in theory. The facts do not by themselves force either answer. We are, in other words, in a Kierkegaardian Either/Or situation . . . almost. Because we have gone to equally great lengths to try to show that if we answer no, then we must give up Closed Individualism in favor of Empty Individualism. We lose ourselves. Personal identity is not what matters, etc. If we answer yes, then we are all the same person, and we have given up Closed Individualism in favor of Open Individualism.

The reason that if we answer yes we are in Open Individualism is that what makes it from a purely phenomenological point of view seem that I now am one and the same I as I then in experience is the intuition of personal identity, denoted and expressed simultaneously to speaker and hearer, i.e., communicated—especially when they are one—by I am I. Names are not the name of the game. From a purely phenomenological point of view experience is.

§ 10.12 DRAWING OURSELVES (SPATIALLY) WITHIN THE PHENOMENAL WORLD: THE LOCALIZATION OF NONLOCALITY

Let us now attend even more closely to how from a phenomenological point of view the intuition of personal identity actually functions in our experience in order to identify, as best we can, not only the temporal extension of consciousness, the subject-in-itself (more precisely, the I’s location in Phenomenal Time, which is, for us, but another name for the having of experience)—as we have just done—but the I’s spatial location, that is, what is for us our location in the Phenomenal World.

Looking straight up, for instance, I do not see any phenomenal body (i.e., my body image): there is just the experience of “looking-up,” with all its content. Similarly, “looking inwardly” (toward the psychological bundle which I am identified as, consisting in the mind-image) there are certain aspects which I am identified as. Consciousness—the subject-in-itself in relation to which phenomena are individuated and identified (localized) in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, denoted and expressed simultaneously to hearer and speaker,
especially when they are one, by the first person indexical, \( I \)—thus identified and revealed to itself as such in the intuition of personal identity, denoted and expressed simultaneously, i.e., communicated, by \( I \text{ am } I \), is one of those aspects of consciousness, i.e., “self-consciousness,” that might by some be described as the “unseen seer,” located (in any specious present) apparently at the center of my Phenomenal World, the \( I \) thus situated, or located, in space and time.

Attending closely to my experience from a purely phenomenological point of view I now note that, also located at the center of my Phenomenal World, there is attention focused there on that part of my Phenomenal World—the picture on the wall, say—now (as I “move my eyes”) on that part—the picture next to it—and so on. There is no unseen seer seen, there is just the seeing and the what is seen, along with the facts that lead the subject to experientially infer the existence of the subject in relation to which those very phenomena are individuated and identified in persepcival space and time from the first person point of view, namely, the fact that the seeing and the what is seen occur not abstractly, in some realm beyond space and time, but in phenomenal space and time, that is, perspectively in relation to me, the reciprocally individuated and identified (in relation to said phenomena) subject, the \( I \). (This is in neither case from a phenomenological point of view not a rational inference but an experiential one, requiring the subject to notice in the case of the phenomenological fact of the perspectivality of its experience what we might call, “phenomenologically given, or vivid, perspectivality.”) We of course can, and do, talk about our eyes moving but, as a matter of fact, from a purely phenomenological point of view, there are no eyes moving. Wittgenstein may have been the first philosopher to clearly see this, and to find a way of saying, or perhaps I should say showing, it. (We could put it this way: to see this as a perfectly clear and distinct, not to mention complete individual, notion consider the Phenomenal World to which you attend in a dream; your looking at this object in the dream and then that one in dream is not achieved by moving your “dream eyes.” Allow me also to remind the reader at perhaps this late point, as I do again on the next page, that the geometry of waking experience and the geometry of dream experience is in this and virtually all other respects quite the same. They but slightly vary in their topologies, with regard to singularity theorems.) Attending very closely to our experience from a phenomenological point of view reveals not an unseen seer moving his eyes about but, rather, an apparent shifting in the way the Phenomenal World itself appears to me, which consists,
experientially, not even in an apparent shifting of the eyes. There are all phenomenologically vivid givens, i.e., phenomenologically vivid aspects of my experience. (In other words, these are all variety of what are sometimes called *qualia*.)

Staring now at the point at the center of what I identify as the photograph, “Tibetan Monk With Cat” by Larry Model, on my wall, I ask: what exactly is *focused* on that point? The point is in focus. There are many things in focus . . . now, clearly, *there is no subject in focus, no I in focus*. That, in effect, was Hume’s discovery and Wittgenstein’s insight in 5.633 of the *Tractatus* regarding the location of the “metaphysical subject”:

You say this is just like the case with the eye and the visual field. But you do not really see the eye. And there is nothing *in the visual field* to let you infer that it is being seen through an eye. [*Tractatus*, 5.663, Kolak 1998a.]

It is my *attention* that seems to be focused *there* where I am looking. But, again, what is here being experienced is not the noumenal (e.g. physical, mod relativities and/or quantum *non*mechanics, the latter term being the one that David Bohm considered the far more apt) world as it presents itself to the noumenal (e.g. physical) eye (noumenal—physical!—light, after all, consists of photons and waves that as such are not even *bright* any more than atoms jiggling in place are “warm”—the brightness of light waves and the warmth of molecular motion, in that respect, can be regarded as a variety of *qualia*) but, at best, a (re)presentation of what the ([locally] transcendentally identical) subject (i.e., or what can even be thought of, for the sake of argument, as the brain) presents to itself (i.e., the mind) via the subject identified as a Phenomenal Self in a Phenomenal World. And the part of this Phenomenal World that consists in visual sensations is a (re)presentation within this psycho-phenomenological matrix within which, in turn, the Phenomenal World is being manipulated by e.g. some “higher” aspect of me (i.e., the Noumenal Subject, possibly just the brain). I may represent myself to myself cognitively as a seer but from a purely phenomenological point of view, experientially, that part of my Phenomenal World that seems “near” or “far” is just where I am; this whole representation is but an aspect of the Phenomenal Self.

This can more easily—albeit perhaps more strangely—be seen in what I have elsewhere called the “False Geometry of the Phenomenal World.”*9* It is least strange when presented within a Dream Analog. You’re in a dream. There is no light inside your head. Yet the ‘scene before your eyes’ presents itself to you as if the light you see has traced the following geometrical
path: from some light source (what—where—is the ‘light’ source in a
dream?) to the ‘surface’ of the objects (as if they had an inside!) which in
turn sent the ‘reflected light’ you see through space (what is the space, the
medium of light, you see in a dream?) to your ‘eyes’ (what ‘eyes’ do you
see with in a dream?) which in turn sent an impulse to your ‘brain,’ causing
the perceptions you see to exist as ideas in your ‘mind.’ This false geometry
of dreams lies at the root of the illusion that the world in your experience is
external to your mind, a mathematical self-deception written into the
meaning of the ‘scene before your eyes,’ structuring your experience of
your Phenomenal World. For in fact no such geometrical path is involved in
the generation of the objects in your dream. The ‘eyes’ through which you
see the dream are not eyes. The ‘head’ inside which you are situated in the
dream is not a head but a world inside which there is no brain, no processor
of information distinct from the mental objects of your perception. In a
dream the nonexistent head you are in is but a vantage point from which the
subject experiences the dream. The objects you see ‘outside’ yourself,
including the headless body with the world atop its shoulders and the
subject (you) who you take to be not the subject but your head, are
generated not one from another (from the object to the subject via, say,
some Lockean-based notion of physical-to-mental perception) but in one
simultaneous act of consciousness, what is sometimes called, simply,
following for instance the pioneering phenomenological groundwork of
Brentano, intentionality.

The dream and waking case are from a purely phenomenological point of
view the same. Thus, in other words, “far” and “near” are themselves but
representations—those phenomenal elements that I am looking at right now
when I see the “Monk” photograph are neither far nor near from me: in an
important (locally transcendental) sense I am them. They are but the part of
the Phenomenal World that is most sharply created. I can of course blur my
focus and so it is not just visual: attention, awareness, qua subjective
phenomenological aspects of the subject, I, in relation to which these
phenomena are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time
from the first person point of view, i.e., observed—their selves (some sort of,
perhaps anoetic) representations—do not themselves consist from a
purely phenomenological point in any visual sensation. Attention and
awareness are more like aspects of visual sensation. And a really strange
aspect that the presence (localization) of the subject (within the manifold as
a compactification, or singularity, thereof), the I, and of the intuition of the
existence and identity of the subject in space and time, the I am I, bring to
the Phenomenal World is the sensation—in terms of, say, actual phenomenological quanta, or *qualia*—of there being a *distance* and a *depth* between Self and Other, the feeling of being on one side (on the invisible inside—the “inside of the inside”) of the Phenomenal World. This is an illusion created in part by the “body-image” (Phenomenal Body) without a head in the Phenomenal World, when really I am every aspect of this Phenomenal World only one part of which I am identified as, namely, the Phenomenal Self (the body-mind image). The subject—i.e., the subject-in-itself, “consciousness,” the *I*—thus takes the place, as it were, of the missing phenomenal head on top of the phenomenal body and places “me,” the subject, into the Phenomenal World as if I were a transparent window on the outer surface of the missing phenomenal face. (Speaking metaphorically, we could say that just as the brain flips the upside-down image on the back of the retina right-side up, and the way that mirrors reverse images left to right, so the Phenomenal World is the world turned inside-out: the subject appears not as what is behind the mask but as what is in front of it—the correction, or shift, of philosophical perspective provided by our third Copernican revolution.)

Now, in addition to a variety of bordered phenomenal objects in any Phenomenal World, there is, from the Phenomenal Self’s first-person point of view, the perception of the borders of other bodies one of which is perceived without a head and identified as one’s own from that “headless” point of view, as discussed in detail in Chapter 6. That is where, if we wished to speak of the subject, *I*, as located anywhere within the borders of this Phenomenal World (including the Phenomenal Self), it would be.

For instance, when I see my reflection in the mirror I see a head on top of the shoulders where from my immediate first-person point of view there is a phenomenologically “filled void” and I infer that the reflection in the mirror is that of my own head, which I identify with, but—and this is an important difference—is not what I am identified as. For phenomenologically I am “over here,” at the point from which this entire Phenomenal World seems to be experienced at the exclusion of any other, not “over there” in the part of the Phenomenal World that is my ([re]presentation)al experience of the reflection in the mirror. The image in the mirror is a reflection of me. The image (of which we can speak, albeit problematically because this can never, ever be shown, as being “in” or “on the surface of” the brain) that is the Phenomenal Self is what I am identified as (and what, in §10.18, will even more precisely be defined from a phenomenological point of view as “an incarnation,” Ψ, of the subject). In the reflection in the mirror I see a
head and so identify with that image and naturally recognize myself as belonging to the same category as other humans. But phenomenologically I view my Phenomenal World not from there but from here, from this “vastly filled headless void,” not from there in the part of the Phenomenal World that appears as a reflection of a head in a mirror. Notice that the I is not the psychological ego, an image, but phenomenologically speaking the absence of image, a phenomenological blind-spot, to where all images are directed. Virtually all ego psychologies have up to this point not only missed the metapsychological and metaphysical significance of this point, but missed this very point entirely.

Now, I know that from, say, your perspective (let us say you are in the room with me) there is not seen a “headless void” here on top of my shoulders but, rather, that phenomenologically speaking this is what you see at the point where your head would be if you could see exactly what I see: in your Phenomenal World I appear to you as you appear to me in my Phenomenal World, with a head. Clearly, if you were here in my study with me there would be two Phenomenal Selves each in its own Phenomenal World that we have every reason to believe are qualitatively similar to a certain requisite degree yet each experienced from a slightly different perspective or point of view. Leibnizian Monads are especially apt in this scenario, as are Russell’s logically atomistic discreet perspectival worlds. For in a sense what makes it possible for that part of the universe to communicate with this part is not that the parts can see into each other—each Phenomenal World exists, in that sense, as a windowless monad—but, rather, that our individual Phenomenal Worlds are in a certain and clear sense not “off-line” but “on-line” (see the “Point of Contact Problem” in §11.7); our Phenomenal Worlds can even be conceived as Epiphenomenal Worlds exactly in the way envisioned, and required, in Leibniz’s system. Except what makes it possible for us to dream contemporaneously and veridically with each other is not God (or the Noumenal Unidentified Subject, i.e., “NUS”) nor a pre-established harmony but, rather, that we are the same individual consciousness, the same subject identified as different Phenomenal Selves in different Phenomenal Worlds: the (locally) transcendental identity of the subject in each Phenomenal World—Metaphysical subjectivism, the Open Individualist philosophy of choice (but not of necessity, unless one is already in the IF logic mode)—is in fact what makes realism and objectivity possible from a purely phenomenological point of view. It is this ability to exist, with identity, in many worlds that connects the subject, experientially, to many worlds;
indeed, insofar as the subject is a subject, if we ask what the Noumenal Subject “has” as its “transcendental ‘Objects,’” the best answer would be given in terms of something like, “Phenomenal World-subject-in-itself totalities.” In other words: the “noumenal” objects of the noumenal ‘unidentified’) subject are all the Phenomenal Worlds within which the Noumenal Subject is identified as each and every Phenomenal Self. (Recall our earlier discussion in §2.2.3.2 of Weak, i.e., Closed World Nonlocality, Strong, i.e., Many Worlds Nonlocality, and Ultra, i.e., Open World Nonlocality.) If we then simply had to ask by whom then all these many different Phenomenal Worlds are experienced (and, as we shall see, we don’t have to), the best possible answer would be, indeed: the Noumenal Subject.

§10.13 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL BLACK HOLE AT THE CENTER OF THE THIRD COPERNICAN REVOLUTION REVIS(IT)ED: DRAWING OURSELVES INTO THE CENTER OF THE WORLD

As we have noted, although it seems that “moving my eyes about” is but a shifting of the Phenomenal World, attending closely to experience reveals that the Phenomenal World no more moves than does a movie screen upon which images are projected thereby producing the illusion of motion. It is the “projections” (individuations and identifications) within the Phenomenal World—the content—that is being “shifted around.” Thus, if with my eyes open I turn my eyes such that I am looking at the very “borders” of my present Phenomenal World, the moment I close my eyes I see that really I am always in the middle—not on the edge—of the Phenomenological black hole. The fact is that I can never actually project the visual focus to the edge of the Phenomenal World—i.e., consciousness, the I, cannot ever find itself identified as the “edge” for the I is then suddenly in the center. Even when at the border (when the visual focus is centered there) the I cannot stretch out past the border; the I is always the Wittgensteinian invisible dot at the center.

Furthermore, let us again remind ourselves that, in a sense, what ordinarily we call the “inside” is no more the inside that what ordinarily we call the “outside” is outside, as follows. From a purely phenomenological point of view, every visual component of what is being seen is but an aspect
of the Phenomenal World. In a sense, this is what the inside of my head "looks like." But what does it mean to say that this is what the inside of my head looks like? Well, in a sense, yes, this what I am now seeing is, literally, what the inside of my head looks like. But this is not what the inside of my head would look like if I, the identified subject in intuition, through the Phenomenal Self that I am identified as (a [re]presentational construction inside the head looking at a reconstruction of the outside) could look in say by opening up my skull and holding a mirror up to my brain. If I did thus “look in” I would in fact see a Phenomenal World—a Phenomenal World part of which looked like a brain! But this of course would be a phenomenal representation of a brain—what in Chapter 6 we defined as an “object-image”—not a phenomenal representation of a Phenomenal World. What would a phenomenal representation of a phenomenal representation look like? The seen brain, which is an object image, would be identified as a non-phenomenal representation even though in reality it is a phenomenal representation. One cannot ever, even in principle, it seems, have a phenomenal representation of a phenomenal representation that is identified as exactly what it is.

Thus, we have above described, well enough for our present purposes, the location of the nonlocal I, consciousness (the localized nonlocal subject-in-itself) not only within phenomenological space and time but also within the Phenomenal World; that is, we can locate the I in Phenomenal Time—in experience, or more precisely as a three dimensional intuition of the ε/δ manifold—and the Phenomenal World—Phenomenal Space. The I, however, is not just like a passive cursor we draw ourselves with, it is more like an active cursor that draws us into the center of our drawing. In other words: the subject-in-itself, the I, is what draws the (locally) “transcendentally identical” nonlocal subject (the ε/δ manifold) into itself.

Consider: once again I look up at the photograph on my wall. Again I recognize it. But within the borders of my experience there is only one photograph present. How then am I able to recognize it? In my occurrent psychology there is no “cognition” vs. “recognition;” there is only cognition. Well, but the fact is that when I see the photograph I am not shocked. I do not scream with surprise, “Where did this photograph come from?” The fact is that the photograph does not look new to me. We say, “It looks like the same photograph that has been hanging there.” But when we say “it looks like” the same photograph that has been there, it is not that actually, within present phenomenological borders, there is a comparison of content being made by which such similarity is established. The experience
of “looking the same” is itself a cognition. On what is it based?

Again, there is not some semi-transparent “remembered” photograph projected, into my Phenomenal World, over top of the experience of the photograph presently reconstructed in my Phenomenal World that I see as, and call, “the photograph on the wall.” There is only my experience of the single photograph on the wall. How then do I know it is the same photograph I saw before? Not by comparing the present sensation to some previous sensation and making the identification rationally. (I might be able to do it that way, but this is not how, in fact, I do ordinarily do it.) Rather, my present experience of the photograph, like the other ψ in which my experience consists, arrives already identified as the same photograph (an example of primary, not tertiary identification). This identification is not derived from within the borders of experience but arrives contiguous with it. That is why I am not at each moment surprised by new phenomenological events and why I do not have to consciously “do” anything to not be surprised. Were the identification not contiguous with each ψ but, rather, it was required of me to make identity judgments by deriving them from the borders of present content—if the identification was a phenomenological derivative of experience rather than an integral—there should forever be among present individuations nothing but screaming and pointing, “What is that?” “Where did this come from?” “Eeek!” And so on. (It will not be difficult to understand what is here being said if one thinks of dream experiences where one is constantly, as a matter of fact, bombarded by strange and incongruous perceptions—things pop in and out of existence, one sees things that one “recognizes” but which one has never before seen, etc.—and yet, regardless of how bizarre the experiences, one is rarely, if ever, startled by what one is seeing from one moment to the next.)

Let us look once again, as no doubt Wittgenstein if he were here with us would have us do, at an ordinary photograph. Within the borders of my present Phenomenal World, the photograph on the wall is individuated from the wall via the frame, color, pattern, etc., each of which, in turn, can be defined, experientially, by the tracing of borders among perceptibles. The green trees and the blue river, the monk’s orange robe, individuated from each other by color borders, etc., belong to the one photograph. This is not a conceptual deduction. The fact is that these bordered individuations are automatically identified as one photograph; I don’t have to do any thinking or reasoning to make them seem like the elements of one photograph. They in fact arrive already interpreted, as it were, as one photograph consisting in green trees, a blue river, an orange robe, an orange cat, etc.
I close my eyes. There is now, from a purely phenomenological point of view, qualitatively, a very different Phenomenal World—a phenomenological black hole, in fact—in which the subject as it were finds itself qua subject, the I: I “find” myself. (One must actually here shift linguistically from “Phenomenal World” to “Phenomenal Field” because, in fact, the moment I shut my eyes what I see is no longer a [geometrical] world but a [algebraic] field, and the moment I open my eyes what I see is not a field of any sort but a world. This is just an upgrade of the point that what I see from a purely phenomenological point of view are not phenomenological perceptions but phenomenological objects.) The Phenomenal Field is an iridescent, corpuscular black, perhaps best described as sizzling with bursts of phenomenological energy, what one of my experimental subjects once most vividly described as “a phenomenological black hole full of ephemeral stars”—and the visual aspect body-image is gone (but not the tactile body-image) and there is the mind-image; and there is the individuation and identification of these phenomena in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view in relation to the reciprocally thereby individuated and identified subject, denoted and expressed simultaneously, i.e., communicated, by I, as well as the subject’s intuition of its own existence and identity in space and time, respectively, communicated by I am I. Thus in that specious present it seems to me that I exist now rather than when I was a little boy, and that I am I” holds of the two indexicals just thereby each individually denoted and expressed simultaneously, etc. And certainly there is no white wall, no photograph with green trees and a blue river. I now open my eyes. The “sizzling black void” Phenomenal Field becomes, instantly—it is transformed into—a Phenomenal World. There is the one photograph on the wall and I recognize it as the same photograph that was there prior to the black Phenomenal Field. But from a purely physicalist point of view the light waves hitting my eyes are numerically different. In physical theory the quantum particles have gone through a myriad changes, and so on. There is, furthermore, no comparison between this (post-void Phenomenal Field) photograph and the previous (pre-void Phenomenal Field) photograph; I do not have to think or judge whether this one is the same as that one: the image arrives with the Phenomenal World, already identified as one and the same photograph I saw a moment ago, just as the blue sky and the white mountains occur already automatically interpreted as one photograph. This is what I mean when I say that such phenomenological identifications are, experientially, not a derivative intuition of experience but integrals: they are
not intellectual (conceptual) deductions but direct and immediate phenomenologically “transcendental” insights (so long as we do not extend them past the phenomenological borders of the experience in which they occur, as we are here being extremely careful not to do).

Let us now ask how this sort of psychological identification functions not as it does in that part of the Phenomenal World interpreted as “out there,” allowing me to see a bundle of diverse elements as “one painting” but rather, in this part of the Phenomenal World interpreted as “me,” to allow me to “see” the “one (momentarily present) I” among a bunch of diverse occurrences and events. Any experience does in fact seem to be the experience in which the I, the subject, is there: the I is in that sense from a purely phenomenological point of view expressible—albeit given the epistemic constraints of space and time, not showable—as the name of that very experience.

I close my eyes again. The Phenomenal Field is a void, black. (If we wanted to know what from a phenomenological point of view the subject-in-itself itself would “look like” if only it could be seen, then perhaps that is as close as we can get to it: since with eyes open what I am looking at is not a direct perception of the objective, physical world but, rather, a Phenomenal World that is a representation of that world [even my “eyes,” like my seeing, are phenomenal representations], with eyes closed what I am looking at is not a direct perception of the subject but, rather, a subjective, Phenomenal World that is in some sense a representation of the subject presenting itself to itself, i.e., to the subject-in-itself, as the Noumenal Unidentified Subject (NUS). Or, we could say, if by “subject” one means merely the brain, then the way the brain, which lives in darkness, represents itself to itself is not a direct perception of the brain but, rather, a world-image that is in some sense a representation of the brain: its [re]presentation can at any instant, it seems, become anything, that is, the black Phenomenal Field can be transformed into—it can become—any image. Which, in either case—given that the eyes through which the seeing occurs are not open windows to the outside world but phenomenal windows to the Phenomenal World—seems equally remarkable.) And, what also is true in any case is that the blackness “feels familiar.” Furthermore, it is just one, I don’t “see” any borders: no distinctive or functional edgings occur (unless I start to imagine things). This black Phenomenal Field still “feels familiar.” But there is only one black Phenomenal Field now “being seen,” and no other. Again, this feeling of familiarity is not a judgment, an intellectual (conceptual) interpretation, a phenomenological derivative of
experience, etc. It is a phenomenological intuition (but only within the phenomenological borders of that very experience and no other). The feeling of familiarity does not belong to the black. It is not a property of the black. (The black does have some apparent properties—for instance, sensed space. But the black of course is not a real space. It is more like a real point. It feels like a space but is like the distance between a real point and itself in the visual field when the eyes, looking at a single point, are crossed and there is the sensed “distance” between the two “apparent” points when in fact there is only one “real” point. It is more like “virtual” space than real space. Wittgenstein’s “point” again is to the point.) Rather, the feeling of familiarity seems to be an essential property of me.

What about that which is simultaneously denoted and expressed by I am I, namely, the intuition of personal identity? This is, in fact, within any experience in which consciousness—the I, the subject-in-itself—itself, occurs, a sort of “deja-vu toward itself.” That is, it is a psycho-phenomenological identification as myself but without the sensed presence of any psychological object. The “recognition of familiarity” is a psychological identification of sorts but without any psychological individuation serving as the object of that identification: it is an identification thrown not toward any object but back toward itself—it is pure subjectivity. It is what is left, via negativa, when I remove (as in the Omni Dissolve) all other aspects of my being and may thus be an aspect of exactly that which Hume was searching for and what is there hidden, in the very center of the labyrinth.

This would mean, for instance, that a Parfitian-inspired locution such as “I am self-conscious, aware of my identity and continued existence over the specious present” is not a subject-predicate proposition. It means, simply, “the subject is there, the localized non-local subject-in-itself, along with the intuition of personal identity.” In that sense the I is a name, not a predicate, allowing for the same sense in which the good Russell explained that ‘this is red’ is not a subject-predicate proposition, but is of the form ‘redness is here’; that ‘red’ is a name, not a predicate; and that what would commonly be called a ‘thing’ is nothing but a bundle of coexisting qualities such as redness, hardness, etc. [An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth, p. 92]

If we marry this aspect of Russell’s logico-linguisticism to the reunion of pure analytic (formal) mathematico-logical phenomenology, then indeed the identity of indiscernibles becomes analytic, and the supposed Eiffel Tower in New York would be strictly identical with the one in Paris if really indiscernible from it. This requires, when analyzed, that spatial and temporal relations, such as to-the-left-of or before, should not imply
diversity. This causes difficulties in the construction of space-time as required in physics [which] can be overcome, but only by admitting as empirical and doubtful certain propositions which have seemed certain, such as ‘if A is to the left of B, A and B are not identical,’ where A and B are the nearest approach to ‘things’ that our theory allows. [p. 92, my emphasis]

Similarly, we can then now as it were safely say that “Smith is to the left of Jones” does not automatically imply diversity of the subject, since the I is, on the view to which we are at present literally trying to open ourselves, not a thing but a “mere quality, like a color,” that is, the I is not a substance, and in so far as any occurrence of the I is in and of itself qualitatively indistinguishable from any other, we could say of it what we can say of the color red:

When I say that redness can be in two places at once, I mean that redness can have to itself one or more of those spatial relations which, according to common sense, no ‘thing’ can have to itself. Redness may be to the right of redness, or above redness, in the immediate visual field; redness may be in America and in Europe, in physical space. . . . We are supposing that there are only qualities, not also instances of qualities. [pp. 94 - 96]

Similarly with our ubiquitous subject-in-itself: the I is not a thing. In so far as when I say, pointing to myself, “consciousness—the I, the subject-in-itself—is here,” and point to you and say, “consciousness—the I, the subject-in-itself—is there,” what I am saying is that consciousness is a nonlocal phenomenon (to the degree that we can speak of consciousness as a phenomenon) that occurs at more than one “place” at a time and in a way that is perfectly consistent with Open Individualism.

§10.14 DRAWING OURSELVES INTO THE ONE MULTIPERSPECTIVAL REALITY, OR RESTORING THE SUPPRESSED Z-COORDINATE TO GÖDEL’S UNIVERSE: THE ULTRA (OPEN WORLD) NONLOCALITY INTERPRETATION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

I get up from my desk. The getting up feels familiar, even though this getting up never happened before. The walking feels familiar, though this instance of walking never happened before. I put on my jacket, which feels familiar, etc., and also the mode of presentation of these perceived actions feels familiar: they each occur as personified from the first-person point of view, etc., along with the “moving body-mind image,” my Phenomenal Self. As we have seen, there is within and among the borders of any
psychological individuations no comparison of content being made in terms of which similarity is established. The fact is that each experience occurs such that neither the subject, the \( I \), nor the intuition of personal identity, the \( I \text{ am } I \), is derived from within any psychological borders via any cognitive comparison of content. Contiguous with each psychological occurrence there is both ready-made reference and ready-made sense.

When I very slowly and with great care think that very thought, “\( I \ldots \text{ am } \ldots I \),” there is noticed (rather than inferred) in the utterance of each “\( I \)” both a reference and a sense. The reference noticed is a psycho-phenomenological bundle—the one occurring (individuated in time) now. This psycho-phenomenological bundle consists, experientially, in the awareness of the borders of speciously present psychological content. The sense noticed is a psychological identification not with some other individuations (with which it would then be compared) but, rather, is indexical, toward itself. Experientially, the “toward itself” does not imply that the experience is extended in time beyond the specious present but, merely, that it can occur in exactly the same way—indeed, will so occur—regardless of the border in which it occurs. Thus, for instance, when Russell remarks that what it would feel like if the world had begun only five minutes ago, such that no events prior to five minutes ago ever actually occurred but are merely apparent memories none of which, in reality, are more than minutes old, he was in effect saying the same thing.

I go back and read the sentence above, “\( I \ldots \text{ am } \ldots I \).” That experience of reading is not the same as the experience of writing. They may be qualitatively similar events but they are not numerically identical, in the sense that that one occurred at time \( t_1 \) and this one occurred at time \( t_2 \). Actually, I am at the present moment rewriting this chapter and so it is some time since I wrote that sentence; as a matter of fact, I forgot that I had written it. I was even surprised when I read it. Someone else who sneaked into my library and began typing into my computer could, as far as I know, have written it. And so on. The point is that, memory notwithstanding, there is this unobvious sense in which you (the reader) and I (the present writer writing these very words right now who read the sentence above and who no longer remembers having written it) stand in a closer relation to each other as each being the subject than I (the subject in the specious present in which these words are appearing for the first time on this screen) stand to the subject that, for the first time, wrote that sentence, “\( I \ldots \text{ am } \ldots I \).” This is because the sense in which you and I can, in principle, sit together in a room reading this book aloud to each other, neither of us can in that same
sense sit together in a room and be there co-present with the I-then when that sentence was for the first time being written. That is the sense in which the several billion human beings existing simultaneously on this planet right now stand in a closer relation to each other as each being the subject-in-itself therein exclusively conjoined, etc., a relation that, in an important sense, puts them closer to each other than to “themselves” of even one instant ago.

Just as with the photograph on my wall, then, there is for any I at any one time only one Phenomenal Self present. There is no semi-transparent image of a Phenomenal Self projected over top of the present Phenomenal Self to mark it, in terms of its content, as the same as some other, previous, psychological individuation or set of individuations. In experience there is no such double-vision. That is what I meant in saying that the I is not established by any experience (is not a derivative of experience), nor reducible to the phenomenological elements of experience, nor dependent upon any phenomenological borders at all but occurs, ready-made, in every experience (it is an integral of it). Moreover, the I am I, the (space-like and time-like) intuition of the subject-in-itself, namely, the intuition of personal identity, within each and any Phenomenal Self which the subject is identified as, functions much like the awareness that one understands what one is experiencing, what in §10.1 chapter we called, “the intuition of understanding.” The intuition of personal identity—denoted and expressed simultaneously, i.e., communicated, by I am I—is not arrived at by experience. It arrives with experience, it is contiguous with it. That is why I say that the intuition of personal identity, I am I, is not a memory but, rather, that which makes a memory seem to be mine.

The I am I, then—itself contiguous with the tertiary identification of the subject—functions not merely indexically, but also as sensed psychological identification with other, non-present, psycho-phenomenological individuations (at some other time) and as some present psycho-phenomenological individuations; thus it is the I am I that makes possible from a purely phenomenological point of view for a set of present experiences (these experiences going on here and now) to be sensed as if there is not just experience in relation to the subject, i.e., consciousness, but in relation to an experiencer aware of its own existence an identity, i.e., self-consciousness, the person identified as a Phenomenal Self through whose first-person point of view is sensed what is meant in saying, “I am me, numerically one and the same person over time.” It is the intuition of personal identity that makes any experience seem like the experience of
someone, regardless of the experience that preceded it, and what would make any experience seem like the experience of someone regardless how remembered experiences were switched about, as in the various Boundary Dissolves. But neither is the non-indexical, “extended” psychological identification with other psycho-phenomenological bundles inferred from, or established by, one’s present psychological borders: one does not arrive at psychological identification from within the borders of an experience; rather, the content of an experience arrives already sensed with psychological identification. (The subject-in-itself, the I, can, in that regard, because of the I am I, be conceptually likened to the [Wittgensteinian] extensionless point where the Noumenal Unidentified Subject [NUS] “touches” the subject-in-itself identified as the Phenomenal Self.)

Consider, by analogy, the so-called “blind spot” of the eye, the place on the retina where the optic “nerve”—which is not a light receptor—connects to the 160 million or so light receptors of the retina. In a sense, the blind spot is where my Phenomenal World is connected to the Noumenal Subject. It is the spot by which the Noumenal Subject is “hooked perceptively (via the geometrical properties of the manifold, e.g. with a vanishing point, etc., i.e., the subject) and proprioceptively (via FEC) to the world by what is missing in perception.” It is nothing less than amazing to realize that every element in my present Phenomenal World is connected to the Noumenal Subject through what is missing in the Phenomenal World, through a gap. There are absolutely no phenomenal elements in that gap. (Incidentally, that is one new way you can tell, in principle, whether you are asleep and dreaming: when you are asleep and dreaming there is nothing missing. Where as when you are awake and dreaming [“online”], there is something missing. [Though of course even in a dream one could in principle be fooled by an imaginary blind spot, though my own research with lucid dreams has shown that as a matter of psychological fact one never in fact is. But perhaps there would be a way around even that problem.]) So, by analogy, there is no border, no phenomenological image, or element, that is, necessarily me, but there is the one “thing” always missing that makes it possible for any and all of the borders to be mine. It is the experiential fact of the (from a purely phenomenological content point of view) missing Cartesian Ego—positively experienced in every experience as the intuition of the subject-in-itself, I am I—that connects the Phenomenal Self to the Noumenal Subject. This “personal blind spot” is experienced as a sort of “deja vu toward itself,” the feeling of familiarity without content, psychological identification as X where there is no X.
We can illustrate with the following concrete example. I sit at the present moment in a Cuban restaurant where I sometimes go to eat. I experience “deja-vu”; the place looks and feels familiar—I don’t say to myself, “I’ve been here before,” but (usually, anoetically) I feel it. I look at the chairs, the walls, the people . . . now again I don’t say to myself, “I’ve seen all this before,” but the fact is that everything just “feels familiar.” So also I am at the present moment “in” Phenomenal Self DK. There is deja-vu; I don’t say to myself, “I’ve been this fellow before, I know him, I’ve been Kolak a long time,” and so on. I look at my hands. I “look” at my thoughts. The physical contours, the psychological contours—definitely it all feels familiar, it is nearly all deja-vu. This feeling of familiarity is a phenomenological extension of the I, the subject-in-itself, via the intuition of personal identity, the “I am I;” it is a “logical (necessary in the Kantian and neoKantian sense) identification,” which really is not a psychological identification at all. I do not for instance deduce based on any phenomenologically connected psychological elements that this I at time $t_1$ is qualitatively indistinguishable from the I at time $t_{1+}$ and qualitative indistinguishability plus the identity of indiscernibles makes for identity, and so on. I don’t even have to think about it. There is just the psychological identification with various aspects of this Phenomenal World and psychological identification as various other aspects of this Phenomenal World. I could, just a moment ago, been anybody anywhere and, in the next, be anybody anywhere. Given how the I and the I am I function, there could never, even in principle, be any way of telling within any particular moment in which I find myself existing, where—if anywhere—in the entire history of the Cosmos I qua subject had in the previous instant been (this phenomenological fact is itself a derivative, and expressible in terms, of quantum consciousness). Not only could the universe be running “forward” or “backward” in time, such that the presence of the I at any moment would make it impossible to tell which way the universe was “going,” the universe could be “running” completely randomly through time. It would be like running a film through a projector one frame at a time but having whatever frame is at any instant in front of the projector selected randomly: from the point of view of the individual frames—from the inside perspective of the film itself—it would make no difference whatsoever since the internal relations would remain exactly the same.

Suppose now that something akin to the bizarre, many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics was true about individual
consciousness, with the following twist. Let us suppose that I *qua* the Noumenal Unidentified Subject (NUS) exist not in sequence, from one quantum instant to the next along the world-line of this Psycho-phenomenological matrix (“P-matrix” for short) but, rather, moves to the next closest locally simultaneous P-matrix, where the I then moves to the next, and so on down the line. This would mean that I who just typed this word, went in the next instant of time not to the next instant in this world but, rather, to the next instant in the next closest world: before the second word was typed, that “I” was not in the P-matrix here at the desk typing but in my wife, then in my next door neighbor, then in the mailman walking across the street, and so on. After a certain amount of time the I that was there when the “I” above was typed will pass through you. What would such a scenario look like? It would, of course, look just like this.

Or, suppose that, like John Archibald Wheeler’s one electron weaving through spacetime, there was not just a plurality of consciousness weaved through the Cosmos, as we imagined above, disjoined from P-matrices by quantum-jumping from one possible world to the next but that there was only one individual (quantum) consciousness, one *I*, weaved throughout all spacetime. What would such a scenario look like? Once again it would look, of course, look just like this.

Now, what sort of world would this be? It would be an Open World, in that such a subject would be the ultra nonlocal subject discussed in §2.2.3.2. This would be a world in which the individuation and identification, i.e., localization, of phenomena (e.g. the objects of experience) in many multi-perspectival, i.e., “objective,” “empirical,” “public,” etc., space and time manifolds (worlds) from multiple first person points of view in relation to the reciprocally multiply localized, i.e., non-local, in relation to said objects, subject, multiply exclusively conjoined therein to objects within multiple disjoint, e.g. Hausdorff separated, open spacetime manifolds. In such a uni(multi)verse the subject is an open individual living in all of those world’s worlds, each of which are themselves open.

Now, what would such a world “look” like, not from within, but as a large scale structure of space and time model? I conjecture that it would look like Gödel’s universe with the coordinate $z$—which theoreticians (e.g. Stephen Hawking) have generally regarded as “irrelevant” and have therefore openly suppressed—restored. Such a space is rotationally symmetric about any point, with time–invariance, in that the light cone opens up and out, resulting for instance in closed timelike curves. What is not easily, if at all, representable in such models, from a purely mathematical point of view, is
the essential fact of the Gödel universe: all points are in fact equivalent. (Which is to say that as a manifold $M$ with metric $g$ and Christoffel connection with a four-dimensional group of isometries that is transitive, our Gödel universe contains closed timelike curves through every point. Hawking, for one, has criticized Gödel’s exact solution [of Einstein’s equations] model, which is geodesically complete, on the grounds that “the solution is not very physical.” Such a constraint would seem to bother certain other physicists much less, such as, notably, John Wheeler.)

The point of such a bizarre speculation is not to suggest that that is in fact something to be considered to be the truth about us. On the contrary, in our view it is equally bizarre to think of the $I$ as traveling from one moment to the next—along the time line of one P-matrix—as it is to think of the $I$ as traveling “along” other P-matrices, as it is to imagine the $I$ traveling everywhere, or anywhere at all. Rather, in our view, to say that the $I$, the (e.g. Stone-Čech compactification) of the (e.g. absolute, or transcendental, in Husserl’s or Brouwer’s sense, Noumenal Unidentified in our sense) subject into the residual subject-in-itself, does not travel anywhere at all and to say that it is everywhere amounts, in the final analysis, to saying one and the same thing.

§10.15 WHY WAS HUME NOT A KORSAKOFF?

Once again I close my eyes. I see darkness. Even this darkness feels familiar. Again: why do I not scream? The fact is that I do not. I don’t even have to say, “Don’t worry, you’ve seen this darkness before.” But is this darkness really qualitatively identical to some other darkness? Supposedly, the universe is over fifteen billion years old or so but this experience of darkness has never before happened. Why then does it feel the same? Why does it feel familiar? Why does it look familiar? Well, actually, there is a bunch of apparent flickering “dirtying up” the black darkness. So in actuality it is qualitatively different. And, in fact, the apparently “continuous” Phenomenal World is constantly being split up by darkness borders, as I blink, black Phenomenal Fields like black frames inserted between the other frames of a film. Yet we don’t have to say to ourselves, “Ignore those blank black frames.” We don’t even notice them; we do in fact ignore them. But who ignores? I’m not ignoring anything—that would be active. The fact is that from my present limited and limiting perspective on myself and the world $I$, the subject identified as this P-matrix—an identification consisting, experientially, in this Phenomenal Self within this
Phenomenal World—am not noticing and this not noticing—like the intuition of personal identity, the *I am I*—is not something I do but something that, at each moment, happens to me. And it would happen regardless of whether in the previous moment I was there and who where you are now presently reading (or rewriting) this book or I was Alexander the Great astride a horse, or I was no one at all.

It thus seems that Descartes’ belief that the I and the feeling of certainty are linked, however mistakenly he may have developed that belief, is based on the sound experiential insight revealed in the intuition of personal identity, *I am I*. The I, the subject-in-itself is, in that limited sense, the Cartesian shadow of objectivity reified at the heart of subjectivity. So there is from a phenomenological point of view no need for underlying continuing permanent substance beneath the perceptions, as Descartes thought, and no need for underlying permanent continuing perceiver of perceptions to be found among the perceptions, because what there is in experience—the I and the *I am I*—is sufficient to establish the concept of the person as a self-conscious being whose consciousness is bordered but unbound. The intuition of personal identity is an experiential element of the subject, contiguous with particular perceptions of pain or pleasure, warmth or coolness, and so on, that Hume claimed he could not find. Unlike other cognitions, the *I am I* is the bordered experience of consciousness (apparently) not being bound by the borders experienced: it is the cognition of recognition contiguous with identification as a psychological individuation. The *I am I* is in that sense the conscious expression of the fact that perceptions occur identified as one’s own, independently of the borders of their content or of any rational judgment, such that there is always the subject’s intuition of its own existence and identity within each specious present occurring from within the borders of any P-complex—across the Ordinary Life Dissolve and even across the Omni Dissolve.

We can thus add to Hume’s heat, cold, etc., the intuition of personal identity, the *I am I*, our “partly Cartesian,” “partly Kantian,” element that allows us the possibility of a neo-Humean quantum phenomenological analysis by which the person exists not “transcendental” to the world of experience but is, itself, the empirical foundation upon which there is erected the *concept* of personal identity based not on the borders of the Phenomenal Self, nor of any aspect of the P-complex: the intuition of personal identity, the *I am I*, can thus help us to avoid the pitfalls of both the purely transcendental and purely substance analyses, return to the Cartesian insight, answer Hume’s inquiry, and avoid the problems of the
Cartesian, Humean, Kantian and Parfitian moves. The *I am I* is in that sense exactly the sort of bordered experiential unity that Hume was looking for, making it possible to form a positive experiential account of our requisite concept of a boundless person that both satisfies the requirements of an empirical account of personal identity.

The only “problem,” of course, from the limited perspective afforded by traditional Closed Individualism, is that drawing our boundaries in this way draws us into a Parmenidean Unity and makes us all one person. For Open Individualism, of course, this is not a problem but a solution.

In other words, an anachronistic way to put one central aspect of our positive experiential thesis—our Experiential Dissolve—in a nutshell would be to say that the second way that Hume was wrong with regard to the personal identity question on the grounds that Hume failed to notice that he was not a “Korsakoff.” Interestingly enough, it should be noted that someone suffering from Korsakoff’s syndrome does not exist without the subject; Korsakoffs are not unconscious by any stretch of the imagination. At each instant of his life, the Korsakov experiences the disruption of memory, not of consciousness; the *I* is there. It is the presence of the subject that in fact makes it possible for the Korsakoff to scream with surprise at each new phenomenon. The Korsakoff in that sense sees more clearly the quantum phenomenological (staccato) nature of experience and consciousness than do we.

§ 10.16 INCARNATION VS. REINCARNATION

Now, of course, the intuition of personal identity does not as far as we know happen by itself, say as a floating intuition in some disembodied form, independently of the subject (the *I*) identified as a Phenomenal Self. As we already distinguished a psychological bundle (psycho-phenomenological complex) of appropriately significant borders personified from the first-person point of view, such as the Phenomenal Self, from bundles personified from a third-person (or even a second-person) point of view, it therefore now behooves us to bring in the following distinction.

Given the duration in experience of any occurrence of the *I*, so as not to beg the identity question from a purely phenomenological and even especially empirical psychological point of view let us call any occurring Phenomenal Self that the subject is identified as, in which there is the *I*, the “incarnation,” Φ, of a person. Thus, both experientially and
phenomenologically speaking, any incarnation of a person, both by experience and by definition, lasts only as long as the Phenomenal Self lasts. This would accord with the Parfitian-Humean insights and the minimal phenomenological quantum of consciousness that there is in experience that, although it cannot be properly called a self in Hume’s sense of a continuously existing perceiver (subject) with identity, makes it seem to us that there is such a continuous subject in experience, in the sense that we do have the intuition of personal identity which, experientially, when it is mistakenly ascribed to the Phenomenal Self over time is, arguably, merely Phantom Identity. And although Hume would call the notion that there is a perceiving subject of experience not a perception but a misperception, the I am I itself is, clearly, as we have narrowed it down in our experience, not a misperception. It is an actual perception. Thus let us here correct Hume by noting that the intuition of personal identity in experience involving the subject, the I, who is the same experiencer over time is, at worst, a misinterpretation of an actual perception.

In other words, what it means to say that this present Phenomenal Self—consisting in a phenomenal body (fingers typing) and a phenomenal mind (words and thoughts heard as auditory images, emotions, such as wonder and curiosity, felt, sensations such as the pressure of the keyboard, etc.)—is the incarnation of a person is that the I is, as a matter of psychological fact, occurring within the borders of this Phenomenal Self. That is not to say that the I is a person or that I am I is what personal identity consists in, but, rather, that—from a phenomenological point of view—being presently identified as Phenomenal Self DK means that I (the subject) am presently incarnated as Daniel Kolak, as follows:

A Phenomenal Self, (an exclusively conjoined bundle of appropriately significant borders personified from the first-person point of view, etc.) is an occurrent incarnation, Φ, of the subject, ϕ, if in Φ (separated from other such bundles by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, etc.), there is the intuition of personal identity, I am I.

An incarnation, Φ, can thus experientially be defined from a purely phenomenological point of view, ostensively, via the I am I at any specious present that the subject finds itself identified as a particular Phenomenal Self and only at that specious present. Let us thus call any incarnation an “Φ.” Personal identity might be an illusion, the I am I might be an illusion, and I might not perhaps even exist; however, it can nevertheless be accepted as true that the incarnation, “ΦKolak-now-on-line 38-column 57” exists in this
experience here-and-now in a way that “Φ_{Hume-now}” does not. This is the experience of “Φ_{Kolak-now-on-line n, etc., of I Am You}” (where n is the number of the line on the page that the phrase-name in quotes appears), writing a book on personal identity, not of “Φ_{Hume-now-on-line n of Book II of the Treatise, etc.}”. At the same time, this “Φ_{Kolak-now-on-line n, etc.,}” is not the same identical incarnation, Φ, as that “Φ_{Kolak-now-on-line 38, etc.,}” and so on. Whether any of the Φ’s on this page are the same — the incarnation of the same subject—is—and shall always be—an open question. (But, contra Parfit, not an empty question; there is, in fact, an open answer.)

Again, of course the actual duration of any Φ is less than the time it takes to describe its borders. But the fact is that by relying on our experiential definition of a person as consisting in an incarnation, Φ, we can say that it is a psychological fact that from the first-person point of view of the Phenomenal Self that is the occurrent incarnation, Φ, of the subject (or series of Φ) writing this, or through whom this right now is being written, it is a fact that it is not 1965, nor 1999, but 2004, January 16, etc., and we can make the time interval arbitrarily small so as to correspond to the actual interval of the I. This is in fact the way experience (at least experience as we know it) occurs. I do as a matter of fact seem right now to be a 48 year old Croatian, American, New Yorker, Pomonian, Philosopher, in 2004 sitting at his desk in Pomona, New York (re)writing page 491, Chapter 10, of I Am You and not a Scot in the eighteenth century writing page 10 of Book II of the Treatise, nor do I seem right now to be, say, a 16 year old musician composing the fifty-fifth note of his violin concerto in Maryland. There is in the psychology of this Φ that memory. This incarnation, Φ, might well be the “reincarnation” of the Φ who back in some particular moment in 1971 was a sixteen year old musician playing the fifty-fifth note of the violin concerto and who, in turn, may have in his present psychology had the memory of being the Φ who some time earlier had composed that concerto, and so on. But where as in defining a person as consisting in incarnation we are giving a phenomenologically accurate experiential account, in talking about reincarnation, unlike incarnation, we are from a purely phenomenological view talking theory, not experience. If we wish to rely solely on experience from a purely phenomenological point of view (as in this chapter we are trying to do) we must squarely limit ourselves only to incarnation, nor reincarnation. To identify this Φ with any other Φ is by our strict phenomenological analysis to identify the living with the dead: it is to believe in reincarnation.

I have little doubt that it was some such series of phenomenologically
guided experiential insights that led Hume to write as he did his famous section on personal identity. And, like Hume, I do not believe in reincarnation! (Though I am by no means opposed to the idea, there is from the standpoint of Open Individualism something quite openly incoherent about the notion, as a moment’s reflection clearly reveals.) The reason by now should be obvious: in a phenomenologically analyzed disintegrating universe, nothing persists.

For instance, present experience occurring right here and right now consists in a variety of perceptions, among them: the sensations of warmth, of light, of sounds, of thirst, of pressure . . . putting them all together I would say that I am right now at this moment not sitting with friends playing Backgammon but sitting at a desk writing a book. Going in the other direction, I now focus on one particular sensation: the pressure of the chair against my buttocks, in order to ask: how long has that particular sensation existed? One might think it has been there for as long as the buttocks have been in physical contact with the seat cushion. But I am asking not about how old the underlying physical basis of the sensation is, I am asking from a strict phenomenological point of view how old the sensation itself is. In present experience from a phenomenological point of view this sensation is, at most, a few second old. This particular sensation of pressure, like all sensations, comes and then goes.

I now remember sitting on this chair yesterday. This sensation of pressure (already a numerically different sensation from the one a few lines above, since this one began when I just mentioned the chair again) might be qualitatively indistinguishable from the one yesterday but it is, numerically, a different sensation. This one occurred for (at most) a few seconds on Jan. 16, 2004, the other one on Jan. 15. What then about the memory of yesterday’s sensation? Well, although the event remembered may have happened yesterday, and we say “the memory is one day old,” the experience of remembering that event is once again (at most) only seconds old. My remembering started as I was typing the line above. The experience of remembering lasts (at most) until my attention “moves on” to something else. Any subsequent experience of remembering X will not be this remembering of X. It will be a new remembering of X. And we are talking not about event X but about the event of remembering X which, every time it occurs, is a new event. Thus, this present experience of remembering—the one occurring right now in the specious present—is itself (at most) seconds old.

Put it in such terms, to talk about personal identity (at least in this
universe) is to talk either about the reincarnation of a person, or to talk about the multiple incarnation of a person. Reincarnation—unless a soul somehow traveling through space and time inhabiting matter at a variety of different places and times—is, on most views of personal identity, including our view (in which the notion is, as I’ve already suggested, incoherent), not a plausible state of affairs. Reincarnation would require an entity to travel through time, etc., and to reincarnate itself at each new instant.

Notice, however, given our present analysis, that in order for Closed Individualism to be possible in this actual universe, reincarnation would have to be the case! Since reincarnation is as far as we can tell not the case, Closed Individualism (as we have already discovered) is a false view. This leaves us with Empty Individualism vs. Open Individualism. By our analysis, Empty Individualism and Open Individualism would both accept incarnation as we have defined it. The difference between the two viable views that take the truth about us into account, then, hinges not on whether reincarnation, as we have defined it, is possible (it is not), nor on whether incarnation is possible (it is) but, rather, on whether multiple incarnation is possible. And, of course, we have time and again in this work, if we have done anything, offered a philosophical explanation (in Nozick’s sense) of precisely how multiple incarnation is possible in spite of its many apparent excluders.

§ 10.17 DISMEMBERING OURSELVES THROUGH OUR REMEMBERING: PERSONAL IDENTITY, MULTIPLE INCARNATION AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ALWAYS, NEVER AND NOW

Is multiple incarnation possible? There are two ways: multiple incarnation at-a-time and multiple incarnation over time. Multiple incarnation at-a-time requires us to Dissolve the Spatial Boundary. Multiple incarnation over time requires us to Dissolve the Temporal Boundary. In tradition Closed Individualism and Empty Individualism, these two Boundaries are of radically different metaphysical significance. In our view, they are not. The question, “How is it possible that a person can exist at more than one place at a time?” is on our view no more and no less difficult to answer then the question, “How is it possible that a person can exist at more than one time?”
Fission, multiple personality disorder, the various minded versions of the Dream Analog, etc., can, in our view, be considered as cases of multiple incarnation at-a-time. We have thus already performed the Spatial Dissolve. Having further fine-tuned our understanding of what it is to be a person involving the notion of incarnation, in our view, personal identity requires not physiological continuity with identity over time nor psychological continuity with identity over time, etc. (in this universe there just isn’t any) but, rather, multiple incarnation with identity (either over time or at-a-time).

Incarnation, as we have defined it, consists from a purely phenomenological point of view in identification as a particular Phenomenal Self within which there is the I. Since incarnation, like experience, like time itself, is not a continuant (i.e., one incarnation, \( \Phi \), does not move into the next \( \Phi \)), the question of whether two incarnations, separated by time, can be the incarnations of one and the same person need not (indeed, cannot) be answered in terms of continuity relations between (temporally and/or spatially extended) non-identical \( \Phi \)'s but, rather, in terms of whether multiple incarnation is possible.

Thus, personal identity in our view does not require us to believe in reincarnation but, rather, in multiple incarnation. Nor does it require (but it does allow) us to believe in a “transcendental I”; the subject as we have defined it is anything but transcendental: it is not “over and above” any experience but is, in part, what it means for there to be that experience at that place and time from that first-person point of view: and the subject is exclusively conjoined to that experience only, at that moment, and to no other.

What we must show, then, is how it is possible to be incarnated not only there at that moment but elsewhere, not in the sense of the subject that leaves that P-bundle at that moment in time and travels from there to here (reincarnation) but in the sense of the subject already being there and here, at both times and in both places. To speak of the “transference of incarnation from one moment to the next,” like the “transference of self-consciousness,” given that the essential aspect of consciousness that we are talking about is the intuition of personal identity—the I am I—and the temporal duration which we have defined from a phenomenological point of view in terms of the specious present, is to speak the same sort of nonsense as would be entailed in speaking about the “transference of time,” or the transference of any particular now into any other. (This, I believe, is the under-estimated significance of David Lewis’s deep point about the conceptual impossibility of “time travel.”) Thus just as we should avoid
speaking about a bordered region of space, \( s_1 \), being moved to another bordered region of space, \( s_2 \), and just as we should avoid speaking about a bordered region of time, \( t_1 \), being moved to another bordered region of time, \( t_2 \), we should avoid speaking about a bordered region of a person, \( \Phi_1 \), being moved to another bordered region of a person, \( \Phi_2 \). Neither space nor time need to be borderless in order to be boundless. The same from a purely phenomenological point of view can be predicated of the term, “person.”

It is for these reasons that the concept of multiple incarnation is but the temporal analog of the concept of personal fission with identity, that is, a case in which a person is at two different places at the same time. Thus just as to make Open Individualism a plausible view we had to perform the Spatial Dissolve, so we have, in this chapter, been performing what is, in effect, the Temporal Dissolve—not via the (incoherent) concept of reincarnation but the (coherent) concept of multiple incarnation.

Memory of course says otherwise. Memory, however, supports neither Open Individualism nor Empty Individualism but Closed Individualism. According to memory, my continued existence over time as one and the same person is made possible not through multiple incarnation at every point in time in which I exist, at each point equally real, equally there, but, rather, by single reincarnation. Memory says that I am the present incarnation of a temporally extended series of Kolak-reincarnations rather than, say, a temporally extended series of, say, Hintikka-reincarnations. That is, memory supports the view that only one moment in time is the “real” present—the one occurring now—and that “my” self-consciousness “flows” from one moment to the next along one stream, or series, of reincarnations and along no other.

In other words, and more specifically, we note that within the borders of the Phenomenal Self, such as this occurrent incarnation, \( \Phi \), right here and right now (i.e., in this specious present) there are, as a matter of psycho-phenomenological fact, both

1) psychological identification with some (non-present) past incarnations,
   \( \Phi_{-1}, \Phi_{-2}, \Phi_{-3}, \ldots, \Phi_{-n} \)

and identification with some (non-present) future incarnations,
   \( \Phi_{+1}, \Phi_{+2}, \Phi_{+3}, \ldots, \Phi_{+m} \)

and

2) psychological identification as some non-present \( \Phi \)’s in that
when one of the non-present Φ’s is represented within present (retrospective [past] or prospective [future]) memories (typically, as an imaginary Phenomenal Self [as in a daydream]) it is personified from the first person point of view, via identification as that representation, such that in occurrent psychology both Φ’s are viewed as the incarnations of one and the same person (Kolak-Φ’s), where as some other Φ’s (Parfit-Φ’s) are not.

In other words, from the perspective of any incarnation, Φ, the act of “remembering” involves a “dismembering” from other, non-present, Φ’s, and in a way that gives rise to the (illusory) traditional Closed Individual View of Persons. Why?

For an Empty Individualist who holds that what matters in survival is psychological continuity, such as Parfit, the culprit here is our concept of personal identity; memory is the illusory remembering of personal identity over time. For an Open Individualist who holds that what matters in survival is personal identity, the culprit here is not our concept of personal identity but our concept of memory: memory is the illusory dismembering of personal identity at-a-time. We could say that where as on Parfit’s view memory draws an illusory picture within Π-complexes of what is never there (“Ordinary survival is about as bad as being destroyed and having a Replica,” [Parfit 1984, p. 280]), in our view memory draws a distorted picture of what is always there, and everywhere, by limiting our view of ourselves to the boundaries of particular Π-complexes. In both views, it is memory that gives rise to the illusion. On Parfit’s view, the illusion is identity. In our view, the illusion is non-identity.

Our current scientific view of the true nature of time does not of course support Closed Individualism. But nor does it support Empty Individualism. It supports—and needs—Open Individualism.

To see why, let us first ask whether it is memory—how we remember ourselves—that explains the I am I, or whether it is the I am I—the (space-like and time-like) intuition of the subject-in-itself, i.e., the intuition of personal identity—that explains how we remember ourselves. Had we not performed the Memory Dissolve and other such Psychological Boundary Dissolves and also gone through our lengthy experiential analysis of experience in the sections above, we might be tempted (not merely pre-analytically but, in a sense, pre-experientially) to say that it is memory that explains the intuition of personal identity. But we have performed the Memory Dissolve: having my memories replaced with different memories (among them completely different remembered Φ’s) than the ones that
before the switch were being so viewed) would not in our various examples cease the viewing of the new “past” (seemingly remembered) \( \Phi \)'s as one’s own. Thus it is not memory itself that explains why at any moment there is the intuition of personal identity—the *I am I*—but, rather, it is the *I am I* that explains why a memory will seem, within any \( \Phi \) in which it is an occurrent memory, to be one’s own via the sorts of identifications described above.

This of course does not explain why memory is striated along some \( \Phi \)'s at the exclusion of others over time in the way that it is. The *I am I* merely helps explain why any \( \Phi \) thinks of itself (or, is thought) as being the same \( \Phi \) as some other \( \Phi \) at some other time (independently of the actual physiological, psychological, and phenomenological borders) at least in the way that Marty’s seeing an ugly little man in the mirror helps explain why Marty thinks of himself as being an ugly person. Marty might not really be ugly at all; he might be a very handsome fellow put under a hypnotic spell by his evil and possessive mother, the mirror might be a trick mirror, perhaps there is no such thing as ugliness at all and we have just through convention come to demarcate certain looks with such language, and so on. Similarly, I might not really be a person at all; I might be under a self-hypnotic spell, the brain might be fabricating the presence of an entity that is not real, perhaps there is no such thing as self-consciousness at all and we have just through convention come to demarcate certain behaviors with such language, and so on. But the fact of the matter is that in either case we can pinpoint the experience behind the concept, independently of whether the experience is veridical, whether the interpretation of the experience is correct, whether the concept is the right concept, and so on.

In saying that the intuition of personal identity, denoted and expressed simultaneously to hearer and speaker, i.e., communicated, by *I am I*, is not a memory but that which makes any occurrent memory seem to be one’s own, we are in effect denying that,

> *it is memory that makes us aware of our own continued existence over time...* [Reasons and Persons, p. 208]

If memory explained the intuition of personal identity, getting new memories would limit any \( \Phi \)'s intuition of personal identity to the specious present in which it occurs, and then stop—which would be like death—and then the new memories would limit the subsequent \( \Phi \)'s (new) intuition of personal identity (over the specious present to the specious present in which it occurs *qua* intuition)—which would be like birth. Or, getting amnesia—
along with the disruption of all other continuities, as in the Omni Dissolve—would make the $\Phi$ on the other side of the amnesia border unaware of its continued existence over the specious present in which it occurs—which, again, would be like death or, more precisely, experientially, like a “living death.” But experientially (mod empirical psychology) this is not the case. Second, we had very good reason for not attributing the $I$ am $I$ to our physiologies, psychologies, or phenomenologies or some aspect thereof—namely, grounds for thinking that the intuition of personal identity, $I$ am $I$, is not merely some aspect of the exclusively conjoined physiological-psychological bundle (P-complex) that makes it possible for me to view myself as the same person over time. Parfit writes:

Though it is memory that makes us aware of our own continued existence over time, the various other continuities have great importance. We may believe that they have enough importance to provide personal identity even in the absence of memory. We shall then claim, what Locke denied, that a person continues to exist even if he suffers from complete amnesia. [Reasons and Persons, p.208]

However, as we have already seen, neither memory, nor any other aspect of our psychologies—not even of our physiologies nor of our physiologies—explains how, in this phenomenologically ephemeral universe, the intuition of personal identity is possible in light of its apparent excluders. Nothing does.

In other words, another telling piece of phenomenological evidence that it is the intuition of personal identity that explains memory, and not the other way around, is that in cases ranging from the Ordinary Life Dissolve to the Memory Dissolve, all the way to the Omni Dissolve, experience always occurs with the $I$ am $I$. Any incarnation, $\Phi$, does not ever, as a matter of psychological fact, occur without the $I$ am $I$: we experience ourselves (in any incarnation) as persons who are self conscious, “aware of our existence and identity over the specious present,” i.e., with our intuition of personal identity: $I$ am $I$, regardless of the changes both in experience and the underlying realizers (physiological, psychological, etc.) of experience from one moment to the next. This is what was meant in saying that we do not experience ourselves (in any incarnation, $\Phi$) as brief $\Phi$’s, tiny incarnations of Buddha-instants, or discreet Parfit series-persons. The difficulty, of course, is that neither do we experience ourselves as one person who is everywhere either. We experience ourselves according to a view we know to be false: Closed Individualism. But we have already explained time and
again why that should be so.

Since on Parfit’s view “the various other continuants have great importance,” he in effect denies Locke: a person can (contra Locke) survive even with amnesia. Parfit is right—a person can. But he is right for the wrong reasons. A person can survive with amnesia not because other continuants, such as psychology or physiology matter (we have already seen, via negativa, how they do not). So how then can a person continue to exist with amnesia, that is, even when memory fails to continue? We can answer: in this phenomenologically quantized universe, given our interpretation of Parfit’s view, a person cannot continue to exist—period! This is because the subject, consciousness, is from a purely phenomenological point of view not a temporal continuant (any more than time itself is). Rather, on our view, it is the presence of the I am I itself in any incarnation (within a Phenomenal Self), not the continuity of memory or of any other psychological relata among incarnations that makes any incarnation e.g. “self-conscious, aware of its identity and continued existence over the specious present.”

In other words, one way to understand how it is possible that we experience ourselves in the way that we do actually experience ourselves is to understand in what ways the I am I, like experience itself, like consciousness itself (the I), like time, is from a purely phenomenological point of view not a continuant and, as such, that any identified instance of it—any Φ—like any identified instance of phenomenological time—any now—is not a continuant. Let us see why.

The specious present in which this manuscript is being written—“my” now—and the specious present in which this published book is being read—“your” now—are two different nows. From my point of view, I am the present writer and you are a future reader. Here, in my now as I am writing this (1-22-2004, 12:01 a.m.), you (the reader in my future) are not reading these words on a page of a published book but are some miles away, probably at home, sleeping. You have no idea at this time (12:01 a.m., 1-22-2004) that you will someday (in my future) read this. But you will—you are! Yet, from my present point of view this book is not completed and this very page is not yet written. As far as I am concerned, you are not in my future, reading. You are in my present, probably sleeping. (Note, too, that it matters little whether you, the future reader, happens to be named “Kolak.”)

So which now is the “real” now? Are you in my future (your present) reading, or in my present (your past) sleeping? And where am I? Am I
there, with you, in my future, perhaps writing a different book, or am I here, as experience tells me that I am, in my present, writing these very words which are right now being for the first time written? Clearly, none of us ever finds ourselves in the future or in the past but only in the present. For you and for me the events we experience are going on now, in the specious present. Yet these different events—your reading of these words and my writing of them—occur at different nows.

According to the commonsense (Newtonian) view of time, my now is the only real now and your now has not yet happened. Whereas when your now will be the real now, this now (12:10 a.m., 1-22-2004) will no longer be the “real” now. There is only one “real” now. This is because on the commonsense view of time, anything not occurring in the present is unreal, or at least less real, than whatever exists in the present. The past is gone, not merely because past events are not present events but because past events no longer exist—neither at the present moment nor at any moment. Past events (such as, from the point of view of your now, my writing of these words), although they once existed, no longer exist and hence are no longer real. Similarly, if you now (in your now) know that you will finish reading this book tomorrow, the event of your finishing this book is not real until it happens. Until an event happens it is only a mere possibility, not an actuality. Where as once an event has happened it vanishes into the past and hence, once again, is not real. Thus, according to the commonsense view of time, there is but one reality and it resides in the present: past events and future events, since they are not in the present, are not real.

This commonsense view of time is, according to our best current scientific theory, false. We could say, instead, that the following is a better view. From a phenomenological point of view time, a finite but boundless unity (like the universe itself) consists in a plurality of nows. Time does not “flow” from past, present, to future: the feeling that it does is but a psychological illusion. The fact is that no particular now moves into any other. On the classical and commonsense view of time, time was in fact viewed as flowing from the past to the future. But on this point Einstein showed Newton wrong. This led him to say of the universe that

It is finite . . . and has no bounds. [Einstein 1952, p. 112]

Time, on Einstein’s view, can be conceived of as being like a reel of motion picture film, with all moments fully there, all equally real. Each moment, each specious present, each now, is like an individual frame of a movie. Any particular frame contains images none of which travel from that frame
to the next. The reel of film already contains all the frames, all the moments, not just of your life but of all lives, and the apparent flow from past to present to future is but an illusion. On the commonsense view of time, it is difficult to see how all nows might be equally real. Yet, the commonsense Received View of Time becomes deeply suspect, not because it doesn’t seem true but—ironically—because it does seem true! The problem is that the commonsense view seems true at every now. But how can every now be the real one when, according to the commonsense view, only the current now (which “current” now?) is the real one?

In other words, at each different moment (at each different now) we feel certain that the now of that moment is the only real one. But this feeling of certainty seems to arise not for any good reason but, rather, merely because we always find ourselves looking outward toward all other moments, past and future, from the limited and limiting point of view of a particular now. Viewing ourselves from the perspective of a particular moment blinds us to the possibility that every moment may—at that and every other moment—be equally real.

By our phenomenological analysis of actual experience, we saw that the I does in fact function within and among our physiologically and psychologically bordered individuations not as a phenomenal representation (it appears nowhere among the phenomena) but, rather, like “now” and “here,” it is a phenomenological indexical. Whenever I experience, and say, “here,” there is always a border—for instance, this room. When I “move” to a different room, or go outside, and say “here” again, the borders experienced are very different but, experientially, there is apparently something the same that is captured by both tokens of “here.” Similarly with “now.” This now is bordered against other nows but, it seems, there is an experience within both borders of something that is itself not bound by the very borders within which it occurs. (Thus for instance if I altogether popped out of this universe and found myself floating in a void I could still say to myself, “I am here, I am now,” even though I had no idea whatsoever where “here” was or when “now” was, even if the “here” is “nowhere” and the “now” is never; Ray Martin and I expressed this in our Wisdom Without Answers, by saying that “From the point of view of the universe as a whole, this now—like your now, like all nows—is nowhere, always, and never.”)

What is that which in such cases is bordered but boundless? With the phenomenological indexical, “here,” we could, using our locutions, say it is the identification of oneself as a particular location in space (“I am here,”) rather than, say, the identification of one’s location with some particular
space (“I am in the Milky Way Galaxy, or I am in New York”), such that the answer to the question, what is that which is bordered but boundless would be: Space. With the indexical, “now,” we could say it is the identification of oneself as a particular location in time (“I exist now,”) rather than, say, the identification of one’s location in time with some particular time, such that the answer to the question, what is that which is bordered but boundless would be: Time. With the indexical, “I,” we could say it is the identification of oneself as a particular incarnation, Φ, in spacetime (“I am self conscious, aware of my identity and continued existence over the specious present”) rather than, say, the identification of one’s Φ in spacetime with, say, some particular Phenomenal Self (Φ am the author presently writing this book, etc.) such that the answer to the question, what is that which is bordered but boundless would be: Person.

The experiential indexical, “I,” is thus like “here” and “now” in that in talking about the I, the subject-in-itself, we are talking about there being some definite limit, or extent, to the borders of the subject at any one here and any one now—a apparently always here, apparently always now—not because the subject in relation to which phenomena are individuated and identified in space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, is not bound either by the phenomenological borders of this phenomenal here nor of this phenomenal now but because every phenomenological occurrence of the I has something in common with every other, just as every phenomenological occurrence of “here” and of “now” has something in common with every other. That is what we meant in saying that just as time consists in a plurality of bordered instants—a plurality of nows—but is itself boundless, so person consists in a plurality of bordered incarnations—Φ’s—but is itself boundless. Indeed, it is for this very reason that the I without any effort on our part leads us to naturally (even on the traditional Closed Individual View locally to the ephemeral series of P-complexes) conceive of ourselves as the same person over time and space in spite of the fact that in this universe from a purely phenomenological point of view nothing persists (except, perhaps, as the bordered but boundless Cosmic totality: spacetimeperson?). This experience consists in the activity of apparently looking out both into the occupant borders of the incarnation, Φ (the Phenomenal Self with the I) of the person and through this representation of itself into the occupant borders of the representation of the world (the Phenomenal World).

In other words, suppose, in the time analogy, that we ask whether this “here” is the same as (I now move to a different place) this “here?” In one
sense, no, since qualitatively nearly everything has changed; the borders of my experience have changed. That “past here” occurs within a different spatiotemporal border than does this “present here.” Yet, in another sense, yes, since although qualitatively nearly everything has changed, one aspect of the sensed “hereness,” like the sensed “nowness,” being referred to is the experiential sense of here (“phenomenologically active” here) and the experiential sense of now (“phenomenologically active” now), such that part of what is being referred to is the identification as a particular locus of space and time which in each case as a matter of fact “feels” the same (whether in fact it really is or not). This is not the same as but is sufficiently analogous with the I occurring within the borders of each incarnation, Φ.

These and other such considerations suggest we ought to make the same sort of change with regard to our concept of what a person is as we have in this century had to make with regard to our concept of what time is; as Einstein’s famous remark reminds us,

People like us, who believe in physics, know that the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion. [Quoted in Dyson, Infinite In All Directions, p. 8]

Freeman Dyson, commenting on that very passage, writes,

[Einstein’s] discovery or relativity taught us that in physics the division of space-time into past, present and future is an illusion. He also understood that this division is as illusory in human affairs as it is in physics. [Infinite In All Directions, 1985, p. 8]

The physicist Paul Davies expresses puzzlement not only about the nature of time but also about physicists’ response to their discoveries about time, which are

so stunning that most scientists lead a sort of dual life, accepting them in the laboratory, but rejecting them without thought in daily life. Yet the notion of a moving time makes virtually no sense even in daily affairs, in spite of the fact that it dominates our language, thoughts and actions. [Other Worlds, p. 3]

It is precisely because the notion of a moving time, a word of many “nows,” dominates our language—as does the notion of many I’s—that makes it so difficult to conceive of and understand the universe without such concepts. Yet the discovery that such a pre-theoretical, commonsense view of time could not be justified after centuries of effort led to a fundamental reformulation of a concept that seemed intuitively obvious not because it was true but because it had for so long been a part of how we interpreted our experience.
Likewise, since Closed Individualism—a world of many numerically different “I’s”—is no more theoretically justified than is the commonsense view of time—a world of many different “nows,” each of which flows from one moment into the next—it would seem that the same sort of conceptual reform is in order.

It is Einstein’s revolution that in part forced the change in our commonsense view about the relation between time and reality. What the possibility of telling our story in the way that we have told it implies about us is that the plurality of the moments of time, like the plurality of the points of space, serve not just as an analogy for the plurality of the incarnations, $\Phi$s, of a person, but that the concepts of time, space and person are invariably linked: just as every moment in time is equally real, equally “occurring,” its “now” no more and no less “there” than the duration of any other, just as every point in space is equally real, equally “here,” its “here” no more and no less “there” than the location of any other, so too every $I$ is equally real, equally “me,” its experience and reality no more and now less “mine” than any other. Thus, to Pascal’s famous lamented astonishment in *Thoughts*,

When I consider the short extent of my life, swallowed up in the eternity before and after, the small space that I fill or even see, engulfted in the infinite immensity of spaces unknown to me and which know me not, I am terrified, and astonished to find myself here, not there. For there is no reason why it should be here, not there, why now rather than at another time, we could respond: but you already are—there, here, and everywhere: always, never and now. Just as space is the open (unbound) totality of all points such that space is everywhere but, itself, is nowhere, and just as time is the open (unbound) totality of all *nows* such that time is everywhen but, itself, is never, so I am the (unbound) totality of all $\Phi$s such that I am everyone *because* from a purely phenomenological point of view $I$, the Noumenal Subject, am no one.
NOTES

1 My understanding of conceptual reference frame, or View—which I rely on here but do not have the space to develop more fully in this work—is, roughly and briefly, as follows. A conceptual reference frame can be thought of as an interpretation function that assigns reference to particular key (ontological, metaphysical, categorical, etc.) terms within one’s language. Thus the meaning of “object,” for instance—to take an obvious example—is fixed by one’s conceptual reference frame. Different theories can share conceptual reference frames; in fact, one can make interesting View Domains consisting in, say, religious, scientific, philosophical, psychological, political, etc., structures or elements on the basis that what they share is the same conceptual reference frame. Thus a Theravada Buddhist, a logical positivist, a quantum physicist and a phenomenalist philosopher might for instance be sharing (perhaps unbeknownst to them) a conceptual reference frame. Typically, from the standpoint of a pre-theoretical (or pre-conversion) state one regards such references as open, or questionable, or as fixed by “folk theory,” where as in the middle or learning stage one asents to them through concerted effort; but once in the post-theoretical (or post-conversion) framework these references have as it were been compiled and thus occur, from the standpoint of the subject, automatically. There has, at this last stage, occurred a literal Self-transformation, i.e., the subject is now identified as a different Self. Thus what is fundamentally logical through language becomes phenomenological.

2 That is, it automatically interprets (gives meaning to key terms in) our language for us in ways mentioned in the above Note.

3 Kant, for example, distinguishes empirical, or a posteriori, intuitions, derived from or caused by or gotten to by means of our perceptions, from pure, or a priori intuitions, structuring whatever sensations are created by means of empirical intuitions.

4 Here I follow Russell’s notion of intuitions as those immediate beliefs “that we find ready in ourselves as soon as we begin to reflect,” which although they have a tenacious hold on the Self (they are extremely resistant to alteration, modification, or revision) they are not immune to such change.

5 By Received View I mean a Conceptual Reference Frame whose references have, as it were, been compiled by the prevailing interpretation functions—see endnote 1.

6 Which, I claim, invariantly brings about paradoxes that one can then use to create
new and better Views from within one’s current View. Elsewhere I have argued in some detail for this view of paradoxes in general and Zeno’s paradox (as well as Russel’s) in particular (see Zeno’s Paradox Refined).

7 A dream in which the subject is aware that it is dreaming, i.e., thinking subject of experience thinks the thought, “The experience I am now having is a dream.”

8 Which is not to say that there is not covariation, even statistically significant covariation; rather, it is merely to remind ourselves that covariation is not causality.

9 A judgment itself based, of course, on my present intuitions of veridicality and non-veridicality.

10 Lucid dreams are intensely interesting and philosophically revealing phenomena in their own right. Typically, they happen by happenstance but they can also be induced; one can train oneself and others to have them. For a full and detailed exposition of my lucid dream research see my New Interpretation of Dreams, forthcoming.

11 On Certainty p. 90e.


14 Which, again, in turn brings about paradoxes that one can then use to create new and still better Views and Selves from within one’s current View and Self. See, for instance Kolak & Goloff, “The Incredible Shrinking Zeno” and my Zeno’s Paradox Refined, as well as the sections in Chapter 6 on Self formation, which can and should be integrated with conceptual revolutions in general.

15 There are obvious parallels here with the philosophy of Augustine—particularly those parts that had most influence on Descartes and, especially, Kant—in terms of the relationship between “man” (i.e., the Phenomenal Self) and “God” (i.e., the Transcendental [Metaphysical] subject), and both Averroës who would claim here numerical identity between the (immanent) and Transcendental [Metaphysical] subject and the Upanishads, in which Brahman is ultimately identical with Atman. Although a detailed discussion would take us beyond the scope of the present work, I have argued elsewhere (In Search of God: The Language and Logic of Belief) such religious imagery is itself an evolutionary stage in the development of philosophical thought from a “mythological” to a “scientific” milieu.

16 This is akin, in our Dream Analog, to retaining the deep intuition, e.g., “I am this locus of motion and intentionality apparent,” against the Empty Individualist alternatives. That is, I can accept formal rationality without accepting any
particular rationalizations based on it. Or, to use semi-Kantian language, it is not the intellectual intuitions per se but, rather, the experiential insights that reach through the phenomena to the formal a priori intuitions beneath (or above). Experiential insights gain their explanatory power not from the appearances themselves but from what is beyond, or outside the appearances. That is how, by conceptually extending myself beyond the cognitive borders of the intuition of understanding, beyond the limited phenomenal elements in which the experience of reasoning consists, I, via the generation of experiential insights within the borders of my experience, reach beyond the phenomenal borders through which my (always representational) experience of myself as myself consists. See the discussion in Chapter 2.

17 There is no reason to suppose that a Self must be cognitively simple, that is, that it cannot be sustained by multiple Weltanschauungs; indeed, typically, more complex Selves do involve exactly some such amalgam of views. Such cognitive complexity—producing, as it does, the ability to hold simultaneously contradictory propositions—gives the subject (the subject-in-itself, I, consciousness) more “wiggle room,” as it were, to shift positions while remaining, essentially, the same Self.

18 Kant 101 being the prerequisite for Kant 102, “relativity theory,” which is the prerequisite for Kant 103, “quantum mechanics.”

19.6.63, my Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, p.38.

20 As I have argued in my Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.

21 This of course yet again reaffirms that what the concept person designates is essentially metaphysical.

22 This creative function is by no means best understood in any standard linear ratiocination procedures and requires a substantial overhaul of our understanding of e.g. game theory, logical construction games (e.g. the brilliant and insightful works of Johan Van Benthem in the bibliography), and upgrading Closed Individualist single agent models of reasoning, at the very least, as multiply interfering Lorenzen and Beth type Open Individualist tableaus, perhaps sequenced in conjunction with Brouwer’s second act of intuitionism, namely, choice sequences—see Van Atten’s On Brouwer.

23 The “cheap logic” as Heidegger calls science.

24 If science is the “cheap logic” as Heidegger more than once quipped (e.g., his wonderful Introduction to Metaphysics), then surely religion is an overly expensive one.
25 That it is not possible is, arguably, an analytic truth in so far as the request for such an experience can be shown to be or reducible to a request for a perspectival event (subjective experience) of a non-perspectival event (“objective” things in themselves).

26 It is through this rather complex (and, let us assume, more or less veridical) representational self-construction and representational world re-construction into an ordered locus of phenomena (a set of mental representations within which the subject becomes identified as a particular Phenomenal Self and the Physical World is modeled as a Phenomenal World, i.e., the $\varepsilon/\delta$ phenomenal spacetime manifold) that correctly (we have sufficient reason to believe) tracks—at least with some requisite degree of isomorphism—both mental and physical reality. (So even if the sky is not “really” blue and not “really” up, we can and do believe that the sensations of “blue” and of “up” are, at least on most realist interpretations and at least to some degree isomorphic with something “out there.”) It is by the projection of ourselves into our (experienced from different points of view) Phenomenal Worlds within which we are identified as Phenomenal Selves that “we” manage to interact both with each other and with the world and on the basis of which are formed our conceptions about how things really are.

27 There are of course a slew of other problems with such a conception, one of which was best expressed by one of my favorite neurologists, Britain’s Mark Solms: “The object representations which we know as the physical organs of the body—and that includes the nervous system . . . are no more real in themselves than the subjective phantasies that we uncover in psychoanalysis concerning the psychical reality of an internal world.” Quoted in Dennett and Kolak, “Consciousness, Self and Reality: Who Are We?”

28 To equate the Noumenal Subject with the brain, which is possible and in some ways unproblematic from an Open Individualist point of view, is problematical in that the brain qua brain is not a self of any sort but, rather, a bundle of neurons. The brain of course can be conceived as the physical realizer of a self (“self” here understood not in psychological but purely functional terms).

29 Quoted in the best book on Brouwer’s philosophy written thus far (though I suppose I should openly reveal that it is one I published as series editor), which I would recommend as required reading for any and all up and coming philosophers and/or mathematicians: On Brouwer by Mark Van Atten, Wadsworth 2004, p. 76. See, especially, his section, “The creating subject as phenomenology’s transcendent subject.”

30 A phenomenological object, or set, from which identified as a Phenomenal Self
the subject is dissociated through secondary identification (superobjectification). See §6.3.

31 For an admittedly Wittgensteinian elaboration of my view of situations, see my Witgenstein’s Tractatus.

32 If all this sounds rather mystical and perhaps reminiscent of some of the wilder metaphysics of the middle ages, let us keep in mind that nothing being said here could not be easily restated in terms consistent with contemporary cognitive science. Indeed, recall the sense in which there is no light inside the head as expressed via our Dream Analog. Indeed, as we already said it would be fair to say, from the standpoint of physics, that light is not bright, that is, that “bright qualia” or the “visual phenomenon of brightness” are not properties of lightwaves per se nor of photons—another point that seems to go universally unheeded by virtually all philosophers and physicists today. This is what I have called the “false geometry” and “false physics” of dreams.” See my In Search of Myself: Life, Death and Personal Identity and §8.3 of the present work.

33 Blue and Brown Books, p. 55

34 It is in this sense, then, that much mental illness can be viewed as a sort of “nightmare” that sometimes occurs during the dream we ordinarily call, “waking reality.” We might conjecture, along such lines, that both psychotherapy and madness may be part of an elaborate, sometimes deadly, game of self-deception, where the subject and Phenomenal Self take the roles, respectively, of cat and mouse.

35 The obvious implication here for Open Individualism would be to push the shadow analogy and say that there exists but one Noumenal Subject that casts many numerically distinct shadows.

36 See Brian Garrett’s articles in the Bibliography.

37 In that regard “brightness” is like “warmth,” in that both exist as phenomena. What from a purely physical point of view differentiates the molecular motion of an object that feels warm to the touch vs. an object that feels cold to the touch has to do with just that—molecular motion—just as what from a purely physical point of view differentiates light in the “blue” wavelength from light in the “red” wavelength is not the color of the waves but their lengths and frequencies.

38 Do animals have Phenomenal Selves? If they see consciously, yes. The obvious implication here is that conscious seeing necessarily requires not just a monitoring of one’s external world in the way that a camera or a thermometer can achieve but a monitoring of one’s external world achieved via a monitoring of one’s self-
representation within one’s representational (phenomenal) world.

39 Of course in Empty Individualism all Phenomenal Selves are one’s own; the way to thus explain from a phenomenological point of view the notion of such alienation would be to express it in mathematico-phenomenological terms as an artificial inversion of the natural metric in the $\varepsilon/\delta$ manifold between the identifying subject of experience (the subject) and the identified psychological objects (the Phenomenal Self); it’s a case of what we might call “robbing one’s self to pay one’s other.”

40 In Brower’s view there are four kinds of consciousness: stillness, sensational, mathematical, and wisdom; see Mark Van Atten’s brilliant “The irreflexivity of Brouwer’s philosophy,” and his On Brouwer in my Wadsworth Philosophers Series.

41 As opposed to thinking about our experience; see the chapter, “Experience” in my Wisdom Without Answers.

42 Unger has since modified his view; he now believes we exist for a while—a few years, for instance. See his Identity, Consciousness and Value, and his comments therein to my APQ article “Personal Identity and Causality: Becoming Unglued.” When I once remarked to Unger (in a conversation with him and Steve Stich) that it seemed to me ironic that he went from a view in which he believed he was no one and did not exist, to a view in which he exists for a while, he said, “Well, Dan, I was rather an impetuous young man when I had that radical thesis; you are now young and believe we are all the same person. When you get to be my age you too will mellow with your views and then probably you will believe you are only a few other people.” Stich almost fell off his chair laughing.

43 Distinguished here, of course, from phenomenological.

44 This I believe is the original impetus behind the secular platitude that philosophy cannot be taught, that it ought not to be written down, etc., and its religious counterpart, namely, that one ought not to build churches. One can certainly train a monkey to mimic human behavior or program an automaton to do so, perhaps so much so that subsequently one could not tell the difference, whereas arguably such higher levels of consciousness and self-consciousness do not spontaneously arise unless there is indeed the subject there. The implications for theology in particular and for education, religious and secular, in general of such a View are beyond the scope of the present work and I so leave it to “others” to draw the obvious conclusions.

45 The Coast Guard still uses Ptolemaic methods in navigation, because the
calculations are simpler and do a sufficiently accurate job.

I should also perhaps at this point inform the perhaps uninformed reader that the well known maximal extensions of the well known Kerr’s solution for singularities, where by identifying the top of a disc in the (x, y, z) plane with the bottom of the corresponding disc in the (x', y', z') plane allows for passing from the one plane to the other by circling twice round the singularity at $x^2 + y^2 = a^2$, $z = 0$, in ways similar to surfaces in the Reissner-Nordström solution. Indeed—though I must leave the exposition of the technical details for my forthcoming The Logical Foundations of Spacetime, Geometry, and Quantum Mechanics: A Topological Model for the Mind—I should perhaps also point out that my former professor Charles Misner’s two dimensional solution allows for something no less similar and no less astounding, from our point of view. Misner’s two-dimensional example allows for extension of (Cartesian indexed) region I across the boundary $t = 0$ into II, where the vertical null geodesics are complete but the twisted null geodesics are not. A two-dimensional Minkowski space is the universal covering space where under the discrete subgroup $G$ of the Lorentz group, where identifying equivalent points in regions I and II makes such extensions possible. The importance, of course, is that one family of null geodesics can be completed in the extension of another, independently, with both extensions as it were simultaneously, where quotients such as $(I + II + III)$, $\hat{\eta}/G$ are still manifolds but not Hausdorff. The bifurcation of continuous curves, with one branch going into one region and another to another, is barely understood still today in my view because physicists working on such problems are handicapped, not in the Steven Hawking sense (who said, most cleverly, with regard to the bifurcation above, that “Such behavior of an observer’s world-line would be very uncomfortable,”) but in the presently beloved professor Hintikka sense, namely, what is needed for such study is e.g. the branching quantifiers of Hintikka’s Independence Friendly Logic.

A number of interesting complexities, which we cannot go into here, suggest for instance that because, as is well known, bundles of frames can be well behaved even in naughty spaces (my term for spaces that are not well behaved in the Hawking sense), a most phenomenologically fruitful way to model singularities is with bundles of linear frames, whereby we could extend our discussion in Chapter 6 of psychological bundles into the phenomenological analog using for instance Taub-NUT spaces (spatially homogeneeous empty space solutions of Einstein’s equations with topology $R \times S^3$ and metric,

$$ds^2 = -U^{-1}dr^2 + (2l)^2 U(d\theta + \cos \theta d\phi)^2 + (r^2 + l^2)(d\theta^2 + \sin^2 \theta d\phi^2),$$

where $\theta, \psi$ and $\phi$ are Euler coordinates on $S^3$), in many ways similar to the Misner example mentioned in note 40 above. Misner used to say (in fact he titled one of
his papers thus) that Taub-NUT spaces could be used as a counterexample to almost anything. He was speaking of course in the topological sense, but the broader sense for anyone who can read between the lines (or the knots) is not out of the question.

48 One difference being that different singularity theorems apply albeit in horrifically interesting and revealing ways, as I explain in my corresponding “Topology of Dreams” chapters, slightly less mathematically in my *New Theory of Dreams* and a good deal more mathematically in my *Logical Foundations of Spacetime, Geometry, and Quantum Mechanics: A Topological Model for the Mind*. As a preview, or teaser, consider the fact that I show why because of the incomplete timelike geodesics in dreams the world line of the dreaming subject identified as a particular dream character, from the point of view of that character, never comes to an end, it winds itself around inside the phenomenologically and mathematically compact set, never moving beyond the time enclosed in that dream. As Hawking has already pointed out, if strong causality is violated, which I have shown *at the very least* for dreams it is, then what he most brilliantly and insightfully calls “totally imprisoned incompleteness” (e.g. Taub-NUT spaces, mentioned in note 41, with incomplete geodesics all totally imprisoned in compact neighborhoods of past and future horizons) can occur, i.e., is thereby within that manifold enabled. Such spaces, in my view, can serve as the repository within which personalities, as such, live, as it were, until they are ready to be farmed, that is, applied. I might also add, here, that the *I* as I have been trying to explain is a singularity connecting all spaces, near and far, which are not only *ontologically vast* in the sense that Quine once described my book but, also, to defer to Hawking’s apt phrase, “unboundedly large.”

49 As I first argued in my “The Resolution of the Discrepancy Between the Geometry of Visibles and the Geometry of the Physical World Through a Theory of the Dimensionality of Visibles,” and refined in my *In Search of Myself*.

50 Because singularities involve singular points around which curvatures become unboundedly large, both “near” and “far” require multiple (nonlocal) localizations of singularities (what I called in Chapter 2 “compactifications of the subject”); in dreams this would require the situation described in our *Dream Analog II*. Such “*manningfältigkeit*” to use once again Schrödinger’s bon mot, require either a singularity or a Cauchy horizon. Interestingly enough, from the standpoint of our remarriage (after Husserl’s unfortunate divorce) of mathematics, logic and phenomenology, compact partial Cauchy surfaces with points whose past and/or future light cones start converging again allow for closed trapped surfaces, making it impossible from one instantiated subject-in-itself (*I*, compactification) to know
what its own instantiation in another is doing, just exactly in the same epistemic logic disconnect fashion that forbids (and explains) us from predicting the future in any one world timeline so construed from the point of view of the subject therein exclusively conjoined. Such mathematically-logical explanations, if they are that, help to explain the epistemic exclusions that make Open Individualism no less difficult to conceive than a universe whose boundary condition, to now simply echo Hawking, is that it has no boundaries.

51 Exact solutions to Einstein’s equations involve a spacetime in which field equations with the energy-momentum tensor obeying “local causality” postulates and certain specific types of energy conditions; the move allows solutions provided in a local form to be reformulated to include global properties, as required for instance in General Relativity. Given what we said above about multiperspectivalism, our Open World (ultra nonlocality) solution would not, strictly speaking, afford an exact solution to Einstein’s equations. It would, however, provide a way to bridge both Special and General Relativity with quantum mechanics (or, to again evoke Bohm’s apt phrase, quantum nonmechanics) with a (new and improved) understanding of singularities, with functors from singularities (black holes) in spacetime manifold theories to singularities (the I) in our Open View theory. These provide exactly the sort of singularities in generic situations in General Relativity, which some (e.g. Hawking) have suggested are best approached with a refinement of the power series expansion techniques developed by Lifshitz and Khalatnikov, as well as by at the same time making the category-theoretical connections between singularities in these various theories. Some physicists, as well as a few mathematicians, I have already mentioned—e.g. Brower, Schrödinger, Dyson, Wheeler—who as I have also pointed out share or are sympathetic to my view, have tried to incorporate subjectivity into their theories but not into their exact solutions. It is my hope that our present development of Open Individualism may inspire others to pursue the quest.

52 It is, in that sense, like the problem of conceiving a mathematical point as moving; it is not the points of a manifold that move, they are where they are, but it is constructions in the manifold that “move.”

53 To those interested in such topics I would also throw the following additional counterexamples in topology as further “hints” (recalling my previous mention that my professor at the University of Maryland Charles Misner called the Taub-NUT space a “counterexample to everything”) Novak Space, both Strong and Single Ultrafilter Topologies, The Infinite Cage, and Michael’s Closed Subspace, though I have not yet studied all of these sufficiently. But intuition tells me that in this
regard IF Logic might here too prove to be a very helpful tool.

54 It is amusing, and hardly trivial, to note that in the course of writing various drafts of this work, starting while I was still in graduate school, I have had to change this number on nearly every occasion, the “age of the universe” varying each time by several billions of years. For those seeking arguments that bring that age down considerably, I recommend my In Search of Myself: Life, Death and Personal Identity.

55 For a discussion of Korsakoff’s syndrome, see Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife For His Hat, “A Matter of Identity,” pp. 108-115. “. . . such a [Korsakoff’s Syndrome] patient must literally make himself (and his world) up every moment,” p. 110. What I have argued here, to oversimplify, is that we all do, except in us this process goes by unnoticed.

56 I have chose to use here the Arabic symbol ُ, “yâ.”
TRANSCENDENTAL BORDERS

I know this sounds like metaphysical megalomania of an unusually shameless kind. Merely being TN [Thomas Nagel] isn’t good enough for me: I have to think of myself as the world soul in humble disguise. In mitigation I can plead only that the same thought is available to any of you. You are all subjects of the centerless universe and mere human or Martian identity should seem to you arbitrary.

Thomas Nagel, *The View From Nowhere*

§11.1 CLIMBING KANT’S LADDER: FROM THE PHENOMENAL SELF TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT

There is little doubt that throughout the space of the Cosmic Ocean, our universe, there flow a multitude of ephemeral individuations that in varying degrees sustain their borders over time—a myriad swarm of waves within waves of perceptible patterns identified into countless arrays of objects and entities: galaxies, stars, planets, atoms, quarks . . . Somewhere between the ceaselessly disintegrating and integrating chaotic microscopic waves of complexes and the ceaselessly fluctuating macroscopic waves of complexes there emerge from out of the flux the bundles which we find ourselves identified as—“the faces myriad yet curiously identical in their lack of individual identity,” to borrow Faulkner’s words—living human beings, themselves whirlpools of ever-changing patterns through whose borders flow the amorphous experiences and conceptions in which the conscious contemplation of this entire Cosmic array consists.

Historically, there have been and still are basically three different approaches to dealing with the problem of personal identity. One looks downwardly, beneath physiological, psychological and phenomenological borders for some underlying unity or underlying substance that remains permanent across the changes in the content of experience. This, basically, was Descartes’ move. Another looks directly and more closely at experience to see if there is a perceiver among the perceptions or for evidence of a permanent Self in experience to provide unity. This, basically,
was Hume’s move. Or, one looks upwardly, above experience, for some overarching transcendental unity that would provide identity over and above the physiological and/or psychological individuations, the many ever-changing elements. This, basically, was Kant’s move.

Kant conceived, in effect, the subject not as a substance as Descartes had nor as identifiable in experience as Hume thought it would have to be. That is, Kant’s conception of the subject is not of something that you can experience, as Hume thought it would have to be put, rather, of something that makes the having of any experience possible.

According to Kant, our experiences are in fact unified. The experience of reading, for instance, is not just a sequence of separate experiences of individual words. You experience not just individual words but the sentences that the words compose. Were it not for some unity over and above the psychological individuations within which each word occurs, each word would stand by itself unconnected to any other words. How then could sentence comprehension occur, unless the individual experience of words is not separate but unified? Something must connect the individuations into an identifiable whole within experience. Since experience is thus unified, something must account for this unity. Kant, like Descartes, claimed that the possibility of the “I think” accompanies experience and accounts for the unity perceived. Unlike Descartes, however, Kant did not reify this “I think” as a *res cogitans*, a thinking thing (an underlying substance) but conceived of it as something “over and above”—transcendental to—experience.

Kant claimed unified experiences cannot exist unowned. The fact that Hume could not find the unifier, claimed Kant, was due to Hume’s looking in the wrong place. Hume’s mistake was in supposing that experiences could exist unified by themselves, independently of any subject. But the having of an experience itself presupposes, according to Kant, that the experience is someone’s. Kant’s mistake, from our point of view, was to conceive the experience as belonging to e.g. Kant (i.e., the Phenomenal Self) albeit subject to the transcendental unity of apperception.

Kant’s idea, roughly, is this. We could speak about experiences impersonally—for instance, instead of saying “I see a pebble,” we could say, “A pebble is being seen,” or “Pebble-seeing is going on.” But to speak impersonally is to ignore the fact that when a pebble is being seen there is someone doing the seeing: I see the pebble. That is, and as I argued earlier, we can give a descriptive account of how it is that the subject is intuited as such, not as an object per se but, rather, in the way that objects are
perceived: the fact is that the pebble is being perceived from a particular point of view. Hume failed to recognize the full implication of the subject in relation to which objects are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time, i.e., observed, this and that is why, according to Kant, Hume failed to uncover the subject in experience. By presupposing that experiences can exist independently of the subject, Hume blinded himself to what Kant claims is an always present but unexperienced element of experience—the subject. Hume could not find it because, Kant claims, as we saw Wittgenstein too would later in very much his own way do, the subject exists nowhere in experience, enters it from the “outside,” the subject is itself “transcendental,” existing altogether beyond the categories of space and time—for Kant, the “Noumenal World.”

Consider, by analogy, the contribution a blank movie screen makes to unifying the images projected upon it. In terms of adding actual content the movie screen contributes absolutely nothing. In terms of adding content, the screen is absolutely contentless (as it must be if it is to be a good screen). In terms of making it possible for there to be any images at all, the movie screen contributes a great deal. Though the screen does not show up among the individuated elements of experience, without it there is no unified experience whatsoever. There are only the flickering lights. If one turns away from the motion picture screen (which itself is never in motion) and looks, as in a sense Hume did, directly into the source of the picture—the projector—the experience of the motion picture disappears. All one sees are the experientially un-unified flickering lights: there is no picture, only motion. Unless one looks at the screen (away from the projector), there is no experience of a unified picture. From the perspective of the individual phenomenal elements of the motion picture itself, neither the screen nor the projector exist (they are not themselves phenomenal elements) but are “transcendental.” The screen and the projector “transcend” outside or beyond the phenomena. Kant claimed that the subject thus transcends outside or beyond the phenomena, as both the conceiver and seer of its Phenomenal World. It is this transcendental subject that both projects and unifies the phenomena into what we call the having of “experience.”

Kant wrote,

I cannot have any representation whatsoever of a thinking being through any outer experience, but only through self-consciousness. Objects of this kind are, therefore, nothing more than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things, which in this way alone can be represented as thinking beings. [Critique of Pure Reason, p. 347]
CHAPTER 11

But what is “this consciousness of mine?” For Kant it is a *transcendental* subject that, just as the movie screen and projector do not exist inside the motion picture itself, does not exist in the Phenomenal World but is something beyond it—akin in the way that Wittgenstein referred to the Metaphysical Subject as the “limit” of the world but not an object within it:

The subject does not belong to the world but is the boundary of the world. . . . Where in the world could a metaphysical subject be? . . . Here we see that solipsism thoroughly thought out coincides with pure realism. The *I* in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality coordinated with it. Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can speak about the self in a nonpsychological way. The *I* occurs in philosophy through the fact that the “world is my world.” The philosophical *I* is not the human being, not the human body, nor the human soul with which psychology deals. The philosophical self is the metaphysical subject, the boundary — nowhere in the world. [Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*, pp. 38-39]

For Kant, too, the transcendental subject is the provider of unity to experience that is not itself given anywhere in experience but is the means by which experience is ordered:

I am conscious of myself not as I am in myself, but only that I am. The representation is a thought that is . . . it is not an experience. [p. 157]

Kant’s theory of the transcendental subject has had, and still has, enormous influence.¹ In this chapter we consider, first, how some contemporary philosophers have tried to provide a transcendental analysis of personal identity in order to see whether and to what degree such a transcendental analysis may correspond to what, after all our Boundary Dissolves via negativa, might be left for a person to *be*. In asking what is left for a person to *be*, I am asking what aspect of my existence makes it seem plausible that the various Boundary Dissolves are not like death? What makes it possible that, even though I would no longer be the same body, brain, or psychology, I *would still be there*? If I am not necessarily tied to a particular brain, a particular psychology, a particular stream of consciousness, and so on, what then *am* “I”? Second, we look at how some contemporary philosophers have actually expressed their transcendental analysis of personal identity in order to see whether and to what degree any transcendental borders between us would be of sufficient metaphysical significance so as to necessitate our drawing along them inter-personal boundaries.

Since I have imagined Boundary Dissolves, such as the Omni Dissolve in which I cease being Daniel Kolak and become Ann-Margret, across which I
don’t believe that Daniel Kolak survives but across which I believe I would survive, it seems plausible to me that though right now I am Daniel Kolak, I am not bound to Daniel Kolak. Who then, am I, the subject, bound to? To no one, it seems. That is, as we have seen time and again, our method of via negativa suggests that my existence is not necessarily bound to this or any other particular persisting body-character-memory complex.

Under ordinary circumstances, of course, it certainly seems as if I am bound to Daniel Kolak—that I am bound to this particular persisting body-character-memory complex. In ordinary circumstances, “where I go, there goes DK” seems true, as does “where DK goes, there go I.” This, however—given the various Boundary Dissolves—seems merely due to the persisting body-character-memory complex in my experience having always remained this particular body-character-memory complex, having always remained DK. Such conclusions are based on presently available memories, however, and we have successfully imagined thought experiments in which the available memories, along with the entire persisting body-character-memory complex—of which, in ordinary experience, we say “wherever I go, there goes the persisting body-character-memory complex”—are no longer there but I am still there. If I were essentially tied to any element of my persisting body-character-memory complex—to DK—I could not imagine being some other persisting body-character-memory complex. I even have access to actual experiences, such as in my dreams, in which my character-memory complex is in fact different, along with my phenomenal body-mind (the Phenomenal Self), yet which I would still call the experiences of the same person, me.

It is for such reasons that I do not consider the Boundary Dissolves in any way to be like death. I find that I can perfectly well understand and believe that I, the person who is writing these words right now, would be a different persisting body-character-memory complex but that I would still be there. I might not remember having written these words, and would perhaps remember having written other words, and I might have a woman’s body, and so on, but I would still exist. And if I can imagine still being there when a completely different human being is there, I can imagine that different human beings, with neither their bodies, their brains, their psychologies, nor their streams of consciousness in common, are the same person. But what is it about the subject that makes it seems plausible that this same subject continues to exist throughout the entire spectrum of the Omni-Dissolve, for instance? How is it that the subject, given the various Dissolves, seems
capable of attaching itself to (identifying itself as) virtually any persisting body-character-memory complex? What could it possibly mean to say that, for instance, the existence of this subject transcends any particular body, psychology, etc.—that I am not limited to being just Daniel Kolak or just Ann-Margret or just any one particular persisting body-character-memory complex, that my personal identity transcends all such psychological and physiological identifications? How can I even call it “my I?” Whose I, if not DK’s?

We already know the Open Individualist answer to this question: everyone’s and no one’s.

§11.2 J.L. MACKIE, ZENO VENDLER, AND I: THE WITTGENSTEINIAN VESSEL OF LIFE, ALL ABOARD!

Zeno Vendler, following Kant, suggests one sort of variant on a contemporary transcendental I view (though like Wittgenstein, Vendler too erroneously, like virtually all philosophers writing on the subject, conflates I and Self):

The transcendental “I” is not a thing, it has no content; it is a frame into which any content may fit, or, better, a “format” or a “schema” into which any content may be cast. As the Kantian schema of a triangle is not an object to be perceived but a “rule” to be followed, so is the “schema of subjectivity,” which, as I see it, is at least one aspect of the transcendental self. [The Matter of Minds, p. 107]

J.L. Mackie characterizes this same idea of a transcendental subject as follows:

What . . . unites the images of Zeno Vendler mounted on a horse and watching, through Hannibal’s eyes, the battle of Cannae, of Peter Strawson blazing a trail through a jungle of phenomena, and of Elizabeth Anscombe floating in a tepid bath? It is, of course, the transcendental “I.” [“The Transcendental I,” p. 48]

Vendler derives his notion of the transcendental subject from his ability to perform “intersubjective transference” in his imagination. His comments about our ability to perform such transference could as well apply to the various Boundary Dissolves:

in general, we can imagine being someone else: that blind beggar, that child, Helen Keller, or Napoleon. We might not be able to bring it off to our own satisfaction, but we can try without the threat of absurdity from the outset. Hence we see that being a subject, being an “I,” is not
necessarily tied to having the experiences I actually have. Subjectivity is not bound to the content of my consciousness: I can remove and replace as much as I want to, as much as necessary to represent the “mind” of that alien being, without the slightest harm to the self, to the “I,” to subjectivity. [p. 11]

Certainly what it cannot mean, when I imagine being anyone else is that I am merely imagining that, for instance, this human being—this particular exclusively conjoined physiological-psychological bundle—is a different human being. Thus when performing the Omni-Dissolve in which I am transformed from Kolak to Krishnamurti to Ann-Margret, it cannot possibly be, for reasons that Kripke and others have given, that a human being—a particular series of exclusively conjoined physiological-psychological complexes—ordinarily designated by the name “Daniel Kolak,” son of Rajka and Miro, born in Zagreb, raised by his mother and his grandmother in Bethesda, Maryland, in such-and-such a way, could have been born for instance in England as a different persisting body-character-memory complex named “Derek Parfit,” son of Jessie and Norman, raised in some different such-and-such a way, or born in Madanapalle to a Jiddu family of Telugu-speaking Brahmins, named after Sri Krishna, raised in an altogether starkly different such-and-such a way. For instance this physiology could perhaps have been there and that physiology could have been here but this physiology could not have been that one. No doubt a different sperm and egg would have produced a different physiology, just as a different set of experiences, interacting with that physiology, would have produced a different psychology. And so on. That is I think the real sum and substance of Kripke’s point. Yet I can imagine being Krishnamurti, I can imagine being Parfit, etc. The impossible, as many philosophers have argued, cannot be imagined (we cannot, for instance, imagine a square triangle). So when I am performing such Boundary Dissolves I must not be necessarily bound by the borders that Daniel Kolak is here identified as (apparently exclusively) or the borders that Krishnamurti is there identified as (apparently exclusively) or the borders that Ann Margret is there identified as (apparently exclusively) or any other exclusively conjoined physiological-psychological bundle from whose first-person point of view the subject is there identified as (apparently exclusively). Thus, for instance, when in the Omni-Dissolve I get new memories, it cannot be that my memories get new memories. My memories did not get new memories—my memories were replaced by new and different memories and this could conceivably happen so quickly, or while I am in pain, that I do not even notice it. Similarly, when I get a new brain, it
cannot be that my brain gets a new brain—my brain was replaced by numerically different neurons and this, too, could happen without me even noticing it. Nor can it be that when I get a new physiology that it is my physiology that gets a new physiology—my physiology was replaced by numerically different cells and actually this did in fact happen over the last seven years. The same is true for “stream of consciousness;” when I say “my stream of consciousness” I do not mean “my stream of consciousness’s stream of consciousness.” Even if I got a “new soul,” it would not be the case that “my soul got a new soul”—my soul would be replaced by a (presumably) numerically distinct but qualitatively indistinguishable metaphysical substance (metaphysiology?) in such a way that, as we were able to imagine, I would not even notice the switch. Nor when I say “my” brain am I merely saying “my body’s brain.” For if my brain is moved to another body, we can well imagine that I get another body and then we are back with the supposition “my body gets a new body,” which is false. And when I say “my” Phenomenal Self I do not mean my Phenomenal Self’s Phenomenal Self. And so on.

Such deceptively simple logico-linguistic deductions mask the depth of the subject. That was part of Wittgenstein’s genius, not only to see but to show this. In ordinary circumstances, when we refer to our own bodies it does not seem as if we are making merely a tautological claim. Wittgenstein (who, interestingly enough, said that “The human body is the best picture of the human soul” [Phil. Invest., II (iv)], makes a similar point when, as G.E Moore quotes him, Wittgenstein says that “This body is my body” does not mean “This body belongs to this body” [Philosophical Papers, p. 310]. Such musings supposedly led Wittgenstein to his still not properly understood Solipsism:

I can still express my solipsism by saying, “Only what I see . . . is really seen.” And here I am tempted to say . . . by “the word ‘I’ I don’t mean L.W.” . . . I could also express my claim by saying: “I am the vessel of life . . .” [Philosophical Investigations, pp. 64-65]

What about this Wittgensteinian “vessel of life” that, apparently, is able to identify itself as anyone—including itself, over time? The Ordinary Life Dissolve shows that, as a matter of psychological fact, in spite of the actual physiological, psychological and phenomenological borders occurring within the life of a human being, I do appear to myself in experience as always bordered yet I do not (unless I am a Buddhist or a Parfitian Empty Individualist) appear to myself in theory (i.e., what I call the conceptual reference frame—see §10.1) ever to be bound either by my old nor by my
new psychological, physiological, and phenomenological borders. The real borders occurring in ordinary day-to-day life thus do not have the (metaphysical) significance of boundaries between the momentary life and death of one person and the momentary life and death of another. Thus when, for instance, I suddenly get all new neurons (that is, a new, but exact replica, brain) and even supposing that at that moment I have no occurrent memories whatsoever, there seems to be someone who survives—transcends—the “gap.” So it must therefore be possible to survive, since we can imagine ourselves surviving. But that explication of logical possibility does not in and of itself explain how it is logically possible that we do, and these are not philosophically equivalent by any means. Zeno Vendler, and those sympathetic to a Kantian-type transcendental approach, might try to answer the question of what makes such survival possible is the transcendental subject that has, in Vendler’s words,

no content and no essence; it is a mere frame in which any picture fits; it is the bare form of consciousness [italics mine, The Matter of Minds, p.117].

§ 11.3 THE NEW AND IMPROVED TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION: PHENOMENOLOGY’S TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT AND BROUWER’S CREATING SUBJECT AS THE OPEN INDIVIDUALIST NOUMENAL SUBJECT

Such transcendental analyses correspond, arguably, to our concept not of transcendental unity but transcendental identity of the nonlocal subject-in-itself. In other words, phenomenology’s transcendental subject is not only Brouwer’s creating subject but also the Noumenal Subject of Open Individualism, the major difference being that our open concept (besides explicitly making us all one numerically identical person) does not go beyond the accepted canons of philosophical explanation (modulo Nozick). This, I would suggest, is no minor difference; it means that those philosophers who have by and large been unsympathetic to Kantian approaches in general and transcendental arguments and approaches in particular, now have a new way out of their Closed Individual View into the Open Individual View.

Clearly, individual perceptions of the world and of myself, like the conceptions through which they are interpreted via the conceptual
framework into what ordinarily we call, “my experience,” are in neither case direct apprehensions of the “physical world” but, arguably, as we have seen, phenomenological representations of that world (i.e., the Phenomenal World consisting, experientially, in series of Phenomenal Fields) and of myself in it (experientially, the Phenomenal Self) within which the subject finds itself at the center, the fulcrum of self-consciousness, identified as a representation from the first-person point of view of my physiology—the phenomenal body (the body image)—and a representation from the first-person point of view of my psychology—the phenomenal psychology (the mind image). Within the borders of each physiology we count: two lungs, two kidneys, one heart, one brain (two brains on Puccetti’s view), etc. Within the borders of each psychology we count: a variety of roles and personas, one (let us assume) “dominant personality,” one stream of consciousness, a plurality of simultaneous “attentions” (i.e., listening, daydreaming, talking), etc. Within the borders of each phenomenology we count: a plurality of various phenomenal individuations, among them one Phenomenal Self, one Phenomenal World, etc. And within the borders of each Phenomenal Self, identified as each individual personality the subject-in-itself finds itself in the intuition of personal identity from which both our concept of personal identity is derived and also on the basis of which, via negativa and across all the Boundary Dissolves, we are able to construct a philosophical explanation of the possibility that we are all one and the same person.

The point now with regard to the various transcendental conceptions of the subject is not necessarily to make such a leap, or to suppose that Open Individualism (which should certainly at the very least be able, as we have already shown it is, not only to enable but even to explain such a notion more coherently than do standard transcendental accounts) requires such a perhaps Kierkegaardian leap of faith but, rather, merely to show how, if one’s philosophy is transcendental, i.e., one is already some sort of “transcendental” Closed Individualist, we can nevertheless explain how it is possible that we are all the same person in spite of such a (non-apparent, i.e., transcendental) excluder. In that respect our requisite Transcendental Boundary Dissolve will be no different than the sort required in our most mundane excluders, such as for instance for those of us steeped in a physical view we were required to show how if we are but physical entities nevertheless it is possible that we are all the same person. On the contrary: to show how it is possible that the transcendental subject, e.g. the Kantian “Noumenal Self,” Wittgensteinian “metaphysical subject,” Brouwer’s
creating subject, etc., can be simultaneously in various spatiotemporal positions identified as each and every Phenomenal Self, though in and of itself this may be difficult to believe, is no more taxing from a philosophical point of view than it is to show how it is possible that there is just one Objective Reality in the world being looked at from a plurality of subjective points of view. Indeed, it is far less difficult to explain, from the perspective of this or any other Phenomenal Self, how it is possible that there is just one transcendental subject than it is to explain, as we have already done, how it is possible that there is one mundane (albeit nonlocal) subject-in-itself, one numerically identical Noumenal Subject, and so on.

In other words, in so far as we have sufficient good reason already for thinking that the concept of personal identity is not bound by our physiological, psychological, and phenomenological borders—that I am not, essentially, my physiology, psychology, my phenomenology, etc.—we have already made sufficient room (as we are about to see) for a view in which personal identity is not bound by our transcendental borders either.

§ 11.4 THE BRAINS OF DANIEL DENNETT AND THE MYTH OF DOUBLE TRANSDUCTION: TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS EXPOSED

Let us first briefly return to Dennett’s refreshingly more mundane example in which he imagines two qualitatively different and numerically distinct (spatially separated) brains, running in perfect synchronization (such that the mind in brain1 and the mind in brain2 are qualitatively identical), as being one and the same person. What made this plausible is that there seemed to be but “one stream of consciousness” involved. What, however, made it seem plausible to count this as only one “person,” not two? It was that the two brains had, at each instant, exactly the same thoughts, exactly the same sensations, etc. Thoughts and sensations, we can and do believe, do not have a spatial location—if they did, we could point to them; I can point to your neurons but I can no more point to one of your thoughts than I can point to the number three. Right now, for instance, as you are reading these words you are having thoughts. Whose thoughts are they? Would you not say they are, right now, your thoughts? You may think they are someone else’s—perhaps DK’s exclusively. But these bloated ink spots here on the page are not thoughts. They are ink spots. Symbols for thoughts, perhaps. If I opened your skull as you are interpreting these inkblots, I would not find thoughts, I would find neurons.
Are these particular neurons essential to your being who you are, any more than these particular inkblots are essential to the thoughts presently thought being the thoughts they are? It seems not, given the possibility of Boundary Dissolves such as Neuraids. Are your particular (personal) memories essential to the thoughts presently thought being the thoughts they are? It seems not, given the possibility of Boundary Dissolves such as Memoraids. And that was how we got around the Spatial Border; *ex hypothesi*, the two brains are having at each moment exactly the same “stream of consciousness”—they are experiencing exactly the same thoughts and sensations. Their “consciousness,” as such—the *I*—however, since consciousness, subjectivity, seems to be a “mental” rather than a “physical” sort of occurrence—would not be the sort of thing that is located at a particular spatio-temporal position. Neither would there in Dennett’s example be any qualitative difference between the “naked form of consciousness” of brains A and B. It therefore seems not only meaningful but also even plausible to suppose that, unlike in the case of two ordinary physical objects that are qualitatively identical, two transcendental subjects whose contents of consciousness are qualitatively identical, as in the Dennett example, could plausibly be considered numerically identical.

Now, in Dennett’s example the two brains run in sync contemporaneously. But suppose that brain A existed 10,000 years ago, and brain B exists today, and each brain “runs” qualitatively indistinguishable (phenomenal) worlds, qualitatively indistinguishable thoughts and experiences, etc., up to and including qualitatively indistinguishable (phenomenal) Selves, etc. If we can imagine that they are the same person when the two brains “run” contemporaneously, what is to prevent us from imagining that they are the same person when the two brains run at different times? If the transcendental subject is not itself limited exclusively to one particular spatial position, why should we suppose that it is thus limited exclusively to one particular temporal position?

One might suppose that such a transcendental subject would be located at a certain spatiotemporal position because one’s world looks very different depending on where and when one looks at it. Such differences, however, are qualitative differences, and we are presently supposing that Brain A, 10,000 years ago, had thoughts, experiences, etc., which are qualitatively indistinguishable from those that Brain B has today. If this is coherent, then, it would seem, when or where the transcendental subject occurs (is localized in relation to said mundane phenomena), is not a definite and uncrossable boundary delineating personal identity.
One might suppose that the way to distinguish between ‘my’ transcendental subject from ‘your’ transcendental subject would be in virtue of each being experienced within two different brains, each of which is in turn bordered from the other via various qualitative borders. But, given our other Boundary Dissolves, we could ask whether such qualitative differences are enough to make the difference between there being one person or two. In Dennett’s example, for instance, when the two brains “fall out of sync,” what changes is not the consciousness but, rather, the content of consciousness. The two brains start having different occurrent memories, which after a while give rise to an ever-widening gulf of different dispositional memories, and so on. In other words, we could begin “differentiating” one “consciousness” from “another”—somewhat in the way the scholastics tried to differentiate souls by the way each soul is related to a particular body—by identifying consciousness (the subject-in-itself) with some particular content of consciousness. But as we have seen in the various Dissolves, personal identity does not necessarily consist in any such content.

In the various Psychological Boundary Dissolves, we imagined a person surviving, with identity, across all changes in psychological content. We saw how it is possible that a person is not essentially bound to a particular psychology. Thus, thinking different thoughts and having different occurrent memories—having “different streams of consciousness”—whether at two different times, as in the Psychological Dissolve, or whether contemporaneously, as in the Unity of Consciousness Dissolve, does not necessarily make for a boundary between persons. That is why it would seem inappropriate to individuate consciousness along the borders of the content of conscious experience, and why a contentless, or “naked form of consciousness,” like a soul which is not bound to any particular content or spatial or temporal location, would not appear to be the sort of thing that could be metaphysically individuated. It seems we could neither differentiate nor individuate the “naked form of consciousness.” When devoid of content, there seems to be no qualitative difference between my “naked form of consciousness” and your “naked form of consciousness.”

Trying to distinguish one such transcendental subject from another would thus be like trying to distinguish two qualitatively indistinguishable metaphysical entities, which as in the case of our two meta-quarks, is deeply questionable.

Now, the possibility that I can remove and replace as much as I want of the “contents” of my consciousness—what does this show? What it shows,
Vendler, Mackie and others have claimed, is that I can imagine myself as experiencing the world from any number of other perspectives. One might thus suppose that our ability to imagine experiencing the world from any number of other perspectives—perspectives from which the present “content” of our consciousness has also changed—does not imply anything like a single transcendental subject who is everyone but, rather, that it implies the existence of other persons. But, first, your ability to imagine other perspectives does not other perspectives make; and, second, other perspectives do not other persons make. If they did, then, first of all, they would do so in the minded version of the Dream Analog and, second, they would also do so in the Unity of Consciousness Dissolve such as in Parfit’s Physics Exam and my Ethics Exam.

How, then, given our analysis which does not presuppose the individuation and separateness of persons assumption, would we count this transcendental subject? Just because I can, by a piecemeal transference of memory, experience, etc., imagine myself as being you, have I shown that another transcendental subject exists? How? In other words, if there is the transcendental subject above and beyond the physiological, psychological and phenomenological borders in which you and I consist, in virtue of which I am me and you are you, then is there some (metaphysically) significant difference between what it is like to be you and what it is like to be me independently of what particular physiology, psychology, and psychology the transcendental subject “inhabits” (is identified as) such that we are two numerically distinct transcendental subjects? Is what is it like to be me at any particular moment and what is it like to be you of sufficient metaphysical significance that it would make you one person and me another? To put it still differently: I have succeeded in representing your different-from-mine, subjective, point of view on the world if I can imagine myself projected into your beliefs, memories, character traits, physical appearance, etc.—in short, if I can imagine being identified as a different (Phenomenal) Self. To the extent that I can do this I have succeeded in representing myself as another if by “myself” I mean the Self affected by your beliefs, memories, character traits, physical appearance, etc., through which, identified as that Self, you happen to be experiencing the world at this moment. This, it seems, is what happened in the example where I go from being Kolak to Krishnamurti to Ann-Margret; through Ann-Margret’s physiology, psychology and phenomenology I would see what it is like to be Ann Margret by becoming Ann-Margret. What, though, happens to Kolak when I become Ann-Margret? If by “Kolak” we mean this
physiology, psychology, and phenomenology, or some content thereof, “Kolak” would disappear. If by “Kolak” we mean the “naked form of consciousness” as had by the transcendental subject, then I would still be there. I would still be me when I become Ann-Margret. I would still be there because the bare form of consciousness would still be there. Hofstadter and Dennett make a similar point:

“What would it be like to be Indira Gandhi?” Well, for me, or for her? Poor Indira - where does she go while I’m being her? Or if we turn it around (identity being a symmetric relationship), we get “What would it be like for Indira Gandhi to be me?” Once again, where would I be if she were me? Would we have traded places? Or would we have temporarily collapsed two separate “souls” into one?” [The Mind’s I, p. 407]

Given, as we saw, our inability to individuate souls, such a “collapse” would not be temporary—it would be permanent even without any trading of places. This is because even if you—the “transcendental” subject identified as that Self—were identified as a completely different physiology, psychology, and phenomenology, up to and including a different Self, we can imagine that the answer to the question of what it is like to be you would not necessarily change; we can imagine, as in the Omni-Dissolve, that you would not even be aware of any such changes. Thus my “switch” from, at one end, being Kolak to, at the other, being Ann-Margret, we can imagine occurring several times while I was lying out on the street after my bicycle accident: we can imagine me lying on the street “metamorphosing” continuously, and very rapidly, back and forth between Kolak and Ann-Margret and—the person lying there attending, throughout the changes, to nothing but pain—being unaware of anything but the pain.

Dennett and I, in our recent dialogue (“Consciousness Self, and Reality: Who Are We?”) brought these dual issues to the following “head.”

KOLAK: . . . we can agree that we live in commensurate dreamworlds. Right? Would you agree to that phrase? Each subject’s own world is “on line,” as it were—the “reality network” made possible by language . . . . But here now is the . . . question, which . . . I can think of no better person to ask than you: Who is Dan Dennett? The word I is, of course, ambiguous. We use it to refer both to our bodies and our minds, both to the system S (the brain/mind/bodyorganism) and the subject, s, that is S’s self-representation within the virtual reality of its own mind. Now, we agree that in the immediate reality of our experience (within the perspectival representational system) we each present ourselves to ourselves, as a subject, a perceiving thinking self with its own narrative history, what you have so aptly called “the center of narrative gravity” and the “Head of Mind.” . . . which itself beautifully compounds the ambiguity problem: It’s not just that we’ve got
two different cognitive systems; it isn’t even clear that within the perspectival system there is just 
one perspective—that ultimately the perspectival system of my own mind may in and of itself be a 
“public” system. I think it would be very illuminating if you could address this secondary issue as 
well, but I would like first to focus on the intersubjective cognitive duality as it exists between 
Cog, Dennett, and Kolak, not as it may exist within any of them (as we probably both suspect is 
the case). For when you say to me, “I am Dan Dennett,” you are establishing an identity between 
Dennett and S, and I understand you as saying as much. No problem. But Dan Dennett . . . is not 
known to himself as S but s. That is I, Kolak, know myself only as I present myself to myself as a 
self in my own perspectival experience. Likewise, I think, the same must be true for you. And for 
Cog. And this I think is the problem, and I think it is a very real problem, which Kant was the first 
to nail down—that is, we are known to ourselves not as things in themselves but as phenomenal 
selves—which I think is every bit as significant to us today as what Wittgenstein, Quine, and 
Sellers, taught and which parallels exactly the situation you so rightly pointed out at the 
beginning: that everybody honors what these great philosophers have achieved but “they don’t get 
it, and continue to embrace the doctrines these great philosophers worked so hard to demolish.” 
What I think Kant demolished nobody got until Wittgenstein, and it produced the first revolution 
of twentieth century philosophy. . . So when I ask you now, “Who is Dan Dennett?” I’m really 
expressing my own ignorance and puzzlement about who and what it is that is engaged in this 
activity we call philosophy . . . and how by your best understanding you think we as conscious 
subjects can get around the problem that we are each within ourselves not our whole selves but, 
literally, cogs in a wheel within a wheel. . . . You seem to have situated yourself in a view from 
which one can at least see a way out of this quagmire, if not cross it, a view in which one doesn’t 
have to remain silent about what (once) one could not talk about, nor throw in the philosophical 
towel in favor of common sense or naive realism. What is it? What is the view from Dennett? 
DENNETT: Commensurate dreamworlds. Well, Okay. It reminds me of MazeWar, the early 
video game we played on the timesharing computers at the AI lab at MIT many years ago. Each 
agent appears (as a cartoon stick figure with a label) in the other agents’ virtual worlds, and the 
worlds are coordinated into a single virtual world in which all act. That is pretty much the way it 
is in real reality, too. . . . What I am, first and foremost, is the system of information that guides 
my body. In “Where Am I?” I claim that it makes no difference which “brain” subserves that 
information, the organic brain or the computer duplicate. I exist just as long as either instantiation 
exists. And when the systems of information diverge, I split in two. Not before then. As you note, 
Kant saw that we are known to ourselves as phenomenal selves, an observation that I put slightly 
differently in Consciousness Explained, as “first-person operationalisms,” with a footnote to 
Kant’s doctrine that the “for me” and the “in itself” are the same thing in experience. . . . You put 
it vividly: “Each and every aspect of my experience comes to me in varying degrees prefabricated 
and preinterpreted for me, the subject, by my language/mind/brain system within which I subsist.” 
But you are your language/mind/brain system—you’re not something served by it. The 
“preinterpretation” you speak of is something you do in the course of doing the work of a
TRANSCENDENTAL BORDERS

conscious agent. Wittgenstein and Ryle are the theorists of the personal level, as I said in Content and Consciousness, and both of them leave the subpersonal level untouched. It is important, when we begin to study the relations between these levels, not to try to locate the person, and the person’s acts and experiences, at some inner boundary within the subpersonal system. I now call this the myth of the double transduction (I wish I’d thought of that phrase when I was writing Consciousness Explained!), and back in Elbow Room, I spoke of the bugbear of the Incredible Disappearing Self. When you hang on to the idea that you are the whole system, a system that has two ways of being considered, personal and subpersonal, you can escape the strong pull of this perennial favorite.

So what am I? I am a system of information that is embodied, and because of the richness of that embodiment and the capacity of the system has for reflection (for higher-order acts and states), the two Dennets you speak of tend to stay in close registration. Chimpanzees are now famous for recognizing themselves in mirrors; we human beings have a related but even more sophisticated capacity for self-recognition: We can recognize ourselves in verbal descriptions of “other” people. I can encounter a text about one Dennett, Daniel C., philosopher, born 1942, . . . and consult it, cautiously and skeptically, to see if that is what I am. When I do this, I have to remind myself, as it says in the rear-view mirror of my car, that “objects in mirror are closer than they appear.” That guy being written about or talked about is not so far away either. In fact, corrected for the inevitable distortions, he’s right here, none other than yours truly.

The idea that the identity of the subject resides not in something over and above experience, nor in something below experience, but is revealed directly in experience, has been the sum and substance of our demonstrations in the previous chapter. To the degree that our arguments have been convincing and our demonstrations (the examples and counterexamples) clear, it should now be poignantly obvious that the hidden motive for the traditional sorts of transcendental analyses of the subject—their apparent philosophical “openness” (in a variety of modes, from phenomenological and theological to mystical) notwithstanding—is but to preserve the traditional status quo, namely, Closed Individualism. There is no need for the transcendental subject. The subject-in-itself, the I—consciousness—that is right here, none other than yours truly, will do just fine—provided one is willing to accept the possibility of Open Individualism.

§11.5 WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE THE TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT?

The notion of a transcendental subject, like the question of what it is like
to be you—with the emphasis on the ontology, rather than the psychology, of the Self—seems deeply mysterious. It is like asking what it is like to be a subject \textit{qua} subject, what that is, in and of itself, like, independently of the particular contents of consciousness. What seems clear, however, is that in imagining what it is like to be you I have not succeeded in representing myself as another “consciousness.” I have merely imagined \textit{this} “consciousness”—which is presently aware of writing these words—as presently doing something different (reading these words without being aware of having written them), having access to different memories from the ones it has access to now, being in control of a different body, etc.

Consider: I stand on a deserted beach at the edge of the ocean watching the blood-red sun sinking slowly and melting into the deep blue watery horizon, feeling the gentle breeze rumbling in my ears and tickling my skin and ruffling my hair as I listen to the waves crashing and thumping rhythmically onto the sand; I am not thinking about anything—perhaps I am meditating on the flow of air past my nostrils, absorbed in the moment itself, reveling in the sensations. Now, you ask me: “What would it be like for me to be you at that moment?” We could answer: “What it would be like for you to be me at this moment is exactly what it is like for me to be me at this moment,” on the grounds that when you ask me that question you are not asking merely what it would be like for you to be hooked up via some fantastic contraption to my brain to experience in this way what the beach looks and feels like to me, a philosopher named Kolak, standing on a deserted beach who at that moment is not thinking about anything in particular and so is not even aware of being a philosopher named Kolak, etc. Suppose someone built a contraption that hooked your brain up to mine so that you could “see” through my eyes, “hear” through my ears, and apprehend directly all my thoughts. Would that allow you to see a different subject from yourself? No. All it would show is that you, the subject reading these words (assuming for now that there is one), normally limited to the perceptions experienced through the senses of your body alone, can now perceive experiences through the senses of my body as well. One could not, even in principle, build some instrument with which you could then go and look to experience another subject as a subject who, while being perceived as a subject appears as a \textit{different} subject. Injecting consciousness into consciousness is to simply focus the attention on itself, not to create a new “attender.”

In other words, just as it seems redundant to say that one qualitatively identical experience is simultaneously doubled up with another (within a
particular psychology), so too it seems redundant for there to be such a
doubling up of “my” transcendental subject and “your” transcendental
subject. Yet what about my thoughts, which through this fantastic
contraption you are able to experience as perhaps voices from inside my
head? How can you tell the voices are not yours? Because you are not
controlling them? But that relies on the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment as a
border between persons, which we saw is deeply problematic. The only
way, it would seem, for you to experience what it is like to be me is for you
to be me; that is why, when you ask “What is it like to be you?” you are
asking what it would be like to be me, not to observe being me. And to be
me, what would that entail? Would you no longer be you? Why not?
Because you do not remember being born in Zagreb, Croatia, because you
do not have blond hair, because you are not five feet nine inches tall,
because you do not remember taking a train from Karachi to Bombay, etc.? It
seems not. First, strictly by those criteria, I, standing on that beach
meditating, am not “me” either, for at that moment I do not recall any of
those things. We can even imagine not only that I am not experiencing any
occurrent memories, but that even my dispositional memories have
(unbeknownst to me) dissolved. Secondly, if you would cease being you for
such reasons, then you believe that the borders comprise the essential
boundaries of a person—which, as we saw in our various Dissolves, is
deeply problematic. So in what way, if you were me, would you cease being
you? From even a transcendental point of view, then, with the philosophical
emphasis on the “bare form” of consciousness—the “transcendental”
subject-in-itself—rather than on the contents of consciousness, all
“subjectivities” collapse into the I of personal identity, the nonlocal subject-
in-itself in relation to which phenomena are individuated and identified in
perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e.,
observed, the transcendently identical Noumenal Subject.

§11.6 NAGEL’S METAPHYSICAL MEGALOMANIA
AND THE SUBJECT OF THE UNIVERSE: PLAYING
THE WITTGENSTEINIAN GAME FOR HIGHER
STAKES

The concept of a transcendental subject thus easily allows us to play the
Wittgensteinian game for higher stakes; we can imagine the possibility of
Open Individualism in terms of “your” subject (the subject identified as
that Phenomenal Self) and “my” subject (the subject identified as this
Phenomenal Self) being one numerically identical transcendental subject somewhat in the way that Collingwood claimed that a particular “act of thought,” say of Plato’s, can be numerically identical with an act of thought in a completely different psychology and physiology, say Collingwood’s, or the way Averroes claimed all people share in the same “active intellect,” and the way Vendler and others believe in a transcendental self that, being neither a thing nor having any content, is in all of us the now transcendental “I” which, in Vendler’s words, is through each of us “‘hooked’ to the universe.” Because the transcendental subject seems to be exactly the sort of entity that cannot be individuated, it has brought many a philosopher to the threshold of Open Individualism:

[You ask:]”Am I entitled, then, to my own little transcendental self, distinct from yours, which has the same kind of access to my mind as yours does to yours?” No, you are not, I reply, but nor am I. I have a mind, but I do not “have” a transcendental self: the ultimate subject cannot be had . . . How, in the first place, could there be many contentless beings, not located in space and time either? How would they differ from one another? [The Matter of Minds, p. 109]

A Closed Individualist could however in (literal) self-defense consider the possibility, already mentioned and which we considered in our discussion of the soul view, that one could individuate contentless beings that are not located in space and time by the relations they bear to particular physiologies and psychologies. That is, what makes these experiences of writing mine, and what makes these experiences of reading yours, is that there is a numerically different transcendental subject attached to each of these experiences. The problem with such a move, however, is, as before, that to do so may be to draw ourselves out of the picture; Vendler notes this problem by saying that, if we were to draw our boundaries in this way, then “my” transcendental self would be essentially tied to me, thus, once more, transference would be impossible: I could not imagine being Ronald Reagan, because I could not be in the state of being he. But I can: ergo . . . [p. 109]

Moreover, there is an additional problem which Vendler does not consider: namely, that in that case I could not imagine being me, either—that is, I could not imagine being the same person who as a little boy caught pigeons in Zagreb (an event that as I now remember it consists in the remembered experiences of me-now remembering both the experience remembered and identifying myself as the experiencer doing the remembering now and with the experiencer doing the watching then). In other words, if the transcendental subject is individuated by which physiological-psychological
bundle it is attached to, then the change in physiological and psychological borders from Kolak age 3 to Kolak age 42 results in the person here and now being a different person from the person then and there. The conclusion Vendler would like us to draw from the possibility of any such transference is that we can put a wedge between the transcendental self and any particular human being:

Hence, since I can imagine being Napoleon, it follows that I could have been born as Napoleon . . . or R.R., or you. By the same token, I could have been born in the Middle Ages, as a Chinaman, or even perhaps as a pig or a bat. All these things are impossible for Z.V., but possible for me. If, therefore, I had been born as Napoleon, then I would be Napoleon; i.e., the very same “I”, which actually recognizes himself in Z.V., would recognize himself in Napoleon. To use the familiar terminology: the very same “I” would be in another state. The same thing holds in regard to your state; consequently you do not have another transcendental self. [p. 111, italics his]

What we have here, in effect, is a description of what Wittgenstein meant by “the metaphysical subject” and what Nagel refers to as “the objective self,” what Husserl called the “transcendental ego” and what Vendler and Mackie refer to as the transcendental self. But there are some important differences between the description offered by Vendler, and to a degree Nagel, as compared to the description which Wittgenstein and Mackie offer and which are closer to the positive analysis I offer. Mackie, clearly recognizing the difficulties of trying to make a convincing case for a transcendental self, concludes that a deep conceptual reform would be needed to make the concept analytically coherent, perhaps something akin to what in Chapter 1 we referred to as analogous to a paradigm shift. This leads Mackie to disagree, as do I, with Vendler’s unwillingness to suppose that the transcendental self is identical to each one of us. Vendler claims:

the transcendental “I” is not identical with Z.V. I am Z.V. . . . but in no sense am I the transcendental self . . . . So, to allay your fears I do not appropriate that self. If anything, the transcendental “I” “has” me, as it “has” you and Napoleon. . . . But . . . how can that same self be in all these states at the same time? It is not “at the same time.” [p. 112]

Given our various Boundary Dissolves, however, such restrictions seem at this point entirely unnecessary. For when Vendler asks, “How can that same self be in all these states at the same time,” and then answers, “It is not ‘at the same time’,” he is guarding against the “patently impossible” [p. 105] situation of one person being in more than one place at a time. He is guarding against a seemingly incoherent possibility that our analysis has shown time and again to be coherent, given the possibility of the Spatial
Dissolve and the many other Dissolves. What then are the other “fears” from which Vendler wishes to protect us? The following passage provides the answer:

It is the imagination, and the imagination alone, that saves us from solipsism, and makes it possible for us to attribute subjective states to other beings in the world . . . [p. 11]

Once again, here, it seems, Vendler assumes that the only sort of solipsism available to us is problematic solipsism, a world in which others are dark inside. He is not considering the Open Individualist “Enlightened,” or Independence Friendly alternative to problematic Solipsism, which implies that instead of being “dark” inside, other human beings feel and have subjective experiences in exactly the way I do without being other persons. But now why should this be a fear? The views of Mackie and, to a degree, especially Wittgenstein, seem more open in that regard; Wittgenstein, if we interpret him to be making not just a linguistic but an ontological claim, implies that he, L.W., is identical to the “metaphysical subject,” and it is this that allows him to “express” his “solipsism”:

The word “I” does not mean the same as “L.W.” even if I am L.W., . . . But that doesn’t mean: that “L.W.” and “I” mean different things. [Blue and Brown Books, pp. 64-67]

Mackie’s view, too, seems open to the possibility of trying to understand some aspect of the transcendental subject using our ordinary experience by the “whittling down” of the meaning of the transcendental subject until it has reference not to some other-worldly transcendental form but to something down-to-earth and ordinary, something here and now—even though this would require conceptual reforms of undisclosed proportions, the nature of which Mackie does not even speculate about:

I am inclined to think, then, in view of our readiness to engage not only in first person but also in second and third person transferences, that our present ordinary concept of I (and of you and he and she) is partly Cartesian, and that in whittling down the meaning of the transcendental “I” to “the subject, whatever it may be . . .” and thereby allowing it to have a genuine reference to this human being, I am proposing a conceptual reform. [The Transcendental I, p. 61]

Nagel, too, in trying to come up with a theory of an “objective self,” seems briefly to stumble in such a direction:

The idea of the objective self has something in common with the “metaphysical subject” of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.641, though I stop short of excluding it from the world entirely. The metaphysical subject is the logical limit that we reach if all the contents of the mind, including its objective thoughts, are thrown into the world as properties of TN [Thomas Nagel]. The objective
self is the last stage of the detaching subject before it shrinks to an extensionless point. It also has a good deal in common with Husserl’s transcendental ego, though I do not share the “transcendental idealism” to which his phenomenology is committed (Husserl, sec. 41). Neither do I accept the solipsism of the *Tractatus*. [The View From Nowhere, p. 62]

Open Individualism offers us, in marked contrast, a philosophically viable version of both the “transcendental idealism” of Husserl’s phenomenology and the solipsism of the *Tractatus*, inclusive even (re the Noumenal Subject) of Brouwer’s crating subject, precisely because we are led to it by my analysis *via negativa* of personal identity, led to it at “the last stage of the detaching subject before it shrinks to an extensionless point.” That is precisely what we have tried to show with the various Boundary Dissolves—that by the procedure of “sending” by thought experiment the different components of your “being” in different directions and then seeing which way you would go, the nature—and transcendental identity—of the subject is thereby illuminated.

It is interesting to note what happens when Nagel, for instance, comes right up against Open Individualism:

I know this sounds like metaphysical megalomania of an unusually shameless kind. Merely being TN isn’t good enough for me: I have to think of myself as the world soul in humble disguise. In mitigation I can plead only that the same thought is available to any of you. You are all subjects of the centerless universe and mere human or Martian identity should seem to you arbitrary. [p. 61]

Hovering on the doorstep, however, he immediately does an about-face and, in the very next sentence, takes it all back:

I am not saying that I individually am the subject of the universe: just that I am a subject . . .. [p. 61]

Perhaps, however, the reason Nagel, like Vendler, does not go as far as Wittgenstein might have wished to go to conclude that we are each, personally, the subject of the universe, is because it has not occurred to these writers how Open Individualism could be possible given its many apparent excluders. To the extent that we are able to show how Open Individualism is, indeed, possible in spite of its many apparent excluders, we may be able to bring our many Selves to see, not just for ourselves but for everyone, how it is possible that we are each the same person—how it is indeed *possible* that we are each, personally, the Subject of the Universe.
§ 11.7 FULL CONTACT PHILOSOPHY: THE NOUMENAL TOUCH

To claim that there exists only one subject is to claim that real life is like our Dream Analog II. A difficulty with such an idea, one might suppose, is that what makes it plausible to believe, in Dream Analog, that each conscious dream character is one and the same person is that the person—the “dreamer”—is in direct contact with each and every element in the dream up to and including each personified psychological bundle (each conscious dream character)—each (dream) Self—via neurophysiological connections. This objection can now easily be dismissed.

First, even a little reflection reveals that while it may be relatively easy to understand how neurophysiologies are in direct physical contact with each other (via electrochemical connections, the synapses, etc.) there is still the problem of how neurophysiologies are in direct physical contact with phenomenologies—how Brain States are in direct physical contact with Mind States—and vice-versa. In other words, what we might think of as “the point-of-contact problem” is not limited to Open Individualism (it is not unique to the one-subject-to-many-selves problem); it occurs just as paradoxically in every other view, including Closed Individualism. So if one is going to be unwilling to accept Open Individualism, it should not be on grounds that as a philosophy of personal identity it cannot unproblematically solve certain problems in the philosophy of mind that no other theory can solve unproblematically either. This having been said, however, it should neither be surprising to find that, having now performed our Transcendental Boundary Dissolve, Open Individualism better solves what I call the point-of-contact problem than any competing view.

§ 11.7.1 DREAM ANALOG III

You’re having a lucid dream. In the dream you say to yourself: “This is a dream!” Someone enters the (dream) room that you are in. Startled, you ask: “Who are you?” Perhaps because you have recently finished this book, the other character, who perhaps even looks like me, in the dream replies, with a smile: “I am you!”

This character in the dream, who let us now assume not only talks but looks like Kolak, is you. Clearly, nothing is at that moment entering your brain from the outside; the dream is not being beamed into your head from Mars. And so on. Let us now also assume, as we did in Dream Analog II, that in the dream both characters are conscious but not co-conscious. (This is not necessary to make the points below, but merely to drive them home.)
In that case, on a weak (closed world) interpretation of nonlocality, the individuation and identification (localization) of phenomena (the dream objects) occurs in one (multi-perspectival) space time manifold (dream world) from multiple first person points of view in relation to the (reciprocally multiply localized, i.e., “non-local” in relation to said dream objects) dream subject—consciousness—multiply exclusively conjoined to objects within one closed (dream) spacetime manifold. You and I, on this closed world interpretation, are the same (weakly nonlocal) subject-in-itself in one manifold. On a strong (many worlds) interpretation of nonlocality, the individuation and identification (localization) of phenomena (the dream objects) occurs in many (mono-perspectival) space time manifolds (dream worlds) from the first person point of view in relation to the (reciprocally multiply localized, i.e., “non-local” in relation to said dream objects in said dream worlds) subject-in-itself—I, consciousness—multiply exclusively conjoined to dream objects within multiple disjoint (e.g. Hausdorff separated) closed spacetime (dream) manifolds. On a ultra-strong (open world) interpretation of nonlocality, the individuation and identification (localization) of phenomena (the dream objects) in many (multi-perspectival) space and time manifolds (dream worlds) from multiple first person points of view in relation to the (reciprocally multiply localized, i.e., “non-local” in relation to said dream objects) subject-in-itself—I, consciousness—multiply exclusively conjoined therein to dream objects within multiple disjoint (e.g. Hausdorff separated) open spacetime (dream) manifolds.

One may object: but how could any of these be the case? Whichever the case may be—even the standard, locality interpretation—the problem is that the dreamer “running” the dream—and whether we think of the mind as just the brain, system uncs., a mechanized nonconscious or unconscious process, etc., isn’t important at the moment—must be in equal contact both with the words you in the dream hear coming from “your” imaginary head, the one you imagine in the dream sits atop those dream shoulders. There is consciousness, the subject-in-istelf masked by the one persona, “you,” which in the dream from your point of view you think of as being the real and only you. And there is from that first person point of view something equivalent to the problem of other minds: you may be wondering whether “Kolak” in the dream truly is conscious in the way that you seem to be conscious. And likewise the character “Kolak” in the dream may be wondering—we can at the very least imagine you hearing “Kolak” in the dream claim to be wondering this—whether you, the character who let us
now assume Kolak in the dream claims is but a character in his dream and are conscious in the way that he claims (or thinks) he is. But, in either case, the mind of the dreamer must be capable of bifurcating from a phenomenological point of view, first—as is obvious from any dream—into subject and object (a necessary condition for the having of any experience as we know it) and, second—as both I and Kolak in your dream claim is the case not just in cases of multiple personality disorder but in dreams such as the one being presently described—into subject and subject.

Suppose, however, that we now ask what the point-of-contact is, in any of these scenarios, between the subject—be it a mundane monoperspectival subject, as in the standard locality interpretation, or a mundane multiphrenic subject, as in one of the nonstandard nonlocality interpretations, or a transcendental subject, as in views being considered in the present chapter—and, on the one hand, the objects in the dream—e.g., the (dream) Phenomenal Self to which it is conjoined, apparently exclusively—and the underlying (or overarching) realizers (i.e., causal mechanisms) of the dream, e.g., the brain, the Noumenal Subject, the transcendental subject, etc.?

The point of raising the point-of-contact problem is not necessarily to solve it (though we will allude) but, rather, to make the point that even in the most mundane dream scenario the Transcendental Boundary dissolves under its own as it were philosophical weightlessness. Let us therefore imagine the dialog in your dream continuing along the following lines:

YOU: All right, I can see how Open Individualism might be true right now inside my own mind, here within this dream. I am you. You are me. Let us suppose then the subject presently here is identified, as in your Dream Analog II, as two distinct loci of motion and intentionality in this dream experiences you and me, each of us a different phenomenal Self, separated from each other by the Fact of Exclusive Conjoinment, etc. How can that possibly be the case in the world of waking experience? Explain that, dream Kolak!

I: Well, just as you and I are the same person here in this dream, so too in the waking world all the people you meet are just yourself. You see? If it is possible here then it is possible there. Do you see? Wait, no, no, don’t just nod your nonexistent head and say, “yes, I guess I see how this may be possible here,” and then obscured by the intuition of understanding lose the sublime insight. Go ahead and explain to yourself right now exactly how it is that the separateness with identity that you experience in each and every dream, at whatever degree—regardless of whether the other characters in
TRANSCENDENTAL BORDERS

your dream are minded or not—is possible, I mean, tell yourself how you do that. Can you? Do you know? Do you? Don’t you see how whatever explanation you offer yourself is but a concocted and I might even say confabulated theory and that you don’t really know how any of this is possible. You cannot pull yourself out of the phenomenal pit using phenomena, any more than you can absolve yourself from the intuition of understanding and non-understanding—

YOU: Now hold on! I can conceive—sort of—how it is possible now, in this dream, that I am you: we are after all in the same brain, you and I. It may be interesting to realize that what is going on right now is not just possible but actually occurs when I am dreaming and that the brain is to you and to me in the dream what according to Open Individualism the Noumenal Subject is to me and to other people out there in the real world. But how, in your view, is the Noumenal Subject in contact with everyone? That’s absolutely preposterous! I mean, now, in this dream, the Noumenal Subject can be conceived of as being just the brain. The brain at this very moment is in contact with us, its phenomenal projections into its own phenomenal world, via neural connections. So what kind of mystical transcendental being is this Noumenal Subject of yours?

I: Please don’t ascribe to me any mystical doctrines! Open Individualism is not mysticism. Moreover, it does not require any leap of faith, Kierkegaardian or otherwise, into the transcendental arena. I agree that we might be able, relatively easily, to understand how neurons can be in direct physical contact with other neurons—but how, exactly, are neurons in direct physical contact with the phenomena in which you right now consist? Before you answer this as far as I know as yet unanswered and perhaps unanswerable question, let me just clear up yet again a crucial misunderstanding you and many “others” seem to be having. The misunderstanding is this. Isn’t the reason why it is so difficult for you to accept Open Individualism “out there” in the “multi-perspectival” world—what according to Closed Individualism is the one true “objective,” “real,” world, when you are dreaming, so to speak, with your eyes open—is that it seems preposterous to you then to suppose that what you are seeing and hearing right now could possibly ever occur? I mean, isn’t that the problem—that you find it hard to believe you could ever be hearing, seeing, and experiencing things which are all you but which you have no conscious access to whatsoever as being generated at that moment by you? But don’t you see? That is exactly what is going on right now in this, and any other, dream! Regardless of whether in this dream I am conscious in the way that
you are conscious, the fact is that you hear me talking to you and you listen with interest and so on, but of course who am I? I am you.

YOU: You are me, yes, but—
I: It just doesn’t seem to you as if I am you.
YOU: It certainly doesn’t!
I: Well, but don’t you see that what you are experiencing right now dissolves one of the major apparent excluders of Open Individualism? The point-of-contact problem you raise is a difficult problem but it is always a problem. That’s not what makes it difficult to accept Open Individualism! What makes it so difficult to accept Open Individualism is something that you already know is not really the case—namely, that you could never actually be experiencing what you are in fact right now experiencing. That is how you keep self-deceiving yourself—

YOU: Only if you can explain to me how it is possible that just as the brain is in contact with you and with me right now in this dream so too the Noumenal Subject is in contact with each of us out there in the world, without involving any kind of *transcendental* argument, can I accept the possibility of Open Individualism.

I: Again the same double-edged mistake! Don’t you see? If you explain to me exactly how the brain is in direct physical contact with you and with me and with this entire phenomenal world, I am sure I would be able to explain to you how the Noumenal Subject can do it, without going beyond the scope and limits of formal philosophy!

YOU: Well, perhaps there are no Mind States. Perhaps—

I: Of course you can say there are no Mind States. Of course you can say that consciousness is an illusion. Well, that just solves everything! And especially of course you can take one of the Empty Individualist positions and claim, with Parfit’s hedges or as Unger once did that there are no persons who exist, with numerical identity, over time, and so on. What I am saying here is that you cannot require of Open Individualism to solve problems that no other view can solve. Be fair. After all, even if Mind States ultimately reduce just to Brain States, this what you are now seeing does not look like neurons firing, nor like the brain! So how is this, what you are now seeing, in contact with the underlying physical elements? You can say, “supervenience,” “emergent property,” or whatever you wish, but really the point of contact problem is not thereby solved—

YOU: But surely I do have lots of reasons for thinking that I am my brain. Whereas I have no reason whatsoever for thinking that I am the Noumenal Subject—
I: But you also have lots of reasons for thinking that you are not your brain—neither now in this sleeping dream nor in your waking states—as the various Brain Dissolves and other examples show. Suppose for instance that while this dream is occurring right now the brain through which it is occurring is undergoing Neuraids. So the neurons that were here when this dream began are no longer here. Is this, necessarily, a different dream now and are you, necessarily, no longer identical to the one who began this dream? Or suppose that phenomenal Self—you—is being run by the left hemisphere and this phenomenal Self—me—is being run by the right hemisphere. Maybe the hemispheres are, even as we speak, being placed in different bodies, kept in contact by cables. And so on. Does that, necessarily, make the difference between identity and non-identity? You have by now encountered many reasons for thinking that if you are going to view yourself as the same identical person over time then you had better view yourself not as any of the physiological, psychological, and phenomenological elements in which you consist—for that leads, as we saw on the Empty Individualist View, to a dissolution of personal identity.

YOU: What you are saying, then, is that right now I don’t really understand how the words I hear you saying are in fact me talking to myself.

I: That’s right—and note, regardless of whether I’m conscious, that is, whether the subject is simultaneously in this dream identified as two Phenomenal Selves, you and Kolak, or just you and Kolak is but an empty figment of your imagination.

YOU: What you are saying, really, is that this, what is going on right now, in and of itself, is as “transcendental” as I am claiming Open Individualism must ultimately degenerate to, as a philosophy?

I: Worse than that: for an Open Individualist, some sort of transcendentalism must be somewhere hidden in your agenda, if there is to be any personal identity, else you must give up the proverbial ghost and migrate to an Empty view. Look, how is this what you are now seeing in this dream really possible? Explain it. You seem to yourself right now to be standing there, listening. I seem to you right now to be here, standing here, talking. You say to yourself, “well, but we are in the same brain.” As if that explains it! It is like saying, “we are in the same universe, each quantum particle connected to every other by the Schrödinger equation, differential equations, Lipschitz functions, etc., so we are all the same person, Q.E.D!” This lucid dream you are right now having may be unusually philosophical, yes, but everything I am saying applies to your ordinary, non-lucid dreams.
just as well. Open Individualism is not a mystical view at all. I claim that the one-person view can be an explanation within the accepted scope and limits of formal philosophy, not that it is some perfect and all-encompassing theory. It has loose ends and some necessary paradoxes. Every theory does.

YOU: Still it seems much more plausible to me that you and I are the same person—or at least parts of the same person—since we are right now exist in the same head . . .

I: Look, let’s get this perfectly clear: I’m pointing up at the ceiling of this room—do you think that the sky above this room will lead, if only we flew upward in a Rocket Ship—outside your skull? Obviously not. But there is here an unobvious point not being realized. In pointing upward am I right now pointing toward the outside of your skull? Of course not! Well, but where are we at this moment really, where is this space that you are right now seeing in your dream? For that matter, where is the space that fills the Cosmos located? Is the space you are right now seeing located inside the neurons firing? Perhaps—but this space you are seeing sure does not look like neurons firing, does it? So how exactly does a brain do this?

YOU: You’ve lost me. I don’t see what you are getting at now. Are you trying to say that the theory that Mind States are just Brain States is a bad theory?

I: Hardly. I am trying to show you that when you say, “Well, I can see how you are me right now in my dream because we’re both in the same brain, where as I cannot see how you are me when we are awake since I do not then see how the Noumenal Subject could exist so as to be in contact with each and every Phenomenal Self that it is identified as,” etc., you are allowing yourself to forget several points, among them:

1) neither now nor when you are awake do you have a complete understanding of consciousness (I, the subject-in-itself) nor of how one gets consciousness from Brain States,

2) replacing your current brain with an exact replica would not even be noticed, either phenomenologically nor psychologically, by “you” or by anyone else.

And so on. We are not here trying to solve the problem of consciousness. Rather, we are trying to see how it is possible that we are all one and the same person. Consciousness, subjectivity, is obviously capable of being used to generate many interesting illusions—this dream is one of them—and you have had enough experience and reasons with which to understand
that what you are experiencing right now, which is all you, is exactly the sort of illusion that according to Open Individualism is going on all the time. It would be one thing if Open Individualism were some sort of mystical doctrine about some grand cosmic illusion that you could barely make sense of. Open Individualism holds that the sort of illusion that you already know goes on in your own experience much of the time is actually going on all of the time.

YOU: So who am I, then? Who am I right now?
I: You are an exclusively conjoined psychological complex from whose fist-person point of view you seem right now to be experiencing this dream. Remember how at first you had trouble identifying with this psychological bundle that is me? Well, now, after our discussion, it may actually begin to feel as if you are me: the intuition of personal identity—"I am I"—transcends its complement, the intuition of personal non-identity—"I am not you"—toward other Selves—"I am you." You may now find yourself identifying with me, recognizing me to be yourself. Of course you still seem to be over there, not here—you are not, from your present first-person perspective, over here, in this part of your Phenomenal World. The fact is that even in your Phenomenal World, which you believe exists all within one person, you, you are not identified as me. Thus your psychological identification with this part of yourself can to a certain degree be altered through this brief philosophical analysis, but not your identification as this part of yourself. Moreover, what you fail to realize is that once you accept that you and I are both conscious even though we are the same subject there is no way that we can be in the same Phenomenal World. Your Phenomenal World and my Phenomenal World are two numerically distinct dreams being experienced simultaneously by one multiperspectival individual. That is why I keep telling you that in spite of the fact that because this is a sleeping dream we presently exist within the purely phenomenal or mental realm what you are here presently experiencing already shows that what in your waking states you believe is impossible is, in fact, necessary. Without some sort of multiperspectival Open World that is at the very least sympathetic to Open Individualism communication would be impossible.

YOU: I don’t see that. What are you leading up to? That perhaps I could be identified as you too?
I: No! That you already are! And that if you weren’t we wouldn’t be talking because we couldn’t be.
YOU: Why then do I not see out of your eyes?
I: First of all, you do not perceive phenomena with your eyes. Are you
seeing me with your eyes right now? No; your “eyes” are closed. Second, this viewing is just not co-conscious with that viewing, any more than either of these viewings are co-conscious with you on your sixteenth birthday in the past or with you in the future lying on your death bed. So then right now, at this moment, how would you answer the question with which we started, namely, Who are you?

YOU: I am . . . the dreamer.

I: In one sense you are, yes, but those borders that you take to be your borders do not bind you. Look, you think you are the dreamer—you still think all this is occurring inside your head? But what you are here identified as is not you. Haven’t we already established that what you are here identified as is but a Phenomenal Self? Here. I will not put my fingers on your skull. Is this what I hold in my fingers your head?

YOU: Yes, it is, I can feel your fingers pressing against my head—

I: So all this—including me—all this is in there, in that head? Ridiculous! We’ve been over this same ground before. You think you—that Phenomenal Self—are the whole dreamer? You think you are a different entity from me? You too, like I am, are but a phenomenal body-mind image! Here, I touch your eye. You feel a slight pain. But these are not your eyes, are they? These are dream eyes. That’s a dream head. You too are but a figure in the dream. Whether dreaming with your eyes closed, as now, or whether dreaming with your eyes open, as in waking states, the eyes you intuit as your phenomenal eyes are not your eyes. What you intuit as your eyes are themselves but phenomenal representations constructed through the brain and so is the brain. In other words: what you intuit as you is but a phenomenal representation constructed through the brain, as is your concept of your brain. You see? So, once again, as the Smoking Caterpillar said to Alice: Who are you?

YOU: Obviously, I am me . . .

I: As you just said you brought your hands to your chest—one part of this Phenomenal World moved toward another part.

YOU: No, no, this is where I am, in here.

I: Now again you are putting your hands on your head. But that’s not you! That’s just a representation of you. Again one part of your phenomenal world moved toward another part. In other words, that Phenomenal Self which you are at present identified as represents, in this phenomenology, the borders of you but not the boundaries of you . . . if you are a person clearly you experience yourself as being bordered yet you are not border-bound . . . look, why don’t you simply reveal yourself, right now in this
dream, to yourself exactly as you really are? I mean, right now whatever is running this dream is in direct contact with each and every part of this Phenomenal World, including your phenomenal yet non-apparent eyes and my phenomenal yet non-apparent eyes. Why are you not able to move my limbs the way you move yours? Because you are bordered there, but obviously since all this that you are now seeing is occurring within you, you must not be bound by those borders. So why are you not co-conscious of this part of your own Phenomenal World? (And did you just notice that trans-world indexicality?)

YOU: Perhaps with some effort I could be?
I: Whose effort? Only if whatever is causing these experiences makes both your apparent effort and the apparent movement occur contiguous with each other. What you seem to keep forgetting is that you too are merely an appearance. What you are calling “you” is but a Phenomenal Self. You can’t trace a single thought, image, or idea back to its original source. Try it! Whether awake, dreaming with your eyes open, or whether asleep, dreaming with your eyes closed, all that is generated into any phenomenal world are phenomenal images, among them which is the phenomenal image of you. Bordered within—identified as—a Phenomenal Self you cannot trace an image back to the source of the phenomenal image because you are (identified as) that phenomenal image. It would be like your eyes suddenly turning inside out and following visually an impulse sent from the eyes back to the brain . . . the eyes cannot send an image of the image being looked at forward as an image past the image! Like any image, you are part of what is being thrown forth into your phenomenal world by the Noumenal Subject as a representation of itself, a locus of motion and intentionality identified as a Phenomenal Self. Phenomenal Selves as such can’t have a phenomenon of the origin of a phenomenon, since the origin of the phenomenon \( p \) is a non-\( p \). How can you see a non-\( p \)? Impossible! You will only see a \( p \). That too will be thrown forth, another \( p \), thrown forth by a non-\( p \). But what is constantly getting lost here is the fact that in trying to see yourself as you really are, are you not asking yourself to do what is already known by you to be impossible? Why would the Noumenal Subject, or even just the brain, generate an image that apparently wondered about the origin of itself, of that image? Why would the Noumenal Subject, or even just the brain, create within itself a Phenomenal Self who asks itself what \( it \) is when the \( it \) already pulling the strings is making that entire bundle of images, up to and including the Phenomenal World and the Phenomenal Self, ask these questions?
YOU: Perhaps the Noumenal Subject, even though it can do so many things—creating this dream is one of them—somehow does not really know who, or what, it is.

I: But have you forgotten? The intuition of understanding—like the intuition of non-understanding—like this present conscious sensation of wondering, is but another phenomenon thrown forth contiguously into experience, not derived from it. In making you wonder who you are, isn’t the Noumenal Subject just playing a cat and mouse game with itself?

YOU: But why?

I: You tell me.

YOU: Let me then now speak directly to the Noumenal Subject—

I: Who said that?

YOU: I did.

I: Who heard it?

YOU: I did?

I: So go on, speak to yourself directly . . .

YOU: All right, then I am now asking myself: why do I not know everything about myself?

I: That is the epistemological problem here, isn’t it? The problem is not how it is possible that we know anything at all. The problem is how it is possible that we do not already know everything! Perhaps Plato was right, knowledge is remembrance, and Leibniz too was right in saying that the mind knows everything but is confused by what it knows.

YOU: So if it wanted to know itself as such, the Noumenal Subject would saturate itself with the intuition of understanding.

I: On the contrary! If it didn’t want to know itself, the Noumenal Subject would saturate itself with the intuition of understanding—to “calm itself down,” as it were, to make the Phenomenal Self that it is identified as feel as if it understands itself and thereby to stop trying. Which is what it usually is doing. If it really wanted to try and know itself, the Noumenal Subject would always and forever be generating the intuition of non-understanding—

YOU: Just as Socrates did!

I: Well, yes, maybe, but isn’t having the intuition of understanding toward what they do not really understand how most Phenomenal Selves live their lives? Philosophers often wonder why philosophers are in such a minority and why everyone is not puzzled by the sorts of questions philosophers are puzzled by.

YOU: Maybe philosophers are a bug, or a flaw—a “virus” in the system.
I: Or maybe the Noumenal Subject branches out—
YOU: What you are trying to say to me—really, to say to yourself—is that the Noumenal Subject—or whoever, or whatever, you, the dreamer behind or beyond the appearances are—does not really know itself as such? Or is that too only an elaborate self-deception? Or wait: are you omniscient? Omnipotent, maybe? The Noumenal Subject is starting to sound a lot like God. But no. Descartes’ God functioned in his philosophy essentially as a reliable non-deceiver. The Noumenal Subject is just the opposite, is it not: essentially a deceiver, up to and including, especially, a self-deceiver. But why then is there so much suffering in the world? Why, if the Noumenal Subject is pulling its own strings—
I: Whom are you asking this?
YOU: Myself? But that makes no sense! How then am I, the Noumenal Subject, in contact, like this, with what seems to be me and what seems not to be me—
I: Ah, but you see it should no longer be surprising that the point-of-contact problem, like the problems of agency, of free will, of knowledge, of why there is anything at all rather than nothing, like all other such philosophical problems, is not solved by Open Individualism. The purpose of developing our view is not to erect some all-enlightening all-encompassing system but, rather, merely to show how Open Individualism is possible in light of its many apparent excluders, to make room in the metaphysical arena within the scope and limits of formal philosophy for a truly global ethics.
NOTES

1 See my Self & Identity.

2 Naming and Necessity, though Kripke has been perhaps misunderstood on some of these points, where I have been led to believe he is much more sympathetic now to a more Wittgensteinian-inspired (Tractarian) view; I have thus asked him, and he has agreed, to do a new translation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus for my Longman Standard Library of Philosophy Series, with notes, to make some of these I think quite important new insights more readily available.

3 In a recent conversation with the wonderful Grande Dame of Logic Ruth Barcan Marcus, she explained to me very clearly and in no uncertain terms that, yes, she did have the “long ostensive finger of” reference idea but the explanation as to how such reference was possible was worked out by Kripke.

4 Dennett and Kolak 2000.

5 The robot at MIT mentioned in Chapter 10.

6 See Dennett’s Consciousness Explained, p. 132.

7 I am here assuming that we can distinguish my personal memories—memories of my past experiences—from both my factual memories—memories about what the world is like—and my dispositional or remembering-how memories—memories about how to do particular things, such as stand. I am here following Swinburne’s Personal Identity, pp. 8-9.

8 Again, lest anyone think this is an overly fantastical example, let me repeat again as I already said in Chapter 2 that my work on lucid dreams, replicating some of Paul Tholey’s original experiments in Germany and developing new versions of them, suggest this is not just conceptually but psychologically possible. As I say, apparently, Tholey was the only other researcher besides myself who became convinced of the thesis that other dream characters are indeed, in his view virtually always, conscious. (Tholey died in 1998.) In my view, dreams are states in which the subject exhibits (is identified as) multiple personalities and, moreover, my view of multiple personality disorder is that, unlike in most ordinary cases, upon waking the other characters don’t die or, worse, one of them becomes the dominant personality. See my 1993 Philosophical Psychology article, “Finding Our Selves: Individuation, Identification, and Multiple Personality Disorder.” Moreover, I want once more to point out that in lucid dreams you can engage dream characters in extremely elaborate conversations. You can even do experiments. You and the other character can both, for instance, draw a picture of the scene and then you can check if it the same scene drawn from the same perspective, or from two different
perspectives; you can ask the other characters to solve mathematical problems, for instance, that require thinking but which you do not think about as they solve them such that, upon waking, if their answers are correct, this too would provide some confirming evidence. I am grateful to Brigitte Holzinger for suggesting to me the drawing experiment which, having now tried it on a number of dream characters in my lucid dream experiments, do indeed suggest that the other characters are having first-person points of view on the dream—that the subject is located at multiple vantage points in the Phenomenal World of the dream. For a full account of the details of this research see my forthcoming New Interpretation of Dreams.

9 Each of which can be thought of as a Hausdorff space, as I show in my forthcoming New Interpretation of Dreams, where I connect by means of category theory the concept of Hausdorff space with e.g. Hintikka’s independence friendly logic (for which see Appendix A and On Hintikka).

10 Thus, the experience of “moving my eyes” is, from a phenomenological point of view, the alteration of the Phenomenal Field in various perceivable ways, such as blurring, focusing, etc.

11 No one makes clearer than Brentano that phenomenal is not limited just to visuals; see Velarde’s On Brentano.
MORAL BORDERS

Hell is other people.
Jean-Paul Sartre, No Exit

If we are all the same person, how should we live our lives? How should we behave toward one another? What are the implications for our social, legal, political and economic institutions?

§12.1 MORALITY AND THE SEPARATENESS OF PERSONS: FROM SIDGWICK TO PARFIT AND RAWLS

Under traditional Closed Individualism to accord to something or someone, $x$, the status of person is, in addition to other things, to make a certain sort of moral claim on behalf of $x$. Why? Because it is to claim, in addition to whatever else is being claimed, that $x$ has certain rights. We might not agree as to what these rights are or whether they apply in some particular instance, but nevertheless the implication is that to be a person is to be accorded, among other things, freedom from interference by others when such interference is in opposition to one’s well being, interests, needs, and so on, provided that these are themselves conscripted within accepted moral bounds. Thus, for instance, you are not infringing upon my rights if you interfere with my nap as I float in a canoe toward Niagara Falls. Nor are you infringing upon my rights if you stop me from driving drunk in a speeding car through a school zone. You are however infringing upon my rights if because you want my seat on the park bench you kill me. Whereas if you interfere in this same ultimate way not with a man but with a fly by killing it with a flick of a newspaper so you can sit undisturbed on the bench, you have not infringed upon anyone’s rights1 because the fly is not a person. Even if the fly is to a certain degree conscious it is not obvious that it has rights from a moral point of view and it certainly does not have any rights in the legal sense. (Indeed, here we can easily see that the moral and legal sense of right diverges, such that even if one is a person one can have
one’s legal rights taken away, say, by a court of law, up to the ultimate degree in capital punishment, etc.)

This sort of thinking involves two steps. One is that we must draw a certain sort of boundary between certain sorts of things and other certain sorts of things, one of which is accorded a variety of rights that ultimately concur upon it a great, perhaps supreme, degree of specialness among all other sorts of things in the universe. The second is that those very rights thereby accorded are themselves understood as applying strictly within that boundary, that is, between one person and another. In other words, a spontaneous avalanche, whether it destroys a television set or a person is not immoral, any more than a person who destroys his own television set is immoral; it takes a person to do something to another person before immorality, as such, can become an issue. Which now brings us to a pivotal question from the standpoint of our present concerns in this book. Are moral rights—whether as properties, or relations, or whatever—such that they necessarily require some sort of ultimate metaphysical otherness in order to exist? Or can rights as such exist without the concept of the other?

The reason we must ask this question should by now be clear. Since the notion of rights involves essentially the notion of freedom from interference from others, if we are all the same person and there are no others it seems we have altogether lost the notion of right. Does it for instance make sense, say, for me now to demand of myself next month that I not interfere with my present desire to send this manuscript to the publisher, on grounds that I have no right next month to throw what I have done today into the fire? Leaving aside the question of why I would want to burn my own work (Kafka did), would it in this way be wrong for me to do so on moral grounds? Notice that if you find yourself having to some degree the intuition that it might make sense to consider such an act to be morally wrong, probably you are thinking not just about myself but also about others, such as whether it might be wrong to destroy a book that could be of value to others, in the same way that it might be wrong for, say, DaVinci to deface the Mona Lisa. Since our question is about whether morality in general and rights in particular necessarily involve the concept of other persons, we must be careful not to sneak the concept in by the back door. And if we are, and we don’t, I think we can see clearly that the prima facie answer is No: I cannot behave immorally toward myself. I can be stupid or irrational toward myself but not immoral.

The concept of morality thus seems ultimately to involve not so much the concept of person as it does the concept of other person. Questions having
to do with the nature of my relationship to myself are, in that light, not moral questions at all but matters of **prudence, rationality** and **self-interest**. This sort of point has readily been acknowledged by key philosophers, from Sidgwick to Rawls; as one recent writer so well puts it, “the separateness of persons . . . is _the_ basic fact for morals.” Parfit puts this same point as follows:

We are different people, each with his own life to lead. This is true on all views about the nature of personal identity . . .. This fact has been called the **separateness of persons**. Sidgwick believed that this fact is the foundation of the Self-interest Theory about rationality. If what is fundamental is that we are different persons, each with his own life to lead, this supports the claim that the supremely rational ultimate aim, for each person, is that his own life go as well as possible. Sidgwick believed that there is another equally rational ultimate aim. This is that things go, on the whole, as well as possible for everyone. Many agree with Sidgwick that this is the ultimate aim given to us by morality. And some accept Sidgwick’s view that, when morality conflicts with self-interest, there is no answer to the question of what we have most reason to do. When he compared moral and self-interested reasons, neither seemed to Sidgwick to outweigh the other.

Sidgwick held this view because he believed the separateness of persons to be a deep truth. He believed that an appeal to this truth gives a Self-interest Theorist a sufficient defense against the claims of morality. And he suggested that, if we took a different view about personal identity, we could refute the Self-interest Theory. [Reasons and Persons, p. 329]

The thrust of Parfit’s Empty Individualism allows him to argue that by making the relation between himself now and in the future not one of identity, or at least in so far as identity is not primarily what matters in such relations, the relationship between Daniel Kolak now and Daniel Kolak of, say, ten years from now is more like the relationship between one person and another rather than stages of one and the same numerically identical person. Thus on an Empty Individualist View such as Parfit’s it is possible that I can at this moment stand in a moral relation to what may be regarded as a future self, even though strictly speaking the relationship is not one between **self** and **other** as conscripted under traditional Closed Individualism. The reason is that in Parfit’s view the boundary of identity is not one that holds over time for Kolak any more that it holds Kolak, that is, with identity, even when the stages of Kolak’s existence, or “survival,” are sustained by relations of psychological continuity and/or connectedness. In other words, although it is still a **self-self** relation, the selves are not thereby necessarily **identity**-related but have everything that matters in survival, yet allow for moral relations between them. Thus the **sort** of moral relation that holds between **myself now** and in the future can be made to hold, in Parfit’s
analysis, between *me now* and *you now*. This is a major thrust of Parfit’s most brilliant book—which, after all, is not just about personal identity (the middle part) but rationality (the first part) and morality (the latter part)—and, I would suggest, one of its most important results. He has, to his credit, relaxed the identity conditions just enough to allow moral connectedness not just between person stages but also across selves at a time. From our open (vs. his empty) standpoint however such a move does not substantially change the fact that morality as such, involving in particular the notion of moral rights, involves essentially the notion of *other persons*, at least in so far as it requires even in the Parfitian case non-identity between person-stages.

Indeed, such a move brings to light the *separateness of persons* assumption that much more as a necessary condition for morality. But now then what about Open Individualism, in which there are *no* other persons? What happens to morality in that case? Notice, first, that Parfit’s claim above that “We are different people . . . is true on all views about the nature of personal identity,” is false: because Open Individualism quite explicitly denies that we are different people, it is no longer true that we are different people is true on all views about the nature of personal identity. It certainly isn’t true in Open Individualism. This is trivial and obvious. What is also obvious but hardly trivial is that Open Individualism dissolves the implicit borders, without the residual problems—and thereby removes the philosophical tension—between *morality* and *self-interest*. In Open Individualism there is no opposition, as it were no philosophical tension, between self-interest and morality. They are one and the same. It turns the moral clock all the way back to Sidgwick, who himself thought this to be the case:

A moral theory asks, not “What is rational?” but “What is right?” Sidgwick thought that these two questions were, in the end, the same, since they were both about what we had most reason to do. This is why he called Egoism one of the “Methods of Ethics.” A century later, these two questions seem further apart. We have expelled Egoism from Ethics, and we now doubt that acting morally is “required by Reason.” Morality and the Self-interest Theory still conflict. There are many cases where it would be better for someone if he acts wrongly. In such cases we must decide what to do. We must choose between morality and S[elf-interest]. But this choice has seemed to some undiscussable. The claims of each rival have seemed unrelated to the claims of the other. [p. 129]

The problem as Parfit here sees it with Sidgwick’s original position is that Sidgwick was unduly constrained by traditional Closed Individualism. Sidgwick himself recognized, as noted above, that a change in our thinking
about the nature of personal identity might defeat the self-interest theory in favor of morality. Sidgwick writes:

From the point of view, indeed, of abstract philosophy I do not see why the Egoistic principle should pass unchallenged any more than the Universalistic. I do not see why the axiom of Prudence should not be challenged, when it conflicts with present inclination, on a ground similar to that on which Egoists refuse to admit the axiom of Rational Benevolence. If the utilitarian has to answer the question, “Why should I sacrifice my own happiness for the greater happiness of another?” it must surely be admissible to ask the Egoist, “Why should I sacrifice a present pleasure for a greater one in the future? Why should I concern myself about my own future feelings any more than about the feelings of other persons?” It undoubtedly seems to Common Sense paradoxical to ask for a reason why one should seek one’s own happiness on the whole; but I do not see how the demand can be repudiated as absurd by those who adopt the views of the extreme empirical school of psychologists, although those views are commonly supposed to have a close affinity with Egoistic hedonism. Grant that the Ego is merely a system of coherent phenomena, that the permanent identical “I” is not a fact but a fiction, as Hume and his followers maintain: why, then, should one part of the series of feelings into which the Ego is resolved be concerned with another part of the same series, any more than with any other series? [The Methods of Ethics, 418-419]

The reason Sidgwick did not himself seriously consider some such challenge to the Self-interest theory is that, in Parfit’s words, “Since Sidgwick accepted the Common-Sense View [i.e., Closed Individualism], and believed that Hume’s view was false, it is not surprising that he did not develop his suggested challenge to the Self-interest Theory,” [Parfit 1984, p. 139]. Parfit’s own original position is in fact exactly the sort of “different view about personal identity” that Sidgwick imagines could defeat the Self-interest theory. Parfit’s Empty Individualism, in which personal identity is not what matters primarily in survival, implies that if my relation to my future self is of a lesser sort of significance than, say, my relation with others existing concurrently with me in the present, I will be drawn away from self-interest as traditionally conceived and be more likely to behave in a traditionally more moral manner: I will care about more about others than I will about myself in so far as sometimes, indeed often, I will more easily choose to benefit them rather than my distant future self to whom in Parfit’s view I am not related by identity as ordinarily conceived. That is how Parfit, by moving from traditional Closed Individualism to Empty Individualism, builds the Principle of Equality and other distributive principles as a way of trying to defeat self-interest on behalf of his version of utilitarianism.
All this is even from the Open Individualist point of view well and good, for it brings us closer together but at too high a price, namely, by at the same time loosening us from our selves. It is, to use the old expression, a philosophical version of robbing Peter to pay Paul. Our overall account has not increased; it has just been redistributed. Open Individualism offers a better alternative. To begin with, from the Open Individualist point of view it is traditional morality itself, conceived under Closed Individualism, that unduly and unnecessarily divides us against ourselves by creating an opposing boundary where, in our view, there is in this case not even a border and therefore no philosophical tension, between the “internal” demands of our own self-interest and the “external” demands of living with others in a society. The well known received notion of contract-type theories since Hobbes and Rousseau has of course been that without some externally imposed (and at least tacitly agreed to) moral restraint upon the basic self-interests of individuals there could be no organized society; we would without some such “social contract” exist in a primitive “state of nature” consisting in a perpetual war of all against all: life would be, as Hobbes so famously put it, “poor, nasty, brutish and short.” A slew of deontological, or non-consequentialist, and consequentialist moral theories have followed suit with some ideal sets of rules, or principles, or some appropriate moral calculus, that if correctly followed either individually or in the right combination would lead us into a just, or good society or at least situate us properly in the world. So how can Open Individualism offer us improvement by giving up what these traditional views have taken as so fundamental for collective and individual improvement?

Open Individualism too is a “different view about personal identity” except, unlike Empty Individualism, one that doesn’t so much defeat the self-interest theory as once and for all removes the tension between it and morality. In Open Individualism, since all “others” in society are but myself, my interests are ultimately your interests and your interests are ultimately my interests. Before proceeding, however, let us yet again remind ourselves why Open Individualists cannot perceive themselves to be anyone any more than Empty Individualists can perceive themselves to be no one, any more than we who have been taught the Heliocentric theory can see the Sun to be the pivotal center of the solar system around which the Earth and other planets revolve. In each case philosophy is required. Without the conceptual and theoretical understanding provided by philosophy, each of us will most likely believe what we must all in any case necessarily perceive, namely, that we are each a separately existing person
whose identity is closed under known individuating and identifying borders. This is so, as I have argued, because the Illusion of Other Persons is itself a necessary condition for the having of experience as we know it (i.e., identification as a [phenomenal] Self), in the same way that the Transcendental and Transcendent Illusions are necessary for experience as we know it (i.e., in space and time)—just as it is necessary that standing on the Earth and looking up we see the Sun and planets revolving around us. What this means is that, from the standpoint of Open Individualism or even Empty Individualism (the other viable alternative), those of us who don’t know any better and are firm believers in Closed Individualism must be taught to know better. Only once this is accomplished either in the direction of Empty or Open Individualism will there be, in either case, the sort of improvement in our relations with each other that both theories promise.

For the Empty Individualist such an improvement can be explained in terms of my ability to act less selfishly in so far, as for instance Parfit in his own work so well demonstrates, the relationship to my future Self becomes less important to me, to my existence and to my identity, such that the relationship to other selves concurrent with me and my actions in the present will therefore become closer and I will be more sensitive towards others, more caring, more open. For the Open Individualist such an improvement can be explained in terms of my ability to act more rationally in so far the relationship to my other Selves concurrent with me and my actions in the present becomes more important in so far and the degree to which I recognize them as myself.

Furthermore, we must make perfectly clear as to why Open Individualism neither demands nor expects our collective interests to be single-minded. Indeed, they are not. What Open Individualism claims is just that these various and often-opposing interests all belong to one and the same numerically identical person. This is in and of itself quite understandable once we remind ourselves of the extent to which each one of us is already within ourselves a conglomerate of conflicting interests, tendencies, urges, etc., all of which must if we are to act be tempered by some means of internal conflict resolution. In other words, since singlemindedness is a singularly rare characteristic among any one of us we should not be surprised if singlemindedness is not a characteristic of the one person who is everyone. Often we struggle with ourselves over what to do and how to behave, we are inconsistent in our wants, we change our minds, we make mistakes, we have regrets, and so on. Notice, however, that whereas such multiplicity can be an unresolvable problem for single individuals living...
under Closed Individualism, in Open Individualism the problem disappears almost entirely, in so far as Open Individualism makes ample room for all of me: as an open individual everywhere identical yet mutually independent I can express and simultaneously achieve a multiplicity of different interests and desires. So whereas in Closed Individualism a single individual cannot be both a full-time sculptor and a full-time fisherman, both promiscuous and chaste, cannot be both a politician and a hermit, all at once a businessman, a scientist, a philosopher, and so on, in Open Individualism I am at once anyone and everyone. The moral problem in Open Individualism thus itself vanishes and is replaced by the problem of prudence and rationality regarding the proper management of our own multiple and often conflicting self-interests.

There are of course other related problems, not the least of which is what to do given that not all of us realize that we are all the same person. My suggestion is this. Such univocality is, by my lights, unattainable. If there is more than one possible philosophy of personal identity, and I believe there is, it follows that never will it necessarily be the case that everyone believes that we are all the same person. “Personal mechanics” must be taught the way one must be taught celestial mechanics. Although Open Individualism can, as I have tried to show, be reasonably believed to be the truth about us, it is not the only reasonable view. Traditional Closed Individualism, as espoused by common sense is, as I have argued, not a reasonably believable view about us. Empty Individualism, on the other hand, especially as espoused by Buddha, Hume and Parfit, is a reasonably believable view. As we are about to see, however, even this equivocal perplexity about the true nature of personal identity will turn out not to be a problem from a moral point of view. In fact, it can serve as a new, second-order pragmatic solution. For even if we recognize the ultimately equivocal nature of metaphysical theories about ourselves and accept the possibility of our living simultaneously under more than one philosophy—and I strongly believe that we should—we can from a moral standpoint stand united under one global ethics. And, most remarkably, there is not even a need to invent some radically new sort of moral theory. One already exists, waiting in the wings. And it should come as no surprise as to what it is: utilitarianism, albeit a new, what I call open utilitarianism.

From a Open Individualist point of view it is a mistake to draw borders between self-interest and morality. There is no need to and traditional issues of morality are better conscripted under rationality as conceived through the philosophical conjoinment of utilitarianism with Open Individualism. It is
nevertheless deeply revealing, from the standpoint of utilitarian theory itself, that whereas Open Individualism ends up supporting utilitarianism through the “conflation of persons into one,” Parfit’s Empty Individualism achieves exactly the same effect by directly antithetical means! Our two opposing theories of personal identity turn out to have the same desired effect:

On my suggestion, the Utilitarian View may be supported by, not the conflation of persons, but their partial disintegration. It may rest upon the view that a person’s life is less deeply integrated than most of us assume. Utilitarians may be treating benefits and burdens, not as if they all came within the same life, but as if it made no moral difference where they came. And this belief may be partly supported by the view that the unity of each life, and hence the difference between lives, is in its nature less deep. [Reasons and Persons, p. 336]

How remarkably close Parfit’s Empty Individualism and our Open Individualism converge upon utilitarianism is nowhere more clearly evident than in the following passage, which also sums up what the net effect is of the implications of Parfit’s proposed move from traditional Closed to Empty Individualism are for the Principle of Equality and other distributive principles. Parfit argues that, on the Traditional Closed Individual View of personal identity,

It is a deep truth that all of a person’s life [i.e., over time] is as much his life. If we are impressed by this truth - by the unity of each life - the boundaries between lives will seem to be deeper. This supports the claim that, in the moral calculus, these boundaries cannot be crossed. On the [Empty Individual] View, we are less impressed by this truth. We regard the unity of each life as, in its nature, less deep, and as a matter of degree. We may therefore think the boundaries between lives to be less like those between, say, the squares on a chess-board, dividing what is all pure white from what is all jet black. We may think these boundaries to be more like those between different countries they may then seem less morally important. . . . If some unity is less deep, so is the corresponding disunity. The fact that we live different lives is the fact that we are not the same person. If the fact of personal identity is less deep, so is this fact’s denial. [p. 339]

We have however seen that “the fact that we live different lives” is not “the fact that we are not the same person.” One numerically identical person can live a multiplicity of qualitatively non-identical lives. But here Parfit’s Empty Individualism, as we noted at the very beginning of the book
(Introduction), shows itself to be positioned right up against its antithesis—Open Individualism—such that our two opposing theories of personal identity end up both supporting the same moral edifice, namely, utilitarianism. His from the left, mine from the other left.

§12.2 OPEN INDIVIDUALISM, EMPTY INDIVIDUALISM, AND UTILITARIANISM: LEARNING TO LIVE WITH OURSELVES

For the Open Individualist there is no conflict between self-interest and morality. They are one and the same. The key to the good life is for the Open Individualist is simply a matter of rationality, though of course rationality in this case, as in every other case, is anything but simple.

Consider The Case of the Needy Visitors. I own many things. Suppose I own many more things than you. I have a large house with many rooms, a garden, and you have no house at all. You ring my doorbell. “Hello, me,” you say. “I’m cold and hungry and my family and I have no place to live. Since I believe as you believe that we are all the same person, may we come live with you? We are on the verge of starvation. You have more food, more room, and more money than you need. Won’t you please help us, that is, yourself?”

What ought I to do in this case? Although there is no clear answer to that question, there is a clear answer to the question of whether as an Open Individualist I am obliged to share what I have with my other Selves. The answer is no. Obligation is, I claim, a relation between self and other. If there is no other there is no obligation. What, though, about the question of whether it is in my rational self-interest to fulfill your request? There is an answer to that question too, although the answer depends on various details not all of which have yet in this case been specified. Initially, however, all else being equal, what your request in the case just described strongly suggests is that you are in your overall attitude quite clearly mistaking Open Individualism for, say, socialism or communism and that the answer may turn out to be No. It depends. Before we see on what the answer depends, let us make sure we understand why the issue for us in not one of moral obligation but prudent, or rational, self-interest and what sort of difference this makes.

Under say, communism, or any kind of socialist system—indeed, under just about any sort of moral system that has yet been conceived—there is some moral obligation for individuals to treat others with some degree of
respect, to value the lives of others, to not cause unnecessary harm to others, and so on. Thus on just about every moral theory ever conceived it would be wrong, for instance, for me to let you and your family into my house under the pretext of helping you and then to enslave you and ultimately to kill you for the sheer excitement of it. Under Open Individualism this would not be morally wrong, not in the least. It would, however, be very extremely stupid. The reason it would not be morally wrong for me to enslave and kill you for the sheer excitement of it is that from the traditional Closed Individualist point of view morality is, as we have noted above, a relation between I (the subject) and you (a numerically distinct subject), not a relation “between” I and I. In Open Individualism, on the other hand, because we are all the same person, there is, literally, no moral room for a betweeness relation. (Again, Parfit’s assertion to the contrary is predicated on the notion that the relation between psychologically continuous and/or connected temporal stages of selves are such that “my” self now and “my” self in the future are not, strictly speaking, numerically identical and this is how Parfit achieves a “moral” relation to “one’s self.”) It is not immoral for me, say, to cut off my feet with a dull knife (assuming, again, that the person who starts doing the cutting and the person who feels the pain and the person whose foot drops away are all one and the same numerically identical person, which in an Empty Individualist view such as Parfit’s they may not be.) It may verge on immorality if I need my feet to work and support, say, my family, if the welfare of my family depends on my doing so, I have agreed to do so or am obliged by my responsibilities to do so, and so on, provided in addition that there exist individuals in my family who are other than myself. If my “family” consists just of me then no matter what I do it cannot be immoral. But it can be very, very, . . . very, stupid, irrational, and even pathological.

In the scenario just described above, for instance, if I enslave and kill you for the sheer excitement of it because I am bored, etc., and that’s why I think I am doing it, and I am a Open Individualist, then I am just a very stupid Open Individualist who (typical of those who are stupid) has not thought through his position nor his actions. It may alleviate my boredom or even give me pleasure to enslave and kill you but it will also give me great pain, say, the burning pain I will feel in my eyes when I stick the hot pokers into your eyes. I may be laughing when I am doing it to you, enjoy the tears in your children’s watching eyes, and I may think that I am enjoying all of this but those are my children watching me get butchered and killed and in fact they are me watching myself killing myself (without
MORAL BORDERS  563

realizing it, of course); all this added up together consists in a great deal of suffering and pain. So I cannot be killing you for the sheer pleasure of it unless I am extremely and grossly ignorant, deranged or some not very subtle combination of both. I can at best, if as an Open Individualist I believe I know the truth about personal identity, be killing you for the simultaneous experience both of sadistic pleasure and gruesomely masochistic pain. But that was not the original scenario described.

Suppose, then, that I enslave and kill you for the simultaneous experience that I know I am having during this scenario of extremely sadistic pleasure and gruesomely masochistic pain. There would then be nothing wrong with this scenario from a purely rational and self-interested point of view, provided that I also believe at the time of my performing these actions that, say, since I cannot really die so long as anyone goes on living, the experience of killing and torturing along with the experience of being tortured and being killed are desirable, say, for the sheer totality of contradictory experiences such an event produces in the (nonlocal, i.e., multiply exclusively conjoined) subject who is simultaneously experiencing all aspects of it. This then would perhaps be all right. It depends whether this really is so desirable. And I would venture to guess, as a first approximation, that it is not, that there is still something even in that case seriously wrong, or even pathological, with me. Although it cannot be immorality it can be something as mundane as, let us say, lack of creativity. There is nothing morally wrong, for instance, with my making very bad movies full of cheap thrills starring myself and then watching them over and over for eternity but it seems not very difficult to convince myself, unless for instance I am mentally retarded, that there must be better ways for me to spend my time—even if the amount of time I have is endless. Here it is not so difficult to imagine a variety of aesthetic theories of value that would work rather nicely for our purposes.

Let us now return to the example of the Needy Visitors and ask whether I should, on grounds of purely self-interested rationality, fulfill your request to allow you and your family to share some of our food and give you shelter, say for a time until you can start to fend for yourself. A Yes answer would not be a very difficult position to support, from an Open Individualist perspective. Indeed, we can easily imagine that under such a scenario we would all collectively try to see what if anything went wrong in our society that a family, let us suppose through no fault of its own, ended up in this way destitute. It would seem quite natural to me, believing that I know that I am each and every one of you, that I and you and everyone else
whom we can involve should do something about this situation in which, unbeknownst to me before you came to my door, I was in pain and experiencing so much suffering about which you just informed me. It would be irrational for me, for instance, to let food, space and shelter go to waste under the pretext that I cannot be bothered to do something about the situation because what I want to do is, say, watch television. I am being bothered, even as I am relaxing and watching television, by hunger, cold, sadness, and pain—I am just not, from my situated position as the subject identified as this particular Self, aware of it. This does not necessarily mean I must give everything I have away by any means, not even most of it, not even a lot of it. All it means is that I cannot sit around and do nothing under the pretext that I cannot be bothered! For I am being bothered, extremely so, and if I am rational and self-interested and believe that I know that I am you then I should do something about it though it may not as yet be perfectly clear what, exactly, I should do and to what degree. But I “should” do something in the same, perhaps weak, sense that we can say that I “should” do something if I notice that I am about to be run over by a truck. What you did by coming to my door and alerting me to your situation is in fact from the Open Individualist point of view in the same category of what my body does when my eyes inform me that a truck is coming my way or my hand informs me as I accidentally lean up against a hot stove that I am in pain and in danger and that I should do something about it provided I want to go on living in a certain sort of manner. Indeed, if everything in me is functioning properly, that is exactly what I do in fact do. I could say, with the truck coming, “I really don’t feel like moving now,” and endure the pain and perhaps death, just as it would not be immoral for me to watch my hand going up in flames. But it would certainly raise questions about my sanity. In that sense, actions that under Closed Individualism would be conscripted as immoral in Open Individualism are reduced to a variety of insanity.

Notice, however, that although under Open Individualism what is mine is yours, it is yours not because you have a right to some apportioned piece of what is mine but because you already own it in toto. That is, what is mine is yours not because I am obliged to share what I have with others but because there are no others, because I am you. And so if I have a very large house and a garden and a bank account and my neighbor with a much smaller house and much smaller garden and much smaller bank account wants to share these things that I own with me simply in virtue because my neighbor is me, it seems now there is something not quite fully rational about my
neighbor. If, say, my neighbor comes in and forces me to share what I have with him what he is doing is taking what he already has away from himself by turning, say, a private space or dominion into a communal one. For in no way does Open Individualism say that there is just one (phenomenal) Self. There are many such Selves. All the many Selves, however, are but one person. Just as a particular phenomenal body-mind (Self) may be better off from a rational point of view with just one personality in it rather than if the same (phenomenal) resources were shared with multiple personalities (even though one and the same person exists simultaneously identified as each and every such personality), so too with a house, a garden, a bank account. Open Individualism does not turn private property into communal property. On the contrary: it turns communal property into private property. Indeed, a little reflection reveals that Selves living under the enlightened philosophical auspices of Open Individualism would if anything want to achieve as much individuality, autonomy, independence, and so on, as is possible—mutual independence from what ultimately are but their own other incarnations.

Say I am a bohemian painter of seashells living in a bungalow on a beach somewhere, and upon seeing me and my paintings you say to yourself, “Now there’s the life for me, I want that, that’s what I will try to achieve.” There is from the Open Individualist point of view something wrong with you. You are making a cognitive error. You are failing to realize that you have already achieved this life that you say is for you, that you are already in it, you have it, you live it, you are it. Duplication, mimicry, and all varieties of social amalgamations of individuality are from an Open Individualist point of view a form of very, very, . . . very, bad art and, ultimately, irrational.

This is not a new idea but an old idea whose time has come. Extreme diversity, indeed, the very sort of eccentricity of life and lifestyles that John Stuart Mill advocated in *On Liberty* becomes the new call of the new day. Indeed, following a path taken by “others,” or any sort of obedience to authority is expressly forbidden to Open Individualists by the demands of intelligent rationality. Followers of every variety—religious, ethnic, political, nationalistic, scientific, philosophical, artistic, you name it—are the lowest form of Open Individualist life. In fact, Mill’s arguments for radical diversity and almost unlimited freedom among individuals expressed in *On Liberty* are extremely well suited to Open Individualism.

In and of itself this should not be surprising. John Stuart Mill was, after all, the ultimate utilitarian. Utilitarianism is a moral theory in search of a
new theory of personal identity. There are now two such new theories: Empty Individualism and Open Individualism. What is surprising is that, as we already saw above, they converge from two opposing sides on utilitarianism.

§12.3 AND JUSTICE FOR NO ONE: RAWLS VS. UTILITARIANISM

Consider the following extremely illuminating passage from John Rawls’s widely influential *Theory of Justice*:

The most natural way . . . of arriving at utilitarianism . . . is to adopt for society as a whole the *principle of rational choice for one man*. Once this is recognized, the place of the impartial spectator and the emphasis on sympathy in the history of utilitarian thought is readily understood. For it is by the conception of the impartial spectator and the *use of sympathetic identification* in guiding our imagination that the principle for one man is applied to society. It is this spectator who is conceived as carrying out the required organization of the desires of all persons into one coherent system for desire; it is by this construction that many persons are fused into one. Endowed with ideal powers of sympathy and imagination, the impartial spectator is the perfectly rational individual who identifies with and experiences the desires of others as if these desires were his own. In this way he ascertains the intensity of these desires and assigns them their appropriate weight in the one system of desire the satisfaction of which the ideal legislator then tries to maximize by adjusting the rules of the social system. On this conception of society separate individuals are thought of as so many different lines along which rights and duties are to be assigned and scarce means of satisfaction allocated in accordance with rules so as to give the greatest fulfillment of wants. The nature of the decision made by the ideal legislator is not, therefore, materially different from that of an entrepreneur deciding how to maximize his profit by producing this or that commodity, or that of a consumer deciding how to maximize his satisfaction by the purchase of this or that collection of goods. In each case there is a single person whose system of desires determines the best allocation of limited means. The correct decision is essentially a question of efficient administration. This view of social cooperation is the consequence of extending to society the principle of choice for one man, and then, to make this extension work, conflating all persons into one through the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator. [Theory of Justice, pp. 26-27, my italics.]

The problem with the utilitarian approach, Rawls concludes, is that “Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons,” (p. 27). But of course this is a *problem* only under Open Individualism. If the distinction between persons is an illusion, Rawls’s contractarian charge against utilitarianism turns into nothing short of an endorsement. Here’s
MORAL BORDERS

Consider again the Case of the Needy Visitors. Suppose I am an Open Individualist and a utilitarian. To determine what the right action is in that situation, I must determine what I would prefer for myself were I simultaneously numerically identical to all the individuals affected by my choice. I must, in other words, first identify with all the persons affected by the choice while being impartial to any particular one and then determine what I would myself prefer were I in fact identified as them. By thus imagining that I am you, however, I am according to Rawls ignoring the “fact” that who in reality will be affected by the choice is not one person who is everyone but numerically distinct persons. Obviously, if we are Open Individualists this objection is moot: Rawls’s attempt to defeat utilitarianism on grounds that it wrongfully ignores the traditional boundaries between lives is, from our Open Individualist standpoint, not a problem but a solution. Our solution is not a moral but a prudent one, requiring not some degree of strained altruism but a purely rational calculus of self-interest.

That is the obvious part. But there’s a bit more to it than that. Consider, for instance, Rawls’s charge above that “the principle of rational choice for one man” is an artificial demand requiring the (unrealistic) notion of an “impartial spectator” and an (again unrealistic) “emphais on sympathy” to achieve “sympathetic identification” as a guide for the imagination by which the “principle for one man is applied to society.” Such a combined state of affairs would be, and is, practically very difficult, if not theoretically impossible, under Closed Individualism. That is in fact why Mackie, for instance, also rejects utilitarianism on grounds that utilitarianism is “the ethics of fantasy,” charging that it is simply too unrealistic in the scope and depth of its demands. But the required sort of “sympathetic/empathic intuition” is exactly what we have already named, and defined, as the intuition of the subject-in-the-not-itself, what we have called moral consciousness, denoted and expressed simultaneously to hearer and speaker, i.e., communicated, by I am you.

Moral consciousness—the intuition of the subject-in-the-not-itself, I am you—may be difficult, if not impossible, to have toward strangers under traditional Closed Individualism but certainly is achievable in the way we detailed throughout this work. We have argued for instance that one’s own self-identifications can be derived from identification with a group to whom the other individuals that one is identifying with already belong, leading to primary identification as a particular Self. Open Individualism makes room
for moral consciousness without the group identification process as required under Closed Individualism, that is, it makes it possible for me to experience myself as a particular kind of being (i.e., an Open Individual) such that the requisite sort of intuition, namely, moral consciousness, communicated by I am you, exactly of the sort that Rawls and Mackie seem to preclude as artificial or unrealistic, is much more like to occur, perhaps may even under Open Individualism be guaranteed.

Likewise, the necessary impartiality of the spectator that is again from a practical standpoint so difficult to achieve under traditional Closed Individualism may be much more readily attainable for an Open Individualist who believes that as spectator she is herself not an impartial observer but is herself, in fact, simultaneously numerically identical to all others affected by her choice.

This suggests as a real possibility the shift from, say, feeling morally outraged by the sight of starving children because you feel it is wrong that they should be starving in this way through no fault of their own, versus encountering one’s own existence from the outside, the unbearableness of the situation exposing itself to itself in an act of self-conscious intuition, I am you. In the former, one identifies with certain moral principles; in the latter, one identifies with and perhaps to a sufficiently robust degree even as the suffering individuals themselves. Such identification is hardly imaginary! Theirs is also nothing at all intellectual about it. In fact, I would venture to suggest that intellectualizing relations in exactly the sort of way that traditional moral theories conscripted under Closed Individualism have done only further distances us from each other exactly in the way I suggested at the beginning of this chapter. It is only under Closed Individualism that the “ideal powers of sympathy and imagination,” by which the Rawlsian impartial spectator must be perfectly rational about and sympathetic with the desires of all persons, are artificial or unduly theoretical. Under Open Individualism such requirements for action become less, if at all, prohibitive. Without the shield of moral principles that deflect the subject toward identifying with a particular moral outlook, political cause, social movement, etc., there is that much more possibility of direct sympathetic empathy between us, between the subject identified as Self and subject identified as Other. Indeed, the “conflation of all persons into one through the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator” that utilitarianism calls for is exactly what I claim the metaphysical subjectivism of the Open Individualist philosophy brings into the phenomenal, psychological world.
And so, to Rawls’s charge that “Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons,” we can answer: *nor should it*. “Conflating all persons into one,” as Rawls puts it, is for us not a flaw in the utilitarian system but its supreme achievement.

Parfit and Nagel as well criticize utilitarianism on similar sorts of grounds. Utilitarianism, in Nagel’s words, “treats the desires . . . of distinct persons as if they were the desires . . . of a mass person.” 7 Thus Parfit charges that Utilitarians ignore the boundaries between lives. We may ask, ‘Why?’ Here are three suggestions:

1) Their method of moral reasoning leads them to overlook these boundaries.
2) They believe that the boundaries are unimportant, because they think that sets of lives are like single lives.
3) They accept the [Empty Individual] View about personal identity.

Suggestion (1) has been made by Rawls. . . . Suggestion (2) has been made by Gauthier and others. On this suggestion, Utilitarians must assume that mankind is a super-organism, or believe, like some Hindus, in a single World Soul. If suggestions (1) or (2) were true, they explain the Utilitarian View in ways that undermine this view. It is clearly a mistake to ignore the fact that we live different lives. And mankind is not a Super-Organism.

I suggest (3). On this suggestion, Utilitarians reject distributive principles because they believe in the [Empty Individual] view. If the [Empty Individual] View supports the rejection of these principles, this third explanation supports rather than undermines the Utilitarian View. [Reasons and Persons, p. 331]

Note Parfit’s utterly unwarranted dismissal of a Open Individualist type view (#2). He may be right in supposing that utilitarians are Empty Individualists. I don’t *know* if they are but I doubt very much that they are. Most people are traditional Closed Individualists and there is as far as I know no reason for supposing that the few who are Empty Individualists are more likely to be found among utilitarians. Parfit here seems to be trying to make an auxiliary argument for his general view of personal identity on the very dubious grounds that some of us already realize the truth that we are not what we (ordinarily) believe ourselves to be, i.e., that the motives driving utilitarians are somehow rooted in the deep and hidden truth of Empty Individualism. But why does Parfit *reject* (2)? Here’s why:

Is suggestion (2) correct? . . . Utilitarians . . . do not believe that Mankind is such a single being. Suggestion (2) is better taken, not as an explanation of the Utilitarian View, but as an objection to this view. The suggestion may be that this view cannot be justified unless mankind is a Super-organism. Since this is false, utilitarians are wrong to reject distributive principles. [p. 332]
This dismissal is not just unwarranted but extremely odd. How does Parfit know that utilitarians are (closet) Empty Individualists rather than (closet) Open Individualists?

Parfit, like Nagel, Mackie, Rawls, and others, asserts entirely without argument, and dismisses without any analysis, the very sort of possibility for which our present work has been laying the metaphysical foundations. Indeed, what Open Individualism offers is not some naïve version of a one-(straw)person view of personal identity as Parfit (overly) simply describes and then, simply, dismisses. The underlying scope of this entire work has been to lay out the details of a view that can function at the moral level as no less than the substitution of a viably unified and subject-centered theory of personal identity in place of the unnecessary philosophical epicycles that Rawls calls the “sympathetic identification in guiding our imagination” toward the “construction that many persons are fused into one.” In this way the metaphysical foundation for utilitarianism have been systematically and unilaterally dismissed both by personal identity theorists and moralists on the grounds that it would involve and require an incoherent theory of personal identity. Parfit, again, simply dismisses this possibility on the grounds that

Utilitarians must view mankind as a super-organism, or believe like some Hindus, in a single World Soul. . . . It is clearly a mistake to ignore the fact that we live different lives. And mankind is not a Super-organism. [p. 331]

Likewise, Gauthier criticizes utilitarianism on similar grounds. In his view, any imperative to maximize the benefits for the whole of humanity “is to suppose that mankind is a super-person.” As Parfit explains,

‘We are free to maximize within one life only because it is one life.’ This claim supports Gauthier’s charge against Utilitarians. It supports the claim that we could be free to maximize over different lives only if they are like parts of a single life. When presented with this argument, Utilitarians would deny its premise. They might claim: ‘What justifies maximization is not the unity of a life. Suffering is bad, and happiness is good. It is better if there is less of what is bad, and more of what is god. This is enough to justify maximization. Since it is not the unity of a life that, within this life, justifies maximization, this can be justified over different lives without the assumption that mankind is a super-person.’ [p. 334]

Parfit uses this as an additional reason, on moral grounds, to accept his Empty Individualist view as a viable metaphysical defense of utilitarianism. But the utilitarian does not need to guard against any such assumptions for fear of having to accept an absurd of unviable theory of personal identity.
Open Individualism shows how it is possible that we are all one and the same person, whether the person is understood ultimately as a sort of super-person or, more closely aligned with the theory presented in this work.

Utilitarianism conscripted under Open Individualism is not vulnerable to any of the sorts of objections that have been levied against it. Unlike utilitarianism conscripted under Empty Individualism, Open Individualist utilitarianism is completely free of the moral epicycles of distributive principles. It functions, perfectly well, under the sole guidance of Plato’s sun.

§12.4 THE GAME OF LIFE AND THE MATHEMATICS OF MORALITY

Parfit writes that

the Utilitarian view is, in the following sense, impersonal. All that matters are the amounts of happiness and suffering, or of benefits and burdens. It makes no moral difference how these amounts are distributed as between different people.

Many people reject this view. They might say: "The Utilitarian aim may be one of our ultimate moral aims. But we have at least one other. Happiness and suffering, or benefits and burdens, ought to be fairly shared as between different people. Besides the Utilitarian Principle we need principles of Distributive Justice. One example is the Principle of Equality. . . . The argument for equality is often claimed to be grounded on the separateness of persons. One such claim might be: 'Since it is a deep truth that we live different lives, it is an ultimate moral aim that, in so far as we are equally deserving, the lives of each should go equally well. If this is impossible, it should at least be true that the lives of each have an equal chance of going well. [Reasons and Persons, p. 330]

I claim that utilitarianism can, instead of being impersonal, be supremely personal, even if all that matters are the amounts of happiness and suffering, or of benefits and burdens. And although it makes no moral difference how these amounts are distributed among my many selves, there may be other sorts of values to consider.

Traditionally, we have been taught and indeed most of us have assumed based on our experience of growing up that life consists in compromises and balances between two opposing forces: from within, the built-in motive for self-interest and self-preservation vs. the needs and demands of others, imposed from without, by the society of selves in which we live. However, if and when we come to realize that the other against whom I am struggling, competing, and compromising, is none other than myself, this relieves us of
the burden of having to come up with various artificial means of overlooking the boundaries between us. We don’t need to overlook them if they aren’t there. The borders are there, and there can be no getting around that, for reasons duly explored: the Illusion of Other Persons, like the Transcendental and Transcendent Illusions, is itself a necessary condition for the having of experience.

What this means, ultimately, is that life as we know it can be viewed as a certain kind of logical game involving borders that are taken for boundaries in order to make the game possible. We are all the same person. We don’t have to pretend that sets of lives are like a single life: they are a single life. For us the questions, “What is in my self interest?” and “What is morally right?” are, as Sidgwick originally claimed, not two questions but one question. Self-interested rationality and morality do not conflict once we give up the separateness of persons assumption, without which the tension between rational self-interest and morality ceases to exist because the two are no longer in opposition to each other at extreme ends of a spectrum of motives for action. This substantially simplifies the moral calculus in so far as the old moral epicycles are replaced with a rational mathematics. But, we may wonder: to what end? What exactly is the game of life according to Open Individualism and how should I—we, the one who is the many—best play it?

The ideal metaphor here is the game of solitaire chess. Let us accept that in playing chess against myself I am conscripted by my actions to the rules of chess. Then not only is there no point in me helping my opponent (who after all is myself), I am in fact being irrational if when playing Black I see that as White I made a mistake and so, since I know it is me who is both Black and White, I choose not to capitalize on it. In one sense of course I am free to do so but under a strict application of game-theoretical semantics we can easily construct a good argument that to “play the game” in this way is to have ceased playing the game and to have begun to play a different game. And since what we are talking about is chess and not, let us say, “chessypoo,” such help is forbidden. Likewise for all the following actions:

*Actions Forbidden in Solitaire Chess*

- White helps Black win.
- Black helps White win.
- Cheating.
- White tries not to win.
- Black tries not to win.
- Stalling.
White places sleeping powder in Black’s water. 
Black places poison in White’s water. 

... 

This list may be infinite. It may also strike us as rather funny to contemplate actually undertaking such actions in any actual game of solitaire chess. If someone actually did this not in order to make us laugh but in all seriousness, we would suspect there was something wrong with this person. This I think is especially revealing once we consider the relationship between some such list of Actions Forbidden in Solitaire Chess with a similar sort of list of Actions Forbidden in Chess. In fact there is a startling revelation to be found here. For although the two sets of Forbidden Actions overlap, the list of Forbidden Actions In Solitaire Chess contains more items. “Stalling,” for instance. Even “Black helping White to win,” though expressly forbidden in tournament play, often happens in games of chess where Black views herself as a superior player to White and so either out of kindness, or heuristic reasons, etc., lets White win. There can be no room for such sympathies in solitaire chess. Solitaire chess if it is to be played at all must be, to a certain degree, brutally self-competitive.

§12.4.1 FROM THE I AM YOU TO THE IMF: OPEN METAPHYSICAL CAPITALISM

The reason why I take solitaire chess to be such an ideal metaphor providing a model game-theoretical semantics for the sort of world as envisioned in our marriage of Open Individualism and utilitarianism is rather obvious. Open Individualism, as I have been implying, has similarities to socialism, communism, etc., only in the most superficial sense. The rational calculus of Open Individualism implies a world of brutal competition. Open capitalism, for instance, perhaps even a more radically open and more extreme than the most radically open versions of capitalism in play in the world today, would be the Open Individualist economic order of the day. For note that the Closed Individualist tension between the demands of morality and the demands of Self-interest is itself rooted, as we noted above, in the fundamental presupposition that the individual repositors of the balances (surpluses and deficits) of our moral calculus are metaphysically separate individuals functioning under the auspices of traditional Closed Individualism. It is as if each of us functions as a bank in which value is deposited and stored or drawn from, each with a finite account, with an exchange rate for dealing with other competing banks over
finite sets of values. It should be even clearer now why Open Individualism is indeed not only quite dissimilar but opposed to socialisms and communisms of just about every variety; Open Individualism is, in fact, the metaphysical contrapositive to Marxist dialectical materialism and much closer to capitalism not of the mid-nineteenth century variety but of the late twentieth century, post-IMF, variety, in so far as what we are dealing with here, from a moral standpoint, would be nothing less than a global central bank of value from which each individual directly draws.

In other words, from a (traditional) moral standpoint, Open Individualism is an open metaphysical capitalism. It’s ultimate function is to create and sustain a viable concept of a global superperson not as an abstraction or collective but as one individual who is practically and actually everyone for the purpose of stimulating and enhancing the quality of the subjectivity, the conscious life of the subject identified as many Selves through the global capitalization and investment of shared knowledge—e.g., intelligence, wisdom—as enabled in an open marketplace of ideas conscripted under our Open Individualist manifesto. In other words, Open Individualism does for consciousness (subjectivity) what capitalism does for money. It does not distribute it evenly under some socialist market-controlled system but rather empowers an almost limitless accumulation of wealth by individuals based on the idea, in this case, of our common independence friendly personal identity, for the purpose of stimulating the growth, development and evolution of the whole multiperspectival person who is (identified as) everyone. Since each individual (localized) subject is identical to the whole such a system does not suffer the moral tensions inherent in traditional capitalism conscripted under traditional Closed Individualism, for it is regardless of its distributions perfectly just and fair provided that everyone is smart enough, knows enough, and is willing enough to play the right game by the right rules.

§ 12.5 THE ABORIGINAL POSITION AND THE VEIL OF KNOWLEDGE: FROM MISERY TO HAPPINESS—TOWARD A NEW MORAL CALCULUS

Consider now a traditional sort of utilitarian moral calculus in which our ultimate aim is to maximize the net sum of benefits and minimize the net sum of burdens. One sort of example is Sidgwick’s own ultimate moral principle of Impartial Benevolence. Because Sidgwick subscribed to a hedonistic theory about self-interest, his Principle of Impartial Benevolence
takes a hedonistic form. According to him, our moral calculus should achieve the greatest net sum of happiness, which he defines in terms of “desirable consciousness,” minus the net sum of misery, which he defines in terms of “undesirable consciousness.” Both of these sorts of utilitarian approaches have, as we have seen, been criticized by the likes of Rawls, Mackie, Parfit, and Nagel on grounds that they are far too impersonal: if as all that matters is the quantity of happiness and suffering, benefit and burden, etc., what about wildly uneven distributions? Let us suppose, nevertheless, that we are given a choice between situation 1 and 2, in which the individuals have the following distributions of value:

1: \(a = 1, \ b = 1, \ c = -3, \ d = -10, \ e = 100\)  \text{total} = 89

2: \(a = 20, \ b = 15, \ c = 15, \ d = 15, \ e = 20\)  \text{total} = 85

On a strict classical utilitarian moral calculus we should choose (1) over (2). But this seems to most of us grossly unfair. So what is then needed, it has been suggested, is some sort of Distributive Principle of Justice. We need some sort of Principle of Equality according to which we must impose certain sorts of limitations, such as that no individual should through no fault of his own be worse off than any other.

Indeed, traditionally, utilitarians have defended various versions of their position with various well-known arguments designed to build some sort of equality into their moral calculus using notions such as relative deprivation or diminishing marginal utility of value. Because these corrections (what I would regard as moral epicycles) all treat equality not as a basic value within the moral calculus but merely as a means to an end, utilitarianism has I think been consistently frustrated by various sorts of limitations imposed upon the moral calculus due to metaphysical boundaries between us as conscripted under Closed Individualism. That is why, as I have been suggesting, the leading attempts at solutions to this problem have involved varying degrees of alteration in our view of the nature of personal identity such as, explicitly, in Parfit’s new theory of personal identity and, implicitly, in Rawls’ new Theory of Justice. In Open Individualism, however, we need to consider neither any sort of Distributive Principle of Justice nor any sort of Principle of Equality. This is because Open Individualism itself changes drastically the nature of self-interested rationality in ways that in this chapter I have been laying out. So let us take a look, from an Open Individualist point of view, at our two choices above:

1: \(a = 1, \ b = 1, \ c = -3, \ d = -10, \ e = 100\)  \text{total} = 89

2: \(a = 20, \ b = 15, \ c = 15, \ d = 15, \ e = 20\)  \text{total} = 85
Which should I choose, (1) or (2), and on what does my choice depend? Remember that (1) and (2) describe two different possible worlds both of which consist of me living five different lives concurrently. Which possible world would I rather live in (given that I live, in either, identified as five different human beings)? The rational thing to do is to choose the option in which I, who am everyone, am enjoying the most amount of benefit with the least amount of suffering. And this may turn out to be (1) rather than (2). It depends on a variety of complex factors that can be simplified, however, using fundamentally Rawlsian principles, once they are translated from their Closed Individualist framework into the Open Invididualist philosophy. In fact modified versions of Rawls’s Original Position and his Veil of Ignorance provide Open Individual Utilitarianism with all the benefits of a basically Rawlsian-Kantian approach to ethics.

§ 12.6 THE ORIGINAL POSITION AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE

My “Aboriginal Position” and “Veil of Knowledge” are of course Open Individualist reinterpretations of Rawls’s “Original Position” and “Veil of Ignorance.” Rawls’s original position, you may recall, is itself a reaction predicated on the following presupposition: “Now obviously no one can obtain everything he wants; the mere existence of other persons prevents this.” But of course if others are myself, as I have been suggesting, what is absolutely best for me is not that all my other Selves should join with me in furthering my conception of the good. Nor is it absolutely best for me that they are required to act justly while I am authorized to exempt myself as I please. I can in fact under Open Individualism obtain absolutely everything I want; the mere nonexistence of other persons enables this, provided that, in fact, I don’t get others to join me in furthering my conception of the good! For by doing so I will in fact be frustrating my ultimate desire to obtain everything I want. This can only be obtained if we split up, give each other as much room as possible, and create a society in which there will be as much opportunity as possible for all individuals to fulfill their goals and desires provided that this is achieved.
with the opportunity for maximal diversity among individuals. How can this be achieved?

Again it is not necessary that we reinvent the moral wheel. Starting from an Open Individualist instead of a Closed Individualist framework, we can simply contrapose Rawls’s Original Position and Veil of Ignorance. Rawls’s notion of an Original Position as a starting point from which we would all choose is built upon his initial two Principles of Justice as Fairness:

1. The principle of greatest equal liberty.
2. (a) The principle of (fair) equality of opportunity
   (b) The difference principle.

In their final formulation these principles are stated as follows:

**First Principle:** Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

**Second Principle:** Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
   a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
   b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. [Theory of Justice, p. 302]

Now, these principles come in what Rawls calls their “lexical” order, meaning that the first, which upholds individual liberty, has priority over the second, which is the so-called “difference principle.” Basically, the difference principle is strongly egalitarian in that unless there is a better distribution of value that makes everyone better off, the equal distribution is preferable. This means that, for instance, fundamental liberties such as freedom of speech cannot be infringed upon for the benefit of least advantaged individuals, provided that our social institutions are themselves properly designed to raise the welfare of those who are worst off to begin with. The just savings principle is designed to hold over time, such that each simultaneously existing generation of individuals must both preserve the gains of culture and civilization achieved by previous generations while putting aside some proper amount of economic capital. Thus, ultimately, in Rawls’s vision all social primary goods such as liberty, opportunity, income, wealth, the bases of self-respect, and so on, must be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution would benefit those who are least favored.

Now, the centerpiece of Rawls’s argument for why these Two Principles
of Justice as Fairness are best is that any one of us would choose it from the hypothetical starting point of what he calls the Original Position, in which none of us have any knowledge of our own particular wants, values, attachments, and so on. These are the principles that all rational persons would choose from behind the Veil of Ignorance, a starting position in which no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particular of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. The persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong. . . . the veil of ignorance excludes all but the vaguest knowledge of likelihoods. The parties have no basis for determining the probable nature of their society, or their place in it. [pp. 137-155]

By then adopting a maximin strategy for making decisions under uncertainty, we would always rank our choices by their worst possible outcomes and opt in the end for that choice whose worst outcome is superior to the worst outcome of any other choice. It is such a conservative strategy that ultimately makes Rawls’s Two Principles of Justice as Fairness the best moral theory because it guarantees basic individual rights and liberties while maximizing the benefits to the least advantaged in our society. But let us now see what happens when we translate these same principles into our Open Individualist framework.

§ 12.7 THE PRIMORDIAL POSITION AND THE VEIL OF WISDOM

Almost straightforwardly contra-positive to the Rawlsian, the fundamental presupposition of Open Individualism is, “Everyone can obtain everything one wants; the mere nonexistence of other persons guarantees this.” Since obviously this can occur only if there is as great a latitude as possible in our individual and collective activities, in so far as they bring about what each of us most wants, an Open Individualist version of Rawls’s first principle, guaranteeing individual liberty, will need little modification from his original position. But notice that where as in his system I don’t know who I will be, in our case I know perfectly well who I will be. I will be each and every individual in the society that I choose to instantiate. So liberty will
simply be maximal. What about the second principle, the so-called “difference principle?” Here we part company with Rawls. Open Individualism is so strongly anti-egalitarian that we might wish to call it Ultra Individualism. But, we would do so within some fairly obvious limits, from the standpoint of purely rational self-interest. This is perfectly realizable in the Ordinary Individual Life Analog. Consider how I should divvy up the various moments of my own individual life as Daniel Kolak. Should I make sure that happiness is fairly evenly distributed across the days, weeks, months, years? Likewise, pleasure? And so on and so forth? Clearly not. The dynamics of life clearly are such that there are many sorts of qualities of happiness, pleasure, and other desirables that can be attained only by sacrificing lesser qualities of happiness, pleasure, and so on, at a time in order to achieve greater qualities of such value over time.

Philosophy, science, and art are examples that come most readily to mind. There is hardly anything I find more edifying in life than the attainment of philosophical insights and wisdom, the having of scientific or mathematical knowledge with which to connect oneself to the rest of the universe (in Russell’s sense), the composing of music, the creation of art, and so on. We all know either from personal experience or personal testimony that such attainments take a great deal of time to accomplish, that during much of that time there is great personal struggle, suffering, and pain, and that if and when the accomplishment is attained one is more than glad to have gone through it and would gladly do it again. This is just an example, and just by an analog, and it could be presented in a more precisely detailed and formal manner but this I think would be unnecessary. The point is merely that what is by and large true about what we know about ourselves as individuals suggests what sorts of strategies we should follow once we realize that what is going on with us collectively (and individually) at a time is going on within us individually (and collectively) over time. What this implies (but by no means proves) is that just as I should not want the sort of Rawlsian egalitarian condition to impede me in a “just” and “fair” distribution of positive mental and physical states for myself over time, I should not want any such egalitarian condition to impede me with any such forced and unnatural distribution of value for my many Selves at a time.

What this means is that I should be perfectly willing, if I am an Open Individualist, to endure all sorts of hardships, provided that they are truly necessary, so that I (you) can walk on the moon. So, for instance, suppose that as an Open Individualist society we have developed the technological means by which to go to Mars but this could be achieved only by lowering
the economic conditions by some noticeable rate for all the rest of us; let us suppose, further, that this loss for say a million people will be that they will be able to afford fewer things, for a hundred that they will live shorter lives, and for three that they will lose their lives. Is this worth it? On an Open Individualist calculus of rational self-interest it most certainly could be well worth it. Although we obviously would need to factor in all sorts of other details that in our example we have not done, the tentative answer would indeed seem to be Yes. In fact, although this will no doubt be viewed as the worst aspects of utilitarian thinking, we can see that if in fact we are all the same person nobody really ever dies and so it becomes rational even to sacrifice individual lives in the pursuit of, say, the advancement of the knowledge seeking enterprise, or art, or whatever. At the same time we must also note that there are some naturally limiting constraints even to such a radically inegalitarian liberalization of moral theory. For in choosing to make such sacrifices I must keep in mind that the one suffering under any such sacrifice will be not you but me. It is these sorts of considerations, carried out to the required degree as a theory of rational action, that can thus at the same time both widen and limit the scope of what counts as permissible behavior.

The same sort of reasoning applies to the just savings principle, with the additional benefit that building a better world for the future is just another, extended form of self-interest. The world I am thus building is one that I will live in. If I know I must make my choices not based on the imaginary imperative that I should choose as if I will be someone in it I know not who, but on the actual imperative that I will in fact be not just someone but everyone in it, I will try and make sure that there are certain sorts of situations precluded in such a world. I do not like to suffer. I do not like mediocrity. And so on. Thus, to once again contrapose Rawls, we have our new Open Individualist Veil of Wisdom, which reminds us to so choose that:

you know your place in society, your class position, your social status: all of them. Likewise, you know your fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, your intelligence and strength, etc. Moreover, you have full information as to which generation you belong: all of them. The Veil of Knowledge includes all the best available knowledge of likelihoods, for any life that will may be lived if it is lived will be lived by none other than you, the person who simultaneously occupies each and every place in society.

And, instead of ranking our choices by their worst possible outcomes and opting in the end for that choice whose worst outcome is superior to the
worst outcome of any other choice, as Rawls would have us do, we rank them by their best possible outcomes and then opt in the end for that choice whose best outcome is superior to the best outcome of any other choice. I simply would not have it any other way. And neither would you. Or so I claim.

§12.8 NOUMENAL ETHICS AND FREEDOM

And here my claim yet again finds great affinity with, in this case, Rawls’s own sentiments regarding the Kantian idea of autonomy. Rawls comments on this aspect of the problem as it relates to his own view, and its original expression in Sidgwick, as follows. The point is a brilliant and subtle one and because it so centrally captures the entire thrust of the Open Individualist stance of morality, freedom, and rationality, I quote at some length:

There is . . . a difficulty that should be clarified. It is well expressed by Sidgwick. He remarks that nothing in Kant’s ethics is more striking than the idea that a man realizes his true self when he acts from the moral law, whereas if he permits his actions to be determined by sensuous desires or contingent aims, he becomes subject to the law of nature. Yet in Sidgwick’s opinion this idea comes to naught. It seems to him that on Kant’s view the lives of the saint and the scoundrel are equally the outcome of a free choice (on the part of the noumenal self) and equally the subject of causal laws (as a phenomenal self). [Theory of Justice, p. 254]

This accords with points we have made on several occasions in earlier chapters with regard to our concept of the Phenomenal Self as having no causal powers as such but being itself the effect of causal laws, whereas it is with our concept of active self-consciousness that true freedom to act, to choose, itself resides. Rawls goes on:

Kant never explains why the scoundrel does not express in a bad life his characteristic and freely chose selfhood in the same way that a saint expresses his characteristic and freely chose selfhood in a good one. Sidgwick’s objection is decisive, I think, as long as one assumes, as Kant’s exposition may seem to allow, both that the noumenal self can choose any consistent set of principles and that acting from such principles, whatever they are, is sufficient to express one’s choice as that of a free and equal rational being. Kant’s reply must be that though acting on any consistent set of principles could be the outcome of a decision on the part of the noumenal self, not all such action by the phenomenal self expresses this decision as that of a free and equal rational being. Thus if a person realizes his true self by expressing it in his actions, and if he desires above all else to realize this self, then he will choose to act from principles that manifest
his nature as a free and equal rational being. The missing part of the argument concerns the concept of expression. Kant did not show that acting from the moral law expresses our nature in identifiable ways that acting from contrary principles does not.

This defect is made good, I believe, by the conception of the original position. The essential point is that we need an argument showing which principles, if any, free and equal rational persons would choose and these principles must be applicable in practice. A definite answer to this question is required to meet Sidgwick's objection. My suggestion is that we think of the original position as the point of view from which noumenal selves see the world. . . . The description of the original position interprets the point of view of noumenal selves, of what it means to be a free and rational human being. [pp. 254-255, italics mine]

This startling passage from Rawls, especially the claim that his original position is the point of view from which noumenal selves see the world, almost perfectly captures our Open Individualist position regarding what the original position and veil of ignorance contraposed into our aboriginal position and veil of knowledge portend: indeed, the point of view from which the One (transcendental) Subject sees all its many worlds. 14

This is of course not just a Kantian ideal but the one he was most inspired to by Rousseau’s theory that liberty is itself nothing less and nothing more than acting in accordance with the laws that we have given to ourselves. The problem is that Kant’s moral doctrines, like those of Rousseau, have been consistently misunderstood by those who would make out of it a system of laws based on internal forces of guilt from within and external forces of austere command from without. Contractarian systems in general, in so far as they proscribe the notion of freedom as being attainable only through some system of restraints, and Rousseau’s in particular, have been rightly criticized on exactly such grounds. His argument to the effect that human beings can realize their true natures only through society and that it is the individuals who control the sovereign, for instance, while inspiring the Hegelians with the idea of national spirit have led many to suggest that it is Rousseau who made possible the suppression of freedom in the name of freedom with the idea that what makes freedom possible to being with is a social contract, that is, by trading natural liberty for civil liberty. In doing so, according to Rousseau, “Each of us puts his persona and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member of an indivisible part of a whole.” Rousseau thus claims that anyone who does not obey the “general will” must be forced to do so: it is through the social contract that a human being is “forced to be free.” It is this aspect of his contractarian approach that has for instance led to Russell’s famous charge that Rousseau was
The inventor of the political philosophy of pseudo-democratic dictatorships as opposed to
traditional absolute monarchies. Ever since his time, those who considered themselves reformers
have been divided into two groups, those who followed him and those who followed Locke. . . .
At the present time [1941], Hitler is an outcome of Rousseau; Roosevelt and Churchill, of Locke.

It certainly is true that in Rousseau’s view the will of the political leader is
the incarnation of the general will, which supposedly reflects the sum of the
individual wills of all the citizens. Rawls no less than Kant draws
inspiration from such an ideal that if each individual citizen was given just
enough of the right kind of information (more for Kant, less for Rawls) and
the freedom to choose, all individuals would, quite independently of each
other—since they are all directed by the same will to do the common
good—arrive at the general will for the good of all. Indeed, the very basis
of Kant’s categorical imperative,

Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to become a universal law,

becomes in his system the universal moral test of right principles of action.
The categorical imperative makes us all duty-bound to obey certain
principles in the same way that objects in nature are bound to act according
to the laws of nature. It applies universally. It is synthetic; if you deny it no
contradiction results. Because it has no empirical content, it is a priori.
Therefore it is a paradigm of pure reason at work in the moral realm. But
there is an equally important second aspect to the categorical imperative:

So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always at the same
time as an end and never simply as a means only.

In saying that we should treat others as ends in themselves and not merely
as a means, Kant is of course saying that we ought not to use other people
as a means to our own ends. But it applies as much to ourselves as it does to
others; it is, in fact, the very source of our ability to choose freely. This is
because the moral law, in terms of the categorical imperative, arises from,
and is known through, pure reason. It says, “Choose your rules according to
whether they can be universalized.” But notice too that since this is a
principle of pure reason, and I am a rational being, I am not merely a
subject to this law! I am also in part (in Kant’s view) its author (sole
author in our view). In other words, just as the objects of the phenomenal world
are in part created (constituted into reality) by the subject, so too the moral
law is itself in part my own creation:
The will is thus not merely subject to the law but is subject to the law in such a way that it must be regarded also as legislating for itself and only on this account as being subject to the law of which it can regard itself as the author.

Hence, quite fully in the spirit of Rousseau, it is when we act from duty with respect to the moral law that each of us exists as a fully and absolutely autonomous being:

The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational; freedom would be the property of this causality that makes it effective independent of any determination by alien causes. . . . freedom is certainly not lawless, even though it is not a property of will in accordance with laws of nature. It must, rather, be a causality in accordance with immutable laws, which, to be sure, is of a special kind. . . . What else, then, can freedom of the will be but autonomy, i.e., the property that the will has of being a law to itself? The proposition that the will is in every action a law to itself expresses, however, nothing but the principle of acting according to no other maxim that that which can at the same time have itself as a universal law for its object. Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality. Thus a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same.

Rawls would agree:

Those who think of Kant’s moral doctrine as one of law and guilt badly misunderstand him. Kant’s main aim is to deepen and to justify Rousseau’s idea that liberty is acting in accordance with a law that we give to ourselves. And this leads not to a morality of austere command but to an ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem. [Theory of Justice, p. 256]

He thus openly claims that

The original position may be viewed, then, as a procedural interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative. . . . No longer are these notions purely transcendent and lacking explicable connections with human conduct, for the procedural conception of the original position allows us to make these ties. It is true that I have departed from Kant’s views in several respects. . . . The person’s choice as a noumenal self I have assumed to be a collective one. The force of the self’s being equal is that the principles chosen must be acceptable to other selves. Since all are similarly free and rational, each must have an equal say in adopting the public principles of the ethical commonwealth. This means that as noumenal selves, everyone is to consent to these principles. [pp. 256-257]

But why? How? Perhaps even more to the point: why is it that we do not? For here we are forced to notice that Rawls too is prepared to force, by means of some sort of unspecified method of authority, that “everyone is to consent to these principles.”
Here we part company part way with Rawls and part way with Kant, though how far from Kant is not clear since it is never clear in Kant whether there is one Noumenal Subject or many. Certainly Schopenhauer’s representation of a Kantian-inspired system makes room for the notion of a single “Noumenal Self,” but there too it is not clear. In any case, if there is but one person, the (nonlocal) subject identified as each and every Self, as I claim, then our mutually independent choices need not be—indeed, ultimately they cannot be—collective ones in the way that Rawls supposes must be necessary for his theory of Justice as Fairness. Rawls, no less than Rousseau—and here rather unlike Kant—seems to be considering the concept of a Noumenal Subject as a sort of pragmatically useful fiction. For the action that Rousseau and Rawls both call for, unlike Kant, is one that takes place in the external arena of the Phenomenal World, actions on the part of Phenomenal Selves. Hence the social contractarian schema, involving the construction of the right sorts of institutions rather than the right sorts of Selves, becomes the order of the day.

It is here no less than anywhere else that our contraposition of Rawls comes to our timely aid and draws us even further into the Kantian metaphysic. Build a better Self and you will have no need to build a better World through some sort of structure of authority. Here a little reflection here quickly reveals what’s wrong with the subsequent Rousseau-Kant-Rawls moral enterprise: it is conscripted under Closed Individualism. What it needs is our amalgam of Open Individualist inspired utilitarianism to revamp the principles and positions of the Original Position and Veil of Ignorance. Under such an amalgam forcing others, in the way we see Rawls advocating above, into compliance with rules and principles is ultimately irrational. It makes no more sense for me to force others to consent to some set of principles than it would be, say, for me now to try and force myself to comply tomorrow to a belief I hold now by the following means: I comply now to principle x and then somehow I bring it about that tomorrow I cannot do otherwise than continue to comply to x, even should I choose then not to do so.

First of all, it seems that such effort would itself be irrational simply because I cannot now force myself by sheer force of will that in two minutes I should, say, touch my nose. In two minutes, no impulse from the past will reach the future; which is just to point out in yet another way what I have called the Transcendent Illusion: the illusion that the phenomenal body-mind is the body-mind, i.e., that this coordinated self-representation is the whole of me. And that is just another reason why from the Open
Individualist point of view and such externally imposed constraints on our freedom, as utilitarians such as John Mill for slightly different reasons so aptly realized, is for us even more out of the question than it was for Mill, since the person who I am thus constraining is myself.

But so then what are you and I to do if we disagree? What if we disagree vehemently, and now and, furthermore, are both convinced that the other (even though the other is ourselves) must be convinced? But isn’t the answer here obvious? Isn’t the answer philosophy? We simply must then play the right game, with the right rules, to see who wins. Would anyone want it any other way? I wouldn’t. And I know that neither would you.

§12.9 THE THIRD COPERNICAN REVOLUTION AND THE BREAKDOWN OF METAPHYSICAL AND METAPSYCHOLOGICAL PHILOPATHOLOGY

If we are all the same person, why then do we treat each other as we do? The apparently obvious answer is of course that we do not regard ourselves as the same person. And why don’t we? To that question too there is an apparently obvious answer: because appearances strongly suggest otherwise. The reason appearances are in this case, as in so many others, deceiving is that mistaking ourselves for others—the Illusion of Other Persons—is a necessary consequence of the Transcendental Illusion, that phenomenological-psychological divide within us that is itself a necessary condition for the having of experience as we know it (i.e., in space and time), thereby making possible our inner dialogue of thought, the conversation with oneself that subjectivity, consciousness, is.

Recall that, in this regard, we can compare the Illusion of Other Persons to the Geocentric Illusion. Why, if all the planets revolve around the sun, did nearly everyone until recently believe that the Earth is at the center of the universe?

Because that’s what they saw. It’s what we see too but today we all accept without question a view that a few centuries ago was unthinkable and heretical: ours is not a uniquely privileged position in the universe. That the Earth seems to be at the center around which everything revolves is, we believe, due to an illusion that applies equally well to any and all observers in whatever reference frame they are looking out at the universe from. We understand the Geocentric Illusion to be a necessary consequence of the relationship between geometry, mechanics and visual phenomena that makes whatever planet one is on seem as if it is the unique center around
which everything else revolves.

Likewise, Closed Individualism may someday seem as false and wrongheaded as the Ptolemaic view seems to us today. We can certainly imagine future generations explaining to their children that the reason people once took the separateness of persons for granted (“did everyone really believe that, even the philosophers?” we can hear the puzzled youngsters ask) was not because they (we) were brainwashed by religion but simply because, after all—and this the scholars will take great pride in demonstrating—that’s how it looks!

Now, in the same way that the Galilean-Copernican theory cannot make us feel the Earth move nor show the Earth, moon and planets to be moving around the sun, at least not very much, so likewise Open Individualism cannot make us feel we are all the same person or allow us to see ourselves as such, at least not very much. An Open Individualist experiences the Illusion of Other Persons just as a believer in the Heliocentric Theory experiences the Geocentric Illusion. The Illusion of Other Persons as such can be glimpsed only in theory requiring a Galilean-like transformation of our present metaphysical coordinate system, a joint philosophical and scientific rape of the senses that dislodges the Self from its privileged position and places instead the Subject, the light of consciousness, at the center. Closed Individualism, however, can nevertheless account for all the appearances just as well, and the same can be said for Naïve Realism.

An initial moral challenge to Open Individualism is thus a behavioral counterpart to the metaphysical challenge of our having to explain why, if we are all the same person, we do not experience ourselves simultaneously as being everyone everywhere—a challenge to which we have risen in various ways and on a variety of fronts. We’ve seen for example that to be both identified as ourselves and as each other with simultaneous co-consciousness of the subject-in-itself from all points of view on all (phenomenal) worlds—which is what such an experience of transcendental unity would demand—is itself precluded by conditions necessary for the having of experience. The fact is that I can no more achieve such a conscious state than I can feel or see the Earth move. Understanding how the mind within which I exist, the subject identified as Daniel Kolak, must be bordered from (within) itself so as to make experience as we know it possible, shows that to be conscious of all aspects of myself from the first person point of view—subjectivity seeing itself directly as a mind and not just as a subject identified as a particular Self in the world—is itself
impossible. That is, the fact that I—the subject-in-itself identified as this (phenomenal) Self—don’t experience you—the subject identified as that (phenomenal) Self—as myself is hardly preclusive of Open Individualism, since to be an identified subject in any conceivable world already requires consciousness (the subject-in-itself) to be bordered exactly the way I already am (and must be) from the rest of my own (phenomenal) world, dissociated from all the rest of the being within which I subsist identified as a (phenomenal) Self, an exclusively conjoined locus of awareness and control, etc. That is, it shouldn’t be surprising that I don’t experience you as myself once I understand that I don’t experience myself (i.e., my own phenomenal world) as myself, either.

To be ignorant of the Transcendental Illusion is to take appearances as what they appear to be, to live in the commonsense, pre-philosophical world of Naïve Realism. To become aware of the Transcendental Illusion as such is to take the first small step (Kant’s Second Copernican Revolution) toward Open Individualism. To understand Closed Individualism—the commonsense view of ourselves as each being a separately existing person—as a natural consequence of Naïve Realism, a false philosophy derived from the Transcendental Illusion, is to make the second, giant leap (our Third Copernican Revolution) toward Open Individualism. In realizing that without both the Illusion of Other Persons and the Transcendental Illusion operating within us subjectivity, as we know it (i.e., conscious experience in space and time), would be impossible, we create the possibility of moving beyond a philosophical explanation to a scientific one. For by showing not just how $p$ is possible in light of its apparent excluders, $r$, but that in addition the laws of experience, nature, or both, themselves require such apparent excluders, $r$, we thereby create the possibility of a scientific explanation expressible in this case, for instance, within the domain of cognitive science.

I repeat all this to lead up to the following question: why do we divide ourselves from each other the way we do to begin with? One answer may be deeply illuminating. I have suggested many reasons why the Illusion of Other Persons is a necessary consequence of the Transcendental Illusion that is itself a necessary condition for the having of experience. Waking experience, I have argued, is a type of waking dream in which being bordered from myself in various ways makes possible both my ability to function as an individual in a world and to create a society of individuals and worlds in which I exist as a (nonlocal) subject who is simultaneously identified as everyone in all worlds. The ability of the subject in this way to
be identified as a plurality of phenomenal Selves, to transform itself into a
metaphysical universe of phenomenal worlds, etc., is from the Open
Individualist point of view the most prudent way for us to exist, provided
that at some point, from the standpoint of an evolutionary view of
consciousness, we are able to realize Open Individualism. Here’s why.

If I close my eyes and imagine myself, say, at Delphi, I am able to
generate various images that appear as mental images; these mental images
(of ruins, of Mt. Parnassus, etc.) as such do not appear to me as other but as
my own self—my own mind—in the act of imagining. That is, such acts of
the imagination are automatically interpreted as aspects of my own mind.
At that point the Transcendental Illusion has not yet kicked in. This limits
my imagination in various vivid and important ways, such as that I can thus
make mental pictures but I cannot yet enter the picture, I am still “on the
outside looking in.” All this of course is “real” (acts of imagination exist as
such) but the ability to imagine a scene and then project yourself into it
enhances the perceived reality in so far as you are then able to explore the
picture (i.e., the model) from within the model; from a purely quantitative
informational standpoint there may be no difference but qualitatively the
difference is between a two dimensional rendering and a three dimensional
one, an increase not in the number of points but certainly in the quality of
their manifest presentation. But when I am further able as I am in my
dreams to leave one picture and enter another, I cease existing (being
situated in) one (phenomenal) world and I enter another. (In the case of my
dreaming qua dreaming such a shift is still within the first-order
phenomenal level, a change in identification as one (phenomenal) Self in
one (phenomenal) world to another. It is not a second-order shift as in the
waking life case.) Thus as I begin to dream I find myself at Delphi and the
knowledge that I am not at Delphi but at home in my bed asleep is not an
apparent excluder of finding myself at Delphi but, as a matter of cognitive
and psychological fact, is an actual excluder, in so far as such knowledge
gets in the way of the experience. And it is precisely at that point that the
mental images cease to appear as two-dimensional mental images and
appear as a three-dimensional manifold of objects, i.e., as things situated in
a world that I am myself situated in. At that point the Transcendental
Illusion has kicked in: I am now mistaking what is me, part of my own
mind, for what is not me, as if it were mind-independent reality.

Suppose now further that before falling asleep I was thinking and writing
about what philosophy is, deliberating and debating with myself about how
philosophy should be practiced, whether philosophy has changed for the
better or the worse since Socrates, whether there has been progress, what philosophical progress itself is, and so on, trying as best I could to play devil’s advocate to my own ideas. Say I began writing a dialogue between Socrates, Descartes, Hume and Kant in which the great philosophers debate these questions. This sort of open conversation with myself, an inner dialogue in which I am co-conscious of all sides of the “debate,” is such that all aspects of my own thought are automatically identified as my own thoughts, as being me, the thinking subject of experience engaged in the art of thinking. The Illusion of Other Persons has not yet kicked in. There is, as in the case of picturing of objects, a definite limitation imposed on the veracity of the experience. To put it bluntly, if still only allegorical: the imaginary dialogue a writer writes (unlike the one the dreamer dreams) is flat and artificial, one-dimensional, lacking in depth, etc., I am, in a certain sense and to a certain degree, in my own way: I know to much, I have a birds-eye-view of the exchange, etc., and this limits the quality of the dialectic.

But suppose now that the different sides of my deliberations become disputants such that I begin to dream and thus my mind divides itself into multiple characters such that I now take on the role of the other characters of the dialogue in my dream. The subject now appears to itself on opposing sides of its own thinking, experiencing those aspects of the conversation with itself, not as Self but Other, such that the subject exist in the dream as a truly multiperspectival individual at Delphi named Socrates, Descartes, Hume, Kant, and so on. In other words: the Illusion of Other Persons has just kicked in. I now have created a multi-dimensional, multi-perspectival situation that can be fully and richly explored by the subject from within. Less in this case is so much more. Thought in such a dream appears to the thinking subject of experience not as Self but as Other. That’s one clear and distinct value, in terms of the significance, function and quality of experience, to the Illusion of Other Persons.

Moreover, whereas the Transcendental Illusion transforms the subject via alienation (dissociation) into Self and Other, the Illusion of Other Persons as second order derivative illusion completes the philosophical circuit so as to transform the Self thus alienated as Other back into Self, an alienated Self, a Self-other. This is the quartic identification that in §6.3, i.e., the transference of consciousness. Just as the Transcendental Illusion enables subjectivity, consciousness, the Illusion of Other Persons enables self-consciousness, the existence of the identified Subject as such. It enables consciousness, subjectivity, to be dissociated (alienated) from itself without
It shatters the necessary limitations imposed upon a unitary one-world uniperspectival being into the multi-perspectival reality of one being simultaneously existing in many worlds. It increases the amount of happiness, pleasure and quality of life. It makes existence richer, more fun, and eminently more dangerous from an experiential point of view.

That’s the ideal case. But not the actual case. In terms of actual lives as we presently live them ours seem hardly to be the best of all possible worlds, and this is as much a problem for Open Individualist utilitarianism as it is for Rawls’s original position. And the reason that’s so, I claim, is not that something went wrong on the way to the present but that something in the future has yet to go right. The problem now is that we have become enmeshed in a false theory of personal identity that also is wrong from a practical and moral standpoint. The Illusion of Other Persons is as necessary as is the Transcendental Illusion; Closed Individualism, however, like Naïve Realism, is not. Now, if there were a God—that is, if we were God, since for reasons already given all conscious beings are in our view, even in this case, one and the same numerically identical person—the situation would be different. For then we should wonder why, if the (in that case transcendental) subject is a perfect, all knowing and all powerful being who is everyone, ours are not the best of all possible worlds. But in our view there is not sufficient reason for the existence of such a God (though nor is it precluded). Closed Individualism is but a stage in the evolution of consciousness. So the Open Individualist solution to the traditional moral issues problem in terms of how we can maximize, say, happiness and the quality of life, is to use philosophy as a therapeutic tool for constructing a better theory of personal identity that not only accords with and explains experience as well or better than any other but also, in addition, can improve our lives. This requires the migration of consciousness (the subject) from traditional Closed to Open Individualism.

In this way not only the metaphysical but also the moral conundrums of our experience and behavior towards others and also towards ourselves can both be explained in part by the fact that the subject is not directly aware that the world in which it is situated is its own—i.e., that the (phenomenal) Self I find myself identified as (whether in a dream or waking state) is as much a construction as are the phenomenal worlds within which dream and waking experience unfolds. The subject as such cannot be directly aware of this. We cannot both be conscious and see the truth about the world and
ourselves. Our behavior both in our waking and sleeping dream states can thus be explained at least in part by the fact that ordinarily we are not aware of what experience itself is, what it involves from a cognitive, neurological and representational point of view, and that some of the conditions necessary for it, such as the Transcendental Illusion and the Illusion of Other Persons, necessarily require that we will find ourselves experiencing ourselves in the world exactly in the way we do. And at this stage of our philosophical understanding of the world and ourselves we are as the Ptolemaic believers were prior to the advent of the first Copernican revolution living in a false philosophy (such as, in the majority of our own cases, Naïve Realism and Closed Individualism).

We can, however, become aware of these sorts of second and third order truths about the world and ourselves through the activity of philosophy. For us philosophy is not the sort of pathology that Wittgenstein and others at one time have supposed but, rather, just the opposite: philosophy is a pragmatic vehicle for metaphysical and moral improvement of our lives. The best of all possible worlds as best we can presently gather are those in which the Illusion of Other Persons and the Transcendental Illusion are safely in place but in which Closed Individualism, the natural first order of the day, gradually gives way to Open Individualism. Through Open Individualism the subject can build an intellectual connection within and among its many (phenomenal) worlds without breaching within and among its many (phenomenal) Selves the experiential disconnections necessary for the having of experience as we know it, a way of metaphysically and metapsychologically repairing and improving itself not from a moral but a prudential, rational, purely self-interested point of view. The purpose of the Open Individualist philosophy is not to destroy “the dream,” to somehow “transcend the necessary illusion,” but to make us better by helping us through the process of philosophy to dream better dreams.

From our Open Individualist standpoint, then, our present form of life is not an error or mistake but a step in our ongoing metaphysical evolution. From the standpoint of the subject simultaneously identified as multiple Phenomenal Selves, the advent of Open Individualism suggests that the limitations imposed upon consciousness as we know it by the Transcendental Illusion, the Illusion of Other Persons, and the identification/dissociation function are limitations only upon present human experience, living it open as to whether in the future we may transcend such present limitations. Open Individualism may not be the end of the Game but the Beginning: there may be a next phase of the philosophical
transformation of consciousness. Such a philosophical paradigm shift itself if possible would involve a metaphysical reversal in line with what we have called the third Copernican Revolution. Experience essentially remains the same—the key difference being not a metaphysical but axiological one, in which there is not just identification with others but also identification as their thoughts—discussed below—in which waking experience becomes a philosophical counterpart to the understanding afforded, for instance, by lucid dreams.  

One must of course continue to bear in mind that understanding the Illusion of Other Persons to be, like Naïve Realism, a necessary (and user friendly) illusion that is nothing less (and nothing more) than the personal counterpart to the Transcendental Illusion—the commonsense view that the (phenomenal) objects in our immediate experience are not things in themselves that exist independently of the subject—does not dispel the illusion. It merely explains it. These are, after all, necessary illusions for the having of experience exactly in the way Kant suggested. But as I have just suggested it may be possible for the subject identified as a philosopher to partly transcend the limitations ordinarily placed upon thought by such phenomenological limitations, to generate limited experiential insights that are sufficient to produce a moral sea change through the identification of the verbally expressed thoughts of others as one’s own.

What I am now here suggesting, albeit only speculatively, is in some ways akin to what Julian Jaynes postulated with regard to what he called the “breakdown of the bicameral mind.” In Jaynes’s view our ancestors of only a few thousand years ago heard their own voices not as Self but Other, as the thoughts of “gods” communicating with them. Higher cognitive functions involving the second order activity of thinking and self-conscious behavior according to Jaynes were not generally appropriated by the brain so as to be sequenced with the conscious mental states of what we have defined (in §6.8) as the Self. From the perspective of the subject identified as a particular Self, the higher cognitive functions of the mind within which the subject as such subsists were in the bicameral era automatically interpreted in accordance with what we are calling the Illusion of Other Persons, except this illusion—I am now openly speculating—was then far stronger than it is now; however, it still even today appears among a slew of neurological and psychiatric disorders such as, for instance, schizophrenia, in which the subject “hears voices” taken to be not Self but Other, as well as the sort of dissociation that we explored at some length in our analysis of MPD. Now—assuming that such an analysis is, roughly,
viable—why would the Illusion of Other Persons have lost some of its grip on the mind in this way, making it possible for us to exist as more autonomous (phenomenal) Selves, with our higher degree of self-awareness? The answer I offer here—again, one that is openly speculative—is that this development occurred through a reorganization of thought through the process of philosophy (here I don’t necessarily mean the work of philosophers; I’m using “philosophy” in an analogous way that one might talk about “logic,” not as an academic discipline but as a function of, say, the brain). In other words, Open Individualism may have a similar affect akin to a second order “bicameral breakdown” such that we would then evolve to a conscious state in which we no longer heard each other’s voices as that of Other but, rather, as that of Self.

Let me be perfectly clear as to what I am actually claiming here. Suppose you and I are in the same room, talking. For reasons that should by now be clear we cannot, in any thus far imaginable scenario, experience such a situation identified as both of us with simultaneous co-consciousness between the two (phenomenal) Selves, each one of which is situated in its own (phenomenal) world. Your voice sounds to me as if it’s coming from another person, just as we might suppose that in the bicameral era one’s own voice used to sound as if it were coming from another person (i.e., “the gods”).

In suggesting the possibility that I could learn to hear your voice as my own, I reason as follows. First of all, when I am alone in the room thinking, I immediately identify the heard thoughts as myself. I hear them from the first person point of view. This, I would claim, requires a theory of personal identity in the functional sense, that is, an interpretation scheme operating within the brain with regard to its conscious phenomena (similarly to the way it has been suggested that a theory of mind is a necessary condition for self-consciousness and something that autistic people lack). When I hear you talk, on the other hand, I hear those thoughts expressed from the third person point of view. Recall now our various Dream Analogs. There I made it clear in what ways, from a phenomenological point of view, the subject finds itself exactly in this same sort of situation, in the dream case, that I am in during my waking states: I seem to be talking to someone else. That is, in dreams I hear characters talking to me and though their thoughts are my thoughts I do not hear them identified as my thoughts but as the thoughts of other persons. The dream character who talks to me in my dream and asks, for instance, “Do you know what I will say next?” and I answer, “No, I do not,” is a case in which my mind is having a conversation with itself. Such
a dialogue requires both the Transcendental Illusion and the Illusion of Other Persons, such that one side of the dialogue sounds as if it is coming from one person, me, while the other side sounds as if it coming from another, second, person, you. But, first, when I answer, “No, I do not know what you will say next,” I—the Self from whose point of view I seem to be experiencing the dream exclusively—did not consciously compose those words from some lexicon, I did not write “my own” side of the dialogue any more than I wrote the dialogue of the other character in my dreams. I simply experienced the verbal expression of this sentence, just as I experienced the other side of the dialogue when I heard the question, “Do you know what I will say next?” The key difference is that the latter was heard from the second person point of view while the former was heard from the first person point of view. This itself is the result of a theory of personal identity actively functioning within my (phenomenal) world, conscripting (interpreting) my experience along requisite borders. In neither case am I, the subject identified as that Self, consciously aware of myself as the originating agent of the thoughts—a “transcendental awareness” reserved perhaps for the “transcendental subject” (and therefore is not itself an identified conscious process, i.e., conscripted under the inverse fourfold identification/dissociation function of the \( \varepsilon/\delta \) manifold, in space and time)—which the subject once identified merely appropriates, as if they originated in consciousness, via the process of identification as. Would it be possible in a dream to hear the voices of the other characters as one’s own thoughts, to actually have a transcendental unity of experience analog to the transcendental unity of consciousness scenario that is itself precluded by the necessary conditions for the having of experience? I claim, Yes, it is possible.

Such would be a case in which I was having a “lucid” dream in which I believed that I was dreaming, that all the beings I encountered were myself, etc. Such a belief itself would of course even in the dream be not strictly correct, in so far as I, the subject identified as a particular (phenomenal) Self, am not, strictly speaking, the dreamer but the dreamed. The Self that the subject is identified as is as much a construction as are the other characters in my dreams, and my own self-conscious states are but the projection of myself qua subject into the (phenomenal) world. But I, the (e.g. nonlocal, transcendental) subject, the dreamer, am everything and everyone in the dream—yet no aspect of myself in the dream can experience itself as the transcendental subject for reasons already given, namely, that such a state of affairs is itself precluded by the necessary
conditions for the having of experience as we know it (i.e., in space and
time, conscripted under the fourfold \( \epsilon/\delta \) manifold identification/dissociation
function, etc.). The subject as such is not a being in space and time, it is
space and time as they are experienced by the subject-in-itself (itself a
projection of the subject into the phenomenal world). What the lucid dream
experience allows me to have—and this could alter the quality of dream
experience substantially for the better—is, within the dream, a theory (in
the functional, not necessarily intellectual, sense) that might then act as a
sort of virtual wire to get around the necessary borders the existence of
which are necessarily conscripted under Naïve Realism (a view which the
lucid state defeats). This could thus alter substantially the inner dialogue in
which the thoughts of “others” in dreams are identified as one’s own
exactly in the way and to the degree which the breakdown of the bicameral
mind allows the superior illusion that the Self is not just conscious of its
environment (the phenomenal world) in the way, say, animals may well be
but, in addition, that I, the subject identified as a Self, am a self-conscious
causal agent. In reality the Self is not. The subject is. (Although to make
experience possible identified as a phenomenal Self I cannot experience
this as a truth about myself, I can live inside a theory allowing me to
believe this to be the truth, thereby, in effect, upgrading the quality of
experience in which the subject lives the many lives of its many Selves.)

The same is true of our waking experience, I claim, in so far as we are not
precluded from being able to identify each other’s thoughts as our own.
Surely, someone may object, this is not possible—what about causality?
Were you to actually hear my thoughts as if they were yours, would this not
be just an illusion, given that you are not their cause? Well yes, I answer,
but it is similarly an illusion that what I, the subject am identified as is the
cause of the thoughts that I presently hear (correctly) as if they were mine.
This is a very useful and user-friendly illusion, making life in the
(phenomenal) world possible. What the new and improved illusion of all
our heard thoughts being identified as our own might do, likewise, is to
make a better life possible.

In other words, while Open Individualism cannot be expected to bring
about the transcendental unity of all conscious experience in experience (an
impossible experience), it can nevertheless in principle allow me, the
subject, to be identified as other Selves not phenomenally but cognitively,
that is, through cognition, through the voice. So if it’s purely a question of
the visual phenomena themselves, the answer is No, I cannot transcend the
Illusion of Other Persons, any more than I can transcend the Transcendental
Illusion. If it’s purely a question of the identification of the activity of thinking itself—verbally expressed thoughts—the answer is Yes, I can achieve at the level of second order activity what is necessarily precluded at the level of first order activity. My own thoughts, after all—voices from within me—are not under the direct conscious control of the subject, either (both are the effect, not the cause, of primary identification; see the discussion in Chapter 10), any more than I, identified as this (phenomenal) self, am co-consciously in control of yours. In so far as the philosophy of mind and of personal identity within which existence as we know it occurs is that of Closed Individualism conscripted under Naïve Realism, the transcendental experience, although neither logically nor phenomenologically prohibited, is nowhere present. The subject therefore arguably does not yet understand itself as itself, but only understands itself as Other. (“Metaphysical and metapsychological autism” may here be the appropriate sort of metapsychopathological concept.)

This would suggest at least one reason why I would treat you sometimes more poorly than I ordinarily treat myself. It furthermore suggests that the Open Individualist philosophy can function as a sort of cognitive therapy of the individual who is in varying degrees of what I call philopathology at odds with himself, what I call a philopath, involving three distinct stages of the Philosophical Evolution of Consciousness:

1) The understanding of the Transcendental Illusion as a response to the philopathology of Naïve Realism
2) The understanding of the Illusion of Other Persons as a response to the philopathology of Closed Individualism
3) The experiential transcendence of primary identification as through I am you in response to the philopathology of immoralism.

Ultimately, the suffering victim in my dreams is, always, me, my own consciousness. Freudian psychoanalytic theory, and Freud’s obsession and preoccupation with dream analysis—themselves inspired in part by Freud’s understanding of the Kantian system as interpreted and developed by Schopenhauer—are themselves derived from the Freudian insight that the entire mind-brain organism, inclusive of the Id, Superego and Ego structures—some of which is conscious (in the spatiotemporal sense) and some of which is not (leaving the possibility of either superconsciousness or unconsciousness as its processes) is necessarily partitioned (bordered) from itself in such ways that make our lives outwardly and inwardly antagonistic. A person, as any psychiatrist or psychologist of far less than
Freud’s acumen can attest, can be—and often is—her own worst enemy.\textsuperscript{25}

\section*{§12.10 Improper Dysfunctionality: Why We Harm Ourselves}

Why do we harm ourselves? \textit{How} do we? These, I have suggested, are not two questions but one question. If we understand how we do it we shall understand why we do it.

So: how do we do it? We do it with borders: national, political, religious, racial, social, and personal borders. For these borders to be properly functioning they must be conscripted under the correct philosophy. Open Individualism, I have argued, is the correct philosophy of borders. The wrong philosophy is the one that builds a false wall of perceived non-identity (dissociation) between us: Closed Individualism. Dissolving the boundaries between us is thus the path toward understanding our borders so as to lay the metaphysical foundations for global ethics.

Clearly, social, religious, racial, political and national borders enhance our attachment to identifications and dissociations that are the leading cause of harm that we perpetrate upon ourselves. But then what about cases where I do it to myself \textit{knowingly}? Above I suggested as a first Moral Dissolve that what makes it possible for us to harm ourselves is that we are not aware that it is ourselves we are harming. But what about cases where I am—or at least seem to be—aware that it is \textit{myself} whom I am harming, and yet in which I nevertheless cause harm, such as in cases of outright suicide?

“There is,” wrote Camus, “but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide.” Open Individualism in full agreement with this, but not merely for the existentialist reasons envisioned by Camus. The killing of any human being by any human being is, according to Open Individualism, a form of suicide; indeed, any and all types of harm perpetrated upon human beings by human beings is self-harm, a variety of self-mutilation, an extreme pathology. So looking at such pathologies as understood in the ordinary psychological cases may be an analog to what has gone wrong in the larger metapsychological and metaphysical case.

Before proceeding down this track, however, we must insert an important qualification. Life and death are all about borders. Life itself as we know it requires the erecting, sustaining, and dissolving of borders. Not just any borders—the right borders—and not just their preservation but also the right balance of preservation and dissolution. Nowhere is it more apparent than in biology that the proper self-death of cells—apoptosis—is absolutely
essential and necessary for life as we know it. Veer even slightly from the delicate balance and the organism dies. Self-harm is, as far as we know, up to and including self-destruction—death in the right dosage—the very key to life. Stasis is as far as we know impossible. A species will either evolve or else cease to exist. “Change or die” seems to be a sort of cosmic imperative encrypted into our very genes.

In other words, preserving life means preserving the right borders. For instance individual cells must preserve and sustain their borders but if they are to survive as a form they must also appropriately give them up, that is, they must commit suicide. One example of what happens when they don’t is cancer. Thus not only death but, specifically, suicide are key ingredients of properly functioning organisms in a universe ruled as ours is by entropy. What we witness at the macroscopic level as the deaths of individual human beings thus exists in a variety of ways as essential features of the microscopic systems upon which and out of which the greater human organism is built. When everything is functioning properly we are each a complex of borders interfacing in a ceaseless and everlasting war of suicidal self-destruction, dying in bits and pieces at each and every moment—not one death but a myriad deaths—so that the whole may live for a time until it, too, dies as it must to give way to yet another variation on itself.

Given such a delicate balance of borders it should hardly be surprising when something goes wrong. What we are concerned here in the present chapter are dysfunctions at the gross behavioral level, what traditionally is considered immoral behavior and what from an Open Individualist point of view is pathological dysfunctionality. Above I’ve just suggested that suicide, like death, is not in and of itself harmful but may under the properly functional circumstances be beneficial, indeed, at the biological level it is an essential aspect of proper functionality as we understand it. Thus what we need to understand is the whys and hows of dysfunctional self-death as the beginning of a solution to the problem of the good life, at least of life as it is presently being lived by us here and now during the startup phase of the third millennium.

_In killing you I am killing myself._ This maxim goes to the very heart of Open Individualism; it is a moral axiom. (It is of course not as simple as it looks, usually nothing ever is; in an equally important sense I cannot kill you, nor myself, without killing everyone. I am merely, by killing, depriving myself of a view.) The problem is to understand how and why I kill myself when I seem to know it is myself whom I am killing. This is the
problem of suicide. And here we can indeed, as I implied above, find some extremely illuminating answers. The hypothesis I put forth is that intentional self-death without self-deception is impossible in so far as out-and-out self-harm is logically prohibited in ways that shall be spelled out below. Yet, as I also have just been suggesting, self-death is a necessary condition for at least some levels of our existence as we know it, from the standpoint of ourselves as biological organisms. So if the mechanisms that make self-death possible must exist necessarily at some level, the problem of immorality—pathological dysfunctionality, in our view—must itself be a levels problem, as I will in fact argue is the case.

The psychiatric and psychological background for such a thesis has a long history beginning with Durkheim’s classic analysis, *Le Suicide*, (1897). Durkheim sees all suicides as having one thing in common: a fundamental dissociation between the person and society, more specifically, the social group which the person is most strongly identified with (perhaps even as). This dissociation, which he called *anomie*, results from dissolution of the connections that unite individuals into groups. Freud (1917) theorized early on that the leading cause of suicide is sublimated aggression directed toward some Significant Other that the person formerly identified with (or perhaps even as). Three years later (Freud 1920) posited his additional theory that suicide is the active manifestation of the death instinct, programmed into the organism biologically, for some unknown reason gone awry and now directed against the self. Bernfeld (1929) offered another variation of Freud’s original theory, postulating that suicide is the result of the person acting out an unconscious impulse to murder some one else with whom the person unconsciously but strongly identifies with (or, perhaps again, as), because one now hates whom one formerly loved.

According to Horney (1950), all violence toward oneself up to and including suicide is due to alienation of the self brought about by severe dissociation between what in Chapter 6 I called the “private” and “public” personas, where the one tries to destroy the other. In other similar sorts of theories, the conflict is described not in terms of identification and dissociation imbalances between various Selves but between the Self and that within which the Self subsists, or is subservient to, such as the Id and Superego of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Thus according to one extremely fascinating such analysis, that of Fenichel (1945), suicide results when an irrational tug of war between the ego and a sadistic superego, involving a series of psychopathological sparrings in which various bordered parts of oneself alternate between escalating degrees of passive
submission and aggressive resistance toward each other, ending in the ultimate form of self-punishment.

This is not the place to go into a detailed analysis of these theories of suicide, except to say that what from our point of view may be deeply revealing is that what such leading psychoanalytic and psychopathological theories have in common suggests suicide is at the extreme end of varying degrees of what I term identification disorder syndrome (IDS). For as is easy to see it turns out that what under Closed Individualism is viewed as immoral behavior is itself a type of IDS. Thus to the question of how I can kill myself when I am aware it is myself that I am killing (in the sense of being identified as the victim), our answer is that I cannot.

We might put this position allegorically by saying that in our view the one (identified as) pulling the trigger is not identified as the one anticipating the bullet: the pathology here is not one of identity but of identification. Ultimately, it makes little difference whether the one pulling the trigger and the one anticipating the bullet are facing each other on opposing sides of a battlefield or whether the hand with the finger on the trigger is one’s own. The metaphysical battle may be taking place in a theater of war or in the theater of the mind, in both cases it is a sort of metaphysical trench warfare in which one is divided from oneself.

The problem for us then is that we necessarily fail to see the truth about ourselves (i.e., the Transcendental Illusion and the Illusion of Other Persons are necessary conditions for the having of experience) in ways that sometimes lead us to harm ourselves unnecessarily. Although we cannot do anything about the necessary limitations imposed upon the having of experience, we can transcend them with the right philosophy. The problem is that we have been living the wrong philosophy, namely, Closed Individualism, the major means of production of anomie. Open Individualism offers an antidote to anomie in the form of I am you, our independence-friendly anti-anomie.

§12.11 THE CONCLUSION OF THIS CHAPTER

For millennia we have looked to each other in building unities outside ourselves. We have turned to each other or against each other but always outside ourselves, mending our walls, building bigger and better external unities: racial unity, social unity, national unity, religious unity, economic unity, political unity . . . external unities erected by individuals imposing order upon individuals from the outside. Rarely have we turned to
ourselves, inwardly, looking not to impose but to expose unity from within. Perhaps this is because we believe looking inwardly draws us only further apart from each other and that for unity to emerge from within would be impossible. Unity must be imposed from the outside. Exposed from within only chaos would emerge.

Looking inward we have looked not far enough and if and when we do we shall find common ground in the subject-in-itself, the I, a basis not for political, economic, religious, national, social, racial, or any sort of externally imposed unity, but an inner unity that makes such external impositions of unity superfluous.

Open Individualism does not remove our dividing walls. It shows us how to build better lives.
NOTES

1 Peter Singer has of course famously argued in his *Animal Liberation* (1st ed., 1975, 2nd ed., 1990) that all beings with interests are entitled to equal consideration. I am not certain whether he would extend this to flies but it would certainly not be out of the question.

2 See my "Art and Intentionality."

3 Findlay, *Values and Intentions*, p. 294.

4 Hanson’s clever point about seeing as notwithstanding.

5 Rawls’s *Theory of Justice*. This widely influential contractarian alternative to classical Utilitarianism has been called "the greatest work of substantive moral philosophy in the Utilitarian tradition since Sidgwick’s *The Methods of Ethics* was published over a century ago," *Times Literary Supplement*, as quoted in Parfit’s *Reasons and Persons* [1984] revised 1989 edition, back cover.

6 Mackie, *Ethics*.


8 See, for instance, Gauthier, *Practical Reasoning*, p. 126.


10 E.g. in the Hintikka and van Benthem sense.

11 *Theory of Justice*, p. 119.

12 Ibid., p. 119

13 See Appendix to Sidgwick’s *The Methods of Ethics*, ”The Kantian Conception of Free Will” (reprinted from *Mind*, vol. 13, 1888), pp. 611-516, esp. p. 516.

14 That we are of course not there yet strongly suggests that any such “Noumenal I” is itself not a fait accompli but an evolutionary being.

15 All the Kant quotes here are from his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* are from the T.K. Abbott translation, London, 1873, with emendations by the author, reprinted in Kolak 1998c.

16 In terms of our sensations.

17 When astronauts on the moon plot the motion of the Earth that too is but an apparent motion from their reference frame; the movement thus "seen" is thus itself a consequence of an illusion. Only from the surface of the sun would the apparent motion of the Earth across the sun’s sky be a candidate for seeing the true motion
of the Earth. But, as I have argued, even that is but a perspectival and subjective
description and there is no way even in principle to decide on purely empirical
grounds between the Ptolemaic and Copernican-Galilean models. See my
"Copernicus vs. Ptolemy, the Church vs. Galileo - A Philosophical Recount: Who
Really Won?" Kolak 1994a, in which I argue that on such specific points the
philosophers under the employ of the church were right and Galileo was wrong.

18 See my In Search of Myself: Life, Death, and Personal Identity.

19 One might picture here the difference between the set (or, more properly, a
proper class) of all sets (proper classes) and the power set of all sets.

20 The ultimate function and purpose of the having of experience in space and time
may perhaps be beyond our ultimate grasp but we can certainly speculate that one
essential contribution that the Transcendental Illusion and the Illusion of Other
Persons makes to the Nominal Subject is that they enable the One to be the Many.
Indeed, the present state of affairs can from the Open Individualist standpoint be
viewed as the simultaneous disintegration and integration of consciousness making
existence as we know it possible.

21 Indeed, there is much evidence that lucid dreaming improves the qualities of
one’s dream experience substantially. That is, once one knows that one is dreaming
one is much more likely to have more inspiring, wondrous, and beatific experiences
than in ordinary dreams. Correspondingly, we may conjecture that the sort of
philosophical enlightenment afforded by Open Individualism may have similar
benefits for our waking lives. This of course would be a philosophical variation on
the sort of mystical or religious transformation sought by, and sometimes claimed
by, a variety of well known religious and in a few cases philosophical figures.

22 The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. See also
the related discussions by Daniel C. Dennett and Jonathan Miller in my Self &
Identity.

23 For instance, Simon Baron-Cohn and others have suggested that the autistic brain
lacks a theory of mind. See Gazzaniga et al 1998 and my Principles of Cognitive
Science.

24 I have in some of my lucid dream experiments achieved precisely this sort of
“voice throwing,” “voice switching,” “identification switching,” etc., with other
dream characters. For the explicit results see my forthcoming New Interpretation of
Dreams.

25 Open Individualism thus at least on an initial analysis into the moral arena
presents us with a scenario in which the one person who is everyone seems to be a
far cry from anything like a perfect being. On the contrary. It is a Being that can be seen in some ways as being at least as sick—as mentally ill—as it is powerful and, in other ways, as it is wondrously benevolent. It is only intermittently conscious and that only in its lower, not higher, cognitive functions. In many ways it is like an unimaginably brilliant and precocious child with a variety of horrible disorders that even with all its intelligence it can barely begin to understand—from autisms and agnosias to paranoias and schizophrenias, coupled with extreme savantism.
Our language ought to be able to represent any possible pattern of
dependence and independence between variables. This is the starting-point
of Hintikka’s IF (Independence Friendly) Logic. In first-order logic, the
dependence and independence of variables is expressed by the dependence
and independence of quantifiers, i.e., by the nesting of the syntactical
scopes of the different quantifiers. A quantifier $\alpha (\exists y)$ depends on a
quantifier $\beta (\forall x)$ in a formula $S$ (in a negation normal form) if and only
if $\alpha$ occurs in the scope of $\beta (\forall x)$.

This reveals a major flaw in the received Frege-Russell logic in which not
all possible patterns of dependence and independence between quantifiers
can be expressed because not all such patterns can be captured by the
nesting of scopes (which is transitive and asymmetrical, and hence
incapable of codifying intransitive or symmetrical dependence relations
between quantifiers). Thus many patterns of dependence and independence
among variables are inexpressible in a language whose logic is ordinary
first-order logic, a shortcoming built already into the formation rules of our
received quantification theory.

Hintikka’s extension of ordinary first-order logic removes this defect by
liberalizing how the parentheses that define the scopes of different
quantifiers are used. These parentheses serve two entirely different
purposes in first-order languages, expressing what Hintikka calls priority
scope and binding scope, respectively, and they express through their
nesting relations the relative priorities of e.g. the different quantifiers and
also mark the segment of the formula in question where a variable is bound
to the given quantifier. Because there is no reason why these two should
always go together, in the semantics of natural language we must
distinguish these two functions of scope. In formal logic we can separate
these two functions of parentheses and, by liberalizing the requirements on
the binding scope, reach a stronger first-order logic. Hintikka introduces a
new item of notation, the slash, “$/$”, which serves to express the
independence of a quantifier (or some other kind of notion) from another
one in whose (syntactical) scope it occurs. For instance, in a sentence of
the form
(1) \((\forall x)(\forall y)(\exists z)(\exists u)\) \(S[x,y,z,u]\)

the truth-making choice of \(z\) depends on both \((\forall x)\) and \((\forall y)\), and ditto for \(u\). Such choices of what are called witness individuals (expressible in Open Individualism in terms of the subject-in-itself in relation to which objects are individuated and identified in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed) that vouchsafe the truth of a sentence in question. In contrast to (1), in sentence

(2) \((\forall x)(\forall y)(\exists z/\forall y)(\exists u/\forall x)\) \(S[x,y,z,u]\)

the choice of a truth-making value of \(z\) depends only on \((\forall x)\) and the choice of a truth-making value of \(u\) depends only on \((\forall y)\); (2) cannot be expressed in the ordinary first-order logic because such a pattern of dependence relations cannot be captured by any linear ordering of the four quantifiers. Since the third quantifier \((\exists z)\) is independent of the second \((\forall y)\) but dependent on the first \((\forall x)\), in ordinary first order logic it must be placed after the first \((\forall x)\) but before the second \((\forall y)\), and vice-versa for \((\exists u)\). But then there is no adequate linear ordering of the four quantifiers \((\forall x), (\forall y), (\exists z)\) and \((\exists u)\). Thus (2) cannot be expressed in ordinary first-order logic, and Hintikka’s slash notation or some other such device must be employed. For example, if in the sentence

(A) Some relative of each villager and some friend of each townsman hate each other.

the quantifiers are understood as illustrated by (2), the value of “some relative” is only dependent on the value of “each villager” and the value of “some friend” is dependent only on that of “each townsman.” Under this reading what (A) asserts is that there is a set \(S\) of relatives of villagers and friends of townsmen such that for every villager, some relative of this villager is in \(S\) for every townsman, some friend of this townsman is in \(S\), and every relative of a villager in \(S\) hates every friend of a townsman in \(S\) and vice versa. (2) could also be written as follows:

(2)* \((\forall x)(\exists z)(\forall y)(\exists u/\forall x)\) \(S[x,y,z,u]\)

The dependencies and independencies between the different quantifiers in
(2) can also be illustrated by writing it in a “branching quantifier” notation as follows:

\[(2)^* (\forall x)(\exists z) S[x,y,z,u] (\forall y)(\exists u)\]

The same slash (independence) notation can be extended to propositional connectives, both in their relation to each other and in their relation to quantifiers. In the simplest cases, for instance in

\[(3) (\forall x)(A[x] (\lor/\forall x) B[x])\]

the new notation does not add to the expressive power of ordinary first-order logic. The reason is that since the choice of a disjunct is independent of the first quantifier \((\forall x)\), it might as well be done before the choice of the value of \(x\). Hence (3) is logically equivalent to

\[(4) (\forall x)A[x] \lor (\forall x)B[x]\]

In other cases, formulas with independent disjuncts do not reduce to ordinary first-order logic. A case in point is

\[(5) (\forall x)(\exists z)(\forall y)(A(x,y,z)(\lor/\forall x)B(x,y,z))\]

A glance back at (2)* shows that it is parallel with (5), with the disjunction in (5) playing the same role as the existential quantifier \((\exists y/\forall x)\) in (2)*. By the same token as (2)* is inexpressible in the Frege-Russell notation, (5) is likewise inexpressible.

Hintikka’s originally called his new logic independence-friendly (IF) logic because it is a liberated version of first-order logic, free from all the unnecessary restrictions that limit the expressive power of ordinary first-order logic. Hintikka has since suggested that his new logic ought to be called, simply, first-order logic, without any qualifications and it is the so-called “ordinary” or “classical” first-order logic whose name should indicate a restriction. Perhaps ordinary logic should be called, Hintikka
muses, dependence-handicapped logic or, politically correctly, “independence-challenged” logic.

Independence–friendly logic allows us to express types of dependence (for instance mutual dependence) that were not expressible before. The special case of mutually dependent quantifiers is especially interesting. They are exemplified by sentences of the following form:

\[(\forall t)(\forall x)(\forall y)(\exists z/\forall x)(\exists u/\forall y)((x=z) \& (y=u) \& S[t,x,y])\]

Such sentences with mutually dependent quantifiers behave differently from other first-order sentences. For instance, their semantics cannot be dealt with, or even thought about, in the traditional way. The closest one can come is to think of the meaning of quantifiers as consisting in their “ranging over” a class of values underlying both Frege’s idea of quantifiers as higher-order predicates and Tarski’s way of defining truth by reference to valuations. But the semantics of mutually dependent quantifiers cannot be dealt with by means of the “ranging over” idea only, and we must distinguish from each other the dependence component and the “ranging over” component in the meaning of quantifiers, especially when (as the case may be in suitable many-sorted first-order logics) two classes of quantifiers range over two different and even exclusive classes of values. These quantifiers can still be dependent and independent of each other without any restrictions. When one internalizes this idea, one sees that Hintikka’s new logic, in which many “nice” “traditional” metatheoretical theorems hold (compactness, the upwards Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, the separation theorem, etc.), puts nonlocality and other related issues that have come up in this book in a new and better light.
APPENDIX B: SEMIOTIC BORDERS

Let “I” denote and express simultaneously to speaker and hearer, i.e., communicate, the subject-in-itself in relation to which phenomena (e.g. objects) are individuated in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view, i.e., observed, what ordinarily we simply and naively (pre-theoretically) call “consciousness.” Let us try now to demonstrate the intuition of the subject-in-itself, denoted and expressed simultaneously by “I am I”—the intuition of personal identity—within our experience and see what this implies from a propositional point of view about our semiotic borders.

As an added convenience we can if need be refer to the κ terms in Κ-sentences occurring in some theories Τ, Τ, etc. (I refer the reader to page 101 of the present work)

* * * §1.1 * * *

I ask,

Κ1.1 Who am I?

The question is not rhetorical. By asking it, I am expressing a profound and fundamental puzzlement about my own existence. Nor is the problem pathological. I am not, for instance, an amnesiac. I can tell you my name, where I was born, and so on; altogether my memories are neither worse nor better than average. So when I ask, “Who am I?” what, exactly, is it that I want to know? I am certainly not asking for personal identification. I am not, for instance, asking myself to produce my own driver’s license or my birth certificate; seeing my picture on a laminated piece of paper or my name on some “official” parchment would not resolve my puzzlement. What, then, is the source of my puzzlement?

It is this. Ordinarily, when I think a thought like “I am hungry,” I conceive of myself as the subject who has thoughts, while the things I think about, such as food, are the objects of my thoughts. In asking “Who am I?” I am trying to become the object of my own thoughts. But I cannot do this. When I, qua the subject, try to become an object of my own thoughts—when I try to think about myself as an object in the world (“Who am I” = subject, verb, object), I find that ordinarily I do not know to what the
symbol, “I,” refers. Logically, of course, “I” refers to “me.” But mere logical tautologies do not appease me. I thus become puzzled, confused, and perhaps even frightened because I do not know in what my personal identity—my being me—consists.

Consider, then, the following philosophical question, ignoring for the moment the additional symbols:

\[ 1.2 \text{ How can I, (I who am writing this <or reading what I remember having just written {or re-reading what I believe was written earlier by me even though I don’t now remember the specific act of writing it [or reading what I believe someone else, other than myself, has written]}>, discover the truth about my personal identity?} \]

* * * §1.2 * * *

The symbol (κ term) “I” occurs six times in \(1.2\). The first occurrence, denoted from here on in italics and without quotes, as \(I\), refers to the subject who happens to be the reader of these words at the present moment. By present moment I mean whatever moment happens to be going on while these words are being read by whoever happens to be reading them. In other words, whoever is reading these words right now, and whatever time it happens to be there wherever you (the person reading these words right now) happen to be, the present moment refers to the moment going on right now as you read these words.

In other words, the symbol (κ term) \(I\) refers to you. The (κ term) phrase “present moment” refers to the actual moment going on right now as you are reading these words. And so on.

The second occurrence of “I” in \(1.2\), will be denoted from here on by the symbol “I” enclosed in parenthesis, like so: (I). It refers to the subject who is the author of this book while in the conscious act of writing it. Thus, by writing, “(I) am Daniel Kolak,” (I) mean that “(I)” is coextensive with the “the subject who is Daniel Kolak,” and so on. The symbol (I) will be restricted to the subject who is Daniel Kolak while in the conscious act of writing this book.

The third occurrence, denoted from here on by <I>, refers to the subject who is the author of this book while in the conscious act of reading, for the first time, what he has written as long as he still remembers having written it. Thus, (I) can write:

“(I) am writing these words (right now) and in a few hours when (I) am
done with this section <I> will be able to read them.”

The fourth and fifth occurrence, denoted from here on by {I}, refers to the subject who is the author of this book while in the conscious act of re-reading what he believes he has written even though he no longer remembers the specific act of writing it. For instance, (I) am (right now) in the act of reworking this Appendix after a gap of several weeks and so the first occurrence of “I” in this sentence is properly enclosed within parenthesis. But, since (I) no longer remember the specific act of writing the first sentence of this paragraph, if (I) wanted to refer to myself while I was just now reading the first sentence of this paragraph—a sentence I no longer remember writing—(I) would properly refer to myself as {I} or {you}.

The sixth occurrence, denoted from here on by [I], refers the subject who is any reader of this book who, in the conscious act of reading it, believes this book to have been written by someone other than the present reader [i.e., who believes it was written by (me) and [you] are not (me)]. For a further disambiguation of the meaning of “present” see §1.4 below.

* * * § 1.3 * * *

(I) believe that

§3.1   (I), <I>, and {I} are coextensive: they have the same reference. That reference is the subject who is the person who (at this present moment is writing) <or reading his own work {or re-reading his own work}>.

But (I) also believe that

§3.2   (I) is coextensive with [I].

[You] probably agree with §3.1 but not with §3.2. Thus, [you] and (I) disagree. For clarification of the meaning of [you], see §1.4 below.

* * * § 1.4 * * *

We can extend the (), <>, {}, and [] notation both to other pronouns and to the phrase, “the present moment.” For instance, [I] is coextensive with [you]. That is, [I] and [you] have the same reference. To help keep
these symbols straight, think of the () as simple curves that become simple angles <>, then evolve into the complex {}, finally turning into something “completely different,” a simple square [ ]. Thus we have progressive stages of the “evolution” of the symbols from () to <> to {} to [], from (me), the subject who is the author as I am (presently) in the conscious act of writing these words, to <me>, the subject who is the author as I am <presently> rereading this and still remember the specific act of having written these words, to {me}, the subject who is the author as I am {presently} reading words I believe I wrote even though I can no longer remember the specific act of having written them, to the subject who is [you], the person who is [presently] reading words which [you] believe were written not by [you] but by some other person, (me). When (I) do not need to disambiguate the references, and wish to talk to the subject who is whoever happens to be the reader right now as these words are being read, (I) will simply write I, or the present moment, or now, etc.

Consider, then, the following \( K \)-question:

\( K4.1 \) "Who are you?"

To what does “you” in \( K4.1 \) refer? Again, (I) am asking not for personal identification or a name but for a reference, namely, the reference of “you.” That reference is ambiguous. (I) will disambiguate it as follows. Suppose that you, reading these words at the present moment, believe that someone other than you has written these words. Then you believe that you are not (me) but [you]. Thus, (I) can write,

\( K4.2 \) “You are [you].”

Or, suppose that you, the person reading these words at the present moment, believe that you wrote these words even though you do not (at the present moment), the moment going on [right now] as [you] are reading this, remember the act of having written them. That is, if you remember that you wrote these words but do not remember the specific act of writing them, then (I) can write,

\( K4.3 \) (I) am [you].

Or, suppose that you, the person reading these words at the present moment, are also at the present moment in the specific act of writing these words. In that case, the reference of “you” in \( K4.1 \) is coextensive with (I), in which case (I) am simply asking (myself) the question that in ordinary English is captured by \( K1.1 \), namely, “Who am I?” And so on.
To sum up: the reference of “you” in $\mathcal{K}4.1$ is ambiguous. It can change, depending on who is reading this book at the present moment—whether it is (I), <I>, {I}, or [you]—that is, depending on which particular moment happens to be the occurrent one—whether it is (the present moment), <the present moment>, {the present moment}, or [the present moment]. And we will disambiguate “you” in the same way we have disambiguated “I.” When (I) ask “Who are you?” and the “you” to whom (I) am referring is the subject who is the reader who [at the present moment] believes these words were written by someone other than the [present] reader, (I) can write “Who are [you]?” If, on the other hand, (I) wish to refer to the subject {you}, who is the reader who at the present moment believes {he} is the author of this book even though {he} does not specifically remember the act of writing these words, (I) can write, “Who are {you}?” Note that the reference of {you} and [you] does not change depending on who is reading these words at the present moment. {You} and [you], like all the bracketed pronouns that occur in this appendix, are Kripke “rigid (closed) designators.”

Thus, (I) can write: “[You] believe you know who [you] are. [You] are [you], a reader reading a book who at [the present moment] believes these words were written by someone other than [you]. [You] believe these words to have been written by (me); [you] believe that [you] are not (me).”

You, on the other hand, and I, have open reference—they are what I call “fluid,” or open designators. I and you can refer to the subject who is anyone who happens to be the present reader, the subject who is aware of these words right now, experiencing the world at this moment, regardless of whether you are (me), <me>, {me}, or [you]. In other words,

$\mathcal{K}4.4 \quad I \text{ am you}$

is a true sentence. Moreover, it is analytically true.

* * * §1.5 * * *

Consider the following sentences:

$\mathcal{K}5.1 \quad (I \text{ am (you)}).$

$\mathcal{K}5.2 \quad (I \text{ am <you>}).$

$\mathcal{K}5.3 \quad (I \text{ am [you]})$.

(I) believe that $\mathcal{K}5.1$, $\mathcal{K}5.2$ and $\mathcal{K}5.3$ are each true because (I) believe
(I) am (I)

and

(I) am {I}

are each true, as already stated in $\xi 3.1$ and $\xi 3.2$. And, as was already mentioned, [you] probably agree with (me) that $\xi 5.1$, $\xi 5.2$ and $\xi 5.3$ are each true. Probably the reason [you] believe $\xi 5.1$, $\xi 5.2$ and $\xi 5.3$ are true is that [you] believe, like (I) do, that $\xi 5.4$, $\xi 5.5$ and $\xi 5.6$ are true. Thus, probably we—that is, [you] and (I)—are in agreement about the truth of $\xi 5.1$, $\xi 5.2$ and $\xi 5.3$. Note: from now on, when (I) want to refer to [you] and (me) together (I) will write [we].

$\xi 5.1$, $\xi 5.2$, and $\xi 5.3$, people ordinarily believe, are ways of (me) talking to (myself); it is a bit like making a mental note for tomorrow or a past-self talking to a future self: (I) am here (right now) and soon, in a matter of hours, (I) will there <there> where <you> are <now>, remembering when <you> were <here> where (I) (now) am; a few months from (now) I will be {you}. An interesting question, to which (I)—or, as it were, {you}—will return later is whether $\xi 5.4$, $\xi 5.5$, and $\xi 5.6$ are commutative. That is, can one on the basis of

\[
\xi 5.3 \quad (I) \text{ am } \{you\}
\]

conclude

\[
\xi 5.7 \quad \{You\} \text{ are } (I)\?
\]

One might suppose the answer is “yes” simply because

\[
\xi 5.8 \quad \text{if a person at a particular moment, person stage } P_1 \text{ at } t_1, \text{ is the same person as a later person stage, } P_2 \text{ at } t_2, \text{ then } P_2 = P_1.
\]

Note that $\xi 5.8$ is ordinarily assumed to be the case even though, obviously, in many respects the presumed connection is strictly one-way; this can be expressed by saying that (I) can communicate with {you} while {you} cannot communicate with (me). That is, Daniel Kolak of (the present moment) can write to Daniel Kolak of some future moment (i.e., to Daniel Kolak of {the present moment}), but not vice-versa. This is now interesting because if $\xi 5.1$, $\xi 5.2$, and $\xi 5.3$ are commutative, then we have already disposed of one common sense objection to the idea that (I) am [you]. Ordinarily, the fact that (I) am (over here) doing (this)—(I) am (right now) writing these words—while [you] are [over there] doing [that]—[you]
are [right now] reading these words—and the fact that (I) have written these words to [you] while [you] have not written these words to (me), would be sufficient grounds for concluding that (I) am not [you]. But, if $K5.1$, $K5.2$, and $K5.3$ are commutative, it is also true that (I) am (over here) doing (this) while {you} are {over there} doing {that}, and (I) have written these words to {you} while {you} have not written these words to (me)! In fact, [you] and {you} might be holding the same book at the same time at the same place; that is, Daniel Kolak and [you], the [present] reader who believes that [he] or [she] is not Daniel Kolak, might be reading these words together, at the same time, aloud and to each other, and so can speak directly, back and forth, to each other in a way that (I), Daniel Kolak at (the present moment) and {I}, Daniel Kolak at {the present moment}, cannot.

You can now see, perhaps, how a “naked” $K$-sentence (i.e., a $K$-uninterpreted sentence) that some of you may have considered false on properly basic logical and/or linguistic grounds, namely

$$K5.9 \quad \text{I am you}$$

is not necessarily false. There are at least three senses of $K5.9$—namely, $K5.1$, $K5.2$, and $K5.3$—which are true statements. You might consider these senses trivial but they are not. They demonstrate that you—whoever you are—already possess an elaborate conceptual framework for ascribing identity statements to earlier and later stages of a person. (I) have used this same conceptual framework ($K$-conceptual reference frame) to demonstrate that within the accepted, ordinary conceptual framework $K5.9$ is true even in its “nontrivial” sense, namely:

$$K5.10 \quad \text{(I) am [you]!}$$

In other words, (I) am once again advancing a conditional thesis: if it is true that (I) is coextensive with <I> and {I}—that $K5.5$ and $K5.6$ are true—then it is true that (I) is coextensive with [I] as well, i.e., that $K5.10$ is true.

Interestingly enough, according to some Empty Individualist Views, such as Parfit’s, $K5.5$ and $K5.6$ are not true. These philosophers, in moving away from the traditional Closed Individual View of Personal Identity have adopted a what I call an empty reference view that entails, for instance,

$$K5.11 \quad \text{(I) am not [I].}$$

These philosophers have moved away from the traditional Closed Individual View of Personal Identity because of the well-known, previously insoluble problems with it. Thus, in case you find $K5.10$ hard to configure
conceptually, keep in mind that it must be judged not against the conceptual background of the received Closed Individual View but against the conceptual background of a view that requires you to accept $\S 5.11$. Thus, you are faced with having to choose not between on the face of it a paradoxical consequence and a non-paradoxical one, but between two on the face of it paradoxical consequences. Once this is integrated into one’s conceptual reference frame, it can then be seen that $\S 5.10$ is to be preferred on both conceptual and practical grounds.

You, the present reader may think that Open Individualism is a radical idea. Actually, just the opposite is true: it is a conservative idea. It solves the problem of personal identity with least damage to the present conceptual framework. And instead of minimizing your short life into a series of even shorter sub-lives, it has the metaphysically attractive consequence of putting you at the center of all human activity. For Open Individualism implies, and I do not use this word lightly, that, at least as long as someone continues to survive, you cannot die. I cannot die. I am identical not only to (you) and <you> and {you} but also to [you] and to everyone who has ever existed. I am identical to everyone at all times past, present, and future.

* * * § 1.6 * * *

What, then, of the question with which this Appendix began, namely $\S 1.2$ How can I discover the truth about my personal identity?

It seems clear that when (I), a subject, try to become the object of (my) own thought, (I) invariably plunge into an abyss of unknowing. Why should (I) find it so difficult to become the object of (my) own thought, i.e., to become known to (myself)? (I) know that I am (here), in (the present moment); that is, (I) am conscious of (myself) being (here) rather than, for instance, being [there] where [you] are. In other words,

$\S 6.1$ (I) have no direct and immediate access to {you} and {you} have no direct and immediate access to (me).

But $\S 6.2$ is true regardless of whether (I) bracket the second person pronoun with [ ] or with <> or with { }! For instance, writing to whom [we] probably agree is my future self, (I) can write

$\S 6.2$ (I) have no direct and immediate access to {you} and {you} have
Is it not strange, I ask myself, that (this) (present moment) is going on right (now), and <now> <this>, and {now} {this}, and, finally, [now] [this]?

Let now simply note that the <>, {}, and [] indexicals in the previous sentence do not refer to what is “going on” right (now) as I am writing this. (Right now) where (I) am only (this) (present moment) is going on. They refer, instead, to what will, (I) believe, be “going on” some time in the future, for instance when (I) am preparing this manuscript in final form for publication—when (I) will be {I}—or when Daniel Kolak will be an old man or even dead.

I ask: what is the subject, (this) presence, (this) consciousness, (this) being in the world, aware of its own existence and aware of the world? What is it? It is (me), (myself), (I) answer. And <now>, an hour later, it is <you>. A week later it is {you}. How far do I extend? Is {you} as far as (I) go, or am I (you), too?

Perhaps the thisness, the nowness of (my) existence is the same as yours. Perhaps (I) am you. This thisness/nowness—I am (now) beginning see—might be numerically identical with all other thisness/nownesses: perhaps there is only one I. My awareness might be of one thing at a time, or it might be awareness of many different things, but the awareness itself—what it is—might be one. I cannot differentiate myself identically but, rather, only relationally. Relational differentiation is not non-identical differentiation. What I am thus now talking about, arguably, is the Noumenal Subject.

It (now) seems clear to (me) that

\[ 6.3 \] 

\((\text{this}) \text{ subject} = <\text{this}> \text{ subject},\]

where by “subject” (\(I\)) mean not the object of awareness but the subject of awareness as revealed in by the “empirical” evidence provided at any moment for one’s own existence by 1) the individuation and identification of phenomena in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view in relation to the thereby reciprocally individuated and identified subject, denoted and expressed simultaneously by \(I\), and 2) the experiential fact that there is the psychological feeling, or “inner sense,” that we have been calling the intuition of the subject-in-itself, namely, our ubiquitous intuition personal identity, denoted and expressed simultaneously in perspectival space and time from the first person point of view by \(I \text{ am } I\).

The intuition of personal identity, as we have gone to great lengths to show, is not derived from the content of experience but is, itself, at best
from a purely phenomenological point of view a virtually contentless (except for the perspectivalness of space and time) experience. The evidence, then, is this: (I) am right now writing these words and will continue doing so until (I) pause for a minute, which I will demarcate with elipsis . . . all right, (I) am back (now), (I) am (here); when (I) re-read this sentence in a few moments will the person who is writing these words, i.e., (me), be <there> reading them? Let (me) check . . . all right, (I) have just read the previous sentence, and so using the notation already established (I) can (now) write that in the <present moment> <I> have just read words that <I> remember having written only a moment ago. In other words, it seems to (me) that the person doing the reading, (me), is <there>, re-reading these words which (I) am right (now) writing. I might be mistaken but that, at least, is how it seems. Similarly,

\[ 6.4 \quad \text{(this)} \text{I am I} = \{\text{this}\} \text{ I am I} \]

can also be supported by empirical evidence. Such evidence might not in either case guarantee epistemological certainty, but that would be asking too much. The important point is that (I) have some empirical evidence on the basis of which (I) can (now) make identity claims like

\[ 5.2 \quad \text{(I) am \{you\}}. \]

Right <now> <you> are experiencing the evidence, and right \{now\} \{you\} are. I ask: Don’t \{you\} see? \{You\} are both \{there\} and \{here\}!.

So, (I) ask: Who am I? The question is ambiguous. (I) ask: Who am (I)? (I) answer: (I) am <you> and, also, (I) am \{you\}. But:

\[ 6.5 \quad \text{How can (I) convince \{you\} that (I) am \{you\}?} \]

Perhaps \{you\}, and probably \{you\} too, are already convinced that \[5.3\] is true, and so \{you\} find \[6.6\] a trivial question that has an obvious answer. But what is it? Probably \{you\} also, just like \{you\}, find the question trivial. But on what grounds are \{you\} convinced? That is, on what grounds does \{DK\} reading this at some future time—future relative to the (present moment)—believe that \{he\} is the same person as (me)? What makes \{DK\} \{here\} and \{now\} think that \{he\} is the same person as (me) \{here\} and (now)? One thing is clear: as <I> read this paragraph, <I> begin to wonder whether <I> am really identical to (myself). Indeed, (I) can clearly
see how when {I} am re-reading this at some future time—{here} and
now}, a few weeks after these words (are) (right now) being written down
for the first time—I will feel a gap . . . but back now to question 6.6.

Is the answer to 6.5, the intuition of the subject-in-itself—I am I?
What experience is this that (I) am calling the intuition of personal identity?
We are on the verge once again of entering Hume’s labyrinth, for, it
seems, the only experiences (I) am having at the (present moment) are
sensations, emotions, and thoughts, and nowhere among my sensations,
emotions and thoughts do I find an experience of (me). (I) seem to be the
experiencer, not the experience. And (I), the experiencer, cannot experience
(myself) as an experiencer. Perhaps if (I) mark (my) path through the
labyrinth—by marking (my) words the way (I) have been doing—(I) will
find a way through the labyrinth. And I do. I am I. The intuition of the
subject-in-itself is the featureless marker of personal identity.

But however much this new language may help, this much seems clear:
direct access between (me) and <you>, or between (me) and {you}—or, for
that matter, between (me) and [you]—cannot be established in my present
awareness. So while we might rely on the sort of “empirical evidence”
mentioned above to check whether K5.2, K5.3, and K5.10 are true, the
empirical evidence by itself cannot ever, under any circumstances, as we
shall see, bridge the gap. The gap between (this) (present) conscious state
awareness and any other conscious state of awareness will always exist. So,
if you believe that identity is a relation that can hold between two conscious
states of awareness, no matter how near or how far apart these conscious
states of awareness may be—whether between (me) and <you> or (me) and
[you]—you must acknowledge that identity holds across this gap.

In other words, there is an obvious gap between (me) and [you]. But if (I)
am {me} and (I) am not [you]—that is, if (I) am the same continuously
existing person over time and yet am also a different person from [you]—it
must be for reasons other that the mere fact of there being this obvious
gap in present conscious state of awareness between [us]. For this obvious
gap exists between {us}, too—it exists between (DK) and {DK} as well.
Before {we} turn to these other reasons and examine them, (I) would like to
sum up the main idea of this Appendix by quoting a hand-written note (I)
found scribbled in the margin of one of (my) books, The Anthropic
Cosmological Principle (ACP) by John Barrow and Frank Tipler:
The universe wills to see itself. But by the time it can grow eyes (about fifteen billion years) it can
no longer encompass itself in a single vision, it has expanded beyond its own horizons. Now there
are just the eyes left, billions of disconnected eyes, like the lens of some gigantic inwardly-
turned
being and there is nothing for the eyes to see but the remnants of their own ascent to vision.

When (I) recently found the note, which was obviously scribbled in haste, (I) recognized it immediately as (my) own handwriting. But (I) certainly do not remember writing it. When (I) found the note (I) was both startled and amused by the vivid imagery. Furthermore, (I) found another note scribbled next to the original note, again in my own handwriting:

Use this note as an example in *I Am You*.

The note to in the margin of *ACP* was written the previous time I came across it in the margin. It was “addressed,” so to speak, to {you}. If the person who wrote that note in the margin of *ACP*—let us κ-refer to him as |me|—and the person who at some later time found that note in the margin of *ACP* and scribbled “Use this note as an example in *I Am You,*” next to it—<me>—and the person who at a time after that found the two notes in the margin of *ACP* next to each other—{me}—are all the same person, it must be because

\[ \text{κ6.8} \quad |\text{me}|, (\text{me}), <\text{me}> \text{ and } \{\text{me}\}, \text{ are coextensive indexicals.} \]

Furthermore, |me|, (me), <me>, and {me} are coextensive indexicals in spite of their not being coextensive with the present moment. Thus, if (I), <you> and {you} have the same reference,

\[ \text{κ6.9} \quad \text{the fact that } [\text{you}] \text{ and } (\text{I}) \text{ are not sharing the same experiences at the present moment is not a sufficient reason for thinking that } [\text{you}] \text{ and } (\text{I}) \text{ are not the same person.} \]

Thus if [you] and (I) are different persons, and (I) and {I} are the same person, it must be for some other reasons than the obvious fact that at the present moment [we] are not sharing the same experiences. But, given the various Boundary Dissolves, what could these other reasons be? We thus see that just as personal identity is not closed under known physiological, psychological, phenomenological, etc. borders, neither is personal identity closed under known logical and semiotic borders. Therefore in the final analysis it is far more than merely possible that we are all one and the same person, numerically identical, in spite of the many borders between us. Because it falls well within the scope and limits of formal philosophy we can say that *I am you* and *mean* it.
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Now, I realized that not infrequently books speak of books: it is as if they spoke among themselves. In the light of this reflection, the library seemed all the more disturbing to me. It was then the place of long, centuries-old murmuring, an imperceptible dialogue between one parchment and another, a living thing, a receptacle of powers not to be ruled by a human mind, a treasure of secrets . . . surviving the death of those who had produced them or had been their conveyors.

Umberto Eco

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& Row
INDEX

a posteriori intuitions 505
a priori intuitions 505
aboriginal position 574-576
absolute presuppositions 34
active self-consciousness 239-240
Allport, Gordon 120, 200, 287
alter personality 205-215
alter space and time 63-65
Alter Subject Identification 24, 61, 217, 231
amygdala 293
analytic philosophy 17
Anderson, Susan 287
anima 287
animus 287
anomie 600-601
Anscombe, Elizabeth 98
anti-anomie 601
antiparticles 134-135
apparent excluders 22-26
Aquinas, Thomas 41
archetypes 295
Arieti, Silvano 292
Aristotle 292
atman 317
attender 532-533
attention 469-476, 532
Augustine 402-403
Austin, John 99
Averroës, 69, 291, 341-342

backward causation 141
bald man argument 315-316
Banning, Cyrus 140
Beards, John, 246-247
Beauchamp, Christine 210
behabitives 99
Berkeley, George 44
Beth tableaux 507
betweenness 562
black holes 475-481, 513
blood doping 120
bodily continuity 143-144
body image 55, 205
body/mind image 205, 425
Boolean lattice logic 296
Borges, Jorge Luis 69, 103, 202-209
Borsuk-Ulan theorem 98
boundaries 1, 26
Boundary Dissolves 26-30
brain 144-145
brain bisection 147
brane worlds 297, 437-438
Brans-Dicke scalar
Brentano, Franz 472, 551
Brouwer, Luitzen 52, 98, 441, 507, 508, 524
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem 231-232
BST-procedure 163-168, 187, 197, 302, 317
Buddha 128, 355, 429, 432, 463
Camus, Albert 598
Cartesian 3-space manifold 237-238
Cartesian Ego 245, 317
Cauchy surfaces 512-513
Cauchy horizon 512-513
causal agent 414
causal barrier 48-49, 60-61
causality 299-305, 414-417
cerebral hemispheres 145-147
Chisolm, Roderick 155, 450-451
choice sequences (Brouwer) 507
Christianity 341-343, 357, 394
Christoffel connection 487
Closed Individualism 6-21, 93-95, 112, 285
closed timelike curves 487
closed world nonlocality 75-81
co-consciousness 205-206
COG 40, 452-453
cognitive science 328, 509
collective unconscious 295
Collingwood, R.G. 34-35
color gangs 222
commensurate dreamworlds 530-531
commissives 99
commissurotomy 145-149, 277-278
communication 51-52
communicatives 51, 98
communism 561-562
compact space 98
compactification 52, 291, 512-513
compilers 40, 505
complete individual notion 407
compliance 585-586
conceptual boundary 45
Conceptual Boundary Dissolve 26-30
conceptual framework 255
conceptual reference frames 376, 391-396, 505, 522
confabulation 206
conscious access 205
conscious choosing 210-220
consciousness 47-51, 75, 81-86, 105-106, 136, 212, 457-459, 538-540
consequentialism 93
contractarian schema 585
contractarianism 566-567, 585
coordinate systems 294
Copenhagen interpretation 395
Copernican Revolution 337-338, 440, 457
corpus callosum 145
Cosmic totality
cosmic towers 36-42
counterexamples to everything (Misner) 511-512
co-variation 414-415
Cratylus 443
Cromwell 14
Cusa, Nicholas 41
cybernetics 328
Dasein 100-101
Davies, Paul 315
de Sitter space 394
death 353-360, 443
deep intuitions 379-389, 506
Dennett, Daniel 23, 32, 40, 43, 96-97, 137-138, 143, 167, 179-180, 246-252, 289, 292, 452-454, 525-531
DePascuale, Juan 140
Descartes, René 96, 141, 234, 239, 403-404, 428
designification 255
dialectical materialism 574
DiGiovanni, Norman Thomas 289
discurre 41
dismembering 456, 493-514
dispositional memories 297, 550
DNA 56
dominant personality 203-214, 288
dominant personality/body-mind image 241
Dream Analog I 47-51, 287, 506
Dream Analog II 67-72, 198, 209
Dream Analog III 538-549
Dream Turing Test 105
dreaming idealism 105
dreams 47-51, 67-72, 96-97, 103, 105, 285, 403-404
DSM-III 246-247
dual-aspect phenomenology 389-390
Durkheim, Emile 600
Dyson, Freeman

Eccles, John 146, 167
egalitarian condition (Rawls) 579-580
ego 200-215, 294, 296
eigenvalue 295, 297
Einstein gravity 297
Einstein, Albert 308, 500
Einstein’s equations 511, 513
Einstein-Dirac equations 297
Eklund, Matti 231-232
emotions 255-257
empathy 105, 435-439, 444
empirical intuitions 505
Empty Individualism 6-21, 93-95, 285, 350-351
empty questions 491
energy momentum tensors 513
epiphenomenalism 380-381
epistemological barrier 62-63
Erikson, Erik 200
Euler coordinates 511
Evans, Charles 287
Eve 259
evening star 321
Everett-Wheeler “relative state” interpretation 136
ex nihilo 142
exact solutions 513
exercitives 99
explanation 22-24
expositives 99

false geometry 471
false personalities 242
false physics 509
false psychological appearance 254
feminism 102
Feynman integral 297
Feynman, Richard 134-135
Fichte, Johann 44, 51
field of consciousness 97-98
fields 308
fifth open dimension 239
filters 291
first order identification 216-219
first person point of view 51-55, 205-215, 235
fission 146, 164, 181-195
fixed point of a projective mapping onto itself 295
fixed point theorem 98
Flew, Anthony 466
flexible interpretations 409-410
four states of consciousness (Brouwer) 441, 510
four-dimensional isometries 487
fourfold ε/δ manifold 216-219
fourth order identification 216-219
free will 290
Freud, Sigmund 61, 96, 105, 200, 219-220, 287
Fromm, Erich 200, 287
full-contact philosophy 538-550
fundamental presupposition 578-579

Galileo 342
game of life 571-573
gang identification 218-219
Garrett, Brian 40, 105, 187, 195, 509
Gazzaniga, Michael 148, 167
general relativity 513
geocentric illusion 344
gedesic completeness 487
gometry 471-472
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>438-439</td>
<td>global ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>438-444</td>
<td>Global Open Individualism 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>Glover, Jonathan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210-211</td>
<td>Glover, Jonathan 210-211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13, 23, 41, 103, 217, 374, 402, 474, 549</td>
<td>God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>481-487</td>
<td>Gödel Universe 481-487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>486-487</td>
<td>Gödel’s Z-coordinate 486-487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>287</td>
<td>Goffmann, Erving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506</td>
<td>Goloff, David 506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>Gorovitz, Samuel 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>287</td>
<td>Gotthelf, Alan 287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>298</td>
<td>GSR (Galvanic Skin Response) 298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>hauptvermutung 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97-98, 103, 291, 486, 511, 539, 551</td>
<td>Hausdorff space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>487, 511</td>
<td>Hawking, Stephen 487, 511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>315-316</td>
<td>heap paradox 315-316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Hegel, Georg Friedrich 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100, 507</td>
<td>Heidegger, Martin 100, 507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>443</td>
<td>Heraclitus 443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54, 55-58</td>
<td>hermeneutic circle 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td>hermeneutic distance 54, 55-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297</td>
<td>hidden personality 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297</td>
<td>Hilbert space 297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44, 50, 52, 289, 294, 431, 511, 551</td>
<td>Hintikka, Jaakko 44, 50, 52, 289, 294, 431, 511, 551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>289</td>
<td>Hintikka, Merrill 289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>315</td>
<td>Hirsch, Eli 315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>557</td>
<td>Hobbes, Thomas 557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>holograms 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104, 140, 551</td>
<td>Holzinger, Brigitte 104, 140, 551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>homeomorphism 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247</td>
<td>Humphrey, Nicholas 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52, 105, 234-235</td>
<td>Husserl, Edmund 52, 105, 234-235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>hyperbolic philosophies 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>hypostatization 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>identification 1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>identification disorder syndrome (IDS) 601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114-115, 349-370</td>
<td>identity 114-115, 349-370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601</td>
<td>IDS 601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>328, 343</td>
<td>illusion of other persons 328, 343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101-102</td>
<td>immediate objects 101-102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>immediate subject 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>568</td>
<td>impartial spectators 568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>598-601</td>
<td>improper dysfunctionality 598-601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>489-493</td>
<td>incarnation 489-493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44, 59, 212, 474, 511, 513, 551</td>
<td>independence friendly (IF) logic 44, 59, 212, 474, 511, 513, 551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88-91</td>
<td>independence friendly solipsism 88-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-55, 59-60, 98, 466-468</td>
<td>indexicals 51-55, 59-60, 98, 466-468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>individuation 1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7, 257-261</td>
<td>individuation and separateness of persons assumption 7, 257-261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>580-581</td>
<td>inegalitarian liberalization of moral theory 580-581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>308</td>
<td>Infeld, Leopold, 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>513</td>
<td>Infinite Cage Topology 513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>infinity dense hologram 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409-410</td>
<td>inflexible interpretations 409-410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237-238</td>
<td>insideness 237-238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>241</td>
<td>Insular Open Individualism 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>insular open individualism 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integral Aristotelians intellectus 41</td>
<td>integral Aristotelians intellectus 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>intended interpretation 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>455-</td>
<td>intensional underextension 455-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

456
intentional objects 217
internal space consciousness 105-106
internal time consciousness 105-106
International Monetary Fund 573-574
interpretation function 505
intrinsic features assumption 7-12
intuition of non-intending 415
intuition of non-understanding 379-391
intuition of the subject-in-the-not-itself 105-106
intuition of understanding 379-391
intuitions 233
irreflexivity (Brouwer) 510
isolation tank experiment 269-270
James, William 14, 31, 40, 375, 458
jazz 293
Judaism 395
Jung, Carl 49, 200-201, 211-212, 219-220, 287
Kamber, Rick 287
Kantian intuitions 505
Karma 443
Kerr’s solution for singularities 511
Khalatnikov power series expansion 513
Kierkegaard, 469, 524, 541
Klein, Felix 53, 59-60, 99
Klein’s Bottle 59-60
knock down arguments 33
Korsakoff’s syndrome 454, 463, 487-489, 514
Korsgaard, Christine 106
Kripke, Saul 142, 413, 521, 550
Krishnamurti, Jiddu 60, 220, 268-269, 271
K-sentences 101
Kuhn, Thomas 34
LaBerge, Stephen 104, 140
LaFollette, Hugh 140
Laing, R.D. 120, 200, 287
leap of faith (Kierkegaard) 524
Leibniz 407, 474
Levin, Michael 287
Levinson, Jerry 86-88
Lewis, C.I. 44
Lewis, David 146, 155, 300, 301
Lewis, H.D. 97
liberated will 291
Lie groups 394
Lifshitz power series expansion 513
Lifton, Robert 210
light cones 512-513
linear frame bundles 511
Local Open Individualism 241
localization functions 400
localization of phenomena 208, 538-540
Locke 41, 107, 168, 195, 446, 498
logic 13, 246
logical construction games 507
logical refutations 246
logicism 53
Logos 296
Logos 296
Lonergen 414
Lorenzen tableaus 507
Lucid Dream Analog 396
lucid dreams 108, 330, 377-391

MacKay, D.M. 148, 167
Mackie, J.L. 141, 299, 520-523, 536, 567-568
Mahayana Buddhism 395
Maimonides 41
Malcolm, Norman 96-97
manifold 487
manifolds 51-52, 232, 512
many worlds nonlocality 75-81, 474-475
Marcus, Ruth Barcan 550
Martin, Ray 287, 501
Marx, Karl 51, 102
Marxist dialectical materialism 574
mask of consciousness 234
Maslow, Abraham 200, 287
mathematically askew modalities 75-81
mathematico-logical explanation 513
mathematico-logical phenomenology 480-481
maximin strategy 578
MazeWar 530
memory 117, 261-265, 459, 493-514
metapsychology 18
metaphysical boundary 48, 60, 85
metaphysical capitalism 573-574
metaphysical identification 117
metaphysical individuation 117
metaphysical megalomania 533
metaphysical necessity 404
metaphysical reversal 255-257
metaphysical self-deception 287
metaphysical significance 3, 40
metaphysical subjectivism 99, 322-348
metaphysics of choice 396-397
metapsychological relativism 18
meta-quark 320-322
Meyers, Diana 287
Michael’s Closed Subspace Topology 513
Mill, John Stuart 565-566
Millikan, Ruth 287
mind-body image
Minkowski space 511
mirrors 303-304
Misner, Charles 511
Mittelstedt’s hidden variables 297
modus tollens 117
monads 321
monoperspectival manifolds 76
monophrenia 76
Moore, Henry 133
moral consciousness 105
moral consciousness 567-568
moral freedom 581-586
moral obligation 561-562
morning star 321
Mozart 104
multiperspectival open individual 239-240
multiperspectival space 75-81, 400
multiple personality disorder (MPD) 105, 111, 211, 240
multiplication of consciousness in quantum theory 136
mystical revelation 342
mysticism 108
Nagel, Thomas 147, 296, 355-356, 368, 515, 536-537
naive realism 342-343
national boundaries 125
necessary cause 315
Needy Visitors, the Case Of 561, 563, 567
nets 291
Neurological Borders 143-163
neurophysiology 145-146, 402
neuropsychological dissolve 145, 434
Newton 500
non-consequentialism 557
non-distributive modular lattice 297
Non-Local Open Individualism 241
nonlocality 72-75, 205, 212, 337
non-reductionism 358-359, 361-362
non-singular projectivity 295
noumenal ethics 581-586
Noumenal Self 14, (Rawls) 581-582
noumenal self choosing 584
Noumenal Subject 405, 396-412, 474, 487, 533, 540, 547
Novak Space 513
now 493-514
null space 294
nullteilig 53, 59, 99
O’Connor, John 141
object images 330, 456
object intuitions 51-55
objectification of the subject 100-101
obligation 561-562
obligation 561-652
occurent memories 297
omni-dissolve 268-276, 518, 521
On Liberty (Mill) 565-566
one point compactification 98
one-one 98
one-to-one mappings 292
onto 98
open answers 491
Open Capitalism 573-574
open dimension 239
Open Individualism 6-21, 93-95, 100
open utilitarianism 561-562
open world 481-487
open world nonlocality 75-81, 513
ordinary life dissolve 438-439, 488, 522
original position (Rawls) 576-578
orthocomplemented modular lattice 296
Pagels, Heinz 119-120
pantheism 14
pantheistic idealism 15, 40
paradigm shifts 34
paradox of the dreaming thinker 377-391
P-complexes 488
Peirce, Charles 98
perceptibles 413
persona 199-215
personal mechanics 559
personified psychological bundles 203-206
personology of appearances 457
perspectivality 470
perspectivities 294
personality 199-215
phantom identity 423-434
phantom limbs 296, 331
phenomenal mind 240-241
phenomenal object 330
Phenomenal Self 97, 396-412
Phenomenal World 396-412
phenomenalism 53
phenomenological black holes 474-481
phenomenological functions 393-396
phenomenological gap 434-435
phenomenological indexicals 501-514
phenomenological instantaneity 434
phenomenological necessity 76
phenomenological nothing 434-435
phenomenological quanta 430-431, 433, 447
phenomenological sense 398
phenomeno-psychological functions 235
philopath 597
philopathology 597
philosophical explanation 493
philosophical I 317, 399, 414
philosophical transcendence 396
philosophy of mathematics 53
philosophy of mind 53
phrenic amnesia 72-75
Physiological Borders 24, 110-114
physiological identification 114-122
Physiological Substance
  Boundary 110-114, 122
Physiological Substance Dissolve 122-127
Picasso 133
Plato 104
pleasure 562-563
P-matrices 487
P-matrix 486
point of convergence 232
political boundary dissolve 32
political symbols 33
positrons 134-135
primary identification 216-219
primordial position 578-581
principium individuationis 6
Principle of Equality 556-557
Principle of Impartial Benevolence (Sidgwick) 574-575
private personality 203-206, 226-228
privation of psychological essence 201
problem of other minds 88-91
problem of others persons 88-91
problem of personal non-identity 91-106
projection postulate 297
projective transformation 294
projectivities 294-295
proof 13
proprioception 331
psyche 317
Psychological Borders 25
psychological complexes 287-288
psychological criterion
psychological dissociation 207-219
psychological facts 242
psychological identification 114
psychological identity 240
psychological objects 217
psychological space 287-288
public personality 203-206, 226-228
single continuous individual assumption 7-12, 448
singleness 558-559
singularity theorems 470
sinn 412-423
Sizemore, Chris 259-260
skepticism 109
smart theories 140
socialism 561-562
Socrates 41
solipsism 88-91, 167, 522
solitaire chess 572-573
solitaire game theory 572-573
Solms, Mark 508
Soul Boundary 317-321
space and time 7, 8, 34, 51-52, 54, 57, 60, 62, 64, 187-188, 203-208, 225, 231
spacelike intuition of the subject 105
spacelike vs. timelike speech acts 99
spacetimeperson 502
Spangler, G.A. 140
spatial borders 178-181
Spatial Borders 25, 281-282, 286
especious present, 466
Sperry, R.W. 145-147, 167, 277
Spinoza 14
spirit 317
Stalnaker-Lewis semantics 142
Stone space 291
Stone-Cech compactification 52, 487
strangeness 53
Strawson, P.F. 45, 53, 99
stream of consciousness 25, 174-175
strong nonlocality 75-81
Strong Ultrafilter Topologies 513
subconscious 85, 105
subject 55-59, 100, 205-206, 219-222, 228, 398-399, 422, 529-531
subject-depth phenomenology 464
subjectivity 238-239
subjectivity of four dimensions 542
subjectless selves 454-455
subordinate alter 205
subgroup G of the Lorentz group 511
sufficient cause 315
suicide 598-601
Superego 600
superstrings 297
supervenience 542
survival 349-350, 370-374, 434-439
survival and identity assumption 7-12
survival353-360
Swinburne, Richard 41, 45, 82, 189, 550
system uncs 85, 105
Tang, Paul 140
Taub-NUT spaces 511-512
Taylor, Richard 304
teletransporter 174-178, 197, 301
tertiary identification 216-219, 222-223
Teyssier, Gaspard 97
Theory of Justice (Rawls) 566-571, 575, 581
Theravada Buddhism 395
thinking 414
to third Copernican revolution 336-348
INDEX

third order identification 216-219
Tholey, Paul 88, 104, 550-551
Thomson, Garrett 140
thought experiments 129-134
time 81-86
time-like intuition of the subject 105
time-invariance 486
time-point 295-296
time-travel 129, 134-138
Tolstoy, Leo 4
topology 97-98
Tractatus 53, 60, 97, 507, 537, 550
transcendent illusion 336-348
transcendental idealism 341-344
transcendental identity 400-401, 404
transcendental illusion 217, 336-348, 391-393, 558
transcendental knowledge 392-393
transcendental subject 14
Turing test, 105
Turing, Alan 105
two-brane Randall-Sundrum models 297
ultra filters 291
ultra nonlocality 513
ultra-strong nonlocality 75-81, 538-539
unbordred experience 442
unbounded freedom 220
unfriendly pathologies 217-218
Unger, Peter 40, 42, 102, 315-316, 374, 449, 510, 551
unhappy consciousness 55
uninterpreted intuitions 233
unity of apperception 458-459
unity of consciousness 147-148, 276-298
universal mind 437
Universal Self 13
univocality 559
unspeakable mode of being 396-412
Upanishads 506
user friendly illusions 217, 456
utilitarianism 561-566, 569-571
values 222-228
Van Atten, Mark 507, 510
Van Benthem, Johan 507
vanishing point 232
Van Wagenen, William 145
veil of ignorance (Rawls) 576-578
veil of wisdom 578-581
Velarde, Victor 551
Vendler, Zeno 520-523, 534-536
verdicatives 99
verificationism 400
Vesey, Godfrey 149
vessel of life (Wittgenstein) 522
Vhvelin, Kadri 141-142
via negativa 41, 94-95
View Domains 505
Views 393-396
visual attention 469-476
voice of God 217
von Neumann 298
weak modular identity 297
weak nonlocality 75-81
weak open individualism 76
Weltanschauung 507
wesensschau 234
Weyl tensor 297
Weyl, Hermann 234-235, 295-296
what matters 126-127, 323, 349-350, 359, 370-374
Wheeler, John Archibald 135-
136, 140, 486
White, Stephen 18
Whitman, Walt 436
Wiggins, David 155, 352-353
Wilkes, Kathleen 209-210, 258
Williams, Bernard 281-282, 359-360
Winston, Mort 287
wisdom (Brouwer) 441
Wolf, Susan 106
world (re)presentations
World Soul 13, 401-403
yā 514

Zeno’s paradox 506
zombies 63-67, 85-89

ε/δ manifold 216-219, 393, 426
ε/δ phenomenal spacetime manifold 405
κ-sentences 101, 610-621
κ terms 101, 610-621
Ț-theories 101, 610
Ț-theories 101, 610
ϒ-sentences 101
Φ, 489-514
Ω-sentences 101
ζ 63, 493, 514


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